PAPERS  OF 

THE  MILITARY  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY 
OF  MASSACHUSETTS 


CIVIL  WAR  AND  MISCELLANEOUS 
PAPERS 


CIVIL  WAR 
AND  MISCELLANEOUS  PAPEES 


PAPERS  OF 
THE  MILITARY  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY 

ii 

OF  MASSACHUSETTS 
VOL.  XIV 


THE  MILITARY  HISTORICAL  SOCIETY 

OF  MASSACHUSETTS 

CADET  ARMORY,  FERDINAND  STREET,  BOSTON 
1918 


CONTENTS 

I.  REPORT  ON  THE  ALLEGED  DELAY  IN  CON 
CENTRATION  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  POTO 
MAC  UNDER  McCLELLAN  AT  ANTIETAM,  AND 
THE  CAUSES  OF  THE  DELAY  OF  THE  SEC 
OND  ARMY  CORPS  IN  ENTERING  INTO  THE 

BATTLE  OF  ANTIETAM  .  , 1 

By  MAJOR  JOHN  C.  GRAY,  JR. 

II.  THE  ANTIETAM  CAMPAIGN 6 

By  MAJOR-GENERAL  SAMUEL  S.  SUMNER,  U.S.A.,  Re 
tired. 

III.  THE  TWELFTH   CORPS   AT  GETTYSBURG    ...      19 

By  COLONEL  CHARLES  F.  MORSE,  Second  Massachusetts 
Volunteers. 

IV.  THE  MINE  RUN  CAMPAIGN,  NOVEMBER,  1863     .      43 

By  COLONEL  THOMAS  L.  LIVERMORE,  Eighteenth  New 
Hampshire  Volunteers. 

V.   THE  MINE  RUN  AFFAIR 55 

By  CHARLES  L.  PEIRSON,  Colonel  Thirty-ninth  Massa 
chusetts  Volunteers  and  Brevet  Brigadier-General. 

VI.   THE  RELIEF  OF  CHATTANOOGA,  OCTOBER,  1863, 

AND  GUERRILLA  OPERATIONS  IN  TENNESSEE      65 
By  COLONEL  CHARLES  F.  MORSE,  Second  Massachu 
setts  Volunteers. 

VII.   PETERSBURG,  JUNE  15  — FORT  HARRISON,  SEP 
TEMBER  29:  A  COMPARISON 83 

By  GEORGE  A.  BRUCE,  Captain  Thirteenth  New  Hamp 
shire  Volunteers  and  Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel. 

VIII.   CEDAR  CREEK,  OCTOBER  19,  1864 117 

EXTRACT  FROM   LETTER  TO  COLONEL  BENJAMIN  W. 
CROWNINSHIELD  FROM  GENERAL  W.  H.  EMORY. 

IX.   THE  CAPTURE  AND  OCCUPATION  OF  RICHMOND    119 
By  COLONEL  GEORGE  A.  BRUCE. 


vi  CONTENTS 

X.    MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH      .     .     147 
By  MAJOR  JOHN  CHESTER  WHITE,  U.S.A.,  Retired. 

XI.   THE    EFFECT   OF    PRESIDENT   LINCOLN'S   RE 
ELECTION    UPON    THE    WANING   FORTUNES 

OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  STATES 207 

By  BREVET  MAJOR  HENRY  S.  BURRAGE. 

XII.   THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MANILA  IN  1898.     ...     233 
By    BRIGADIER-GENERAL    CHARLES  A.   WHITTIER, 
U.S.V. 

XIII.  FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS  AS  MANIFESTED 

IN  DIPLOMACY  AND  WAR 261 

By  MAJOR-GENERAL  E.  S.  OTIS,  U.S.A.,  Retired. 

XIV.  THE  VISIT  OF  THE  ALLIES  TO  CHINA  IN  1900    295 

By  CAPTAIN  HENRY  LEONARD,  United  States  Marine 
Corps. 

XV.   THE   NECESSITY   OF   A  BROADER  SYSTEM  OF 
MILITARY  INSTRUCTION  IN  THIS  COUNTRY, 

AND  OUR  MILITARY  POLICY 319 

By  MAJOR-GENERAL  LEONARD  WOOD,  Chief  of  Stuff, 
U.S.A. 

XVI.  THE  NAVAL  WAR  COLLEGE 341 

By  CAPTAIN  F.  E.  CHADWICK,  U.S.N. 

XVII.  THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH 3G1 

By  ANTHONY  J.  ABDY,  Commanding  Fifty-third  Bat 
tery,  Royal  Field  Artillery. 

XVIII.   A    JUDICIAL    VERSUS    A    MILITARY    SETTLE- 

MENT  OF  SOME  INTERNATIONAL  DISPUTES    405 
By  BRIGADIER-GENERAL  WILLIAM  CROZIER,  U.S.A. 

XIX.  THE   GEOMETRICAL   FACTOR   IN  NAPOLEON'S 

GENERALSHIP 423 

By  PROFESSOR  R.  M.  JOHNSTON. 

XX.   AMERICAN  TACTICS  IN  THE  PRESENT  WAR    .    435 
By  THOMAS  G.  FROTHING  HAM. 

INDEX  ,    459 


ILLUSTKATIONS,  MAPS,  AND  DIAGRAMS 

GETTYSBURG  —  BATTLE  ON  THE  RIGHT  AT  GULP'S  HILL,,  JULY 

2o  AND  3D,  1863 22 

MAP  SHOWING  ATTACK  ON  PETERSBURG,  AND  CAPTURE  OF  RICH 
MOND 144 

A  STUDY  IN  CONTRASTS ;_ 152 

SOME  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  OFFICIALS  AT  LIBBY  PRISON      .     .  180 

SOME  PRISONERS  OF  WAR  IN  "  LIBBY  PRISON,"  RICHMOND,  VA.  182 

PHOTOGRAPHS  OF  EXCHANGED  PRISONERS  OF  WAR  FROM  SOUTH 
ERN  PRISONS 204 

A  FAMILY  OF  FAMINE  SUFFERERS  IN  INDIA 204 

PLAN  OF  LADYSMITH 364 

U.S.S.  CONSTITUTION  (OLD  IRONSIDES) 437 

U.S.S.  NIAGARA 448 

DIAGRAMS   SHOWING  AMERICAN  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  DESIGN 

FOR  BIG  GUNS  IN  TURRETS  ALIGNED  OVER  THE  KEEL    .     .     .  451 

DIAGRAMS  OF  DECK  PLANS  SHOWING  ARRANGEMENTS  OF  TURRETS 

IN  MODERN  FIRST  LINE  DREADNOUGHTS   .  452 


REPORT   OF   MAJOR  JOHN  C.   GRAY,  JR. 

MAJOR  AND  JUDGE-ADVOCATE,  U.S.V. 

FOB  THE  COMMITTEE  ON  INVESTIGATION  ON  THE  ALLEGED 
DELAY  IN  CONCENTRATION  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE 
POTOMAC  UNDER  MCCLELLAN  AT  ANTIETAM, 
AND  THE  CAUSES  OF  THE  DELAY  OF 
THE  SECOND  ARMY  CORPS  IN 
ENTERING  INTO  THE  BAT 
TLE  OF  ANTIETAM 


Read  before  the  Society  April  10, 1876 


REPORT  OF  MAJOR  JOHN  C.  GRAY,  JR. 

ON  THE  ALLEGED  DELAY  IN  CONCENTRATION  OF  THE  ARMY  OP 

THE  POTOMAC  UNDER  MCCLELLAN  AT  ANTIETAM,  AND  THE 

CAUSES  OF  THE  DELAY  OF  THE  SECOND  ARMY  CORPS 

IN  ENTERING  INTO  THE  BATTLE  OF  ANTIETAM 

THE  battle  of  South  Mountain  was  fought  September  14, 
and  the  enemy  retreated  across  the  Antietam  Creek,  without 
making  any  attempt  to  stop  or  delay  pursuit,  except  that 
McLaws'  division  remained  to  occupy  and  cover  Maryland 
Heights. 

McClellan  reached  the  ground  on  the  east  of  the  Antietain 
on  the  15th  about  noon,  and  the  whole  army  (except  Frank 
lin's  command)  was  there  in  the  course  of  the  night ;  the  dis 
tance  from  South  Mountain  was  some  six  or  seven  miles.  The 
troops  certainly  could  have  been  all  on  the  ground  before 
midnight. 

McLaws  remained  in  Pleasant  Valley  till  the  afternoon  of 
September  16,  so  that  Franklin  could  not  have  quitted  his 
position  there. 

The  rest  of  the  army  was  or  could  have  been  in  position  to 
attack  on  the  morning  of  the  16th.  At  that  time  it  was  cer 
tain  that  a  large  body  of  the  enemy  was  detached  from  the 
main  army  at  or  near  Harper's  Ferry,  and  could  not  reach  it 
during  the  16th.  This  more  than  made  up  for  the  absence  of 
Franklin. 

There  seems  no  sufficient  reason  why  an  attack  was  not 
made  on  September  16.  There  was  plenty  of  time  to  recon 
noitre  the  ground.  The  other  reasons  given  by  General  Mc 
Clellan  were  that  the  troops  were  not  well  supplied  with 
rations,  and  had  expended  some  ammunition,  but  these  rea 
sons  he  does  not  seem  to  allege  with  any  great  strength. 


2  REPORT  OF  MAJOR  JOHN  C.   GRAY,  JR. 

As  to  the  attack  on  the  17th,  there  is  weight  in  Swinton's 
suggestion  that  neither  Hooker  nor  Mansfield  should  have 
crossed  the  day  before  battle,  as  it  served  merely  to  develop 
the  plan  of  attack. 

Hooker  and  Mansfield  being  over,  I  do  not  think  there  was 
any  fault  in  not  crossing  Sumner  over  that  night.  Franklin 
was  absent,  and  Sumner  might  have  been  needed  to  reen  force 
the  centre  and  left,  for  there  was  no  reserve.  If  Hooker  had 
not  attacked  so  recklessly,  but  had  been  more  deliberate  in 
his  advance,  Sumner  would  have  had  time  to  support  him. 

The  battle  could  have  been  fought  better  on  the  16th  than 
on  the  17th;  that  it  was  not,  was  mainly  McClellan's  fault. 

That  it  was  not  more  successful  on  the  17th  was  the  fault 
of  the  subordinate  generals,  partly  of  Hooker  and  Sumner, 
but  principally  of  Burnside. 

The  Chairman,  after  the  foregoing  report  was  read,  asked 
if  any  officer  present  could  speak  certainly  about  the  position 
of  the  troops,  with  which  he  served,  on  the  evening  of  the 
15th  of  September,  1862.  Colonel  Folsom  said  that  the  Sec 
ond  Corps  was  up.  General  Weld  said  that  the  Fifth  Corps 
was  up. 

A  letter  was  then  read  from  Colonel  Livermore  (who  was 
unavoidably  absent  from  the  meeting),  in  which  he  stated 
that  the  First  Division  of  the  Second  Corps,  to  which  he  be 
longed,  reached  Antietam  Creek  not  later  than  2  P.M.  Sep 
tember  15,  and  that  his  regiment,  the  Fifth  New  Hampshire, 
was  deployed  as  skirmishers  in  the  advance. 

Mr.  Ropes  said  that  he  differed  from  the  Report  of  the 
Committee  in  one  respect :  that  it  seemed  to  him  that  it  would 
have  been  better  if  General  Sumner's  Corps  had  crossed  the 
Antietam  very  early  on  the  morning  of  the  battle,  or  even  the 
night  before,  so  that  the  attack  might  have  been  made  si 
multaneously  by  the  three  corps. 

Major  Gray  said  that  General  Franklin  was  detained  in 


REPORT  OF  MAJOR  JOHN  C.  GRAY,  JR.  3 

Pleasant  Valley  by  McLaws  till  late  on  the  16th,  so  that  he 
did  not  arrive  till  noon  of  the  17th;  and  that  on  this  account 
Sumner  was  kept  back  some  hours  as  a  reserve,  until  the 
battle  was  fairly  begun.  He  further  said  that  the  way  in 
which  the  First  and  Twelfth  Corps  were  fought  by  General 
Hooker  was  most  injudicious,  and  that  their  early  exhaus 
tion  was  entirely  unnecessary. 

In  regard  to  the  operations  on  the  left  wing,  Mr.  Hopes 
said  that  General  Lowell  had  told  him  that  General  McClel- 
lan  sent  five  officers  to  General  Burnside  to  order  him  to 
move,  before  he  started.  General  Weld  said  that  he  heard 
General  McClellan  say,  at  the  time,  that  he  had  sent  all  the 
officers  he  had  to  start  Burnside. 


II 

THE  ANTIETAM   CAMPAIGN 

BY 

MAJORrGENERAL  SAMUEL  S.   SUMNER 
U.S.A.,  RETIRED 


Read  before  the  Society  January  2, 1917 


THE  ANTIETAM  CAMPAIGN 

IN  discussing  the  Antietam  campaign,  it  will  be  necessary 
to  go  back  several  weeks,  and  speak  of  the  movements  of  the 
Union  army,  previous  to  the  march  through  Maryland. 

General  Pope's  advance  toward  Richmond  was  attracting 
the  attention  of  General  Lee,  and  considerable  reenforce- 
ments  were  sent  from  his  army  to  check  Pope.  It  was  then 
determined  to  bring  the  whole  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  the 
support  of  Pope.  This  movement  at  once  relieved  General 
Lee  of  all  embarrassment,  and  allowed  him  to  concentrate 
his  entire  army  against  Pope,  with  the  great  advantage  of 
operating  on  interior  lines. 

General  McClellan  strongly  opposed  this  movement; 
whether  or  not  he  was  right,  is  still  a  matter  of  discussion 
among  military  writers.  At  all  events,  Pope  was  forced  back, 
and  was  in  full  retreat  when  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  finally 
came  on  the  field. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  mention  this  campaign  further. 
When  it  ended,  the  Union  army  was  in  the  defences  at  Wash 
ington,  and  the  Confederate  army  was  at  Manassas,  with  an 
open  door  in  any  direction  except  Washington.  It  is  easily 
seen  why  a  regular  investment  of  the  Capital  was  impracticable, 
so  the  rebel  authorities  determined  on  an  invasion  of  Mary 
land.  The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was  put  in  march  for 
Harper's  Ferry  and  the  fords  of  the  Potomac  in  that  vicinity. 

At  that  time  General  McClellan  was  in  Washington.  He 
was  still  the  nominal  commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac,  although  most  of  his  command  had  been  detached, 
and  were  under  the  control  of  General  Pope. 

Pope  was  relieved,  and  the  army  came  once  more  under  the 
command  of  McClellan. 


ANTIETAM  CAMPAIGN 


No  time  was  lost  in  the  advance  of  the  army  to  intercept 
and  give  battle  to  General  Lee,  who  had  invaded  Maryland 
by  way  of  Edwards'  Crossing,  while  a  force  under  Jackson 
was  sent  to  Harper's  Ferry  to  capture  the  garrison  of  ten 
thousand  men  occupying  that  place. 

The  army  under  McClellan  consisted  of  six  army  corps,  five 
brigades  of  cavalry,  and  an  artillery  reserve. 

The  corps  commanders  were  :  — 

General  Hooker  First  Corps 

General  Sumner1  Second  Corps 
General  Fitz  John  Porter      Fifth  Corps 

General  Franklin  Sixth  Corps 

General  Burnside  Ninth  Corps 

General  Mansfield  Twelfth  Corps 

General  Pleasonton  Cavalry 

General  Hayes  Reserve  Artillery. 

After  reaching  Frederick,  Maryland,  Lee  turned  north,  and 
with  part  of  his  army  passed  through  South  Mountain  Pass, 
presumably  to  invade  Pennsylvania;  in  fact,  his  cavalry  under 
Stuart  had  gone  as  far  as  York. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  moved  on  parallel  roads  con 
verging  at  Frederick.  Just  before  reaching  that  place  a  very 
important  document  was  found  in  an  abandoned  Confederate 
camp  ;  it  was  an  order  or  memorandum  from  Lee's  headquar 
ters  giving  an  outline  of  his  movements  and  affording  an 
opportunity  to  estimate  the  strength  of  his  army.  General 
McClellan  soon  obtained  possession  of  this  paper,  and  presum 
ably  profited  by  the  information  it  contained. 

The  movement  of  the  Union  army  was  so  rapid  that  Gen 
eral  Lee  was  forced  to  reoccupy  the  passes  in  the  mountains, 
until  he  could  concentrate  his  army. 

This  brought  on  the  engagements  at  Crampton's  Pass  and 
South  Mountain  Pass.  The  Union  troops  engaged  were  the 
1  Father  of  the  writer,  who  was  his  Aide-de-Camp.  (ED.) 


THE  ANTIETAM  CAMPAIGN  9 

Sixth  Corps  at  Crampton's,  and  the  First  and  Ninth  at  South 
Mountain. 

The  large  Second  Corps  was  in  reserve  north  of  Frederick. 
At  this  point  the  Twelfth  Corps  was  placed  under  the  control 
of  the  commander  of  the  Second  Corps,  and  remained  as  part 
of  his  command  until  the  close  of  the  campaign. 

It  may  be  well  to  say  here  that  perhaps  at  no  time  during 
General  McClellan's  connection  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
did  he  so  thoroughly  possess  the  confidence  of  the  army  as 
during  this  march  through  Maryland;  he  had  the  loyal  sup 
port  of  all  his  corps  commanders,  several  of  whom  were  close, 
personal  friends.  The  division  commanders  were  equally  loyal, 
and  the  rank  and  file  simply  worshipped  him;  certainly  no 
other  commander  ever  possessed  the  affection  of  the  army  to 
such  a  degree  as  "Little  Mac.'* 

General  Lee,  having  determined  to  give  battle,  hastened  to 
concentrate  his  widely  separated  army  at  Sharpsburg,  and 
General  McClellan,  anxious  to  strike  the  enemy,  pushed  his 
forces  through  the  several  mountain  passes,  and  placed  his 
army  along  Antietam  Creek.  The  First,  Second,  Ninth,  and 
Twelfth  Corps  were  in  position  on  the  evening  of  September 
15.  The  First  on  the  extreme  right,  the  Second  and  Twelfth 
in  the  centre,  and  the  Ninth  on  the  left.  The  natural  position 
would  have  been  the  Ninth  in  the  centre,  and  the  Second  and 
Twelfth  on  the  left,  as  the  First  was  a  part  of  Burnside's  com 
mand.  This  disposition  was  probably  made  to  give  General 
Hooker  full  control  on  the  extreme  right. 

The  16th  of  September  was  apparently  spent  in  reconnoi 
tring,  perhaps  to  give  time  for  the  Sixth  Corps  to  reach  the 
field  and  for  the  Fifth  Corps  to  take  its  position.  It  was  a 
day  vitally  important  to  Lee,  who  had  been  out-gen eraled  in 
the  matter  of  concentration,  and  his  army  was  widely  sepa 
rated. 

The  First  Corps,  under  Hooker,  crossed  Antietam  Creek 
on  the  afternoon  of  the  16th,  and  made  preparations  to  attack 


10  THE  ANTIETAM  CAMPAIGN 

the  left  flank  of  the  enemy.  Next  morning,  in  fact,  he  did  at 
tack  at  daylight  on  the  17th,  and  after  a  spirited  fight  was 
forced  to  withdraw. 

The  Twelfth  Corps  (Mansfield's)  crossed  during  the  night, 
but  apparently  was  not  in  position  to  move  with  Hooker; 
they  made  a  separate  and  independent  attack  and  forced  their 
way  as  far  as  the  Hagerstown  road,  near  the  Dunkard  Church. 

General  Sumner  had  orders  to  be  prepared  to  move  at  day 
light;  he  was  ready.  Sedgwick's  division  was  on  the  road,  and 
French's  division  was  ordered  to  follow.  Richardson's  division, 
for  some  reason,  was  held  back,  but  moved  after  considerable 
delay. 

The  artillery  could  be  heard  plainly  on  the  right,  and  Gen 
eral  Sumner  was  so  impressed  with  the  necessity  of  reaching 
the  field  of  battle  that  he,  personally,  rode  over  to  the  army 
headquarters  hoping  to  facilitate  the  movement  of  his  com 
mand.  After  waiting  about  an  hour  and  a  half  he  received  the 
order  to  move  at  7.20  A.M.  As  it  turned  out  these  were  valua 
ble  minutes. 

General  Sumner  accompanied  his  leading  division  (Sedg 
wick's).  He  supposed  he  was  marching  to  aid  Hooker  and 
Mansfield  in  a  successful  attack.  After  crossing  Aiitietam 
Creek,  he  was  met  by  General  Meade,  who  informed  him  of 
Hooker's  repulse,  and  he  found  the  Twelfth  Corps  in  a  pre 
carious  position.  This  placed  him  in  a  very  awkward  situation. 
If  he  halted  and  withdrew  the  Twelfth  Corps,  it  meant  a  virtual 
abandonment  of  the  attack  and  consequent  disarrangement 
of  the  plan  of  battle.  If  the  Twelfth  Corps  was  to  be  sup 
ported  in  its  advanced  position,  it  had  to  be  done  without  delay. 
He  decided  to  advance,  and  Sedgwick's  division  was  formed 
for  attack.  The  formation  was  in  three  lines  ;  presumably  with 
proper  intervals  on  the  start. 

At  this  time  Greene's  division,  of  the  Twelfth  Corps,  was 
holding  a  position  near  the  Dunkard  Church  on  the  Hagers 
town  pike.  In  moving  forward,  Sedgwick's  division  inclined 


THE  ANTIETAM  CAMPAIGN  H 

to  the  right  and  crossed  the  pike  a  short  distance  to  the 
north  of  the  church. 

At  this  point  General  Simmer  observed  that  French's  divi 
sion,  Second  Corps,  was  too  far  to  the  left,  and  not  in  position 
to  connect  with  Sedgwick;  he  sent  an  urgent  order  to  French 
to  make  a  vigorous  attack  in  order  to  aid  the  advance  of  the 
leading  division.  I  know  of  this  because  I  carried  the  order 
myself. 

On  crossing  the  pike,  Sedgwick  still  had  Greene's  division 
on  his  left ;  he  pushed  forward,  intent  on  turning  the  left  of 
the  enemy's  position,  which  was  the  prime  object  of  the  whole 
movement. 

Sedgwick's  attack  was  successful  on  the  start,  and  he  natu 
rally  kept  moving  forward.  Meanwhile,  General  Lee  actually 
denuded  his  right  flank,  to  hurry  reinforcements  to  his  endan 
gered  left;  it  was  the  opportune  arrival  of  this  force  (two 
divisions)  that  checked  Sedgwick  and  forced  him  to  withdraw. 

In  moving  forward,  the  second  and  third  lines  of  Sedgwick's 
division  gradually  closed  on  the  first  line.  It  was  the  duty  of 
brigade  commanders  to  preserve  proper  intervals,  but  there  is 
always  confusion  in  such  movements  when  under  fire,  and  the 
natural  instinct  of  the  men  is  to  close  together.  That  the  di 
vision  was  practically  closed  "  en  masse  "  when  assaulted  on 
its  left  flank,  is  probably  true,  and  for  this  reason  it  was  not 
able  to  make  the  fight  it  might  have  made  under  more  favor 
able  conditions.  But  Sedgwick's  division  was  not  the  only  com 
mand  that  suffered  from  flank  attacks  at  Antietam.  Hooker 
was  driven  back  by  an  attack  on  his  right  flank.  An  advance 
by  the  rebels  after  Sedgwick's  repulse  was  met  by  an  attack 
on  their  flank.  The  attempt  to  turn  Richardson's  left  flank 
was  successfully  met  by  the  Fifth  New  Hampshire,  and  finally 
Burnside  was  forced  back  by  an  attack  on  his  left  flank. 

General  French  was  already  engaged  with  the  enemy  when 
I  reached  him.  In  his  effort  to  move  forward  he  had  struck 
the  rebel  left  centre,  and  was  committed  to  that  part  of  the 


12  THE  ANTIETAM  CAMPAIGN 

field  during  the  entire  battle.  The  First  Division,  Second 
Corps  (Richardson's),  came  on  the  field  later  and  took  posi 
tion  on  the  left  of  French.  These  two  divisions  fought  through 
most  of  the  day,  and  were  the  most  successful  troops  on  the 
Union  side. 

I  have  gone  more  minutely  into  this  phase  of  the  battle,  be 
cause  the  handling  of  Sedg wick's  division  has  received  much 
attention  from  military  writers.  Viewed  by  the  light  of  sub 
sequent  knowledge  regarding  the  Confederate  line,  and  its 
heavy  reenforcement,  the  attack  by  a  single  division  may  be 
classed  as  extra  hazardous.  The  division  might  have  been 
halted  at  the  Hagerstown  pike,  where  its  left  flank  was  pro 
tected  and  put  on  the  defensive,  before  firing  a  shot.  It  would 
have  been  a  safe  and  cautious  move,  but  if  adopted,  meant 
a  suspension  of  the  turning  movement  for  which  the  Second 
Corps  had  been  sent  to  the  right  of  the  line.  Taking  a  gen 
eral  view  of  the  operations  on  the  right  of  the  Union  line,  the 
question  of  turning  the  left  flank  of  the  enemy  is  easily  de 
batable,  but  as  such  a  plan  was  decided  on,  all  the  troops  as 
signed  to  that  task  should  have  been  on  the  field  and  prepared 
to  act  in  concert;  as  the  attack  was  made,  the  several  corps 
followed  each  other  and  at  too  great  an  interval  to  be  of  mutual 
assistance. 

It  seems  strange  that  the  position  of  the  rebel  cavalry  and 
artillery  on  the  extreme  left  of  their  line,  should  not  have 
received  more  attention.  A  Union  cavalry  division,  with  its 
horse  batteries,  might  have  materially  aided  Hooker  in  his 
initial  attack  and  been  of  great  service  on  the  right  flank  dur 
ing  the  battle.  While  these  several  attacks  were  being  made 
on  the  right,  the  Sixth  Corps  (Franklin)  was  marching  from 
Pleasant  Valley ;  these  fresh  troops  were  ordered  to  the  right 
of  the  line,  the  advance  brigade  reaching  its  destination  before 
noon.  The  arrival  of  this  corps  assured  the  safety  of  the  right 
flank,  and  in  fact  afforded  another  opportunity  to  renew  the 
fight. 


THE  ANTIETAM  CAMPAIGN  13 

Franklin  favored  another  attack ;  Sumner  opposed  it,  and 
McClellan  finally  agreed  with  Sumner.  As  the  attempt  was 
not  made,  its  advisability  must  always  remain  an  open  ques 
tion.  Most  writers  agree  with  Franklin,  assuming  that  the 
rebel  left  was  in  bad  condition.  They  overlook  the  fact  that 
strong  reinforcements  had  been  sent  to  the  left  of  the  line ; 
that  Stuart  still  held  his  commanding  position  unmolested, 
and  that  Jackson  contemplated  an  aggressive  movement  dur 
ing  the  afternoon,  which  was  given  up  on  discovering  the 
heavy  concentration  of  artillery  on"  the  right  of  the  Union 
line.  This  does  not  show  extreme  weakness. 

The  fact  is,  Franklin  did  not  propose  to  attack  with  the 
entire  corps,  as  many  writers  indicate.  He  proposed  to  send 
two  brigades  of  Slocum's  division,  holding  the  remaining  bri 
gade  in  reserve.  His  plan  was  to  reoccupy  the  line  near  the 
Dunkard  Church,  which  had  been  fought  over  several  times 
and  finally  vacated  by  Greene's  division,  Twelfth  Corps.  As 
the  rebel  line  extended  a  considerable  distance  to  the  west 
of  the  church,  this  move  could  hardly  be  called  a  renewed 
effort  to  turn  the  enemy's  left. 

The  occupation  of  the  woods  about  the  Dunkard  Church 
simply  meant  an  advanced  position  in  front  of  the  rebel  line, 
and  in  view  of  the  unsatisfactory  conditions  on  the  right,  Gen 
eral  Sumner  was  wise  in  not  caring  to  risk  another  repulse. 

Keferring  to  this  incident  in  his  report,  General  McClellan 
says:  "General  Sumner,  having  command  on  the  right,  di 
rected  further  offensive  operations  to  be  postponed ;  as  the 
repulse  of  this,  the  only  remaining  corps  available  for  attack, 
would  peril  the  safety  of  the  whole  army."  l 

In  the  centre  the  fight  was  continued,  with  more  or  less 
severity,  all  through  the  day,  but  no  determined  effort  was 
made  to  pierce  that  part  of  the  Confederate  line. 

Let  us  now  turn  our  attention  to  the  left.  I  was  not  on  that 
part  of  the  field  during  the  battle,  and  can  only  speak  of  it 
1  27  W.  R.  61. 


14  THE  ANTIETAM  CAMPAIGN 

through  others.  Whatever  orders  may  have  been  issued,  it  is 
apparent  from  all  accounts  that  there  was  great  delay  in  the 
attack.  Much  time  was  lost  in  attempts  to  cross  the  bridge,  and 
no  effort  was  made  to  find  a  passable  ford  till  the  afternoon. 
Finally,  the  Ninth  Corps  made  a  successful  crossing,  and  were 
driving  the  enemy  toward  Sharpsburg,  when  they  in  turn  were 
assaulted  on  their  exposed  left  flank  by  Hill's  division  coining 
from  Harper's  Ferry,  and  forced  back  to  Antietam  Creek. 
This  ended  the  fighting  on  the  left.  It  would  appear  that  both 
wings  of  the  Union  army  met  the  same  fate  in  their  attempts 
to  turn  the  flanks  of  the  enemy. 

By  the  evening  of  September  17,  Lee  had  his  whole  avail 
able  force  on  the  field,  and  the  selected  position  had  not  been 
seriously  impaired ;  he  had  fought  hard  and  had  lost  many 
men,  and  a  considerable  part  of  his  army  were  incapable  of 
aggressive  action.  The  same  may  be  said  of  the  Union  army. 
Both  McClellan  and  Lee  contemplated  active  operations  the 
next  day.  Lee  was  dissuaded  from  attacking  McClellan  by 
Jackson  and  Longstreet,  and  McClellan  concluded  to  wait 
for  additional  troops  coming  from  Washington. 

On  the  night  of  the  18th,  the  rebel  army  withdrew  from 
Sharpsburg  and  crossed  the  Potomac,  unmolested.  This  ended 
the  campaign  in  Maryland. 

The  battle  of  Antietam  was  the  bloodiest  fight  in  a  single 
day  during  the  war.  The  rebels  lost  8000  men  or  more,  and 
the  Union  army  about  12,000.  It  was  fought  without  artificial 
protection  of  any  kind,  only  the  natural  lay  of  the  land  being 
used  for  advantage. 

Mr.  Ropes  says  in  his  book  that  "  Lee  had  lost  13  guns,  39 
colors,  and  upwards  of  15,000  stand  of  small  arms,  and  more 
than  6000  prisoners.  The  Federal  army  had  not  lost  a  gun 
or  a  color."  If  this  refers  to  the  entire  campaign,  the  loss  of 
10,000  Union  soldiers  at  Harper's  Ferry  should  be  included. 

As  McClellan's  army  remained  masters  of  the  field  of 
battle,  Antietam  can  be  classed  as  a  Union  victory,  but  I  have 


THE  ANTIETAM  CAMPAIGN  15 

never  heard  of  any  one  on  our  side  who  was  exactly  satisfied 
with  the  result,  except,  perhaps,  McClellan  himself. 

There  has  been  much  speculation  as  to  the  reason  for  Gen 
eral  Lee  making  a  stand  at  Sharpsburg.  The  assertion  has 
often  been  made  that  it  was  a  grave  military  mistake,  and 
would  have  ended  in  disaster  had  the  Union  army  been  more 
energetically  handled.  Of  course  this  is  pure  conjecture ;  no 
one  knows  what  might  have  happened ;  all  we  know  is  what 
did  happen,  —  but  the  advantage  of  selecting  Sharpsburg  is, 
perhaps,  more  apparent. 

The  rebel  army  had  invaded  Maryland,  a  purely  aggressive 
move  in  the  enemy's  country,  made  after  a  decisive  victory 
over  the  Union  army.  Now,  if  Lee  retreated  without  accept 
ing  battle,  the  Confederate  Government  would  lose  prestige, 
and  the  moral  of  his  army  would  be  seriously  impaired  ;  he 
could  not  afford  to  throw  away  the  fruits  of  the  summer  cam 
paign  ;  a  retreat  would  be  worse,  perhaps,  than  a  defeat. 

Whether  or  not  Sharpsburg  was  always  in  mind,  or  the 
result  of  changing  conditions,  is  not  known,  but  the  country 
about  Sharpsburg  was  favorable  for  a  defensive  line,  and 
General  Lee,  with  practised  eye,  placed  his  troops  to  greatest 
advantage ;  his  left  flank  rested  practically  on  the  Potomac, 
while  his  right  rested  on  Antietam  Creek;  reinforcements 
hurrying  to  the  field  came  up  behind  the  right,  and  along  the 
natural  line  of  retreat. 

Antietam  might  have  been  a  more  decisive  Union  victory; 
should  have  been  a  more  decisive  victory ;  but  it  was  no  walk 
over,  as  many  writers  have  claimed. 

When  one  reads  the  numerous  criticisms  on  the  handling 
of  the  Union  army  at  Antietam,  they  are,  perhaps,  inclined 
to  sum  up  the  evidence  in  this  wise :  Hooker  and  Sumner  were 
too  fast  on  the  right.  Burnside  too  slow  on  the  left.  McClel 
lan  too  undecided  in  the  centre. 

It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  Antietam  was  a 
Union  victory,  and  will  be  so  recorded  in  history.  That  the 


16  THE  ANTIETAM  CAMPAIGN 

victory  was  not  more  decisive  is  due  as  much  to  McClellan's 
lieutenants,  as  to  himself,  and  they  should  bear  their  share  of 
responsibility. 

McClellan  had  a  definite  plan  of  attack,  and  the  necessary 
instructions  were  given  presumably  on  time.  To  Hooker  was 
assigned  the  task  of  turning  the  left  flank.  To  Burnside,  the 
task  of  turning  the  right  flank.  Contingent  on  the  success  of 
these  movements,  an  attack  on  the  centre  was  to  be  made  with 
all  available  troops  on  hand. 

In  the  battle  under  discussion  it  is  questionable  whether 
two  small  corps  could  accomplish  the  work  assigned  them  on 
the  right,  but  it  is  obvious  that  the  two  corps  should  have 
attacked  together,  and  not  separately. 

As  McClellan  has  stated  that  Hooker  was  selected  for 
command  on  the  right,  it  is  presumed  that  General  Sumner's 
appearance  on  that  part  of  the  field  was  not  anticipated.  As 
the  exigencies  of  battle  took  him  to  the  right,  after  Hooker's 
troops  had  been  repulsed,  it  is,  perhaps,  unfortunate  that  he 
was  not  on  the  ground  and  his  corps  in  position  when  the 
battle  commenced. 

It  is  possible  that  McClellan  hoped  that  Hooker's  attack 
would  be  so  successful  as  to  enable  him  to  use  the  Second 
Corps  (which  had  come  through  the  Peninsula  campaign  with 
an  enviable  record,  and  had  in  no  way  been  mixed  up  with 
Pope's  defeat)  to  make  the  decisive  move  on  the  centre  of 
the  rebel  line. 

Regarding  the  left,  I  will  simply  copy  the  following  pas 
sage  from  McClellan's  report :  "  After  sending  General 
Burnside  several  orders  to  attack  I  directed  Colonel  Sacket, 
Inspector-General,  to  deliver  to  General  Burnside  my  positive 
order  to  push  forward  his  troops  without  a  moment's  delay, 
and,  if  necessary,  to  carry  the  bridge  at  the  point  of  the  bay 
onet,  and  I  ordered  Colonel  Sacket  to  remain  with  General 
Burnside  and  see  that  the  order  was  executed  promptly."  1 

i  27  W.  R.  63. 


THE  ANTIETAM  CAMPAIGN  17 

Planning  a  battle  is  one  thing  ;  having  it  properly  executed 
is  quite  another  matter.  History  is  full  of  examples  where  the 
wisest  plans  have  often  led  to  defeat  through  faulty  execution. 

I  have  attempted  only  a  sketch  of  the  Antietam  campaign, 
and  have  made  it  as  brief  as  possible  in  order  to  give  mem 
bers  an  opportunity  to  discuss  the  various  phases  of  this  pecu 
liarly  interesting  battle. 

In  order  to  facilitate  such  discussion,  I  will  enumerate  some 
of  the  principal  points ;  these  questions  are  not  put  in  the 
spirit  of  carping  criticism,  but  solely  as  military  problems :  — 

1st.  As  McClellan  had  four  army  corps  in  position  on 
Antietam  Creek  on  the  evening  of  September  15,  why  did  he 
fail  to  attack  Lee's  inferior  force  on  the  day  following  ? 

2d.  As  Burnside  commanded  the  right  wing,  First  and 
Ninth  Corps,  why  did  McClellan  place  Sumner's  command 
(the  Second  and  Twelfth  Corps)  between  the  First  and  Ninth 
Corps? 

3d.  As  McClellan  had  determined  that  Hooker  should  have 
entire  charge  of  operations  on  the  right,  and  had  promised 
him  the  Twelfth  Corps  in  addition  to  his  own  command,  why 
did  the  two  corps  not  move  together? 

4th.  The  Second  Corps  (Sumner's)  was  ordered  to  be  ready 
to  march  at  daylight,  but  required  additional  orders  to  move. 
Did  McClellan  expect  that  Hooker's  attack  would  be  so  suc 
cessful  as  not  to  require  the  assistance  of  the  Second  Corps  ? 

5th.  Having  determined  on  the  move  of  the  Second  Corps, 
why  did  McClellan  hold  back  the  First  Division  after  the 
corps  started? 

6th.  As  the  Twelfth  Corps  was  on  the  field,  why  did 
Hooker  make  his  attack  before  this  corps  was  in  position  to 
assist  ? 

7th.  The  Twelfth  Corps  having  failed  in  its  attack,  how 
did  the  Second  Division  (Greene)  manage  to  hold  its  position, 
unsupported,  near  the  Dunkard  Church  all  through  the 
varied  phases  of  the  battle  until  nearly  noon  ? 


18  THE  ANTIETAM  CAMPAIGN 

8th.  When  Sumner  reached  the  field  with  the  Second  and 
Third  Divisions  of  his  corps,  and  learned  that  the  First  Corps 
was  not  available  for  action,  and  that  the  Twelfth  Corps 
needed  immediate  support,  should  he  have  continued  the 
attack,  or  taken  up  a  defensive  position  and  withdrawn  the 
Twelfth  Corps  from  immediate  contact  with  the  enemy  ? 

9th.  When  Sedgwick's  division  crossed  the  Hagerstown 
pike,  Greene's  division,  Twelfth  Corps,  was  in  position  on  the 
left,  near  the  Dunkard  Church ;  why  was  Greene  unable  to 
protect  Sedgwick's  left  flank  ? 

10th.  When  Franklin's  Sixth  Corps  reached  the  right  of 
the  line,  should  he  have  been  ordered  to  renew  the  attack? 
In  case  he  attacked,  could  he  have  driven  the  enemy's  cav 
alry  and  artillery  from  their  detached  commanding  position 
on  the  extreme  left,  and  assaulted  Jackson's  reenforced  line, 
at  the  same  time  ? 

llth.  Why  was  the  left  of  the  rebel  line  considered  the 
most  advantageous  point  of  attack? 

12th.  Why  did  McClellan  concentrate  all  his  cavalry  be 
hind  the  centre,  instead  of  using  it  on  the  two  flanks  ? 

13th.  Was  it  intended  that  the  attacks  on  the  right  and 
left  should  be  simultaneous? 

14th.  Had  Burnside  made  a  determined  attack  in  the  early 
morning,  could  Lee  have  withdrawn  two  divisions  from  his 
right  and  sent  them  to  the  assistance  of  his  left  flank? 

Finally :  Had  McClellan  preserved  the  original  formation 
of  his  army  and  placed  the  First  and  Ninth  Corps  on  the 
right,  the  Twelfth  Corps  in  the  centre,  and  the  large  Second 
Corps  on  the  left,  would  his  plan  of  battle  have  been  more 
successful? 


Ill 

THE  TWELFTH  CORPS  AT  GETTYSBURG 

BY 

COLONEL  CHARLES  F.  MORSE 

SECOND  MASSACHUSETTS  VOLUNTEERS 


Read  before  the  Society  March  6,  1917 


THE  TWELFTH  CORPS   AT   GETTYSBURG 

GETTYSBURG  has  been  more  written  about,  historically  and 
otherwise,  than  any  other  battle  of  the  Civil  War,  and  it  is 
with  some  hesitation  that  I  have  ventured  to  add  another  con 
tribution  to  the  literature  on  this  interesting  subject.  I  have 
been  led  to  do  this  because,  in  most  of  the  historical  accounts 
of  the  battle,  it  has  seemed  to  me  that  sufficient  importance 
has  not  been  attached  to  the  critical  situation  on  the  extreme 
right  of  the  line  between  the  hours  of  seven  and  ten  in  the 
evening  of  July  2,  nor  to  the  fighting,  both  defensive  and 
offensive,  on  the  morning  of  July  3,  for  nearly  seven  hours, 
which  resulted  in  the  entire  success  of  our  troops  on  that 
portion  of  the  line. 

General  Meade  in  his  official  report  makes  the  briefest 
mention  of  the  part  taken  by  the  Twelfth  Corps  in  the  battle, 
and  made  several  serious  errors  as  to  the  facts.  When  his 
attention  was  called  to  what  seemed  to  be  omissions  and  mis- 
statements,  he  very  freely  admitted  that  he  had  not  given 
credit  where  it  belonged,  and  in  February,  1864,  he  made  an 
amended  statement  which  to  a  certain  extent  corrected  his 
original  report.  Later  on,  extracts  from  these  reports  will  be 
given. 

What  occurred  on  the  right  made  a  vivid  impression  on 
me  at  the  time,  as  the  events  were  all  within  a  comparatively 
small  compass,  close  at  hand,  and  the  margin  seemed  very 
narrow  between  possible  great  disaster  and  the  success  which 
was  ultimately  attained. 

In  the  pursuit  of  facts  connected  with  these  occurrences,  I 
have  examined  official  reports  and  other  sources  of  informa 
tion,  and  while  these  contain  many  discrepancies  in  their  state 
ments,  I  have  gathered  from  them  what  seemed  essential  for 


22  THE  TWELFTH  CORPS  AT  GETTYSBURG 

a  consistent  story  of  the  happenings  on  the  right  of  the  line 
at  Gettysburg. 

The  Twelfth  Corps,  commanded  by  Major-General  H.  W. 
Slocum,  reached  Two  Taverns,  on  the  Baltimore  pike,  about 
two  miles  from  Gettysburg,  toward  four  o'clock  in  the  after 
noon  of  July  1.  At  that  time  the  battle  of  the  First  and 
Eleventh  Corps  with  the  advance  of  Lee's  army  was  nearly 
over,  and  the  troops  of  those  commands  had  retreated  through 
Gettysburg  and  were  taking  position  on  Cemetery  Hill. 

Hancock  had  reached  the  field  and  had  assumed  command. 
He  extended  the  line  to  the  right,  with  Wadsworth's  division 
of  the  First  Corps,  and  took  possession  of  a  portion  of  Gulp's 
Hill. 

From  Two  Taverns,  where  the  Twelfth  Corps  had  halted 
along  the  pike,  the  batteries  on  Cemetery  Hill  could  be  seen 
plainly,  standing  out  against  the  sky-line,  and  there  was  still  a 
brisk  cannonading  going  on  from  there.  After  a  short  halt 
the  corps  was  moved  to  the  right  across  country  east  of  Rock 
Creek,  until  it  faced  a  slope  toward  Benner's  Hill,  where  the 
line  was  halted  and  deployed  with  skirmishers  in  front.  The 
country  here  was  open,  and  mounted  officers  of  the  enemy 
could  be  seen  on  the  high  ground  apparently  examining  the 
position. 

Nothing  occurred  on  the  line  there  formed,  and  in  the  dusk 
of  the  evening  the  corps  was  moved  a  short  distance  to  the 
rear,  where  it  remained  that  night  behind  a  strong  picket 
line. 

The  next  morning,  July  2,  there  was  some  skirmishing 
with  the  enemy  along  the  front,  but  no  engagement  in  force 
while  in  that  position.  That  morning  General  Slocum  re 
ceived  a  written  order  from  General  Meade  to  take  command 
of  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Corps  in  addition  to  his  own,  and 
Brigadier-General  A.  S.  Williams,  the  commander  of  the 
First  Division,  was  also  ordered  by  General  Meade  to  take 
temporary  command  of  the  Twelfth  Corps. 


GETTYSBURG 

Battle  on  the  Right 

at  Gulp's  Hill 

July  2nd  and  3rd  1863 


THE  TWELFTH  CORPS  AT  GETTYSBURG          23 

Soon  afterwards  the  latter  corps  was  marched  to  the  Balti 
more  pike  and  across  Rock  Creek  towards  Gettysburg.  The 
First  Division,  now  under  command  of  Brigadier-General 
Thomas  Ruger,  took  up  a  position  which  became  the  extreme 
right  of  the  battle  line  at  Gettysburg.  The  Second  Division, 
Brigadier-General  Geary,  was  at  first  placed  in  rear  of  the 
Fifth  Corps,  which  had  gone  to  the  left  to  connect  with  the 
Third  Corps,  but  a  little  later  was  moved  to  the  right,  where 
it  took  up  a  position  on  the  left  of  Ruger,  connecting  on  its 
left  with  Wads  worth's  division  of  the  First  Corps  and  com 
pleting  the  occupation  of  Gulp's  Hill. 

The  line  now  occupied  by  the  Twelfth  Corps  was  very 
strong  naturally,  and  was  a  strictly  defensive  position. 

Gulp's  Hill  is  a  prominent  eminence  rising  from  the  Rock 
Creek  valley,  called  by  General  Edward  Johnson,  in  his  re 
port  of  the  battle,  a  "  mountain  " ;  all  of  the  hill  was  very 
rough  and  rocky,  covered  thickly  then  with  good-sized  second- 
growth  oaks  and  other  hardwood  trees,  at  that  time  in  their 
thickest  foliage.  From  Wadsworth's  right  Geary's  line  fol 
lowed  the  crest  of  the  ridge,  about  as  shown  on  the  map; 
Greene's  Third  Brigade  being  on  the  extreme  left,  then 
Kane's  Second  Brigade,  and  on  the  right  Colonel  Candy's 
First  Brigade,  which  connected  with  the  First  Division.  The 
First  Brigade  of  the  latter  division,  commanded  by  Colonel 
McDougall,  was  formed  along  the  same  rocky  ridge  in  two 
lines,  but  not  far  from  his  right  the  ridge  terminated  and  the 
hill  fell  off  abruptly  to  what  is  called  in  many  of  the  reports 
the  "  swale."  This  formation  of  ground  did  not  permit  of  the 
entire  Third  Brigade,  commanded  by  Colonel  Colgrove,  being 
formed  on  the  high  ground,  so  a  part  of  it  was  placed  on  the 
rocky  hill  which  rose  from  the  south  side  of  the  swale,  the 
same  general  line  being  continued.  This  so-called  swale  was 
a  low,  flat  meadow,  about  a  hundred  yards  wide,  between  the 
two  rocky,  wooded  hills.  Through  this  swale  trickled  a  small 
stream,  at  that  time  nearly  dry,  which  flowed  into  Rock  Creek, 


24  THE  TWELFTH  CORPS  AT  GETTYSBURG 

On  the  right  of  Ruger's  Third  Brigade,  and  nearly  at  right 
angles  to  it,  Lockwood's  brigade  of  three  regiments,  which  had 
just  been  attached  to  the  Twelfth  Corps,  continued  the  line  to 
the  Baltimore  pike. 

In  front  of  this  strong  position,  at  varying  distances,  was 
Rock  Creek,  flowing  generally  in  a  southeasterly  direction,  a 
sluggish  stream  fordable  in  front  of  Geary's  division,  but  in 
Ruger's  front,  where  it  was  affected  by  the  dam  of  McAllis 
ter's  mill  near  where  the  stream  crossed  the  pike,  it  was  five 
or  six  feet  deep  with  a  muddy  bottom  and  fifty  feet  or  more 
wide.  The  hill  on  the  south  side  of  the  swale,  occupied  by  a 
part  of  Colgrove's  brigade,  was  commanded  by  Wolf  Hill,  also 
very  rough  and  rocky,  on  the  east  side  of  Rock  Creek ;  but 
this  hill  was  regarded  as  inaccessible  for  artillery,  and  as  a 
matter  of  fact  was  never  occupied  by  the  enemy  at  any  time 
during  the  battle. 

As  soon  as  the  troops  of  the  Twelfth  Corps  were  in  posi 
tion,  they  were  ordered  to  construct  breastworks.  This  was 
done  effectively,  especially  in  the  front  of  Greene's  brigade  on 
the  left,  where,  with  the  foresight  and  skill  shown  at  all  times 
by  that  officer,  he  not  only  protected  his  front  by  a  breast 
work  of  logs,  but  also  constructed  a  traverse  at  about  right 
angles  to  his  line,  to  cover  his  flank.  This  traverse  was  an 
important  factor  in  the  defence  of  that  part  of  the  line.  All 
of  Greene's  breastworks  were  surmounted  by  head  logs  which 
gave  almost  complete  protection  to  the  men  while  firing.  In 
addition  to  the  breastworks  along  the  entire  front  of  the 
Twelfth  Corps,  there  was  a  heavy  stone  wall  parallel  to  the 
line  of  McDougall's  brigade  and  about  forty-five  yards  in  rear 
of  it,  in  which  he  established  his  second  line.  On  the  right  of 
the  swale,  rather  light  breastworks  were  constructed,  facing 
Rock  Creek  on  the  east  and  the  swale  on  the  north.  The  artil 
lery  brigade,  consisting  of  one  Pennsylvania  and  two  regular 
batteries,  was  on  high  ground,  on  the  west  side  of  the  pike  in 
rear  of  the  First  Division. 


THE  TWELFTH  CORPS  AT  GETTYSBURG          25 

It  will  be  well  here  to  recall  to  mind  briefly  the  general 
formation  of  Meade's  battle  line,  as  finally  established.  This 
line  is  best  described  as  being  in  the  form  of  a  fish-hook.  The 
Twelfth  Corps  on  the  right,  with  its  general  front  to  the  east, 
formed  the  point  of  the  hook.  Next  came  Wadsworth's  divi 
sion  of  the  First  Corps,  extending  from  Gulp's  Hill  along  the 
ridge  curving  to  the  left  and  facing  northeasterly.  Next  the 
Eleventh  Corps  on  Cemetery  Hill,  facing  Gettysburg  on 
the  north,  with  the  other  two  divisions  of  the  First  Corps  in 
its  rear.  The  Second  Corps  was  on  the  left  of  the  Eleventh, 
forming  the  centre  of  the  line ;  then  came  the  Third  Corps, 
with  the  Fifth  Corps  on  the  left  of  the  line  extending  to  the 
Round  Tops.  The  last  three  corps  formed  the  shank  of  the 
hook  and  they  faced  west.  The  Sixth  Corps  was  in  reserve 
and  in  rear  of  the  Fifth  Corps. 

From  the  position  of  the  Twelfth  Corps,  in  an  air  line  across 
to  the  Second  Corps,  was  hardly  a  mile,  and  the  entire  line  of 
battle  measured  less  than  four  miles.  The  country  about  the 
Round  Tops  was  thickly  covered  with  woods,  but  other  parts 
of  the  line  to  the  left  of  Wadsworth's  division  were  in  open 
country.  The  area  inside  of  the  line  was  mostly  open  fields 
with  small  farmhouses  and  other  buildings  dotted  about. 

Throughout  the  day  of  July  2  very  little  occurred  to  dis 
turb  the  movement  of  troops  into  their  positions  and  the  prep 
arations  for  defence.  It  was  not  until  about  four  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon  that  Longstreet  made  a  furious  attack  on  the 
Third  Corps,  which,  by  the  ill-advised  movement  of  General 
Sickles,  had  advanced  to  a  position  beyond  that  assigned  to  it 
by  General  Meade.  From  the  right  of  the  Twelfth  Corps  there 
was  a  clear,  unobstructed  view  across  the  open,  intervening 
country,  and  with  the  first  of  the  firing  the  non-combatants 
could  be  seen  streaming  out  of  the  woods  on  the  left.  The  roar 
of  artillery  and  the  crackle  of  the  infantry  fire  seemed  very 
near,  and  with  these  sounds  of  battle  came  the  unceasing  rebel 
yell.  Wounded  men  could  be  seen  going  to  the  rear,  and 


26  THE  TWELFTH  CORPS  AT  GETTYSBURG 

ambulances  were  making  rapid  trips  between  the  front  and 
the  field  hospitals.  In  the  open  fields  west  of  the  Baltimore 
pike,  in  rear  of  our  lines,  were  the  parks  of  ammunition  trains 
and  headquarters  wagons  with  their  hundreds  of  mules  and 
attendants  of  all  kinds  that  always  gather  about  a  wagon 
camp.  Near  this  camp  was  the  park  of  the  reserve  artillery, 
also  west  of  the  pike,  and  as  the  battle  went  on,  batteries  were 
frequently  detached  and  went  bounding  away  to  the  support 
of  the  fighting  line,  with  their  horses  at  full  run. 

When  the  uproar  of  battle  was  at  its  height,  about  6  P.M., 
and  disaster  seemed  to  threaten,  General  Meade  ordered  the 
entire  Twelfth  Corps  to  reenforce  the  left.  Orders  were  given 
to  this  effect  by  General  Slocum,  but  he  took  the  responsibil 
ity  of  leaving  Greene's  brigade  on  the  left  of  the  corps  in  its 
position,  with  instructions  to  General  Greene  to  occupy  with 
his  brigade  the  vacated  intrenchments  of  the  corps. 

Lockwood's  brigade  led  the  advance  of  the  Twelfth  Corps, 
followed  by  the  two  brigades  of  the  First  Division.  General 
Williams  going  with  Colonel  Lockwood  to  direct  the  move 
ment. 

The  order  to  General  Geary  to  follow  the  First  Division 
was  given  personally  by  General  Slocum,  who  says  in  his  offi 
cial  report,  "  The  two  brigades  of  the  Second  Division,  under 
Brigadier-General  Geary,  by  some  unfortunate  and  unaccount 
able  mistake,  did  not  follow  the  First  Division,  but  took  the 
road  leading  to  Two  Taverns,  crossing  Rock  Creek." 1  Geary 
claims  that  he  did  not  know  the  object  of  this  move  and  that 
the  First  Division  was  out  of  sight  when  he  started.  Consider 
ing  that  a  fierce  battle  was  raging  at  the  time  and  that  there 
were  many  indications  that  the  forces  engaged  were  needing 
help,  it  did  not  show  much  of  a  soldier's  instinct  to  take  a  road 
leading  to  the  rear  and  follow  it  for  about  two  miles  before 
halting. 

General  Williams  in  his  official  report  says,  "The  First 
1  43  W.  R.  759. 


THE  TWELFTH  CORPS  AT  GETTYSBURG          27 

Division  marched  under  heavy  artillery  fire  in  the  direction 
of  heaviest  firing." 1  This  took  the  division  across  fields  and 
byways  in  a  generally  direct  line.  As  it  approached  the  firing 
line,  shells  were  continually  bursting  overhead  and  there  was 
the  general  noise  of  battle,  but  the  devilish  rebel  yell  was 
subsiding,  which  seemed  to  indicate  that  the  enemy's  advance 
was  checked.  When  near  the  front,  General  Williams,  who 
was  with  Lockwood's  brigade,  was  met  by  Major  McGilvery, 
commanding  the  First  Volunteer  Brigade,  Reserve  Artillery, 
who  told  him  that  his  batteries  were  without  support  and 
threatened  by  the  enemy's  infantry  in  the  woods  in  front, 
where  it  had  just  retired,  carrying  several  of  his  guns.  Lock- 
wood  deployed  his  force,  advanced  into  the  woods,  and  recap 
tured  three  of  the  guns,  which  the  enemy  abandoned  in  their 
retreat.  Ruger,  with  his  First  and  Third  Brigades,  deployed 
in  two  lines  and  pushed  into  the  woods  farther  to  the  left, 
but  did  not  become  engaged  with  the  enemy. 

It  was  now  quite  dark,  firing  on  the  left  —  except  scatter 
ing  shots  — had  ceased,  and  soon  afterwards  orders  were  given 
for  the  First  Division  to  return  to  its  position  on  the  right. 

Greene's  brigade,  it  will  be  remembered,  had  remained  in 
its  position  on  the  left  of  the  Twelfth  Corps,  with  instructions 
to  occupy  the  entire  line  of  intrenchments  vacated  by  the 
movement  of  the  other  troops  of  the  corps. 

It  is  doubtful  whether  any  brigade  commander  in  the  army 
was  better  qualified  to  discharge  the  duties  in  the  situation 
which  now  developed  than  General  George  S.  Greene.  He 
had  proved  his  worth  at  Cedar  Mountain,  Antietam,  and 
Chancellorsville  ;  in  each  of  these  battles  he  had  rendered  dis 
tinguished  service.  He  was  a  grim  old  fighter,  modest  as  he 
was  brave,  gentle  and  courteous  in  his  manner  both  to  supe 
riors  and  subordinates ;  he  had  the  respect  and  confidence 
of  all. 

It  was  quite  dark  in  the  woods  at  seven  o'clock,  when,  by 
i  43  W.  R.  774. 


28  THE  TWELFTH  CORPS  AT  GETTYSBURG 

his  report,  his  right  regiment  moved  into  the  intrenchments  of 
Kane's  brigade.  Just  as  this  movement  was  about  completed, 
a  furious  attack  was  made  along  his  picket  line,  which  was 
driven  in. 

This  was  the  advance  of  General  Edward  Johnson's  divi 
sion  of  E well's  Corps,  and  the  troops  engaged  in  this  attack 
were  mostly  those  of  Jones',  Nichols',  and  Steuart's  brigades. 
When  General  Greene  first  received  orders  to  occupy  the 
intrenchments  to  his  right,  he  called  on  General  Wads  worth 
and  the  Eleventh  Corps  for  reinforcements  and  received  two 
regiments  from  each  of  these  commands,  about  as  this  attack 
began.  The  enemy  soon  extended  his  left  beyond  the  right 
flank  of  the  regiment  sent  into  Kane's  intrenchments,  so  it 
was  withdrawn  and  placed  in  the  traverse  which  Greene  had 
so  wisely  planned  that  morning  and  which  now  served  a  most 
useful  purpose.  Attack  succeeded  attack,  but  they  were  mostly 
directed  against  the  strongest  parts  of  Greene's  line  and  they 
failed  to  break  it  at  any  point. 

The  enemy  did,  however,  take  possession  of  all  of  the  in 
trenchments  vacated  by  the  Twelfth  Corps,  except  those 
beyond  the  swale.  General  Greene  reports  that  the  attacks 
ceased  about  ten  o'clock,  after  steady  fighting  for  about  three 
hours.  His  men  had  the  great  advantage  of  being  behind  well- 
constructed  breastworks,  and,  while  there  were  many  casual 
ties  that  night,  the  loss  on  our  side  was  small  compared  with 
that  of  the  enemy,  who  was  in  largely  superior  force. 

The  period  from  seven  until  ten  o'clock  that  evening  was 
a  very  critical  one  for  Meade's  army,  and  the  enemy  failed  to 
take  advantage  of  a  great  opportunity.  After  the  departure  of 
the  Twelfth  Corps  there  was  nothing  to  obstruct  the  march 
of  a  part  of  Johnson's  troops  to  the  Baltimore  pike,  through 
the  position  which  had  been  occupied  by  the  First  Division, 
which  would  have  placed  this  force  practically  in  the  rear  of 
the  whole  Union  army  and  across  its  main  line  of  retreat. 

There  are  many  evidences  of  the  absence  of  any  enterpris- 


THE  TWELFTH  CORPS  AT  GETTYSBURG  29 

ing  commander  of  the  Confederates  from  a  close  touch  with 
the  situation  that  night.  Johnson  had  four  brigades  in  his 
division,  two  of  them  well  up  by  seven  o'clock  that  evening ; 
the  other  two,  Walker's  and  Nichols',  not  far  behind.  If, 
after  driving  in  Greene's  pickets  and  getting  possession  of 
Kane's  breastworks,  he  had  continued  a  strong  demonstration 
against  Greene's  line,  but  had  not  centred  his  main  attack 
there,  he  could  have  pushed  on  a  few  hundred  yards  farther 
across  the  pike  with  one  or  more  brigades  and  would  have 
been  in  a  position  to  cause  a  demoralizing  panic  in  the  wagon 
trains,  with  a  rebel  yell  and  a  few  volleys.  At  this  hour,  be 
tween  eight  and  nine  in  the  evening,  there  were  no  troops 
within  a  mile  that  could  readily  have  been  detached  to  this 
scene  of  disaster  and  the  advantages  would  all  have  been 
with  the  Confederates. 

I  have  been  led  to  these  speculations  as  to  what  might  have 
happened,  by  statements  in  some  of  the  Confederate  reports 
and  miscellaneous  papers,  which  convey  the  impression  that 
those  high  in  command  did  not  understand  the  situation  that 
night  or  it  would  have  been  taken  advantage  of. 

Stonewall  Jackson  had  a  way  of  always  being  near  the 
advance  of  his  troops  in  any  important  movement,  and  knew 
when  and  where  to  strike  effectively ;  if  he  had  been  with  his 
old  command  that  night,  the  result  might  have  been  very  dif 
ferent. 

However,  we  escaped  the  peril  which  was  so  near,  and  steps 
were  speedily  taken  to  mend  the  break  in  our  line.  General 
Greene  relates  that  General  Kane,  after  marching  to  the  rear 
with  General  Geary,  heard  the  sound  of  fighting  in  the  lines 
which  he  had  left,  and  tried  to  learn  the  nature  of  this  move 
ment  toward  Two  Taverns  and  what  was  the  proposed  des 
tination.  Kane  was  a  fiery  fighter,  a  brother  of  Dr.  Kane, 
the  Arctic  explorer,  and  not  the  kind  of  man  to  march  to  the 
rear  when  there  was  fighting  going  on  at  the  front.  Not  being 
satisfied  with  what  he  could  learn,  he  countermarched  on 


30  THE  TWELFTH  CORPS  AT  GETTYSBURG 

his  own  responsibility,  and  got  back  to  near  his  old  position 
about  ten  o'clock.  On  attempting  to  go  to  his  former  line,  he 
was  fired  on  by  the  enemy's  pickets,  and  General  Greene, 
hearing  the  firing,  sent  a  staff  officer  to  conduct  him  along 
the  Baltimore  pike  to  a  position  in  rear  of  his  own  brigade. 

The  situation  on  the  left  had  been  so  absorbing  that  appar 
ently  but  little  was  known  of  the  occurrences  on  the  right 
until  the  fighting  was  all  over.  It  was  probably  between  nine 
and  ten  o'clock  when  the  First  Division  began  its  march  to 
its  old  position  on  the  right,  the  Third  Brigade  being  in  the 
advance.  It  was  a  clear  night,  with  a  full  moon,  but  the 
march  was  slow,  as  much  of  it  was  across  country,  and  it  was, 
perhaps,  between  ten  and  eleven  o'clock  when  the  advance  of 
the  division  crossed  the  Baltimore  pike.  The  Thirteenth  New 
Jersey  and  Twenty-seventh  Indiana  filed  through  the  woods 
into  their  intrenchments  to  the  right  of  the  swale,  and  the 
Second  Massachusetts,  which  followed  the  Twenty-seventh 
Indiana,  started  to  cross  it. 

At  this  time  General  Ruger,  who  had  become  suspicious, 
sent  orders  to  Colonel  Colgrove  to  throw  out  skirmishers  be 
fore  proceeding  farther.  This  order  was  passed  to  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Mudge,  commanding  the  Second  Massachusetts,  and 
a  small  squad  of  men  was  sent  forward,  which  returned  in  a 
few  minutes  with  a  single  rebel  prisoner.  The  regiment  was 
then  formed  in  line,  facing  the  woods  beyond  the  swale,  and 
a  full  company  was  sent  out,  which  went  across  the  swale  and 
returned  soon  after  with  twenty-three  more  prisoners  who  were 
gathered  up  not  far  from  Spangler's  Spring;  they  all  had  can 
teens  and  appeared  to  be  straggling  about  looking  for  water. 
Thus  far  there  had  been  nothing  to  indicate  how  much  of  a 
force  there  was  in  the  woods  beyond  the  swale,  and,  to  deter 
mine  this  more  definitely,  Colonel  Mudge  moved  his  regiment 
forward  to  the  other  side,  halting  on  the  edge  of  the  woods.  He 
then  ordered  Captain  Fox,  with  his  Company  K,  to  push  for 
ward  through  the  woods,  up  the  hill,  and  find  out  what  was  there. 


THE  TWELFTH  CORPS  AT  GETTYSBURG          31 

I  was  major  of  the  regiment  at  that  time,  and  was  directed 
by  Colonel  Mudge  to  go  with  Captain  Fox  and  bring  a  report 
to  him  when  the  situation  had  been  developed.  The  woods 
were  so  dark  that  it  was  impossible  to  distinguish  anything 
more  than  a  few  yards  ahead,  and  the  way  was  rough  and 
rocky. 

After  proceeding,  perhaps,  one  hundred  and  fifty  yards,  it 
became  evident  that  we  were  approaching  a  considerable  body 
of  men,  but  as  it  had  been  intimated  that  some  of  our  own 
people  might  be  in  the  woods,  Captain  Fox  quietly  halted  his 
company  and  sent  two  of  his  men  forward  to  make  inquiry. 
They  went  on  in  an  ordinary,  careless  way  some  twenty  yards, 
and,  when  in  close  contact  with  this  unknown  force,  called  out 
the  usual  formula  on  such  occasions,  "What  regiment,  boys?" 
The  answer  came,  "  Twenty-third  Virginia,"  followed  by  the 
exclamation,  "  Why,  they  're  Yanks,"  and  a  slight  scuffle,  after 
which  one  of  these  men  came  hustling  back ;  the  other  remained 
with  his  captors. 

No  shot  was  fired  and  no  aggressive  movement  was  made 
on  the  part  of  the  enemy.  It  still  seemed  possible  that  this 
was  not  an  organized  force  in  our  front,  and,  to  settle  this  ques 
tion  beyond  a  doubt,  Captain  Fox  ordered  his  company  forward 
without  concealment.  There  was  an  almost  immediate  chal 
lenge,  to  which  Captain  Fox  responded,  "  Surrender !  Come 
into  our  lines."  The  answer  to  this  was  sharp  and  clear,  "Bat 
talion,  ready,  Fire ! "  and  the  fire  came  from  quite  a  long, 
scattering  line,  but  did  little  damage,  as  Captain  Fox's  com 
pany  was  on  a  much  lower  level  and  the  bullets  went  over  their 
heads ;  two  men  only  were  wounded. 

The  company  retired  down  the  hill  and  the  situation  was 
reported  to  Colonel  Mudge,  who  moved  his  regiment  back 
across  the  swale,  and  was  then  ordered  by  Colonel  Colgrove 
to  place  it  on  the  left  of  the  Twenty-seventh  Indiana,  the 
Third  Wisconsin  being  on  its  left.  In  this  position  the  Thir 
teenth  New  Jersey  faced  Kock  Creek,  the  remainder  of  the 


32  THE   TWELFTH  CORPS  AT  GETTYSBURG 

brigade  facing  the  swale  and  the  woods  beyond.  The  First 
Brigade,  when  it  came  up,  finding  the  enemy  in  its  breast 
works,  extended  the  line  to  the  left,  but  at  a  considerable 
angle,  facing  the  swale  in  a  more  easterly  direction. 

Lockwood's  brigade  was  placed  on  the  west  side  of  the  pike 
to  support  the  artillery  of  the  corps,  which  was  put  in  position 
to  cover  our  former  breastworks  on  the  left  of  the  swale.  Candy's 
brigade,  the  last  of  the  Second  Division,  filed  into  place  about 
one  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  July  3,  and  a  line  was  completed 
that  in  a  general  way  encircled  the  country  which  had  been 
occupied  by  Johnson's  division. 

Orders  were  given  that  night  to  Generals  Ruger  and  Geary 
to  attack  the  enemy  at  daylight  and  drive  him  out  of  our  works. 
During  the  night  Johnson  was  re  enforced  by  Daniels'  and 
O'Neal's  brigades  of  Rodes'  division  and  Smith's  brigade  of 
Early's  division.  Johnson  now  had  seven  brigades  which  were 
massed  between  Rock  Creek  and  the  position  occupied  by 
the  Twelfth  Corps.  Smith's  and  Daniels'  brigades,  with  the 
Second  Virginia  of  the  "  Stonewall "  brigade,  were  on  the 
left,  occupying  the  breastworks  of  the  First  Division,  with  a 
portion  of  one  brigade  facing  the  swale  and  the  woods  occu 
pied  by  Col  grove's  brigade.  The  other  five  brigades  were 
massed  on  the  right  facing  the  Second  Division. 

After  the  movements  described,  the  night  was  very  quiet 
and  peaceful.  There  was  nothing  to  indicate  that  two  large 
armies  were  lying  on  the  ground,  the  lines  in  places  hardly  a 
pistol-shot  apart. 

At  the  first  streak  of  dawn  the  pickets  on  both  sides  of  the 
swale  began  firing,  and,  as  the  range  was  very  short,  the  men 
had  to  protect  themselves  behind  rocks  and  trees.  At  about 
the  same  time,  which  is  named  in  official  reports  as  3.30  to 
4.30,  the  artillery  of  the  corps  began  firing  from  its  position, 
west  of  the  Baltimore  pike,  at  the  breastworks  occupied  by  the 
enemy  at  ranges  of  six  hundred  to  seven  hundred  yards.  This 
firing  was  maintained  for  about  fifteen  minutes.  When  it 


THE  TWELFTH  CORPS  AT  GETTYSBURG  33 

ceased,  the  First  Brigade,  First  Division,  pressed  forward  into 
the  woods  in  their  front  and  began  the  attack.  At  the  same 
time  with  this  advance,  the  enemy  began  a  furious  attack  on 
the  Second  Division,  particularly  on  Greene's  line,  charging 
almost  to  his  breastworks.  The  fire  which  they  met  was  so 
severe  and  their  losses  so  heavy  they  could  make  no  impres 
sion  on  this  well-defended  line,  but,  though  repeatedly  repulsed, 
they  came  again  and  again  to  the  attack. 

At  about  6  A.M.,  when  Greene's  brigade  had  exhausted  its 
ammunition,  Kane's  brigade  took  its  place  and  Greene's  men 
went  to  the  rear  to  clean  their  guns  and  get  a  fresh  supply  of 
cartridges.  About  8  A.M.  the  enemy  massed  their  troops  and 
made  a  determined  attack.  At  this  time  Shaler's  brigade,  of 
the  Sixth  Corps,  came  to  re  en  force  the  line,  followed  a  little 
later  by  two  regiments  from  Wadsworth's  division.  General 
Greene  pursued  his  plan  of  successively  relieving  the  troops 
in  the  first  line  with  fresh  regiments,  which,  he  says  in  his  re 
port,  would  come  up  with  a  cheer  and  pour  fresh  volleys  into 
the  advancing  enemy.  Every  attack  was  beaten  off,  but  though 
repeatedly  repulsed  they  would  only  retire  a  short  distance  to 
form  again.  Candy's  brigade  and  the  First  Brigade  of  the  First 
Division  did  good  work  at  this  time  on  the  right  of  Greene, 
pouring  in  a  cross-fire. 

At  about  ten  o'clock  two  of  Johnson's  brigades  were  formed 
in  a  column  by  regiments  and  made  a  last  desperate  attack 
on  Greene's  and  Kane's  brigades,  the  latter  at  that  time  being 
on  Greene's  right ;  but,  though  they  were  pushed  fairly  into 
our  lines,  where,  according  to  Geary's  report,  the  dead  of  the 
First  Maryland  Battalion,  which  was  in  advance,  mingled  with 
our  own,  they  were  repulsed.  In  this  last  charge  many  of 
Walker's  "  Stonewall "  brigade  threw  down  their  arms  and 
rushed  forward  with  white  flags  to  surrender.  Major  B.  W. 
Leigh,  Johnson's  Adjutant-General,  rode  forward  to  prevent 
this  surrender,  but  was  shot  down  when  very  near  our  lines. 

After  the  last  repulse  our  troops  rushed  forward  with  cheers 


34  THE  TWELFTH  CORPS  AT  GETTYSBURG 

and  reoccupied  the  breastworks  they  had  vacated  the  evening 
before  and  the  defeated  enemy  retired  to  Rock  Creek. 

The  battle  on  this  front  had  lasted  nearly  seven  hours.  Ac 
cording  to  Geary's  report  900  of  the  rebel  dead  were  buried 
in  front  of  our  lines.  There  were  500  un wounded  prisoners 
captured,  besides  400  of  the  wounded  which  were  left  on  the 
field.  The  flag  of  the  "  Stonewall "  brigade  was  captured  by 
the  Sixtieth  New  York,  and  the  Fourteenth  Virginia  flag  was 
taken  by  the  Seventh  Ohio.  Five  thousand  small  arms  were 
gathered  up  on  the  field.  The  strength  of  the  Second  Division 
in  this  fight  was  3922 ;  Greene's  brigade  numbering  but  1424 ; 
Kane's  brigade  only  650.  The  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  in 
the  division  was  549,  of  which  303  were  in  Greene's  brigade. 

The  comparatively  small  loss  of  our  troops  is  accounted  for 
by  the  almost  complete  protection  afforded  by  our  breast 
works,  against  which  E well's  brigades  wasted  their  strength 
in  their  efforts  to  break  our  line  and  reach  the  Baltimore 
pike. 

While  the  battle  was  raging  in  front  of  the  Second  Division 
and  McDougall's  brigade  of  the  First  Division,  General  Ruger 
received  orders  to  try  the  left  of  the  enemy's  line  across  the 
swale  with  skirmishers,  and,  if  the  resistance  was  not  too 
great,  to  advance  two  regiments.  These  orders  were  trans 
mitted  to  Colonel  Colgrove  by  a  staff  officer,  but  there  has 
always  been  a  dispute  as  to  just  what  the  order  was  that  was 
delivered.  In  his  official  report  Colonel  Colgrove  says :  "  At 
this  juncture  Lieutenant  Snow  of  your  staff  came  up  and  said, 
4  The  General  directs  that  you  advance  your  line  immedi 
ately.'  "  l  He  explains  that  the  position  was  such  that  he  could 
advance  but  two  regiments  in  line,  and  that  it  was  impossible 
to  advance  skirmishers,  as  they  would  be  cut  down  by  the 
enemy's  fire  from  behind  breastworks  and  rocks  before  they 
could  cross  the  swale.  He  says :  "  The  only  possible  chance 
to  carry  his  position  was  by  storming  it.  ...  I  selected  the 
i  43  W.  R.  813. 


THE  TWELFTH  CORPS  AT  GETTYSBURG          35 

Second  Massachusetts  and  Twenty-seventh  Indiana  for  the 
work,  and  ordered  the  Second  Massachusetts  to  charge  the 
works  in  front  of  their  position ;  the  Twenty-seventh  Indiana, 
as  soon  as  they  should  gain  the  open  ground,  to  oblique  to 
the  right  and  carry  the  position  held  in  the  ledges  of  rocks."1 
The  commanders  of  both  regiments  gave  the  orders  "  Forward, 
double-quick !  "  The  men  jumped  over  the  breastworks  and 
rushed  down  the  short  declivity  with  cheers.  When  they 
reached  the  open  ground  they  were  met  by  a  most  destruc 
tive  fire.  The  Twenty-seventh  Indiana  was  exposed  to  both  a 
flank  and  front  fire.  It  suffered  so  severely  that,  to  save  it 
from  total  destruction  in  this  hopeless  charge,  it  was  ordered 
back  when  about  halfway  across  the  swale.  The  Second  Mas 
sachusetts,  though  losing  heavily,  crossed  the  swale  and  reached 
the  woods  on  the  other  side,  where,  under  protection  of  the 
rocks  and  trees,  it  began  firing,  the  enemy's  line  then  being 
not  a  pistol-shot  away.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Mudge  was  killed 
by  a  bullet  while  crossing  the  swale,  and  this  became  known 
when  the  woods  were  reached  and  firing  began.  Being  next 
in  rank,  I  then  assumed  command.  My  official  report  at  this 
point  says :  "  I  found  on  going  to  the  right  that  the  regiment 
that  had  advanced  with  us  had  never  reached  the  woods,  and 
that  the  enemy  was  throwing  a  force  in  our  rear.  I  ordered  the 
regiment  at  once  back  far  enough  to  uncover  the  right  flank, 
which  left  the  enemy  in  a  very  exposed  position.  They  fell 
back  rapidly,  but  lost  heavily  in  so  doing."  2  The  force  re 
ferred  to  in  this  report  appeared  to  be  a  regiment  or  more, 
and  they  were  deployed  into  the  swale  at  the  double-quick 
about  fifty  yards  in  rear  of  the  Second  Massachusetts.  The 
movement  of  the  latter  regiment  was  a  right  oblique  to  the 
rear,  and  when  it  faced  about  and  began  firing,  the  enemy 
was  not  only  exposed  to  this  fire  at  very  short  range,  but  also 
to  that  of  the  other  regiments  of  the  brigade,  which  could 
now  fire  without  causing  loss  to  the  Second  Massachusetts, 
i  43  W.  R.  813-14.  2  43  W.  R.  817. 


36  THE  TWELFTH  CORPS  AT  GETTYSBURG 

Those  of  the  enemy  who  escaped  dropped  into  cover  as  soon 
as  they  reached  sheltering  rocks.  The  position  now  occupied 
by  the  Second  Massachusetts  was  a  depression  of  ground,  with 
a  sunken  stone  wall  in  front,  which  gave  some  protection  from 
the  enemy's  fire.  My  report  goes  on  to  say :  "  I  remained  in 
my  new  position,  inflicting  heavy  loss  upon  the  enemy,  until 
my  ammunition  was  nearly  exhausted,  when  I  sent  to  Colonel 
Colgrove  for  further  instructions.  He  ordered  me  to  bring 
the  regiment  back  to  the  rear  of  its  former  position."  l  This 
movement  was  effected  in  perfect  order,  though  at  an  addi 
tional  loss  of  one  man  killed  and  six,  including  one  officer, 
wounded. 

The  attack  by  these  two  regiments  should  never  have  been 
ordered,  as  it  was  hopeless  to  expect  to  carry  a  strong,  forti 
fied  position,  occupied  by  a  greatly  superior  force,  by  a  front 
attack  exposed  from  the  start  to  a  merciless  fire.  It  was  a 
costly  mistake,  as  the  Twenty-seventh  Indiana  lost  in  the 
charge  15  men  killed  or  mortally  wounded  and  7  officers  and 
76  men  wounded,  a  total  of  98.  The  Second  Massachusetts 
carried  into  action  23  officers  and  297  men.  It  had  4  officers 
and  41  men  killed  and  6  officers  and  84  men  wounded,  a  total 
of  135,  or  about  forty- three  per  cent  of  the  number  engaged. 
Three  color-bearers  were  killed  and  one  seriously  wounded, 
the  fifth  color-bearer  carrying  the  flag  until  the  end  of  the 
action. 

If  these  two  regiments,  instead  of  making  this  front  attack, 
had  been  moved  from  the  left  of  the  Third  Brigade  to  the 
right  of  the  First  Brigade,  the  loss  would  have  been  compara 
tively  small,  and  they  could  have  taken  an  effective  part  in  the 
general  attack  to  recover  our  breastworks  from  the  enemy. 

A  steady  fire  was  now  maintained  from  the  line  of  the  Third 
Brigade,  which  was  made  more  effective  by  extending  skir 
mishers  farther  to  the  right  toward  Rock  Creek,  where  they  en 
filaded  the  enemy's  line.  Finally  about  10.30,  when  the  gen- 
i  43  W.  E.  817. 


THE  TWELFTH  CORPS  AT  GETTYSBURG  37 

eral  forward  movement  was  made,  the  Third  Brigade  reoccupied 
its  former  line  of  works.  At  the  last  moment  the  remnant  of 
the  force  which  had  escaped  from  the  swale  and  taken  refuge 
among  the  rocks,  about  one  hundred  men,  displayed  a  white 
flag  and  surrendered.  These  men  were  from  a  North  Carolina 
regiment  of  Daniels'  brigade. 

After  the  recovery  of  our  breastworks,  fighting  on  the  right 
practically  ceased,  and  there  came  the  period  of  perfect  quiet 
referred  to  in  all  accounts  of  the  battle.  Then,  at  one  o'clock, 
came  the  signal  gun,  and  the  great  'artillery  duel  began.  To 
those  who  are  experiencing  the  gun-fire  of  the  present  war  this 
cannonade  would  perhaps  seem  a  trifling  affair,  but  to  those 
who  heard  it  and  saw  its  effects  it  was  beyond  anything  which 
war  had  yet  shown  them.  From  the  position  on  the  right  our 
guns  could  be  seen  standing  out  against  the  sky-line  through 
the  smoke  clouds,  the  bursting  shells  and  explosion  of  many 
caissons  adding  to  this  grand  war  spectacle.  In  the  interesting 
narrative  of  General  Henry  J.  Hunt,  Chief  of  Artillery  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  (3  B.  &  L.  173),  he  writes  of  this 
great  cannonade :  "  Most  of  the  enemy's  projectiles  passed  over 
head,  the  effect  being  to  sweep  all  the  open  ground  in  our 
rear,  which  was  of  little  benefit  to  the  Confederates  "  and,  in  a 
prior  passage,  "  I  saw  evidence  of  the  necessity  under  which 
the  [artillery]  reserve  had  '  decamped,'  in  the  remains  of  a 
dozen  exploded  caissons  which  had  been  placed  under  cover 
of  a  hill  but  which  the  shells  had  managed  to  search  out.  In 
fact  the  fire  was  more  dangerous  behind  the  ridge  than  on  the 
crest."  Many  of  the  solid  shot  came  over  the  entire  field  to 
the  right  causing  some  casualties  in  the  infantry  lines.  Pickett's 
charge  was  out  of  the  sight  of  troops  on  the  right,  but  at  the 
last  moment,  when  the  general  melee  occurred  on  the  crest  of 
Cemetery  Hill,  the  mob  of  rebel  prisoners  which  came  into 
our  lines  was  in  plain  view,  and  the  cheering  from  the  centre 
spread  along  the  entire  line.  Just  before  this  climax,  some  of 
the  troops  of  the  First  Division,  Twelfth  Corps,  were  ordered 


38  THE  TWELFTH  CORPS  AT  GETTYSBURG 

to  the  centre,  and  had  begun  a  movement  in  that  direction, 
but  the  end  came  and  the  troops  marched  back  to  their  works. 

This  was  the  final  act  at  Gettysburg,  and  nothing  further 
occurred  on  the  right,  except  some  picket  firing  after  dark, 
which  was  mostly  occasioned  by  the  groping  about  of  the 
enemy  among  their  wounded  who  had  been  left  on  the  field  in 
the  last  of  the  fighting. 

The  official  report  of  the  battle  by  General  Williams,  dated 
August  22,  1863,  and  that  of  General  Slocum,  dated  August 
23,  1863,  give  full  accounts  of  the  operations  of  the  Twelfth 
Corps  and  mention  with  strong  commendation  the  gallant 
defence  by  General  Greene  of  his  front  on  the  evening  of  July 
2  against  a  greatly  superior  force.  These  reports  also  refer  to 
the  other  principal  events  and  movements  in  which  this  corps 
took  part. 

General  Meade's  official  report  is  dated  October  1,  1863. 
I  quote  his  reference  to  the  action  of  the  Twelfth  Corps :  — 

"  During  the  heavy  assault  upon  our  extreme  left,  portions 
of  the  Twelfth  Corps  were  sent  as  reinforcements.  During 
their  absence,  the  line  on  the  extreme  right  was  held  by  a 
very  much  reduced  force.  This  was  taken  advantage  of  by 
the  enemy,  who,  during  the  absence  of  Geary's  division  of 
the  Twelfth  Corps,  advanced  and  occupied  a  part  of  his  line. 

"On  the  morning  of  the  3d,  General  Geary  (having  re 
turned  during  the  night^)  attacked  at  early  dawn  the  enemy, 
and  succeeded  in  driving  him  back  and  occupying  his  former 
position.  A  spirited  contest  was,  however,  maintained  all  the 
morning  along  this  part  of  the  line,  General  Geary,  reenforced 
by  Wheaton's  brigade,  Sixth  Corps,  maintaining  his  position 
and  inflicting  very  severe  loss  on  the  enemy."  l 

This  is  the  only  reference  made  to  the  Twelfth  Corps  in 
General  Meade's  report.  General  Slocum  was  naturally  in 
dignant  at  the  apparent  ignoring  of  the  facts  stated  in  his 
report  and  wrote  a  letter,  dated  December  30,  1863,  to  Gen- 
1  43  W.  B.  117. 


THE  TWELFTH  CORPS  AT  GETTYSBURG  39 

eral  Meade,  calling  the  attention  of  the  latter  to  his  errors  in 
many  particulars.  I  quote  as  follows :  — 

"  Your  report  is  the  official  history  of  that  important  bat 
tle,  and  to  this  report  reference  will  always  be  made  by  our 
Government,  our  people,  and  the  historian,  as  the  most  reli 
able  and  accurate  account  of  the  services  performed  by  each 
corps,  division,  and  brigade  of  your  army.  If  you  have  inad 
vertently  given  to  one  division  the  credit  of  having  performed 
some  meritorious  service  which  was  in  reality  performed  by 
another  division,  you  do  an  injustice -to  brave  men  and  de 
fraud  them  of  well-earned  laurels.  It  is  an  injustice  which 
even  time  cannot  correct.  That  errors  of  this  nature  exist  in 
your  report  is  an  indisputable  fact."1 

He  then  goes  on  to  say  that  Lockwood's  brigade,  which  re 
ceived  great  credit  as  being  attached  to  the  First  Corps,  was 
in  fact  at  no  time  a  part  of  that  corps,  but  was  a  part  of  the 
Twelfth  Corps,  and  in  the  action  referred  to  was  accompanied 
by  General  Williams,  the  temporary  commander  of  the  Twelfth 
Corps.  In  reference  to  General  Meade's  statement  as  to  the 
operations  of  Geary's  division  he  makes  a  quotation  and 
says : — 

"  From  this  statement  it  would  appear  that  Geary's  division 
marched  to  the  support  of  your  left ;  that  Williams'  division 
did  not ;  that  his  (Williams')  division,  or  a  portion  of  it,  was 
guarding  the  intrenchments  when  the  enemy  gained  posses 
sion  ;  that  Geary  returned,  and  with  his  division  drove  the 
enemy  back ;  that  the  engagement  the  next  morning  was 
fought  by  Geary's  division,  assisted  by  Wheaton's  brigade. 
.  .  .  Yet  the  facts  in  the  case  are  very  nearly  the  reverse  in 
every  particular,  and  directly  in  contradiction  to  the  facts  as 
set  forth  in  the  report  of  General  Geary,  as  well  as  that  of 
General  Williams.  Geary's  division  did  not  march  even  in 
the  direction  of  your  left.  Two  of  his  brigades,  under  his  im 
mediate  command,  left  the  intrenchments  under  orders  to 
1  43  W.  R.  763-64. 


40  THE  TWELFTH  CORPS  AT  GETTYSBURG 

move  to  the  support  of  your  left,  but  through  some  unfor 
tunate  mistake  he  took  the  road  leading  to  Two  Taverns. 
Williams'  entire  division  did  move  to  the  support  of  your  left, 
and  it  was  one  of  his  brigades  (Lockwood's),  under  his  im 
mediate  command,  which  you  commend,  but  very  singularly 
accredit  to  the  First  Corps. 

"  Greene's  brigade  of  the  Second  Division  remained  in  the 
intrenchments,  and  the  failure  of  the  enemy  to  gain  entire 
possession  of  our  works  was  due  entirely  to  the  skill  of  Gen 
eral  Greene  and  the  heroic  valor  of  his  troops.  His  brigade 
suffered  severely,  but  maintained  its  position,  and  held  the 
enemy  in  check  until  the  return  of  Williams'  division.  The 
'spirited  contest'  maintained  by  General  Geary,  reenforced 
by  '  Wheaton's  brigade,'  was  a  contest  for  regaining  the  por 
tion  of  our  intrenchments  held  by  the  enemy,  and  was  con 
ducted  under  the  immediate  command  of  General  Williams, 
and  was  participated  in  by  the  entire  Twelfth  Corps,  reen 
forced  not  by  Wheaton's  but  by  Shaler's  brigade." 

In  conclusion  he  says,  "  I  sincerely  trust  that  you  will 
endeavor  to  correct  as  far  as  possible  the  errors  above  men 
tioned,  and  that  the  correction  may  be  recorded  at  the  War 
Department."  l 

General  Meade  wrote  an  answer  to  this  letter  in  which  he 
admits  very  frankly  the  errors  in  his  report  and  regrets  them, 
stating  at  some  length  how  they  occurred  and  that  they  were 
inadvertent.  He  agrees  to  correct  them,  and  on  February  25, 
1864,  he  wrote  to  General  Halleck  a  letter  in  which  he  made 
a  concise  and  correct  statement  of  facts  as  given  in  General 
Slocum's  letter  and  official  report,  which  as  far  as  possible 
corrected  the  record. 

Gettysburg  will  always  occupy  a  place  by  itself  among  the 
battles  of  the  Civil  War  in  the  minds  of  those  who  were 
there  and  to  those  who  have  made  a  study  of  it. 

There  are  many  reasons  for  this.  The  armies  which  fought 
i  43  W.  R.  764,  765. 


THE  TWELFTH  CORPS  AT  GETTYSBURG  41 

there  on  both  sides  were  at  the  highest  state  of  efficiency  they 
reached  at  any  time  during  the  war.  A  large  part  of  these 
troops  were  the  men  of  '61  who  had  been  in  active  service, 
marching  and  fighting  for  two  years,  and  were  seasoned  vete 
ran  soldiers.  While  numerically  the  Union  army  had  more 
men  than  the  Confederate,  yet  at  the  points  of  encounter  there 
was  little  difference  in  the  forces  engaged.  It  was  square, 
stand-up  fighting,  with  no  flinching  on  either  side. 

Gettysburg  meant  more  to  the  Confederacy  than  any  other 
battle  of  the  Civil  War.  It  was  literally  their  "  high  tide," 
for  if  Lee  had  won  the  battle  and  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
had  been  forced  to  retreat  toward  Washington,  there  seems 
little  doubt  that  foreign  intervention  would  have  come,  as  at 
that  time  there  was  a  large  element  in  the  North  which  would 
have  welcomed  peace  at  any  price. 

The  catastrophe  was  averted  by  the  splendid  fighting  qual 
ities  of  our  soldiers,  and  by  the  feeling  that  pervaded  the 
army  —  that  there  must  be  no  such  thing  as  defeat  when 
fighting  on  our  own  soil. 

In  these  later  years,  General  Meade  has  been  much  criti 
cised  by  many  writers  for  not  attacking  after  the  repulse  of 
Pickett's  division,  and  in  the  light  of  what  has  since  been 
known,  it  seems  probable  that  if  the  Sixth  Corps  had  been 
brought  forward  and  advanced  in  the  centre,  Lee's  line  would 
have  been  broken.  Such  a  movement  might  have  been  fatal 
to  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  and  the  war  might  have 
been  more  speedily  brought  to  an  end ;  but  there  is  much  to 
be  said  for  the  course  which  was  adopted  and  which  was  ap 
proved  at  the  time  by  most  of  the  generals  of  the  army.  In 
these  later  criticisms,  written  in  the  peaceful  quiet  of  a  library, 
with  maps  and  references  at  hand,  perhaps  the  human  factor 
in  the  equation  is  not  enough  considered. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  for  three  hot  July  days,  with 
little  rest  at  night,  nearly  every  man  in  the  army,  from  the 
general  in  command,  oppressed  by  his  new  and  great  respon- 


42  THE  TWELFTH  CORPS  AT  GETTYSBURG 

sibilities,  down  to  the  privates  in  the  ranks,  had  been  under 
the  greatest  possible  strain,  mental  as  well  as  physical,  and 
that  during  these  three  days  they  had  had  an  insufficiency  of 
food  and  a  minimum  of  sleep ;  they  were  in  fact  tired  out. 
If  they  had  been  ordered  forward  that  afternoon,  they  would 
have  responded  with  a  cheer,  but  they  were  not  called  on  to 
advance,  and  when  they  lay  down  that  night  on  the  ground 
they  had  fought  for,  there  were  few  in  the  army  who  did  not 
feel  well  satisfied  with  the  result.  Perhaps  that  is  the  wisest 
conclusion  for  us  to  come  to,  now. 


IV 

THE  MINE  RUN  CAMPAIGN,  NOVEMBER,  1863 

BY 

COLONEL  THOMAS   L.   LIVERMORE 

EIGHTEENTH  NEW  HAMPSHIRE  VOLUNTEERS 


Read  before  the  Society,  April  4,  1916 
(Based  on  official  reports  in  War  Records,  vola.  48  and  49) 


THE  MINE   RUN  CAMPAIGN,  NOVEMBER,  1863 

FULL  accounts  of  this  campaign  have  been  given  in  Gen 
eral  Humphreys'  book,  "The  Virginia  Campaign  of  1864-5," 
and  in  the  paper  of  General  Davis  printed  in  this  Society's 
Volume  3. 

The  campaign  is  an  interesting  example  of  strategic  spar 
ring  between  two  accomplished  generals,  which  served  as 
practice  for  the  battle  of  the  Wilderness  which,  five  months 
later,  began  on  the  same  ground,  with  manreuvres  modified 
on  both  sides  by  the  experience  in  the  earlier  campaign. 

The  following  synopsis  of  the  Mine  Run  campaign  is  of 
fered  as  a  frame  for  the  picture  drawn  by  General  Peirson  in 
his  paper  of  this  evening. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  lay  on  the  line  which  it  had 
taken  after  forcing  the  passage  of  the  Rappahannock  early  in 
November,  1863,  extending  from  Wellford  Ford  on  the  Rap 
pahannock  at  Hazel  River,  through  Brandy  Station  to  Kelly's 
Ford  on  the  Rappahannock. 

The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was  posted  south  of  the 
Rapidan  from  Walnut  Run  to  Hume's  Shop  on  Mountain 
Run,  and  thence  up  along  the  south  bank  of  the  Rapidan  to 
Barnett's  Ford. 

From  its  rear  the  Wilderness,  spreading  south  of  the  Rapi 
dan  on  a  radius  of  about  twelve  miles,  presented  a  formidable 
passage  for  the  Union  army  in  any  attempt  to  march  by  the 
Confederate  right  flank,  toward  its  rear  or  toward  Richmond. 
This  thick  forest  had  been  the  scene  of  the  battle  of  Chancel- 
lorsville  in  May,  1863,  and  was  destined  in  the  following 
twelve  months  to  be  the  field  of  the  battle  on  Mine  Run  and 
the  battle  of  the  Wilderness  in  which  three  battles  fifty  thou 
sand  men  were  killed  and  wounded. 


46      THE  MINE  RUN  CAMPAIGN,  NOVEMBER,  1863 

To  pass  along  the  front  of  the  Confederate  line  in  an  effort 
to  turn  its  left  flank,  the  Union  army  would  expose  its  own 
flank  and  rear  to  attack,  and  an  attack  upon  the  Confederate 
front  could  succeed  only  after  forcing  the  passage  of  the 
river.  But  on  November  26  Meade  marched  into  the  Wilder 
ness  to  attack  Lee's  right  flank,  counting  upon  the  fact  that 
the  right  end  of  the  Confederate  line,  while  twenty  miles  from 
its  left  end,  was  only  ten  miles  from  the  centre  of  the  Union 
line,  and  hoping  therefore  to  defeat  the  right  wing  before  the 
left  wing  could  come  to  its  aid.  To  this  end  he  directed  that 
the  Third  and  Sixth  Corps  should  march  from  his  right,  to 
pass  the  Rapidan  by  Jacob's  Ford  and  thence  march  to  Rob 
ertson's  Tavern  (Locust  Grove),  and  there  join  the  Second 
Corps  which  he  directed  to  cross  at  Germanna  Ford  ;  that  the 
First  and  Fifth  Corps  should  cross  at  Culpeper  Ford  and 
march  to  Robertson's  Tavern  and  Parker's  Store,  respect 
ively  ;  and  that  then  the  whole  army  should  move  rapidly  by 
the  Orange,  Turnpike,  and  Plank  roads  to  fall  on  E well's 
corps  —  the  right  wing  of  Lee's  army  which  held  the  line 
from  Hume's  Shop  to  Robertson's  Ford.  The  delay  of  the 
Third  Corps  to  arrive  at  the  Rapidan  resulted  in  delaying  the 
arrival  of  the  Second  Corps  at  Robertson's  Tavern  until  No 
vember  27.  In  the  meantime  Lee,  being  advised  on  the  26th 
of  Meade's  movement,  started  his  troops  to  meet  the  Union 
columns  south  of  the  Rapidan.  At  about  ten  o'clock  on  the 
morning  of  the  27th  two  divisions  of  E  well's  corps,  marching 
easterly  on  the  Orange  Turnpike,  encountered  the  Second 
Corps  coming  westerly  on  the  same  road  at  Robertson's  Tav 
ern  and,  being  checked  by  this  corps,  halted  for  the  arrival 
of  the  other  (Johnson's)  division  of  Ewell's  corps.  Warren, 
commanding  the  Second  Corps,  also  halted  it  for  the  arrival 
of  the  Third  and  Sixth  Corps.  French,  commanding  the 
Third  Corps,  on  the  morning  of  the  27th,  at  the  house  of 
Widow  Morris,  long  hesitated  in  choosing  his  road  between 
the  two  roads  which  forked  there,  and  finally,  erroneously 


THE  MINE  RUN  CAMPAIGN,  NOVEMBER,  1863     47 

taking  the  right-hand  one,  by  an  unhappy  chance  encountered 
Johnson's  division  of  Swell's  corps,  which  was  on  its  way 
from  Bartlett's  Mill  to  Robertson's  Tavern,  and  was  delayed 
until  night  in  the  consequent  engagement.  Meade  wrote  in 
his  report l  that  in  his  opinion  the  unnecessary  delay  in  the 
progress  of  the  Third  Corps  and  in  its  attack  of  the  enemy  in 
the  front  "  was  one  of  the  primary  causes  of  the  failure  of  the 
whole  movement " ;  and  Humphreys  states  2  that  had  the  col 
umn,  led  by  the  Third  Corps,  moved  promptly,  it  would  have 
arrived  at  Robertson's  Tavern  at  the  same  time  with  the 
Second  Corps,  and  then  the  three  corps,  numbering  40,133 
infantry,  would  have  encountered  Ewell's  corps,  numbering 
16,971  infantry,  "at  a  time  when  Hill  was  too  far  off  to  be 
available,  and  when  the  Fifth  and  First  Corps  were  advancing 
on  the  Plank  road  to  meet  him." 

Davis  expresses  the  opinion  3  that  greater  expedition  by 
French  would  have  insured  a  victory  at  Robertson's  Tavern 
on  the  afternoon  of  the  26th  or  the  morning  of  the  27th,  be 
cause  Gordon's  brigade  of  Hays'  division  was  on  the  Plank 
a  short  distance  west  of  the  Tavern  on  the  night  of  the  26th; 
Hays'  division  in  the  vicinity  of  it  by  6  A.M.  of  the  27th; 
Stafford's  brigade  at  Zoar  Church  on  the  26th  [five  miles 
from  the  Tavern]  ;  Hampton's  cavalry  brigade  in  the  vicinity 
of  the  Tavern  at  9  A.M.  of  the  27th ;  and  the  head  of  Hill's 
corps  on  the  field  at  1  P.M.  This  statement  is  modified  by 
reference  to  the  records  as  follows : 4  Gordon's  brigade  was 
on  the  Turnpike  three  miles  west  of  Robertson's  Tavern  until 
6  A.M.  November  27,  when  it  was  joined  by  Hays  with  two  of 
his  other  brigades.  After  an  hour's  delay,  they  moved  to 
ward  the  Tavern.  They  were  there  halted  by  the  presence  of 
Warren's  (Second)  corps  which  had  arrived  at  about  10  A.M.5 
Stafford's  brigade,  early  on  the  morning  of  November  27, 

1  48  W.  R.  15.  2  Gettysburg  to  the  Rapidan,  58. 

3  3  M.  H.  M.  499.  *  43  W.  R.'  817,  818,  830,  838,  839,  846,  877,  886. 

6  48  W.  R.  14. 


48      THE  MINE  RUN  CAMPAIGN,  NOVEMBER,  1863 

before  the  appearance  of  the  Union  advance,  rejoined  its  divi 
sion  near  Bartlett's  Mill  about  five  miles  from  the  Tavern,  i 
It  was  not  at  Robertson's  Tavern,  but  the  vicinity  of  New  Hope 
Church,  two  miles  or  more  away,  that  Hampton's  brigade 
arrived  at  9  A.M.  and  Hill's  corps  at  1  P.M.2 

If  the  Third  and  Sixth  Corps  had  arrived  at  Robertson's 
Tavern  with  the  Second  Corps  and  had  promptly  joined  it  in 
the  attack  and  pushed  it  hard,  there  is  reason  to  conclude 
that  they  would  have  prevailed,  not  only  against  the  three 
brigades  of  Hays,  and  his  fourth  brigade  (Pegram's)  which 
arrived  at  2  P.M.  from  the  fords  of  the  Rapidan,  but  also 
Rodes'  division,  which  was  at  Zoar  Church  as  late  as 
9  A.M.,3  and  Johnson's  division,  which  leaving  the  intrench- 
ments  between  Mountain  and  Walnut  runs  at  about  11  A.M.,4 
had  to  march  seven  miles  to  reach  Robertson's  Tavern.  But 
a  thorough  victory  would  have  required  vigor  in  leadership, 
promptness,  and  cooperation  such  as  had  not  been  exhibited 
in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  up  to  that  time. 

On  November  28  the  First,  Second,  and  Sixth  Corps 
marching  westerly  along  the  Turnpike,  supported  by  the 
Third  and  Fifth  Corps,  met  only  the  enemy's  pickets  east  of 
Mine  Run,  to  the  west  side  of  which  Lee  had  withdrawn  his 
army  during  the  night.  General  Peirson's  personal  narrative 
begins  at  this  point.  The  First  Corps,  in  which  he  was  serv 
ing,  cannonaded  the  enemy,  pushed  a  skirmish  line  across 
Mine  Run  in  sharp  combat,  and  threw  bridges  over  that 
stream  in  preparation  for  an  assault.  Early  in  the  day  War 
ren  had  been  sent  with  his  corps  and  Terry's  division  of  the 
Sixth  to  the  Orange  Plank  road  to  feel  for,  and,  if  possible, 
turn,  the  Confederate  right  flank.  A  report  at  evening  that 
he  had  reached  a  position  from  which  he  could  turn  that 
flank  by  an  assault  and  reports  that  an  assault  was  practi 
cable,  by  the  First  and  Third  Corps  on  the  centre,  and  the 

1  48  W.  R.  846.   W.  R.  Atlas  XLV,  1.  2  48  W.  R.  895,  898. 

»  48  W.  R.  876,  885.  *  48  W.  R.  846,  871. 


THE  MINE  RUN  CAMPAIGN,  NOVEMBER,  1863     49 

Fifth  and  Sixth  Corps  on  the  left  of  the  enemy,  led  Meade 
to  plan  for  the  three  assaults.  Late  in  the  evening  Warren, 
reporting  in  person,  so  impressed  Meade  with  the  confidence 
that  his  force  could  carry  everything  before  it,  that,  in  view 
of  French's  opinion  against  assaulting  with  the  First  Corps, 
Meade,  abandoning  the  assault  in  the  centre,  sent  to  War 
ren  two  of  French's  three  divisions  for  his  attack  on  the 
enemy's  right.  Meade  wrote  in  his  report  that  on  the  morn 
ing  of  November  30 :  "  The  batteries  of  the  right  and  centre 
were  to  open  at  eight  o'clock,  at  which  time  Warren  was  to 
make  the  main  attack,  and  at  nine  o'clock  Sedgwick  was  to 
assault  with  his  column  "  l  (the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Corps),  and 
that  the  infantry  of  the  centre  were  to  demonstrate,  and  join 
in  the  attack  if  the  assault  were  successful. 

Warren  spent  the  night  in  arranging  his  force  for  the  as 
sault  on  a  front  of  a  mile,  in  two,  and  in  places  three,  lines. 

Hill,  whose  corps  was  opposed  to  Warren,  wrote  in  his  re 
port  that  on  November  28  his  line  extended  from  the  Turn 
pike,  across  the  Plank  road,  to  the  Catharpin  road,  and  was 
covered  by  earthworks;  that  it  being  found,  on  the  29th,  that 
the  enemy  was  extending  on  the  Confederate  right,  his 
(Hill's)  line  before  daylight  of  the  30th  was  extended  to  his 
right  by  two  brigades. 

Warren  wrote  in  his  report:  "At  daylight  all  was  pre 
pared,  and  as  the  sun  shone  upon  the  enemy's  line,  I  examined 
the  whole  front.  I  found  that  the  line  had  been  reenforced 
with  all  the  troops  and  artillery  that  could  be  put  in  position ; 
the  breastworks,  epaulements,  and  abatis  perfected,  and  that 
a  run  for  eight  minutes  was  the  least  time  our  line  could  have 
to  close  the  space  between  us,  during  which  we  would  be  ex 
posed  to  every  species  of  fire.  I  at  once  decided  not  to  attack, 
and  so  informed  General  Meade.  .  .  .  Any  further  attempt  to 
outflank  the  enemy  .  .  .  was  not  justifiable  on  any  principle."  2 
The  record  contains  the  following  despatch  from  him  to 

1  Sedgwick's  report  agrees  with  this.  48  W.  R.  17,  797.  2  48  W.  R.  698. 


50      THE  MINE  RUN  CAMPAIGN,  NOVEMBER,  1863 

Meade  of  that  morning :  "  It  is  now  7.45  and  I  have  heard 
no  firing  from  you,  from  which  I  fear  the  enemy  has  left  your 
front.  His  position  and  strength  seem  so  formidable  in  my 
present  front  that  I  advise  against  making  the  attack  here. 
The  full  light  of  the  sun  shows  me  that  I  cannot  succeed."  l 
There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  any  misunderstanding  by 
Warren  of  the  time  set  for  his  assault  affected  his  decision, 
but  to  show  what  he  understood  I  venture  to  here  transcribe 
from  a  record  of  my  recollections  made  so  soon  after  the  war 
that  they  were  yet  fresh  in  memory,  and  many  years  before 
Warren's  despatch  was  published ;  a  passage  relating  to  this 
campaign  in  which  I  served  on  General  Warren's  staff,  which 
may  be  otherwise  interesting  in  extending  General  Peirson's 
picture  from  the  centre  where  he  was,  to  the  left  of  the 
Union  line :  — 

"  Next  day  after  reaching  Mine  Run  we  found  ourselves 
moving  rapidly  away,  to  our  left,  from  Robertson's  Tavern, 
and  learned  that  in  consequence  of  the  report  .  .  .  that  sev 
eral  miles  up  the  Run  the  enemy's  line  could  be  taken  in  flank. 
General  Meade  had  put  two  divisions  of  General  French's 
corps  and  one  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  under  General  Warren, 
and  directed  him,  with  them  and  his  corps,  to  move  rapidly 
to  the  point  designated  .  .  .  and  there  assault  the  enemy  or 
turn  his  flank,  and  he  was  to  cut  loose  from  the  rest  of  the 
army  to  do  this,  leaving  several  miles  between  us  and  it.  Our 
advance  brigade,  under  Colonel  Miles,  struck  the  enemy  in 
small  force  before  nightfall  and  made  short  work  of  him.  We 
came  by  one  or  more  of  the  rebel  dead  beside  the  road.  We 
had  come  into  one  of  the  main  roads  [Orange  Plank  road] 
leading  across  the  branches  which  join  to  form  Mine  Run, 
and  our  headquarters  were  pitched  in  a  wood  beside  it  after 
dark.  It  was  a  very  cold  night  and  Brownson,  Bingham,  and 
I  rolled  into  our  blankets  together  for  warmth.  We  were 
roused  long  before  daylight  and  took  our  breakfast.  As  we 
1  49  W.  R.  517. 


THE  MINE  RUN  CAMPAIGN,  NOVEMBER,  1863     51 

sat  around  a  bright  fire  with  General  Warren,  waiting  for 
the  coming  of  light,  he  told  us  of  the  assault  we  were  to  make 
and  said :  '  If  I  succeed  to-day,  I  shall  be  the  greatest  man  in 
the  army.  If  I  don't,  all  my  sins  will  be  remembered.'  We 
were  informed  that  he  was  to  assault  with  the  six  divisions 
...  in  one  hour  after  our  troops  at  Robertson's  Tavern  had 
opened  fire  with  their  artillery,  which  they  were  to  do  at  an 
early  hour.  .  .  .  Just  as  twilight  was  glimmering  we  rode 
with  the  General  down  to  the  lines,  and  as  light  dawned  we 
took  in  the  whole  situation.  Our  six  divisions  were  in  line, 
each  regiment  massed,  the  right  division  resting  on  the  [Plank] 
road.  .  .  .  Our  line  was  partly  in  a  meadow,  and  the  left  was 
on  rising  ground.  In  this  meadow,  in  front  of  our  line,  a  little 
stream  ran  parallel  to  it,  ...  which  was  one  of  the  branches, 
if  not  the  head,  of  Mine  Run.  Beyond  this  stream  the  land 
rose  gently,  and  up  the  slope  about  four  hundred  yards  were 
the  enemy's  works.  Our  skirmishers  were  within  a  stone's 
throw  of  the  enemy's,  but  they  disdained  to  fire  .  .  .  and 
ours  were  equally  silent.  The  enemy  seemed  to  be  quite  will 
ing  to  have  us  make  all  preparations  for  the  assault,  and  with 
good  reason,  for  their  works  commanded  a  slope  which  could 
not  have  been  improved  for  defence.  They  were  breast  high 
and  apparently  very  thick.  We  counted  sixteen  pieces  of  artil 
lery  in  front  of  two  of  our  divisions  [a  third  of  a  mile  in 
length]  and  there  were  plenty  of  men  all  in  readiness  for  us. 
Some  of  them  sat  in  front  of  the  works  looking  at  us,  and  we 
saw  their  generals  moving,  mounted,  with  their  staffs,  behind 
the  works.  We  had  seen  steeper  slopes  and  more  rugged 
ground  between  us  and  the  enemy,  and  had  seen  them  fully 
prepared  for  our  attacks,  before,  but  certainly  never  had  made 
ready  to  charge  a  more  formidable  position.  At  Fredericks- 
burg  I  think  the  artillery  could  not  have  hit  our  men  if  they 
once  had  reached  the  foot  of  Marye's  Heights,  but  here,  in 
fantry  and  artillery  would  have  fair  shooting  until  we  reached 
the  muzzles  of  the  guns.  Our  men,  who  had  been  told  that 


52      THE  MINE  RUN  CAMPAIGN,  NOVEMBER,  1863 

they  were  to  charge,  were  piling  their  knapsacks  on  the  ground 
that  they  might  be  unincumbered  in  the  charge,  and  were  pin 
ning  on  their  blouses  slips  of  paper  with  their  names  written 
on  them.  I  never  saw  anything  more  impressively  character 
izing  our  volunteers.  Men  who,  knowing  the  danger  they  were 
to  meet,  could,  in  cold  blood,  evince  their  determination  to 
do  their  whole  duty,  by  labelling  their  bodies  for  the  grave- 
diggers. 

"  General  Warren  indicated  a  hill,  about  fifty  yards  in  rear 
of  the  centre  of  the  line,  as  his  post  in  the  action,  and  we  of 
the  staff  noted  that  not  only  was  it  within  easy  range  of  the 
enemy's  guns,  but  also  that  there  was  a  battery  posted  on  it 
so  that  we  should  have  a  fine  fire  on  us.  We  were  to  be  de 
spatched —  one  to  each  division  commander  —  all  at  the  same 
moment,  with  the  order  to  charge.  With  these  facts  before 
us  we  followed  the  General  to  the  hill,  and  dismounting,  lay 
with  our  bridles  on  our  arms  waiting  for  the  time  to  come. 
.  .  .  The  hour  for  the  opening  of  the  artillery  [on  the  right] 
arrived  and  we  heard  nothing  for  an  hour  more,  and  then  it 
opened  with  a  great  noise.  As  sixty  minutes  had  nearly  flown 
we  anxiously  looked  at  our  watches,  but  we  might  have  spared 
ourselves  the  trouble,  for,  when  the  hour  came,  no  one  stirred, 
and  half  an  hour  later  ...  I  found  the  General  had  gone, 
.  .  .  and  believing  nothing  was  to  be  done  for  the  present  I 
went  to  the  rear  to  look  after  my  train.  As  I  struck  the  Plank 
road  I  met  General  Meade  riding  to  the  front  looking  as  sav 
age  as  any  one  could,  accompanied  by  a  few  of  his  staff.  They 
were  riding  hard  and  had  come  across  from  Robertson's  Tavern 
without  escort  I  judge.  ...  I  was  told  afterwards  that  Gen 
eral  Warren  had  determined  not  to  charge,  on  his  own  au 
thority,  and  had  so  sent  word  to  General  Meade,  and  that  the 
latter  was  riding  to  meet  him ;  that  Warren  then  offered  to 
charge  if  Meade  would  then  tell  him  to  do  so,  and  that  the 
latter  declining  to  do  this,  [and  though  he]  expressed  himself 
as  disappointed  in  the  extreme  that  Warren  had  not  charged, 


THE  MINE  RUN  CAMPAIGN,  NOVEMBER,  1863     53 

.  .  .  refused  to  look  at  the  position  and  directed  a  retreat. 
I  was  also  told  that  at  the  time  appointed  for  our  charge, 
French,  whose  divisions  Meade  had  given  to  Warren  .  .  . 
taunted  Meade  with  4  Where  are  your  young  Napoleons'  guns, 
why  don't  they  open  ?'  ...  I  do  not  wonder  that  he  was 
raging  as  he  rode  to  meet  Warren  who  theretofore  had  been 
his  favorite.  .  .  .  General  Warren  was  a  ...  brilliant  and 
ambitious  soldier,  but  .  .  .  was  always  ready  to  set  up  his 
own  judgment  against  that  of  his  superior  officers,  and  this 
failing  was  what,  I  suppose,  brought  him  into  trouble  at  the 
end  of  his  brilliant  career  in  the  field,  .  .  .  but  on  this  occa 
sion  his  independence  waited  on,  and  his  ambition  gave  way 
to,  his  humanity,  and  in  my  estimation  he  displayed  more 
courage  in  refusing  to  make,  than  he  would  have  had  in  or 
dering,  the  assault.  In  command  of  nearly  one  half  the  army, 
the  youngest  major-general  in  it,  with  the  hopes  of  General 
Meade  resting  upon  his  action,  when  to  do  nothing  was  almost 
as  bad  as  defeat,  with  such  orders  that  the  responsibility  for 
defeat  would  have  rested  on  General  Meade  wholly,  or  in  part ; 
with  a  command  full  of  courage,  and  believing  that,  with  vic 
tory,  he  would  be  the  greatest  man  in  the  army ;  he,  as  he 
afterwards  said  in  my  hearing,  when  he  rode  along  his  lines 
on  that  bright  morning  and  saw  the  enemy's  position,  thought 
of  the  wounded  who  were  frozen  at  Fredericksburg  and  re 
solved  not  to  risk  a  defeat." 

Meade's  army  having  lost  1272  killed  and  wounded  and 
381  missing,  recrossed  the  Rapidan  on  the  night  of  Decem 
ber  1  and  the  next  morning.  The  Confederate  corps  of  Ewell 
had  lost  601  killed  and  wounded.  There  is  no  report  of  the 
missing  or  the  losses  in  Hill's  corps.  E well's  and  Hill's  corps 
then  resumed  their  line  along  the  Rapidan  from  Morton's 
Ford  to  Barnett's  Ford.  Longstreet,  with  two  divisions  re 
turning  from  Tennessee,  took  position  in  reserve  at  Gordons- 
ville  in  April.  Lee's  army  was  thus  posted  when  the  Union 
army  under  Grant  entered  the  Wilderness  in  May,  1864. 


54      THE  MINE  RUN  CAMPAIGN,  NOVEMBER,  1863 

Crossing  at  Germanna  and  Ely  Fords,  instead  of  turning  up 
the  Turnpike  to  strike  the  right  of  Lee's  army  where  it  lay, 
as  was  done  in  the  Mine  Run  campaign,  Grant  attempted,  by 
pushing  through  the  Wilderness  to  the  south,  to  turn  Lee's 
right  and  at  the  same  time  draw  him  to  battle  in  the  open 
country  beyond  the  forest ;  but  Lee  took  the  offensive  in  mov 
ing  by  the  Turnpike  and  Plank  road  against  the  marching 
columns  and  thus  forced  the  battle  in  the  Wilderness  in  which 
neither  side  gained  ground.  It  is  a  debatable  question  whether 
it  would  not  have  been  better  for  Lee,  when  the  direction  of 
Grant's  march  was  determined,  to  have  intrenched  in  his  path 
for  a  defensive  battle  in  the  open  country,  as  he  had  done  in 
November  at  Mine  Run,  and  as  he  did  at  Spottsylvania  three 
days  later  to  forestall  the  resumption  of  Grant's  march  onward. 


V 
THE  MINE  RUN  AFFAIR 

BY 

CHARLES   L.   PEIRSON 

COLONEL  THIRTY-NINTH  MASSACHUSETTS  VOLUNTEERS  AND  BREVET 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL 


Read  before  the  Society  April  4,  1916 


THE   MINE   KUN  AFFAIR 

IT  is  hard  to  find  an  event  of  the  Civil  War  that  has  not 
already  been  described  over  and  over  again  by  much  abler 
h  ands  than  mine.  Such  description  from  me,  therefore,  is  of 
no  value  except  that  which  arises  from  the  fact  that  the  writer 
was  a  participant  in  the  action  and  can  add  a  personality  to 
his  account  which,  owing  to  the  lapse  of  years,  may  give  it 
some  interest. 

My  theme  will  be  the  Mine  Run  Affair.  It  took  place  on 
November  26,  1863,  and  the  following  days. 

Major-General  George  G.  Meade,  having  won  the  battle  of 
Gettysburg,  did  not  attack  General  Robert  E.  Lee  during  his 
passage  of  the  Potomac  River  in  retreat,  because  of  the  un 
certainty  of  further  recruiting  his  army  as  shown  by  the  New 
York  riots,  and  for  the  reason  that  a  reverse  to  our  army, 
while  it  was  so  near  the  Capital,  would  influence  foreign  rec 
ognition  of  the  Confederacy  in  their  favor.  General  Meade 
prepared  to  delay  his  attack  upon  Lee  until  later  when,  hav 
ing  followed  him  from  Gettysburg,  he  should  find  some  favor 
able  opportunity  at  a  little  more  distance  from  the  city  of 
Washington,  being,  however,  fully  determined  to  attack  him 
on  the  first  favorable  occasion  which  presented  itself.  This 
General  Meade  told  me  himself  when  I  met  him  in  Boston 
shortly  after  the  war. 

My  regiment  was  at  Gettysburg,  and  I  had  an  opportunity 
of  talking  with  General  John  Sedgwick,  upon  whose  staff  I 
had  previously  served,  and  upon  whom  I  called  while  he  was 
with  his  corps  at  a  little  place  called  Funkstown. 

General  Sedgwick  said  to  me  that  on  that  day  there  had 
been  a  consultation  among  the  general  officers,  and  all  had 
agreed  (Wadsworth  and  Howard  excepted)  that  General  Lee, 


58  THE  MINE  RUN  AFFAIR 

while  his  force  was  crossing  the  river,  held  a  commanding 
position,  much  superior  to  that  of  the  Union  army,  and  that 
his  troops  were  in  the  best  of  fighting  condition.  They  nearly 
all  agreed  with  General  Meade  that  to  follow  Lee  and  attack 
later  was  the  wisest  plan. 

If  at  the  time  of  Gettysburg  we  could  have  forced  Lee  to 
recross  the  river,  that  would  have  been  all  that  we  could  have 
then  asked,  while  now  we  had  badly  defeated  him  besides. 
This  bagging  an  army,  your  equal  in  numbers,  is  a  hard  thing 
to  do,  and  no  soldier  expects  to  do  it. 

The  country  between  the  Rapidan  and  the  Rappahannock 
Rivers  had  been  traversed  to  and  fro  for  some  months  by  the 
Union  and  Confederate  armies. 

Early  in  August,  1863,  a  disagreement  sprang  up  between 
General  Lee  and  the  Confederate  Cabinet,  and  Lee  tendered 
his  resignation.  He  desired  to  retire  to  the  line  of  the  James 
River,  while  President  Jefferson  Davis  insisted  upon  his  de 
fending  the  line  of  the  Rappahannock.  Much  recrimination 
existed  in  the  Confederacy  in  regard  to  the  immense  loss  occa 
sioned  by  the  advance  into  and  retirement  from  Pennsylvania. 
Prior  to  their  return  there  were  indications  of  the  intentions 
of  the  rebels  to  retire  beyond  the  Rapidan,  and  all  agreed  that 
the  line  of  the  Rapidan  would  only  be  defended  for  the  pur 
pose  of  retarding  the  movements  of  the  Union  forces. 

During  this  period  of  inactivity,  General  Meade  was  in 
constant  receipt  of  advice  and  suggestions  from  the  promi 
nent  officials  at  Washington,  and  he  finally  wrote  to  Major- 
General  Halleck,  October  18, 1863 :  "  If  you  have  any  orders 
to  give  me,  I  am  prepared  to  receive  them,  but  I  must  insist 
on  being  spared  the  infliction  of  such  truisms  in  the  guise 
of  opinions  as  you  have  recently  honored  me  with,  particularly 
as  they  were  not  asked  for.  ...  If  my  course,  based  upon  my 
own  judgment,  does  not  meet  with  approval,  I  ought  to  be, 
and  I  desire  to  be,  relieved  from  command."  l  The  correspond- 
i  49  W.  R.  346. 


THE  MINE  RUN  AFFAIR  59 

ence  shows  that  General  Meade  had  but  little  patience,  and 
that  General  Halleck  was  without  that  charming  trait  —  a 
sense  of  humor  —  indeed,  as  devoid  of  it  as  are  the  Ten 
Commandments. 

In  September,  1863,  the  President  suspended  the  writ  of 
Habeas  Corpus  for  the  duration  of  the  war  in  support  of  the 
new  Conscription  Laws.  The  authorities  would  not  use  force 
to  raise  men  for  the  war,  thus  causing  riots  in  New  York  City, 
to  quell  which  and  to  enforce  the  draft  troops  were  sent  from 
the  army  at  the  front. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac,  therefore,  followed  the  Con 
federate  army,  and  crossed  the  Rapidan  River  in  the  latter 
part  of  November,  and  after  some  fighting,  both  armies  were, 
at  the  end  of  the  month,  facing  each  other  near  Mine  Run. 

At  this  period  I  received  a  detail  as  division  officer  of  the 
day. 

An  orderly  from  division  headquarters  came  bearing  an 
order  to  me.  He  was  leading  a  white  horse  for  my  use,  as  our 
horses  were  not  then  in  the  front  line.  I  rode  just  in  rear  of 
the  picket  line  until  the  bullets  came  too  thickly,  when  I  dis 
mounted,  walked,  and  crawled  the  rest  of  the  way.  I  remem 
ber  that,  wishing  to  cross  a  little  elevation,  I  put  my  cap  upon 
my  sword,  raising  it  to  discover  the  safety  of  the  situation, 
when  it  was  immediately  the  target  for  three  or  four  bullets 
whereupon  I  contented  myself  with  a  more  roundabout  way. 

It  was  very  cold  weather ;  some  of  the  men  in  the  picket 
line  were  frozen  to  death  in  their  little  shelters  before  they 
could  be  relieved. 

Arriving  at  the  proper  place,  I  moved  the  picket  line  for 
ward  after  a  little  fight,  driving  the  enemy  over  and  beyond 
a  little  stream  which,  with  the  assistance  of  a  few  pioneers, 
was  bridged  for  the  passage  of  troops.  In  this  work  I  some 
how  contrived  to  fall  from  the  bridge  into  the  stream,  becoming 
a  mass  of  icicles  in  two  minutes. 

Moving  the  line  still  farther  ahead  before  reporting  upon 


60  THE  MINE  RUN  AFFAIR 

the  situation,  I  discovered  that  the  stream  was  only  a  branch 
and  that  the  main  stream  had  yet  to  be  bridged.  Just  at  that 
moment,  to  my  great  delight,  I  received  orders  to  fall  back, 
as  the  intention  to  attack  was  abandoned,  and  I  returned  to 
headquarters. 

General  Meade  says  of  the  situation,  before  he  crossed  the 
Rapidan :  — 

"  General  Lee  held  the  line  of  the  Rapidan  River  from 
Morton's  Ford  to  Liberty  Mills,  which  is  about  west  from 
Orange  Court  House.  He  had  abandoned  the  lower  fords  of 
the  river,  but  depended  for  the  defence  of  his  right  flank 
upon  a  line  of  intrenchments  that  he  had  constructed  perpen 
dicular  to  the  river  at  Morton's  Ford,  and  extending  to  a 
place  called  Bartlett's  Mills  on  Mine  Run,  which  is  a  small 
tributary  of  the  Rapidan.  My  plan  was  to  cross  the  river  in 
three  columns,  to  unite  at  a  common  point  below  his  intrench 
ments,  and  there  advancing  rapidly,  attack  him  before  he  could 
put  up  any  intrenchments.  The  plan  was  a  good  one,  but 
owing  to  the  failure  of  others  to  whom  its  execution  was  neces 
sarily  entrusted,  it  failed.  After  I  came  up  with  the  enemy, 
one  corps  commander,  in  whose  opinion  I  had  the  highest  con 
fidence  [General  Warren],  reported  that  there  was  not  the 
slightest  doubt  that  he  could  carry  the  enemy's  works  in  his 
front,  and  he  was  given  28,000  men  and  directed  to  begin  his 
attack  the  next  morning  at  eight  o'clock.  At  the  same  time 
another  attack  was  to  be  made  by  15,000  men  at  a  point  where 
the  enemy  was  evidently  not  fully  prepared. 

"  On  the  eventful  morning,  just  as  the  attack  was  about  to 
be  made,  I  received  a  despatch  from  the  officer  commanding 
the  28,000  men  saying  that  he  had  changed  his  opinion ;  that 
the  attack  was  so  hopeless  that  he  had  assumed  the  responsi 
bility  of  suspending  it  until  further  orders  were  received.  This 
astounding  intelligence  reached  me  just  ten  minutes  before 
the  hour  of  attacking,  and  barely  in  time  to  suspend  the  other 
attack,  which  was  a  secondary  one,  and  even  if  successful  could 


THE  MINE  RUN  AFFAIR  61 

not  be  supported  with  so  large  a  portion  of  my  army  away  for 
the  main  attack.  This  lost  me  much  time,  during  which  the 
enemy  so  strengthened  the  part  threatened  by  the  secondary 
attack  as  to  render  it  nearly  as  strong  as  the  rest  of  the  line, 
and  to  have  almost  destroyed  the  before  possible  chances  of 
success.  I  could  not  move  any  farther  around  the  enemy's 
flank  for  want  of  roads,  and  with  the  possibility  at  this  season 
of  the  year  of  a  storm,  which  would  render  the  locomotion  off 
the  prepared  roads  a  matter  of  impossibility,  I  determined  to 
and  did  withdraw  my  army.  If  I  had  thought  there  was  any 
reasonable  degree  or  possibility  of  success,  I  would  have  at 
tacked.  I  did  not  think  so.  On  the  contrary,  I  knew  that  it 
would  result  in  a  useless  slaughter  of  brave  men,  and  result 
in  a  serious  disaster  to  the  army.  In  every  instance  where  we 
have  attacked  the  enemy  in  an  intrenched  position,  we  have 
failed,  except  in  Hancock's  attack  on  Spottsylvania,  which  was 
a  surprise  discreditable  to  the  Confederate  army." 

Another  instance  is  Bunker  Hill,  where  General  Sir  Wil 
liam  Howe  attacked  General  Washington's  army.  The  English 
troops  were  faultlessly  brave,  but  their  officers  appear  to  have 
been  ignorant  of  what  seems  to  us,  with  our  Civil  War  expe 
rience,  the  ordinary  military  movement  of  turning  a  flank. 

All  of  General  Meade's  prominent  officers  agreed  with  him 
as  to  the  in  feasibility  of  attacking  the  works  at  Mine  Run. 

Major-GeneralJohn  Sedgwick  commanding  the  Sixth  Corps, 
says :  "  I  took  my  position  on  the  right  of  the  Second  Corps, 
in  front  of  the  enemy  on  Mine  Run.  The  enemy's  position  in 
my  front  was  one  of  great  natural  strength  and  extensively 
intrenched.  The  condition  of  supplies  of  forage  and  subsist 
ence,  and  the  impossibility  of  replenishing  them  in  our  then 
position,  rendering  all  further  offensive  movement  impracti 
cable,  and  a  return  to  our  base  of  supplies  being,  in  my  opinion, 
a  matter  of  necessity."1 

Major-General  John  Newton,  commanding  the  First  Corps, 
i  48  W.  R.  796-97. 


62  THE  MINE  RUN  AFFAIR 

testifies:  "  Mine  Run,  in  our  immediate  front,  for  men  singly 
on  foot,  was  impossible.  They  sank  in  water  and  mud  nearly 
to  their  shoulders  in  crossing."  1 

Major-General  George  Sykes,  commanding  the  Fifth  Army 
Corps,  on  December  4,  1863,  reported:  "  The  line  occupied  by 
the  rebels  on  Mine  Run  was  exceedingly  formidable,  .  .  .  and 
although  some  parts  of  it  might  have  been  assaulted  success 
fully,  it  would  have  been  at  great  sacrifice  of  life  and  might 
not  have  determined  a  favorable  issue  for  a  general  battle."  2 

My  own  experience  is  taken  from  a  home  letter  dated  De 
cember  4,  1863,  and  from  my  own  recollections :  "Once  more 
safe,  sound,  and  comfortable,  after  a  week  of  danger  and  hard 
ship.  We  crossed  the  Rappahannock  on  Thanksgiving  Day, 
and  reached  the  Rapidan  River  —  crossing  that  after  dark 
without  opposition.  Notice  was  given  to  the  troops  of  Grant's 
victories,  and  under  such  influences  we  took  our  hard  tack 
as  cheerfully  as  we  ever  did  the  best  of  Thanksgiving  dinners. 

"  Hard  Tack.  Had  this  word  been  then  in  existence,  the 
comprehensive  dictionary  of  the  English  language  by  the  late 
Dr.  Samuel  Johnson,  would  doubtless  have  defined  it  thus : 
Hard  Tack.  A  kind  of  bread  used  as  food  by  soldiers  and 
sometimes  given  to  horses.  My  own  ardent  association  with  it 
can  be  paraphrased  thus  :  — 

The  old  oaken  Hard  Tack, 
The  iron-bound  Hard  Tack, 
The  moss-covered  Hard  Tack 
That  we  knew  so  well. 

"  The  next  day  we  marched  to  Robertson's  Tavern,  and  for 
three  following  days  remained  there  in  line  of  battle,  sup 
porting  the  artillery  of  our  centre.  The  enemy  lay  in  plain 
sight  in  strong  intrenchments  about  one  mile  off,  while  our 
pickets  were  within  half  gunshot  of  each  other.  I  was  in  charge 
of  the  division  picket  line  on  the  day  ordered  for  the  battle, 
and  had  to  advance  the  line,  crossing  a  stream  in  our  front, 
i  48  W.  R.  689.  2  48  W.  R.  795> 


THE  MINE  RUN  AFFAIR  63 

which  the  rebels  relied  upon  as  a  part  of  their  defence.  I,  of 
course,  got  shot  at  considerably,  but  with  my  usual  good  for 
tune  escaped  with  no  injury.  It  was  bitterly  cold ;  our  pickets 
could  have  no  fires,  and  could  not  be  relieved  with  safety  at 
night.  Some  men  of  the  Fifth  Corps  were  actually  frozen  to 
death  that  night.  I  was  ordered  to  build  two  bridges  across 
the  stream,  Mine  Run,  and  then  ordered  to  destroy  them  — 
both  of  which  orders  I  obeyed,  but  in  superintending  the  latter, 
fell  into  the  Run  and  immediately  became  a  mass  of  icicles. 
The  order  for  the  battle  was  countermanded,  and  the  next 
night  we  fell  back  to  the  Rapidan,  crossing  in  the  morning. 
There  is  a  feeling  of  disappointment  in  the  army  caused  by  our 
retiring  without  a  battle,  as  the  army  was  never  better  able 
or  more  willing  to  fight  one.  It  is  to  be  considered  that  we  were 
cut  off  from  our  base  and  almost  out  of  rations,  and  in  a  wilder 
ness  with  two  rivers  in  our  rear.  The  ration  question  came  to 
be  a  very  serious  one  before  we  came  up  with  our  wagon  trains, 
three  days'  rations  having  to  last  five  days.  I  saw  men  pick 
ing  up  oats  in  deserted  cavalry  camps,  and  acorns  and  these 
were  the  only  food  for  two  days.  Some  men  went  without  food 
for  more  than  twenty-four  hours,  while  marching  all  the  time. 
We  were  very  much  used  up  when  we  arrived  last  night ;  nev 
ertheless  three  hundred  of  my  regiment  (39th  Massachusetts) 
went  immediately  on  picket  without  rations.  General  Baxter's 
brigade  of  our  division  forded  the  Rappahannock  last  night 
waist-deep,  and  back  again  this  morning.  I  forgot  to  mention 
that  my  regiment  had  the  honor  of  covering  the  passage  of 
the  army  across  the  Germanna  Ford  of  the  Rapidan.  The 
enemy  crossed  the  Rapidan  in  force  after  us,  and  were  expect 
ing  to  occupy  their  winter  quarters,  but  unfortunately  for 
them,  we  occupy  them  ourselves.  I  dread  the  monotony  of 
winter  quarters,  and  shall  be  glad  to  go  South  or  anywhere 
to  avoid  it." 

My  feeling  is  that  we  ought  to  be  grateful  that  the  battle 
of  Mine  Run  never  was  fought,  since  with  the  great  number 


64  THE  MINE  RUN  AFFAIR 

of  men  engaged,  the  loss  of  life  would  have  been  unprece 
dented,  and  the  result  indeterminate.  General  Lee  had  per 
haps  50,000  men  and  General  Meade  70,000  men,  and  these 
two  great  armies  were  facing  each  other  in  full  sight.  The 
intrenched  position  of  the  Confederate  force  made  up  for  the 
deficiency  in  men. 

If  General  Warren  had  not  had  the  courage  to  express  his 
opinion  of  the  uncertainty  of  the  issue  after  having  already 
given  his  deliberate  judgment  as  in  favor  of  an  attack,  the 
struggle  would  have  taken  place  and  there  would  have  been 
mourning  throughout  the  land,  with  nothing  to  show  for  it. 

This  paper  should  be  read  as  a  supplement  to  that  of 
General  George  B.  Davis  on  "  The  Mine  Run  Campaign." 
(M.  H.  M.  490  et  seq.) 


VI 

THE  RELIEF  OF  CHATTANOOGA,  OCTOBER,  1863 

AND 

GUERRILLA  OPERATIONS  IN  TENNESSEE 

BY 

COLONEL  CHARLES  F.  MORSE 

SECOND  MASSACHUSETTS  VOLUNTEERS 


Read  before  the  Society  January  5,  1915 


THE  RELIEF  OF  CHATTANOOGA,  OCTOBER,  1863 

AND 

GUERRILLA  OPERATIONS  IN  TENNESSEE 

THE  battle  of  Chickamauga  was  fought  September  19  and 
20,  1863,  and,  as  we  all  know,  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
under  General  Rosecrans  was  defeated  and  driven  back  to 
the  defences  of  Chattanooga  by  General  Bragg,  whose  army 
had  been  heavily  reenforced  by  Longstreet  with  his  veteran 
corps  from  Virginia,  on  the  eve  of  that  battle. 

The  situation  of  Rosecrans  became  a  very  serious  one,  as 
his  army  was  now  practically  besieged.  With  the  exception 
of  the  strong  fortifications  about  Chattanooga,  the  enemy  was 
in  full  control  of  the  country  south  of  the  Tennessee  River, 
from  Missionary  Ridge  on  his  right,  to  Bridgeport,  where  the 
railroad  from  Nashville  crosses  that  river,  on  his  left.  Bridge 
port  is  in  the  northeast  corner  of  Alabama,  and  this  point 
became  the  base  of  supplies  for  the  army  of  Rosecrans.  Every 
pound  of  rations  for  the  soldiers  and  all  forage  for  the  ani 
mals,  together  with  ammunition  and  supplies  of  every  other 
kind  for  the  army,  had  to  be  hauled  over  a  rough,  circuitous 
mountain  road,  north  of  the  river,  a  distance  of  sixty  miles. 
The  difficulties  of  the  situation  were  greatly  enhanced  by  the 
heavy  rains  which  occurred  that  season,  and  which  made  the 
road  almost  impassable  for  loaded  teams. 

When  it  became  known  that  Longstreet  was  with  Bragg  at 
the  battle  of  Chickamauga,  preparations  were  made  to  ree'n- 
force  Rosecrans,  and  September  25,  the  Eleventh  and  Twelfth 
Corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  were  started  west  for  this 
purpose  and  with  the  special  view  of  protecting  his  communi 
cations  with  Nashville. 


68      THE  RELIEF  OF  CHATTANOOGA,   OCTOBER,  1863 

General  Howard  was  in  command  of  the  Eleventh  Corps, 
General  Slocum  of  the  Twelfth  Corps,  and  both  corps  were 
under  the  command  of  General  Hooker. 

On  the  arrival  of  these  troops  in  Tennessee,  the  Eleventh 
Corps  and  the  Second  Division  of  the  Twelfth,  were  concen 
trated  at  Stevenson  and  Bridgeport,  where  supplies  were  be 
ing  accumulated ;  the  First  Division  of  the  Twelfth  Corps  was 
scattered  by  regiments  along  the  railroad  all  the  way  from 
Nashville  to  Bridgeport,  a  distance  of  123  miles,  to  protect 
it  from  raids  by  Wheeler's  cavalry  and  from  guerrilla  bands, 
which  were  very  numerous  all  through  this  part  of  the  country. 

After  the  retreat  to  Chattanooga,  Rosecrans  seemed  to  be 
in  a  paralyzed  condition  so  far  as  any  efforts  to  relieve  the 
situation  were  concerned,  and  he  did  nothing  actively  to  help 
matters,  even  after  the  arrival  of  Hooker's  command  in  the 
vicinity  of  Bridgeport.  Bragg  brought  his  lines  close  in  front 
of  Chattanooga,  and  though  he  did  not  seem  inclined  to  at 
tack  this  strong  position,  he  waited  confidently  for  our  army 
to  be  starved  out  and  surrender,  or  begin  a  disastrous  retreat 
through  the  mountains.  It  was  literally  becoming  a  condition 
of  starvation,  as  the  soldiers  were  on  the  shortest  possible 
rations  and  forage  for  the  animals  was  entirely  exhausted. 
The  road  from  Bridgeport  to  Chattanooga  was  strewn  with 
dead  mules  and  horses  which  had  given  out  along  the  line  or 
had  been  picked  off  by  shots  from  guerrillas,  who  were  very 
busy  in  their  operations  at  this  time.  The  artillery  horses  in 
Chattanooga  had  practically  all  died  of  starvation,  and  if  a 
retreat  had  been  attempted  the  guns  would  have  been  aban 
doned.  Altogether  the  situation  was  most  critical  and  Rose 
crans  seemed  incapable  of  grappling  with  it. 

The  occasion  called  for  a  man,  and  on  October  16,  an  or 
der  of  the  War  Department  created  the  Military  Division  of 
the  Mississippi,  with  Grant,  fresh  from  his  victorious  Vicks- 
burg  campaign,  in  command.  In  the  same  order,  by  Grant's 
suggestion,  Rosecrans  was  relieved  and  Thomas  placed  in 


THE  RELIEF  OF  CHATTANOOGA,   OCTOBER,   1863     69 

command  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  One  of  Grant's 
first  acts  was  to  telegraph  to  Thomas  that  Chattanooga  must 
be  held  at  all  hazards,  and  the  prompt  response  from  General 
Thomas,  which  has  become  historic,  was,  "  We  will  hold  the 
town  till  we  starve."  Those  who  knew  Thomas  had  no  ques 
tion  but  that  he  would  do  this. 

A  few  days  later,  October  21,  Grant  reached  Bridgeport 
and  made  a  personal  inspection  of  the  situation,  going  over 
the  road  from  there  to  Chattanooga.  He  gave  immediate 
orders  for  opening  more  direct  communication  with  Bridge 
port,  and  this  was  effected  in  pursuance  of  a  plan  which 
had  previously  been  carefully  worked  out  by  General  W.  F. 
Smith,  Chief  Engineer  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  and 
which  was  fully  approved  by  General  Grant.  Chattanooga  is 
on  the  south  bank  of  the  Tennessee  River,  and  at  that  time 
was  connected  with  the  north  side  by  a  bridge,  over  which  all 
supplies  for  the  army  were  hauled.  About  six  miles  below  the 
city,  beyond  the  base  of  Lookout  Mountain,  was  Brown's 
Ferry,  and  a  few  miles  farther  west  was  Kelley's  Ferry,  a 
good  road  connecting  both  of  these  ferries  with  Chattanooga. 
From  Kelley's  Ferry  to  Bridgeport  the  river  was  navigable  for 
small  steamboats,  but  from  this  ferry  to  Brown's  Ferry  the 
current  was  so  swift  through  the  mountain  pass  that  further 
navigation  was  regarded  as  impracticable.  The  problem  then 
was  to  control  the  country  south  of  the  river  from  Bridge 
port  to  Brown's  Ferry,  and  this  problem  was  quickly  solved. 

General  Grant  ordered  Hooker  with  his  command  to  cross 
the  river  at  Bridgeport,  October  26,  and  begin  his  eastward 
march  to  Brown's  Ferry.  At  about  the  same  time  General 
Palmer  with  his  division  was  ordered  to  march  from  Chat 
tanooga  by  a  back  road  north  of  the  river  in  the  direction  of 
Bridgeport,  crossing  the  river  at  a  point  opposite  Whitesides, 
a  station  on  the  railroad,  to  protect  the  latter  after  Hooker 
had  passed  on  his  eastward  march.  General  Smith  was  placed 
in  full  charge  of  the  movement  from  Chattanooga. 


70     THE  RELIEF  OF  CHATTANOOGA,   OCTOBER,  1863 

Before  daylight,  October  27,  sixty  pontoons,  with  thirty 
men  in  each,  under  command  of  General  Hazen,  started  to 
float  down  the  river  to  Brown's  Ferry,  passing  the  picket  of 
the  enemy.  By  keeping  under  the  shadow  of  the  north  bank 
this  was  successfully  effected  under  cover  of  darkness,  and  at 
about  five  o'clock  in  the  morning  Hazen's  men  surprised  and 
captured  the  rebel  pickets  at  the  Ferry.  Simultaneously  with 
this  movement,  General  Smith  with  about  two  thousand  men 
marched  from  Chattanooga  by  a  road  well  concealed  from  the 
enemy  on  Lookout  Mountain  on  the  north  side  of  the  river 
to  Brown's  Ferry,  where  he  arrived  at  about  the  same  time 
with  Hazen's  command.  Smith's  troops  were  quickly  ferried 
over  the  river,  and  the  united  forces  on  the  south  bank  took 
possession  of  and  fortified  a  hill  which  commanded  the  Ferry. 
A  pontoon  bridge  was  speedily  built  and  direct  communica 
tion  established  with  Chattanooga. 

Howard's  corps  of  Hooker's  command  reached  the  vicinity 
of  Brown's  Ferry  the  afternoon  of  October  28  and  Geary's 
division  of  the  Twelfth  Corps  was  halted  near  Wauhatchie 
station  a  few  miles  distant.  The  enemy's  pickets  along  the 
river  from  Brown's  Ferry  to  Bridgeport  were  all  cut  off  from 
their  supports  by  this  movement  of  Hooker's  and  soon  came 
in  and  surrendered. 

As  soon  as  a  connection  was  made  between  the  troops  from 
the  east  and  from  the  west,  steamers  were  started  from  Bridge 
port  with  supplies,  which  were  carried  as  far  as  Kelley's  Ferry 
by  river  and  thence  by  wagon  to  Chattanooga.  The  mule  teams 
of  Hooker's  command,  which  had  been  well  fed  and  were  in 
good  condition,  were  used  for  the  wagon  portion  of  the  trans 
portation. 

These  operations  opened  the  "  Cracker  Line  "  as  the  sol 
diers  called  it,  and  within  a  week's  time  the  army  of  General 
Thomas  was  receiving  full  rations,  with  a  supply  of  clothing, 
and  the  situation  at  Chattanooga  was  wholly  changed.  This 
plan  for  opening  communications  was  well  designed  and  well 


THE  RELIEF  OF  CHATTANOOGA,  OCTOBER,  1863     71 

executed,  and  Grant  gives  W.  F.  Smith  the  whole  credit  for 
its  conception  ;  but,  although  previously  submitted  to  General 
Rosecrans,  the  latter,  with  the  same  means  at  his  command, 
failed  to  take  advantage  of  it.  Rosecrans  was  an  able  strate 
gist  and  a  fine  man,  with  great  personal  popularity,  but  he 
lacked  the  instincts  of  a  soldier  in  times  of  serious  emergency. 
Grant,  with  his  quick  perceptions  and  underlying  common 
sense,  had  these  qualities  in  large  measure. 

The  enemy  was  wholly  surprised  by  Grant's  quick  action, 
and  Hooker  encountered  no  serious  opposition  in  his  march 
from  Bridgeport,  but  after  connection  was  made  with  Chat 
tanooga  a  serious  night  attack  was  made  on  Geary's  division 
and  a  portion  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  which  came  to  its  sup 
port,  by  troops  of  Longstreet's  corps  near  Wauhatchie.  This 
attack  developed  into  a  battle  of  considerable  magnitude,  but 
after  fierce  fighting  the  enemy  was  defeated  and  driven  from 
the  field.  In  this  battle  the  Thirty-third  Massachusetts  distin 
guished  itself  by  a  gallant  charge  up  a  steep  hill,  and  its 
commander,  the  brave  Colonel  Underwood,  was  seriously 
wounded.  General  Thomas,  in  a  congratulatory  order  to  the 
troops  engaged  in  this  battle,  says :  "  The  bayonet  charge  of 
Howard's  troops,  made  up  the  side  of  a  steep  and  difficult 
hill  over  two  hundred  feet  high,  completely  routing  the  enemy 
from  his  barricade  on  its  top,  and  the  repulse  by  Geary  of 
greatly  superior  numbers  who  attempted  to  surprise  him,  will 
rank  among  the  most  distinguished  feats  of  arms  of  this  war.'* 

This  was  the  first  action  in  which  the  soldiers  of  the  Elev 
enth  and  Twelfth  Corps  were  engaged  since  leaving  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  and  it  gave  them  a  standing  with  the  West 
ern  army  which  was  fully  sustained  in  the  subsequent  cam 
paigns  with  Sherman. 

After  the  relief  of  Chattanooga  soon  followed  the  success- 

O 

ful  battles  of  Lookout  Mountain  and  Missionary  Ridge ;  also 
the  raising  of  the  siege  of  Knoxville,  where  Burnside  with  his 


72          GUERRILLA   OPERATIONS  IN  TENNESSEE 

command  had  experienced  nearly  the  same  starvation  condi 
tions  as  those  of  the  army  at  Chattanooga.  These  operations 
of  Grant  opened  the  way  for  Sherman's  great  campaigns  of 
1864,  and  the  year  in  Tennessee  closed  much  more  cheerfully 
for  the  Union  army  than  seemed  possible  in  the  gloomy  period 
which  succeeded  the  battle  of  Chickamauga. 

Tennessee  next  to  Virginia  was  the  fighting  ground  of  the 
Civil  War.  From  the  capture  of  Fort  Henry  and  Fort  Donel- 
son  in  February,  1862,  to  the  final  rout  of  Hood's  army  by 
General  Thomas  in  December,  1864,  there  was  hardly  a  month 
during  the  entire  war  period  when  there  was  not  fighting  of 
greater  or  less  importance  somewhere  in  the  State.  There  was 
a  large  Union  element  in  Tennessee ;  in  fact,  the  mountain 
region  of  East  Tennessee  had  mostly  a  Union  population,  and 
there  was  a  good  sprinkling  of  Union  men  through  the  central 
part  of  the  State. 

These  two  opposing  elements  in  the  population  and  the 
constant  warfare  for  four  years  developed  great  numbers  of 
guerrillas  all  through  the  State,  and  a  complete  story  of  their 
operations  would  be  a  record  of  bloody  outrage  and  cruelty. 
These  guerrillas  differed  in  their  methods  from  those  of  Vir 
ginia  ;  in  the  latter  State  Mosby's  men  were  entitled  to  be 
called  partisan  troops,  as  they  operated  in  considerable  num 
bers  in  a  regular  organization  and,  besides  making  raids  on 
our  communications,  were  always  ready  for  a  fight  when  they 
encountered  our  cavalry.  Mosby,  besides  being  a  good  fighter, 
was  something  of  a  humorist,  and  some  of  his  actions  and 
messages  to  our  quartermasters  and  others  are  interesting  and 
amusing.  No  doubt  there  was  occasional  brutality  by  some  of 
his  men,  but  on  the  whole  his  prisoners  were  well  treated, 
after  being  deprived  of  whatever  they  might  possess  of  value. 

In  Tennessee  it  was  different.  The  guerrillas  generally 
moved  about  in  small  bands  with  little  or  no  organization. 
They  made  raids  on  the  railroads,  wrecked  trains,  and  cap 
tured  occasionally  some  of  our  soldiers,  but  a  great  deal  of 


GUERRILLA   OPERATIONS  IN  TENNESSEE         73 

their  activity  was  directed  against  Union  men  in  localities  not 
within  the  protection  of  our  army.  As  previously  stated,  the 
First  Division  of  the  Twelfth  Corps,  when  it  reached  Tennes 
see  from  Virginia  in  September,  1863,  was  posted,  in  small 
detachments  of  a  regiment  or  less,  at  different  points  along 
the  entire  line  of  railroad  from  Nashville  to  Bridgeport.  At 
these  points  small  earthworks  or  block  houses  were  constructed 
and  the  railroad  was  operated  to  its  full  limited  capacity  dur 
ing  the  autumn  and  winter  months  of  1863-64  ;  but  it  was  a 
single-track  line  and  it  was  necessary  to  guard  it  at  every 
point  to  insure  a  regular  supply  of  rations  for  the  men  and 
forage  for  the  animals. 

There  was  no  serious  attack  on  the  line  during  the  winter, 
but  it  was  threatened  at  all  times  by  detachments  of  Wheel 
er's  cavalry  and  by  the  numerous  bands  of  guerrillas  which 
then  infested  that  part  of  Tennessee. 

General  Slocum,  who  commanded  the  Twelfth  Corps,  had 
his  headquarters  at  Tullahoma  that  winter,  and  for  a  portion 
of  that  time  I  was  Acting  Assistant  Adjutant-General  of  the 
corps,  which  made  me  familiar  with  the  events  which  I  will 
relate. 

The  importance  of  keeping  the  army  at  the  front  well  sup 
plied  with  forage,  combined  with  the  deficient  supply  of  roll 
ing  stock  on  the  railroad,  made  it  necessary  to  secure  as  much 
hay  and  other  forage  as  possible  from  the  country  adjacent  to 
the  line.  Such  supplies  were  regularly  receipted  for,  and  on 
reasonable  proof  of  loyalty,  were  paid  for  in  cash  by  the  quar 
termasters  at  the  different  posts.  The  country  surrounding 
Tullahoma  was  fairly  well  populated  and  many  of  the  people 
were  loyal  to  the  Government.  A  majority  of  them,  however, 
were  strongly  rebel  in  their  sentiments,  and  the  feeling  be 
tween  these  two  elements  of  the  population  was  very  intense. 

After  the  retreat  of  Bragg's  army  from  Stone's  River,  the 
loyal  citizens  had  become  somewhat  bolder,  but  this  was  fol 
lowed  by  such  a  series  of  cold-blooded  murders  and  other  out- 


74          GUERRILLA   OPERATIONS  IN  TENNESSEE 

rages  by  guerrilla  bands  that  at  the  time  of  which  I  write 
they  were  living  in  a  state  of  terror.  These  murders  of  citi 
zens  were  as  often  the  result  of  private  feuds  as  of  feeling 
aroused  by  the  condition  of  civil  war,  and  in  many  cases  the 
guerrillas  were  members  of  what  were  considered  the  best 
families  of  the  State.  Reports  were  frequently  brought  to 
General  Slocum's  headquarters  of  murders  and  other  outrages 
perpetrated  by  guerrillas,  in  which  Union  citizens  were  the 
victims,  but  these  were  usually  by  small  bands  which  would 
scatter  on  the  approach  of  any  military  force,  so  that  it  was 
rarely  possible  to  locate  them  and  bring  them  to  account. 
Their  rebel  friends  would  house  them  and  hide  them,  and  the 
loyal  citizens  did  not  dare  give  information  that  would  lead 
to  their  discovery,  for  fear  of  being  added  to  the  list  of  vic 
tims. 

An  unusually  brutal  outrage  which  occurred  late  in  Decem 
ber,  1863,  attracted  much  attention  from  the  military  author 
ities  and  led  to  such  vigorous  steps  being  taken  that  there  was 
a  considerable  suppression  of  guerrilla  activities  in  that  part 
of  Tennessee  thereafter. 

The  foraging  parties  which  were  sent  out  from  Tullahoma 
usually  consisted  of  a  small  wagon  train  with  an  officer  and 
detail  of  armed  men  as  guard,  but  after  many  expeditions  had 
been  made  that  encountered  no  signs  of  an  enemy,  proper  pre 
cautions  were  not  taken,  which  resulted  in  the  tragic  event 
which  I  will  relate.  Perhaps  the  story  can  be  best  told  by 
quoting  from  a  home  letter  written  at  the  time,  while  under 
the  full  influence  of  surrounding  conditions. 

The  letter  is  dated,  "  Tullahoma,  December  27th,  1863," 
and  is  as  follows :  — 

"  I  have  a  story  to  tell  you  now,  a  true  story,  —  a  tale  so 
strange  and  horrible  that,  if  woven  into  a  Scott's  or  Cooper's 
novel  and  laid  to  the  charge  of  wild  Highlandmen  or  wilder 
Indians,  would  have  seemed  of  almost  incredible  cruelty. 

"  The  troops  that  are  stationed  along  this  railroad  and  the 


GUERRILLA   OPERATIONS  IN  TENNESSEE         75 

adjacent  posts,  obtain  all  their  forage  (that  is,  hay,  corn,  and 
oats)  from  the  country ;  this,  of  course,  necessitates  the  con 
tinual  sending  out  of  forage  trains.  Last  Wednesday  a  train 
left  this  post  at  daylight  in  the  morning  and  went  out  into 
the  country  about  twenty  miles.  At  about  dark,  the  train, 
having  scattered  to  the  various  farms  to  load  up,  began  to 
gather  together  for  the  purpose  of  going  into  camp ;  three  of 
the  wagons  were  a  little  separated  from  the  rest.  With  the 
exception  of  the  officer  commanding  the  guard,  no  armed  men 
were  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  these  wagons.  Suddenly,  as 
they  were  going  through  a  narrow,  dark  part  of  the  road,  a 
party  of  guerrillas  darted  out  from  the  side,  seized  four  un 
armed  wagon  men  and  the  officer,  and  before  any  help  could 
arrive,  hurried  them  off  out  of  sight,  by  narrow,  unknown 
paths ;  even  with  daylight  it  would  have  been  difficult  to  have 
followed  them.  The  guerrillas  with  their  prisoners  hurried 
across  fields,  brooks,  and  woods  until  about  one  in  the  morn 
ing,  when  they  halted,  tied  the  hands  of  the  prisoners,  built 
a  large  fire  which  illuminated  all  around,  and  said  they  were 
going  into  camp.  This  camping-place  has  been  described  to 
me  as  on  the  banks  of  the  Elk  River,  a  deep,  rapid  stream, 
with  a  rocky  bed.  The  fire  was  built  under  the  shelter  of  a 
large,  high  rock,  which  rose  perpendicularly  to  some  height ; 
all  around,  with  the  exception  of  close  about  the  fire,  were 
thick  woods.  After  a  short  consultation  of  the  guerrillas 
among  themselves,  our  men  were  ordered  to  stand  up ;  their 
pockets  were  searched  and  every  article  of  value  was  taken 
from  them.  Before  they  could  get  the  pocket-book  of  the 
officer,  however,  he  managed  in  some  way  to  get  it  out  of  his 
pocket  and  kick  it  out  of  sight.  After  the  robbery  was  over, 
our  men  with  their  hands  tied  were  ranged  along  with  their 
backs  to  the  rock.  These  wretches  then  told  them  to  get 
ready,  for  they  were  going  to  be  shot.  Just  imagine  what  a 
horrible  situation.  Here  were  our  men  out  of  reach  of  all 
human  aid,  in  the  hands  of  relentless  fiends,  without  a  chance 


76          GUERRILLA   OPERATIONS  IN  TENNESSEE 

of  striking  one  blow  in  their  defence,  but  to  be  shot  down  like 
beasts  in  cold  blood.  The  guerrillas  walked  off  three  or  four 
paces  and  then  began  firing ;  all  except  the  officer  were  hit  at 
the  first  discharge  and  dropped  to  the  ground  ;  only  one,  how 
ever,  was  killed.  The  lieutenant  at  the  instant  of  firing  made 
a  rush  forward  through  his  persecutors,  jumped  over  the  bank 
into  the  river,  and  most  fortunately  freeing  his  hands  man 
aged  to  swim  to  the  opposite  side  amidst  the  shots  of  the 
guerrillas,  some  of  whom  mounted  their  horses  and  leaped 
them  into  the  river  after  him,  but  before  they  could  reach 
him  he  had  secreted  himself  among  the  bushes  under  the 
shadow  of  the  opposite  bank.  In  the  meantime  the  poor 
wounded  men  were  taken  one  by  one  to  the  bank  of  the  river, 
their  hands  untied,  and  then  swung  between  two  of  the 
human  wretches  and  launched  into  the  water.  The  next  day 
the  train  guard,  while  searching  for  their  lost  comrades,  found 
the  dead  bodies  of  two  of  them  floating  in  Elk  River,  bullet 
holes  through  the  head  of  one  and  the  body  of  the  other. 
Two  men  had  gained  the  shore  and  crept  along  some  distance 
under  the  bank,  then  dragged  themselves  to  the  farmhouse 
where  they  were  found,  one  of  them  just  dying.  Two  days  after 
these  murders  the  lieutenant  got  into  this  post  more  dead  than 
alive,  with  a  dislocated  ankle  and  bruises  from  head  to  foot. 

"  This  is  my  story.  I  think  it  will  strike  you  as  it  did  me, 
as  a  case  of  incredible  barbarity.  A  party  is  out  searching  for 
these  murderers.  If  found  they  will  be  hung  at  short  notice. 
You  may  all  be  thankful  that  you  live  in  a  part  of  the  coun 
try  where  such  deeds  of  violence  are  unknown." 

My  letter  ends  here,  and  does  not  state  that  I  visited  the 
officer,  Lieutenant  Porter,  Twenty-seventh  Indiana  Infantry 
Regiment,  in  hospital,  and  found  him  so  crippled  with  rheu 
matism  from  his  terrible  experience  that  he  was  unable  to 
move  any  of  his  limbs  and  was  suffering  excruciating  pain. 
From  his  own  lips  I  learned  most  of  the  facts  here  related. 

After  visiting  him  and  receiving  his  detailed  account  of  this 


GUERRILLA   OPERATIONS  IN  TENNESSEE         77 

affair,  General  Slocura  directed  me  to  make  a  full  report  of  it 
to  General  Thomas.  This  was  done,  and  the  story  was  told 
much  as  given  in  my  letter.  The  following  order  was  then 
published,  which  was  unique  in  its  treatment  of  the  offence 
and,  so  far  as  I  know,  without  parallel  in  our  Civil  War  his 
tory  :  — 

Headquarters,  Department  of  the  Cumberland, 

Chattanooga,  Teim.,  January  1,  1864. 
General  Orders 
No.  6. 

It  having  been  reported  to  these  headquarters  that  between 
seven  and  eight  o'clock  on  the  evening  of  the  23d  ult.,  within 
one  and  a  half  miles  of  the  village  of  Mulberry,  Lincoln 
County,  Tennessee,  a  wagon  which  had  become  detached  from 
a  foraging  train  belonging  to  the  United  States,  was  attacked 
by  guerrillas,  and  the  officer  in  command  of  the  foragers, 
First  Lieutenant  Porter,  Company  A,  Twenty-seventh  Indiana 
Volunteers,  the  teamster  and  three  other  soldiers  who  had 
been  sent  to  load  the  train  (the  latter  four  unarmed),  were 
captured.  They  were  immediately  mounted  and  hurried  off, 
the  guerrillas  avoiding  the  road  until  their  party  was  halted 
about  one  o'clock  in  the  morning  on  the  bank  of  the  Elk 
River,  where  the  rebels  stated  they  were  going  into  camp  for 
the  night.  The  hands  of  the  prisoners  were  then  tied  behind 
them,  and  they  were  then  robbed  of  everything  of  value  on 
their  persons.  They  were  next  drawn  up  in  line  about  five 
paces  in  front  of  their  captors,  and  one  of  the  latter  who  acted 
as  leader  commanded  "ready"  and  the  whole  party  immedi 
ately  fired  upon  them.  One  of  the  prisoners  was  shot  through 
the  head  and  killed  instantly  and  three  were  wounded.  Lieu 
tenant  Porter  not  hit.  He  immediately  ran,  was  followed  and 
fired  upon  three  times  by  one  of  the  party,  and  finding  that 
he  was  about  to  be  overtaken,  threw  himself  over  a  precipice 
into  the  river,  and  succeeding  in  getting  his  hands  loose,  swam 
to  the  opposite  side,  and  although  pursued  to  that  side  and 


78          GUERRILLA   OPERATIONS  IN  TENNESSEE 

several  times  fired  upon,  he,  after  twenty-four  hours  of  extraor 
dinary  exertion  and  great  exposure,  reached  a  house,  whence 
he  was  taken  to  Tullahoma  where  he  now  lies  in  a  critical  con 
dition.  The  others  after  being  shot  were  immediately  thrown 
into  the  river.  Thus  the  murder  of  these  men,  Newell  E.  Or- 
cutt,  Ninth  Independent  Battery,  Ohio  Volunteer  Artillery, 
and  John  W.  Drought,  Company  H,  Twenty-second  Wiscon 
sin  Volunteers,  and  George  W.  Jacobs,  Company  D,  Twenty- 
second  Wisconsin  Volunteers,  was  accomplished  by  shooting 
and  drowning.  The  fourth,  James  W.  Foley,  Ninth  Inde 
pendent  Battery,  Ohio  Volunteers,  is  now  lying  in  hospital, 
having  escaped  by  getting  his  hands  free  while  in  the  water. 

For  these  atrocious  and  cold-blooded  murders,  equalling  in 
savage  ferocity  any  ever  committed  by  the  most  barbarous 
tribes  on  this  continent,  committed  by  rebel  citizens  of  Ten 
nessee,  it  is  ordered  that  the  property  of  all  other  rebel  citi 
zens  within  a  circuit  of  ten  miles  of  the  place  where  these 
men  were  captured,  be  assessed,  each  in  his  due  proportion, 
according  to  his  wealth,  to  make  up  the  sum  of  $30,000,  to 
be  divided  among  the  families  who  were  dependent  on  the 
murdered  men  for  support,  as  follows :  Ten  Thousand  Dollars 
to  the  widow  of  George  W.  Jacobs,  of  Delavan,  Walworth 
County,  Wisconsin,  for  the  support  of  herself  and  one  child ; 
Ten  Thousand  Dollars  to  be  paid  to  the  widow  of  John  W. 
Drought,  of  North  Cape,  Racine  County,  Wisconsin,  for  the 
support  of  herself  and  two  children ;  Ten  Thousand  Dollars 
to  be  divided  between  the  aged  mother  and  sister  of  Newell 
E.  Orcutt,  of  Burton,  Geauga  County,  Ohio.  Should  the  per 
sons  assessed  fail,  within  one  week  after  notice  shall  have  been 
served  upon  them,  to  pay  the  amount  of  their  tax  in  money, 
sufficient  of  their  personal  property  shall  be  seized  and  sold 
at  public  auction,  to  make  up  the  amount. 

Major-Gen eral  H.  W .  Slocum,  commanding  Twelfth  Army 
Corps,  is  charged  with  the  execution  of  this  order. 

The  men  who  committed  the  murder,  if  caught,  will  be  sum- 


GUERRILLA   OPERATIONS  IN  TENNESSEE         79 

marily  executed,  and  any  person  executing  them  will  be  held 
guiltless,  and  will  receive  the  protection  of  this  army ;  and  all 
persons  who  are  suspected  of  having  aided  or  harbored  these 
guerrillas  will  be  immediately  arrested  and  tried  by  a  military 
commission. 

By  command  of 

Major-General  THOMAS. 
WILLIAM  D.  WHIPPLE, 

Assistant  Adjutant-General. 

This  order  was  carried  out  to  the  letter.  General  Slocum 
detailed  Colonel  Ketcham,  of  the  150th  New  York  Infantry 
Volunteers,  to  take  charge  of  the  assessment,  and  this  officer 
proceeded  with  a  sufficient  force  to  Fayetteville,  the  county 
seat,  and  there  found  and  took  possession  of  the  records,  which 
gave  the  last  assessment  roll  of  the  county.  Within  the  area 
fixed  by  General  Thomas'  order  a  pro  rata  assessment  was 
levied  on  each  rebel  citizen  sufficient  to  raise  the  full  amount, 
$30,000,  the  last  assessment  being  used  as  a  basis  of  taxation. 
A  notice  was  sent  to  each  person  of  the  amount  of  his  or  her 
tax  and  fixing  the  day  on  which  the  tax  was  to  be  paid  at  the 
county  seat. 

On  the  day  thus  fixed  there  was  a  strange  assembly  at  the 
county  court-house.  Men  and  women  of  all  classes  were  there, 
and  without  exception,  all  were  provided  with  means  in  some 
form  to  pay  the  tax.  Most  of  it  was  paid  in  gold  and  silver 
that  had  been  hoarded  since  the  beginning  of  the  war,  but 
there  were  many  who  brought  in  bales  of  cotton,  which  at  that 
time  was  as  good  as  gold.  When  the  entire  tax  was  collected 
and  converted  into  current  funds,  the  amount  was  placed  in 
the  hands  of  one  of  General  Slocum's  aides  who  personally 
paid  it  to  the  persons  named  in  the  General  Order  or  to  their 
proper  representatives,  vouchers  being  returned  to  the  head 
quarters  of  the  army. 

In  these  times  of  peace,  remote  from  all  the  conditions  then 


80          GUERRILLA   OPERATIONS  IN  TENNESSEE 

existing  in  this  country,  such  an  order  as  that  of  General 
Thomas  may  seem  harsh  and  unjust,  and  doubtless  it  caused 
privation  and  suffering  to  many  innocent  and  unoffending 
persons,  but  it  was  one  of  those  inexorable  war  measures 
which  were  needed  in  this  guerrilla-infested  portion  of  Ten 
nessee,  and  to  us  at  the  time  it  seemed  a  righteous  judgment. 

To  carry  out  the  final  clause  of  the  order  of  General  Thomas, 
the  Third  Wisconsin  Regiment,  Infantry  Volunteers,  com 
manded  by  Colonel  William  Hawley,  was  sent  to  Fayette- 
ville,  and  a  strong  detail  of  this  regiment  was  mounted  and 
placed  under  the  command  of  Captain  Silas  E.  Gardner  and 
Lieutenant  Alex.  D.  Haskins.  These  two  officers  were  bold 
and  adventurous,  and  to  them  and  to  the  veteran  soldiers  who 
followed  them  hunting  guerrillas  on  horseback  was  like  sky 
larking,  after  two  years  and  more  of  active  service  in  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac.  Their  work  was  well  done,  and  although  the 
perpetrators  of  the  murders  at  Elk  River  were  never  identi 
fied,  there  were  some  thirty  of  the  guerrillas  captured  during 
the  winter,  and  the  country  was  made  so  hot  for  them  that 
the  others  disappeared. 

The  captured  guerrillas,  including  three  notorious  desper 
adoes,  Elliot,  Short,  and  Miller,  were  sent  to  Tullahoma  to 
be  imprisoned  in  a  stockade  there  and  tried  by  a  military 
commission.  Murders  were  proved  against  a  number  of  them, 
who  were  sentenced  to  be  hung  and  were  afterwards  executed 
at  Nashville.  Miller,  one  of  the  worst  of  the  band,  was  con 
victed  of  the  cold-blooded  murder  of  a  very  estimable  old 
Union  man,  against  whom  he  had  a  personal  grievance,  and 
was  sentenced  to  be  hung  with  the  others,  fie  belonged  to 
what  was  regarded  as  one  of  the  best  families  in  that  part  of 
Tennessee,  and  was  rather  a  good-looking  fellow  with  noth 
ing  of  the  desperado  about  his  appearance.  He  had  a  mother 
and  sister,  the  latter  a  very  pretty  girl.  They  both  came  to 
General  Slocum's  headquarters  to  plead  for  the  boy's  life. 
The  General  would  not  see  them,  as  he  knew  he  could  not 


GUERRILLA   OPERATIONS  IN  TENNESSEE         81 

grant  their  request,  but  directed  me  to  allow  them  to  visit 
the  prisoner  at  the  stockade.  This  they  did,  and  they  then 
went  to  General  Thomas  at  Chattanooga,  who,  with  all  the 
facts  before  him,  would  not  grant  any  commutation  of  Mil 
ler's  sentence. 

The  sister,  who,  besides  being  very  attractive  in  appear 
ance,  was  an  eloquent  pleader,  went  as  a  last  resort  to  Wash 
ington,  and  through  some  strong  influence  procured  an  inter 
view  with  President  Lincoln,  who  with  his  tender  heart  could 
not  refuse  the  girl's  tearful  plea  ancT  he  commuted  the  sen 
tence  to  imprisonment.  Miller  was  regarded  as  the  most 
cruel  and  bloodthirsty  of  all  the  guerrillas  who  were  cap 
tured,  and  nothing  but  his  sister's  persuasive  eloquence  saved 
his  life.  I  never  heard  of  him  after  his  removal  to  Nashville, 
but  he  was  probably  released  with  other  prisoners  at  the  end 
of  the  war,  and  unless  speedily  shot  by  the  friends  of  some  of 
his  victims  may  have  become  a  respected  citizen  of  Tennessee. 

As  an  instance  of  the  summary  way  in  which  guerrillas 
were  dealt  with,  there  was  about  this  time  a  report  on  file  of 
General  Crook,  who  then  commanded  the  cavalry  of  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland,  which  was  to  this  effect :  That  he  (Crook) 
fell  in  with  a  party  of  guerrillas,  twenty  in  number;  that  in 
the  fight  that  ensued,  twelve  of  them  were  killed  and  the  rest 
were  taken  prisoners.  He  regrets  to  report  that  on  the  march 
to  camp  the  eight  prisoners  were  so  unfortunate  as  to  fall  off 
a  log  and  break  their  necks. 

With  the  exception  of  these  guerrilla  episodes,  there  was 
but  little  excitement  or  activity  of  any  kind  during  that  win 
ter  in  Tennessee,  and  the  troops  remained  quietly  in  their 
quarters  until  the  general  breaking  of  camp  which  preceded 
Sherman's  Atlanta  campaign. 


VII 


PETERSBURG,    JUNE   15— FORT    HARRISON, 
SEPTEMBER  29:    A  COMPARISON 

BY 

GEORGE   A.   BRUCE 

CAPTAIN  THIRTEENTH  NEW  HAMPSHIRE  VOLUNTEERS  AND  BREVET- 
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL 


Read  before  the  Society  February  6, 1917 


PETERSBURG,   JUNE   15  — FORT  HARRISON, 
SEPTEMBER   29:   A   COMPARISON 

WHILE  reading,  a  short  time  ago,  for  the  third  or  fourth 
time,  "  Plutarch's  Lives  of  Illustrious  Men,"  the  thought  of 
writing  this  paper  and  its  subject  occurred  to  me.  After  giv 
ing  an  extended  life  of  his  heroes  Plutarch  often  selects 
two,  generally  soldiers,  and,  in  a  short  separate  chapter,  com 
pares  one  with  the  other.  In  thus  holding  up  the  two,  as 
it  were,  side  by  side,  pointing  out  wherein  they  agree  and 
differ  in  character,  strength,  and  weaknesses,  the  magnitude 
of  their  achievements  and  the  various  methods  by  which  they 
were  accomplished,  Plutarch  enables  his  readers  to  gain  a  dis 
tinct  and  striking  portrait  of  each  and  a  more  correct  estimate 
of  their  relative  standing  in  the  military  profession  and  the 
value  of  their  lives. 

The  two  events  chosen  as  the  subject  of  this  paper  present 
as  striking  a  contrast  with  each  other  as  any  to  be  found  in 
our  military  history :  of  one  much  has  been  written,  while 
the  other  is  very  near  lost  to  sight  in  the  vast  number  of  con 
flicts  in  the  Civil  War.  In  regard  to  the  assault  on  Peters 
burg  on  the  15th  of  June,  four  papers  have  been  published 
by  this  Society ;  the  first  in  order  of  time  by  Colonel  Liver- 
more  ;  i  the  second  by  General  Smith 2  in  a  vain  endeavor 
to  answer,  in  his  own  defence,  the  final  and  important  con 
clusion  of  his  former  staff  officer ;  and  the  other  two  3  by  Mr. 
Peabody,  which  give  such  a  careful  grouping  of  all  the  evi 
dence  in  regard  to  the  number  of  the  forces  participating  in 
the  defence  of  that  city,  that  his  conclusions  can  be  accepted 
with  the  confidence  the  annual  report  of  a  business  company 
commands  when  certified  by  competent  and  reliable  account- 

1  M.  H.  M.,  vol.  5,  p.  33.        2  M.  H.  M.,  p.  75.        «  M.  H.  M.?  pp.  125-47. 


86     PETERSBURG  — FT.   HARRISON:  A   COMPARISON 

ants.  These  papers  show  that  up  to  some  hour  in  the  after 
noon,  that  cannot  be  fixed,  —  probably,  however,  about  three 
o'clock,  —  the  force  that  was  resisting  General  Smith's  ad 
vance  consisted  of  one  regiment  of  infantry,  two  companies 
of  Home  Guards,  seventy-five  militia,  four  light  batteries,  and 
two  regiments  of  Dearing's  cavalry;  General  Smith's  force 
consisting  of  three  divisions  of  infantry  numbering  10,000 
men,  and  a  brigade  of  cavalry  not  less  than  2500.  General 
Beauregard  sent  two  regiments  of  infantry  l  and  two  of  cav 
alry  from  Swift  Creek  in  the  afternoon  as  a  reenforcement. 
The  hour  of  three  o'clock  would  seem  to  be  the  earliest  mo 
ment  that  these  forces  could  arrive,  as  the  distance  would  be 
about  five  or  six  miles.  There  is  no  reason  to  doubt  the  cor 
rectness  of  Beauregard's  statement  that  1200  men  of  all  arms 
was  the  largest  force  at  any  time  confronting  General  Smith's 
two  divisions  of  about  7000  making  the  assault  at  7.30  o'clock 
in  the  evening. 

General  Smith,  on  reporting  to  Butler  at  Bermuda  Hun 
dred  during  the  afternoon  of  the  14th  of  June,  was  ordered 
by  him  to  take  and  to  hold  Petersburg,  thus  feebly  defended, 
the  following  day.  His  instructions  were  verbal,  but  there 
can  be  little  doubt  of  their  character.  General  Grant  went 
up  to  Bermuda  on  the  14th  and  explained  to  General  Butler 
the  object  of  moving  the  army  to  the  south  of  the  James 
Eiver  and  the  importance  of  seizing  and  holding  Petersburg 
as  the  first  and  most  important  step  in  his  strategy. 

Whatever  may  be  thought  of  General  Butler  as  a  soldier, 
no  one  ever  questioned  his  administrative  ability  and  intel 
lectual  power.  He  had  a  most  inquisitive  and  enquiring 
mind,  a  love  of  work  and  capacity  for  it  without  limit,  with  a 
boundless  ambition.  There  must  also  be  conceded  to  him  the 
possession  of  one  quality  of  every  good  commander,  that  of 
obtaining  information  of  the  enemy  in  or  near  his  field  of 
operations.  In  this  particular  he  had  no  superior.  He  always 
i  M.  H.  M.,  vol.  5,  p.  150. 


PETERSBURG  — FT.  HARRISON:  A    COMPARISON     87 

found  men,  either  in  peace  or  war,  anxious  to  serve  him  re 
gardless  of  danger  to  themselves.  By  the  aid  of  scouts,  spies, 
and  agents  of  various  kinds,  male  and  female,  from  informa 
tion  given  freely  by  deserters  and  prisoners  vigorously  exam 
ined  and  cross-examined  by  himself,  he  was  able  to  make 
a  roster  of  the  enemy's  forces  practically  accurate  as  to  num 
bers  and  organization.  If  he  had  been  a  Frenchman  living  in 
the  age  of  Napoleon  he  would  have  rivalled  Fouche  as  Minis 
ter  of  the  Superior  Police  and  might  have  displaced  him  in 
that  office.  It  was  a  characteristic  of-his  mind  to  give  to  one 
intrusted  with  any  enterprise  minute  instructions  and  all  the 
information  he  possessed  to  aid  him.  It  would  be  difficult 
not  to  believe  that  Butler  gave  to  Smith  —  as  he  says  he  did 
—  a  list  of  all  the  forces  in  or  available  for  the  defence  of 
Petersburg.  The  latter  admits  that  he  told  him  that  the  for 
tifications  were  "  not  at  all  formidable  "  and  "  no  force  of  any 
consequence  "  behind  them.  The  last  of  his  statements  was 
absolutely  true.  General  Smith  complained  that  an  engineer 
officer  was  refused  him,  which  leads  one  justly  to  infer  that 
in  addition  to  correct  information  he  was  instructed  to  move 
rapidly,  and  when  in  front  of  the  fortifications  to  assault  them 
at  once ;  that  the  great  danger  would  be,  that  if  the  character 
of  the  movement  as  a  surprise  was  disregarded,  and  time 
wasted  in  interminable  reconnoissances,  Beauregard,  thinking 
Petersburg  of  more  importance  than  his  Bermuda  line,  might 
send  his  whole  forces  there  before  he  would  be  ready  to  attack. 
This  was  his  own  opinion  as  well  as  that  of  General  Grant. 

The  forces  were  to  be  assembled  at  Broadway  on  the  south 
bank  of  the  Appomattox  at  daylight,  but,  owing  to  the  ab 
sence  of  the  cavalry,  the  forward  movement  did  not  commence 
until  five  o'clock,  an  hour  and  a  half  late.  This  delay  would 
have  been  of  no  importance  if  reasonable  use  of  his  remain 
ing  hours  had  been  made.  Here  was  one  of  the  few  opportuni 
ties  given  to  a  corps  commander  to  do  great  work  and  win  for 
himself  lasting  renown  ;  indeed,  it  was  the  most  important 


88     PETERSBURG  — FT.  HARRISON:  A   COMPARISON 

the  annals  of  the  war  reveal.  Every  motive  that  could  stir  a 
patriot  or  inspire  a  man  of  ambition  urged  him  on,  for  Smith 
was  a  patriot  and  a  man  of  ambition,  —  even  so  light  a  mo 
tive  as  gratitude  to  General  Grant,  who,  impressed  with  his 
intellect  and  his  skilful  but  simple  plan  for  the  relief  of  the 
half -starved  army  at  Chattanooga,  had  secured  his  appoint 
ment  as  Major-General  and  put  this  day's  work  in  his  hands, 
was  not  wanting.  For  the  present  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that 
the  defences  at  Baylor's  farm,  such  as  they  were,  were  carried 
at  eight  o'clock,  the  whole  corps  arrived  in  the  immediate 
presence  of  the  main  line  about  Petersburg  at  noon,  and  Bat 
tery  No.  5  was  carried  by  assault  at  about  half -past  seven  and 
other  batteries  to  the  left,  as  far  as  and  including  Battery 
No.  11  with  connecting  breastworks,  by  nine  o'clock  in  the 
evening. 

Leaving  for  later  comment  this  branch  of  the  subject,  I 
now  enter  upon  a  more  extended  account  of  the  movement 
with  which  the  first  is  to  be  compared  —  especially  for  the 
reason  that  it  has  never  been  even  partially  described,  and 
was  the  most  carefully  planned  and  finely  executed  operation 
that  came  within  my  observation  during  the  war. 

The  Eighteenth  Corps  rejoined  the  Army  of  the  James  on 
the  Bermuda  front  on  the  27th  of  August,  under  General 
Ord,  who  had  succeeded  General  Smith  on  the  18th  of  July. 
Since  the  crossing  of  the  army  to  the  south  bank  of  the  James 
there  had  been  no  Union  force  permanently  stationed  on  the 
north  side  of  it.  The  movement  of  General  Early  into  Mary 
land  in  August  had  temporarily  retarded  the  settled  purpose 
of  extending  the  left  flank  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  west 
ward  around  Petersburg,  and  finally  resulted  in  sending  the 
Sixth  Corps  and  two  divisions  of  the  cavalry  under  General 
Sheridan  to  Washington.  The  army  of  General  Lee  was  soon 
thereafter  weakened  by  reinforcements  sent  to  General  Early, 
the  force  left  north  of  the  James  being  reduced  to  a  few 
thousand. 


PETERSBURG— FT.  HARRISON:  A   COMPARISON     89 

On  the  20th  of  June  an  attempt  was  made  to  break  through 
the  Bermuda  defences,  during  which  General  Walker  was 
killed,  and  on  his  body  was  found  a  map  of  the  country  be 
tween  Petersburg  and  Richmond  with  all  the  Confederate 
lines  of  fortifications  marked  on  it.  This  was  a  capture  of 
great  value.  General  Butler  marked  upon  it  the  location  of 
all  the  troops  north  of  the  James  River,  with  the  number  at 
each  place,  and  furnished  duplicate  copies  to  each  of  his 
corps  commanders.  Two  attempts  had  been  made  in  Julv  and 
August  to  gain  important  positions  on  "the  north  side,  which, 
proving  unsuccessful,  the  forces  had  been  withdrawn.  General 
Grant,  being  of  the  opinion  that  the  Confederate  Government 
would  have  something  the  same  feeling  in  regard  to  the 
safety  of  their  capital  that  the  authorities  at  Washington  had 
in  regard  to  that  city,  thought  that  if  their  outer  line  could 
be  taken  and  held,  even  if  nothing  further  was  gained  in  that 
direction,  it  would  neutralize  as  many  men  and  probably  more 
in  the  defence  of  Richmond  than  he  would  require  to  use  as 
a  constant  menace  to  that  city.  General ,  Butler,  being  ac 
quainted  with  his  views,  in  the  last  half  of  September  sent  his 
scouts  and  secret-service  agents  throughout  the  territory,  and 
after  receiving  and  verifying  their  reports,  formed  his  plan, 
which  was  fully  stated  in  a  written  order  directed  to  his  two 
corps  commanders  and  General  Kautz  of  the  cavalry.  It  is 
probably  the  longest  war  order  ever  issued,  filling  eight  pages 
as  printed  in  "  Butler's  Book,"  published  in  1892.  It  was 
submitted  to  General  Grant,  who  authorized  the  movement, 
and,  as  stated  by  Butler,  commended  him  warmly  for  the 
clearness  and  fulness  of  his  instructions  to  those  who  were  to 
execute  them. 

The  brigade  commanders  of  Stannard's  division  of  the 
Eighteenth  Corps  were  directed  to  appear  at  his  headquar 
ters  at  eight  o'clock  of  the  evening,  September  28,  where 
during  an  hour's  conference  they  were  minutely  instructed  as 
to  what  was  expected  to  be  accomplished  the  following  day 


90     PETERSBURG  — FT.  HARRISON:  A   COMPARISON 

and  the  manner  of  doing  it.  It  is  probable  conferences  of  the 
same  character  were  being  held  at  the  same  time  at  the  head 
quarters  of  every  division  to  take  a  part  in  the  enterprise.  Up 
to  this  hour  no  intimation  of  the  movement  had  descended 
beyond  division  headquarters.  Soon  after  the  conference 
ended,  two  divisions  of  the  Eighteenth  Corps  were  under 
orders  to  be  at  Varina  Landing  at  twelve  o'clock  that  night, 
and  the  Tenth  Corps  and  the  colored  division,  at  Deep  Bottom 
at  the  same  hour.  Five  minutes  before  the  hour  the  head  of 
Stannard's  three  brigades  was  at  the  designated  place  and 
the  Tenth  Corps  was  not  a  minute  behind.  As  soon  as  it  was 
dark,  the  pontoons  were  taken  up  the  river,  and  a  small  com 
pany  of  infantry,  on  hand,  was  silently  rowed  across  and 
placed  as  guards  about  the  few  houses  at  and  near  the  land 
ing.  As  ordered,  the  bridge  was  laid,  and  well  covered  to 
prevent  noise,  at  midnight.  I  have  reason  to  believe  that  Col 
onel  M.  T.  Donohoe  was  selected  by  General  Ord  to  command 
the  skirmish  line  which  consisted  of  his  regiment,  the  Tenth 
New  Hampshire  and  the  One  Hundred  and  Eighteenth  New 
York.  These  regiments  first  passed  over  the  bridge  and 
moved  out  some  distance  and  formed  in  line  on  either  side  of 
the  Yarina  road,  which  led  up  to  within  a  third  of  a  mile 
of  Fort  Harrison,  there  curving  to  the  east  to  unite  with  the 
New  Market  road.  At  three  o'clock  the  remainder  of  Stan 
nard's  division  began  passing  over  and  halted  on  the  north 
bank  for  an  hour  or  more.  A  slight  fog  had  settled  over  the 
river  and  either  bank,  which  retarded  the  advance,  or,  rather, 
made  a  short  delay  advisable. 

Soon  after  crossing  the  bridge  Stannard's  division  was 
formed  in  two  columns ;  the  brigades  of  Generals  Burnham 
and  Stevens  on  the  left  of  the  Varina  road  and  that  of  Col 
onel  Roberts  on  the  right.  Each  regiment  was  in  close  col 
umn  of  divisions.  The  column  on  the  left  had  a  depth  of  sixty 
ranks,  and  that  on  the  right  of  forty.  At  five  o'clock  the 
order  to  move  forward  was  given.  The  Varina  road,  which 


PETERSBURG  — FT.  HARRISON:  A    COMPARISON     91 

was  to  be  followed,  ran  for  a  quarter  of  a  mile  near  the  river- 
bank,  then  at  nearly  a  right  angle  across  wide  bottom  lands, 
leaving  which,  it  rose  over  a  sharp  incline  to  the  higher  level 
beyond.  Owing  to  the  darkness,  intensified  by  the  fog,  the 
first  mile  was  made  at  a  slow  pace.  At  the  edge  of  the  woods 
a  mile  from  the  landing,  the  enemy's  skirmishers  were  met, 
and  the  crack  of  rifles  was  heard  along  a  line  for  nearly  half 
a  mile  on  either  side  of  the  road,  which  soon  sent  a  few 
wounded  men  limping  to  the  rear.  From  the  time  the  first 
shot  was  fired  until  the  skirmishers  ~had  reached  the  open 
fields,  one  mile  from  Fort  Harrison,  not  a  halt  was  made,  the 
column  never  being  more  than  four  hundred  yards  in  the 
rear.  In  a  little  over  two  hours  an  advance  of  four  miles  was 
made,  at  first  with  such  opposition  as  a  strong  picket  line 
could  make,  soon  strengthened  by  a  small  Tennessee  brigade, 
which,  the  force  now  driving  them,  had  met  near  Drury's 
Bluff  the  previous  May,  so  depleting  its  ranks  as  to  make  the 
present  encounter  less  difficult.  For  two  miles  through  the 
woods,  across  swampy  stretches  covered  with  thick  brush, 
the  rattle  of  musketry  was  as  rapid  and  continuous  as  seldom 
heard  between  skirmish  lines,  swelling  occasionally  into  a  vol 
ume  like  that  arising  from  a  smart  engagement.  The  Union 
commander  was  operating  in  the  immediate  presence  of  Gen 
erals  Ord  and  Stannard,  who  sometimes  rode  by  the  side  of 
the  column,  and  more  often  in  front  of  it.  There  were  times 
when  many  caught  glimpses  of  an  impassioned  rider  on  a 
horse  covered  with  foam,  hurrying  from  right  to  left,  or  left 
to  right,  shouting,  "  Forward  !  Forward  !  "  with  a  vehemence 
as  if  the  fate  of  the  nation  rested  with  him  alone.  In  very 
truth  Donohoe  was  a  hero  that  day,  and  when  soon  after  he 
received  the  brevet  of  Brigadier-General,  a  united  voice  said, 
"  Well  earned."  As  early  as  seven  o'clock  the  Confederates 
were  driven  from  the  woods,  when,  facing  to  the  rear,  they 
were  seen  hurrying  back  to  Fort  Harrison.  At  this  time  the 
division  halted,  and  literally  it  was  for  the  first  time  since  the 


92     PETERSBURG  —  FT.  HARRISON:  A   COMPARISON 

start  from  Varina  Landing.  But  the  advance  was  accom 
plished  only  at  considerable  loss,  not  only  in  the  front  line,  for 
in  the  column  one  officer  and  some  of  the  men  were  wounded. 

Generals  Ord  and  Stannard,  together  with  the  brigade  com 
manders  and  many  staff  officers,  went  forward  to  the  field  by 
the  edge  of  the  woods  from  which  a  clear  view  of  the  enemy's 
line  was  had.  Smooth,  level  fields  stretched  in  front  for  nearly 
a  mile  to  the  foot  of  the  bluff  on  which  the  great  fort  stood. 
The  house  of  Mr.  Aiken  was  near  the  Varina  road  to  our 
right  and  Mr.  Childrey's  residence  some  distance  to  the  left. 
A  Virginia  rail  fence  ran  across  the  fields  on  either  side  of  a 
lane  to  the  Childrey  residence.  With  these  exceptions  there 
was  no  obstruction  between  the  woods  and  the  fort ;  nor  was 
there  a  visible  object  of  size  sufficient  to  give  protection  to  a 
single  individual  during  the  attack. 

To  the  left  of  the  fort  breastworks  extended  to  the  river 
more  than  a  mile  distant,  and  also  to  the  right,  visible  for  half 
a  mile,  to  Fort  Gilmer,  strengthened  at  intervals  with  redoubts 
all  fully  armed.  Fort  Harrison  was  constructed  along  the  edge 
of  the  bluff,  following  its  contour  with  six  distinct  faces  and 
open  in  the  rear.  These  faces  measured  1463  feet  — one  fourth 
of  a  mile.  A  traverse  thirty  feet  at  the  base  and  eighteen  feet 
in  height  extended  back  one  hundred  feet.  Fifty  feet  to  the 
west  was  a  smaller  traverse,  which  became  known  as  "  Gen 
eral  Grant's  traverse"  for  reasons  to  be  later  explained.  On 
either  side  of  the  larger  one  was  a  100-pound  cannon,  which, 
with  six  small  guns,  constituted  its  armament.  No  fort  of  the 
same  size  and  strength  had  confronted  the  army  in  Virginia. 
As  compared  with  Battery  No.  5  about  Petersburg  it  appeared 
like  the  construction  of  Titans  at  war  with  their  own.  Such 
was  the  situation  before  us. 

The  group  of  mounted  officers  near  the  edge  of  the  woods, 
among  which  would  probably  be  the  commander  of  the  forces, 
offered  too  great  a  temptation  to  the  enemy  to  test  the  range 
and  accuracy  of  their  guns  to  be  neglected ;  and  several  of 


PETERSBURG  — FT.  HARRISON:  A   COMPARISON     93 

them  opened  fire,  which  proved  that  skilful  gunners  were  be 
hind  them.  All  of  our  batteries  were  ordered  to  remain  south 
of  the  James  subject  to  instant  call.  In  some  way  one  had 
come  to  the  front  and  was  standing  in  the  road  near  the  woods. 
A  shell  struck  and  exploded  so  near  it  as  to  kill  three  horses 
and  disable  a  gun.  Another  shot  struck  the  breast  of  Captain 
Bessy's  horse,  aide  to  General  Stannard,  passed  through  his 
left  side,  broke  the  Captain's  sword,  and  twisted  the  scabbard 
into  a  knot,  without  the  least  injury  to  the  rider.  During  this 
reconnoissance  to  the  front,  if  such  it  may  be  called,  which 
lasted  only  ten  or  fifteen  minutes,  all  irregularities  in  the  two 
columns  were  rectified,  caps  removed,  and  bayonets  fixed. 
The  second  division  (Heckman's)  was  ordered  to  follow  the 
first,  form  in  like  manner  on  its  right,  and  join  in  the  assault. 
It  was  not  seen  or  heard  of  until  hours  later.  The  Ninety-sixth 
New  York  was  placed  in  line  in  front  of  the  First  Division, 
then  commanded  by  Colonel  Edgar  M.  Cullen,  only  twenty 
years  of  age,  since  the  Chief  Justice  of  the  Court  of  Appeals 
of  the  State  of  New  York.  At  7.30  o'clock  the  two  columns, 
consisting  of  2000  men,  with  guns  at  a  right  shoulder  emerged 
from  the  woods  and  caught  their  first  sight  of  the  work  before 
them.  The  achievements  of  the  Tenth  New  Hampshire  and 
the  One  Hundred  and  Eighteenth  New  York  may  have  been  an 
inspiration,  but  whether  so  or  not,  on  they  went  in  perfect 
form  and  with  firm  step,  unmindful  of  the  artillery  from  which 
alone  they  first  suffered,  answering  the  call  of  duty.  A  halt 
for  a  moment  only  was  ordered  in  front  of  the  fence  referred 
to  while  this  obstruction  was  being  removed.  Soon  after,  the 
advance  seeming  slow  to  the  impatience  of  those  viewing  it 
from  the  rear,  General  Stannard  sent  Captain  Elder  to  give 
the  order  to  double-quick.  When  this  was  given  in  a  loud 
voice,  the  men  shouted  in  reply,  "  No,  no  —  the  distance  is  too 
great "  ;  and  their  decision,  with  better  judgment  than  that  of 
their  commander,  was  final.  The  first  shot  from  a  100-pound 
gun  came  soon  after  the  fence  was  passed,  its  huge  projectile 


94     PETERSBURG  — FT.  HARRISON:  A    COMPARISON 

being  seen  from  the  time  it  left  the  muzzle  until  it  struck  the 
ground  on  the  left  front  of  the  column,  from  which  it  rico- 
chetted  over  it  and  landed  in  the  woods  half  a  mile  in  the  rear. 
The  time  required  to  load,  aim,  and  fire  these  monsters  was 
such  that  each  was  fired  only  twice  and  no  harm  was  done 
by  them  ;  yet  the  nearer  we  came,  they  seemed  to  grow  larger 
and  larger  and  to  open  wider  and  wider  their  savage  jaws ; 
and  at  the  same  time  the  bluff  and  fort  to  rise  higher  and 
higher  over  which  the  great  traverse  towered  like  a  cliff 
against  the  sky. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  go  into  a  minute  and  harrowing  de 
scription  of  the  advance,  as  step  by  step  the  columns  dimin 
ished  in  numbers  until  they  reached  a  slight  cover  near  the  goal, 
where  all  dropped  upon  the  ground  for  rest  and  safety.  Gen 
eral  Ord,  fearing  a  failure,  now  sent  all  his  staff  to  aid  and 
stimulate  the  men  for  a  final  effort ;  but  before  they  appeared 
in  sight,  Colonel  Roberts,  commanding  the  Third  Brigade,  the 
senior  officer  present,  a  tall,  lank,  and  lean  man,  perhaps  fifty 
years  old,  having  allowed  the  men  time  to  catch  their  breath, 
got  up  and  said  to  them  in  a  quiet  but  assured  tone  of  voice : 
"  Come,  boys,  we  must  capture  this  fort  —  now  get  up  and 
start."  l  All  in  an  instant  jumped  up,  sprang  forward,  rushed 
into  the  ditch,  and  then  up  as  best  they  could,  quickly  cover 
ing  the  sides  of  the  fort  with  uniforms  of  blue,  then  its  crest, 
from  which  hundreds  leaped  inside,  and  the  citadel  was  won. 

The  victory  was  won  at  no  small  loss  of  life.  More  than 
one  fourth  of  the  division  were  killed  or  wounded.  General 
Stevens  was  very  seriously  wounded  while  leading  the  First 
Brigade.  The  color  sergeant  of  his  regiment  was  killed  and 
every  one  of  the  color  guard,  six  in  number,  was  either  killed 
or  wounded.  The  last,  while  planting  the  colors  on  the  parapet, 
rolled  inside  the  fort.  The  garrison  did  not  await  a  bayonet 
charge,  not  being  prepared  for  such  an  encounter,  but  re 
treated  quickly  for  further  resistance  from  behind  the  large 
1  History  of  the  Thirteenth  New  Hampshire  Volunteers,  p.  479. 


PETERSBURG  —  FT.  HARRISON:  A   COMPARISON     95 

trees  and  the  many  log  houses  within  the  vast  area  of  the  fort. 
It  was  considerably  more  than  an  hour  before  they  were  all 
driven  beyond  range  of  our  muskets.  The  division  organiza 
tion  had  disappeared  during  the  last  rush  and  scramble  over 
the  parapet,  and  it  was  some  time  before  the  men  could  be 
gathered  together  about  the  regimental  colors.  As  soon  as  a 
sufficient  organization  could  be  formed,  it  was  sent  to  clear 
the  line  toward  the  river,  all  of  which  was  finally  secured  ex 
cept  the  large  fort  close  upon  its  bank.  To  the  right  toward 
Fort  Gilnier  not  more  than  a  fourth  of  a  mile  of  the  intrench- 
nients  was  secured.  Twenty-two  guns  and  three  hundred  pris 
oners  were  the  further  evidence  of  the  victory.  As  soon  as  the 
fort  was  secured,  Generals  Ord,  Stannard,  and  Burnham  rode 
into  it.  Burnham  was  killed  almost  immediately,  and  Ord, 
soon  after,  was  wounded  while  directing  the  force  that  was 
moving  down  the  line  to  the  river.  Colonel  Donohoe  was 
badly  wounded  at  about  the  same  time  while  engaged  in  the 
same  enterprise.  In  his  official  report  General  Ord  says, 
"Had  General  Heckman  obeyed  his  orders  many  valuable 
lives  would  have  been  saved."  1  It  was  the  irony  of  fate  that 
the  command  of  the  Eighteenth  Corps,  by  reason  of  General 
Ord's  wound,  should  fall  into  his  hands,  coming,  as  he  did,  to 
the  front  an  hour  or  more  after  the  victory  was  won,  to  occupy 
a  position  he  could  not  fill. 

General  Grant  came  up  at  ten  o'clock  and  took  a  view  of 
the  situation.  It  is  not  probable  that  anywhere  two  hundred 
men  could  be  seen  together,  so  scattered  was  the  remnant  of 
the  division  over  the  line  then  held,  half  of  them  entirely  out 
of  sight  in  the  woods  to  the  rear  of  the  fort.  Having  com 
pleted  his  survey,  and  learned  all  that  could  be  obtained  from 
General  Stannard  and  others,  he  sat  down  on  the  lower  step 
of  the  small  traverse,  and  was  writing  a  despatch  to  the  Sec 
retary  of  War  when  a  large  shell  from  a  gunboat  in  the  river 
came  over  and  struck  the  side  of  the  great  traverse  toward 
i  87  W.  R.  794. 


96     PETERSBURG  — FT.  HARRISON:  A   COMPARISON 

which  he  was  facing  and  rolled  down  to  the  floor  not  many 
feet  from  him.  The  group  about  him  instantly  scattered  for 
cover,  some  throwing  themselves  flat  upon  the  ground.  Grant 
looked  at  it  for  a  moment  and  then  resumed  his  writing  with 
out  making  the  slightest  movement.  The  fuse  went  out  and 
did  not  explode,  though  all  say  it  was  burning  when  it  rolled 
down  the  traverse.  The  little  traverse  was  thereafter  called 
"  General  Grant's  traverse."  Had  the  belief  entered  his  mind 
before  that  he  was  a  man  of  destiny  and  immune  from  dan 
ger  until  his  work  was  finished?  Leaving  orders  that  the 
captured  works  should  be  held,  he  returned  to  City  Point. 

The  capture  of  Fort  Harrison  is  unique  in  our  military  his 
tory.  There  is  no  record  of  a  division  or  any  larger  body  of 
men  assaulting  a  strongly  fortified  position,  or  being  ordered 
so  to  do  when  it  was  obliged  to  advance  for  nearly  a  mile  under 
a  withering  fire  of  artillery  and  infantry  before  the  final  rush, 
could  be  made.  In  this,  however,  there  is  no  intention  of  claim 
ing  for  the  division  that  made  it  superiority  over  others.  There 
were  many  divisions  in  the  army  that  would  have  done  as  well, 
none  better,  and  many  more  that  would  have  entirely  failed. 

The  news  of  the  day's  events  caused  the  greatest  excitement 
in  Kichmond  ever  known.  Mr.  J.  B.  Jones  records  in  his 
"Rebel  War  Clerk's  Diary":  l  "The  offices  and  government 
shops  were  closed  and  the  tocsin  was  sounded  for  hours.  All 
the  local  troops  were  hurried  out  to  defend  the  city,  and  guards 
on  foot  and  horseback  scoured  the  streets  with  orders  to 

*. 

arrest  every  male  person  between  the  ages  of  seventeen  and 
fifty  and  send  them  to  Cary  Street  for  service.  Two  members 
of  Mr.  Davis's  Cabinet  were  caught  in  this  sweeping  net,  the 
Postmaster-General  and  the  Attorney- General.  Such  was  the 
need  of  fighting  men  that  the  type-setters  of  all  the  news 
papers,  who  had  a  general  exemption,  were  taken  into  the 
ranks,  and  the  '  Richmond  Whig '  was  the  only  paper  pub 
lished  the  next  morning." 

i  Vol.  2,  p.  295. 


PETERSBURG  — FT.  HARRISON:  A   COMPARISON     97 

The  loss  of  Fort  Harrison  and  connecting  lines  so  alarmed 
the  Government  and  people  for  the  safety  of  the  Capital  that 
General  Lee  hastened  up  from  Petersburg  with  seven  brigades 
to  recover  them.  During  the  night  the  men  of  the  First  Di 
vision  were  busy  constructing  breastworks  in  rear  of  the  fort 
connecting  the  wings  to  make  an  enclosed  work,  but  the  time 
was  not  sufficient  to  complete  it.  About  noon  a  rapid  and 
continuous  cannonade  was  kept  up  upon  the  captured  post  for 
an  hour  or  more  when  the  assaults  by  the  infantry  commenced. 
Three  distinct  efforts,  at  intervals  not  exceeding  half  an  hour, 
were  vainly  made  to  break  through  the  line,  which  to  the  right 
was  entirely  without  protection.  No  line  of  the  enemy  or  any 
part  of  one  was  able  to  advance  beyond  a  swale  covered  with 
bushes  about  fifty  yards  from  their  goal,  where  many  lay  down 
for  safety.  The  firing  ceased  late  in  the  afternoon  and  when 
a  heavy  picket  force  was  sent  out,  five  hundred  Confederates 
rose  up  and  surrendered.  No  official  report  of  Confederate 
losses  was  ever  made.  The  "  Rebel  War  Clerk "  reports, 
under  date  of  October  1,  that  Judge  Lyons  came  in  from  the 
front  and  estimated  that  Lee's  losses  were  from  seven  hundred 
to  one  thousand  killed  and  wounded.  There  is  evidence  enough 
that,  including  prisoners,  they  were  about  two  thousand.  This 
was  the  second  time  the  division  had  fought  on  the  defensive 
under  partial  cover,  and  for  once  it  can  truthfully  be  said  that 
the  men  were  eager  for  the  fray. 

When  the  artillery  ceased  some  one  commenced  singing 
"  The  Battle  Cry  of  Freedom,"  which  a  thousand  voices  in 
stantly  took  up  and  hurled  as  a  defiance  to  the  enemy.  A  can 
nonade  answered  by  a  song !  As  the  long,  well-dressed  lines  of 
infantry  appeared,  there  was  the  wildest  manifestation  of  joy 
ous  emotion  and  excitement  as  flag  after  flag  was  unfurled 
and  planted  on  the  breastworks  —  a  second  challenge  to  the 
foe.  This  is  no  fancy  picture  of  the  imagination  —  only  a 
narrative  of  what  I  saw  and  heard.  It  was  poetic  justice  that 
the  division  capturing  and  holding  this  fort  should  be  per- 


98     PETERSBURG  — FT.  HARRISON:  A   COMPARISON 

mitted  to  march  from  it  on  the  3d  of  the  following  April  and 
first  enter  and  occupy  the  Confederate  Capital. 

General  Butler's  order  contemplated  that,  after  the  antici 
pated  success  at  Chaffin  farm,  his  forces  should  push  on  and, 
if  possible,  capture  Richmond.  It  is  not  difficult  now  to  be 
lieve  that,  if  the  Tenth  Corps  had  followed  the  Eighteenth, 
and  General  Ord  had  been  spared  from  wounds  to  command 
the  fifteen  thousand  troops  that  would  have  been  available, 
such  might  have  been  the  result ;  or  at  least  a  position  so  near 
it  gained  that  the  subsequent  campaign  might  have  been  radi 
cally  modified. 

Unlike  the  task  confided  to  General  Smith,  the  movement 
to  the  north  of  the  James  was  an  independent  one,  no  strategic 
campaign,  important  or  unimportant,  being  dependent  upon 
its  success,  or  in  any  way  to  be  affected  by  its  failure.  There 
is  this  only  in  common  to  each,  the  crossing  of  a  river,  a  five- 
mile  march  to  the  enemy's  line,  and  a  subsequent  assault ;  here 
the  parallel  ends  and  a  sharp  contrast  begins  and  continues 
throughout. 

Reference  has  previously  been  made  to  the  four  papers 
relating  to  the  first  part  of  the  subject  of  this  article.  The 
"  Failure  to  take  Petersburg,  June  15  "  was  written  by  the 
present  President  of  the  Society  in  1878,  at  a  time  when 
General  Smith,  on  whose  staff  he  had  served,  was  a  member 
also,  which  must  have  caused  the  former  some  embarrassment. 
Colonel  Liver  more  has  been  for  many  years  a  close  and  pro 
found  student  of  the  campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
and  evidently  especially  interested  in  its  final  campaign.  The 
writer  is  of  the  opinion,  without  knowing  the  fact,  that  he 
early  formed  the  intention  to  write,  not  a  narrative,  but  a  criti 
cal  history  of  it.  The  first  paper  appeared  in  1877,  the  second 
in  1888,  and  the  last  in  1906,  making  a  noble  trilogy  of  great 
merit  and  value  which  will  remain  as  a  monument  to  his  careful 
research  and  rare  military  judgment.  Impressed,  as  he  doubt 
less  was,  by  the  extent  to  which  the  bold  and  brilliant  strategy 


PETERSBURG  —  FT.  HARRISON:  A   COMPARISON     99 

of  General  Grant  in  moving  the  army  to  the  south  side  of  the 
James  was  adversely  affected  by  the  failure  of  the  15th  of 
June,  and  the  war  thereby  prolonged,  he  was  compelled  to 
write  the  paper,  notwithstanding  his  conclusions  were  to  place 
a  severe  censure  on  his  former  chief  and  a  heavy  burden  of 
responsibility  which  even  now,  perhaps,  cannot  be  fully  meas 
ured.  He  rather  hints  at,  than  states,  the  serious  mistake  of 
General  Smith  in  sending  in  Hincks'  division  at  Baylor's  farm 
in  the  manner  he  did,  involving  a  loss  of  three  hundred  or  four 
hundred  men,  when  the  same  result  could  have  been  accom 
plished  by  a  flank  movement  or  a  strong  and  extended  skirmish 
line  with  slight  loss,  and  probably  in  as  short  time.  The  follow 
ing  quotation  from  his  paper  cannot  be  accepted  without  mate 
rial  qualification  :  "  It  is  not  disputed  that  General  Smith  had 
up  to  his  arrival  in  front  of  the  enemy's  main  works  (twelve 
o'clock)  acted  with  great  promptness  and  spirit."  If  an  earlier 
hour  had  been  adopted  for  this  commendation  it  would  have 
been  readily  enough  accepted.  It  will  always  seem  to  the  writer 
that  the  reservoir  of  "  promptness  and  spirit "  possessed  by 
General  Smith  was  so  small  that  a  single  draught  from  it  at 
Baylor's  farm  left  it  dry.  Various  theories  have  been  suggested 
as  an  explanation  of  his  conduct — one,  that  he  could  take 
no  interest  in  executing  a  plan  not  his  own ;  another,  that 
from  enmity  to  General  Butler,  he  did  not  wish  to  assist  in 
making  a  military  reputation  for  him,  neither  of  which  is 
believable. 

A  partial  sketch  of  his  military  career  may  help  to  explain 
what  on  other  theories  seems  inexplicable.  On  the  6th  of  May 
the  Army  of  the  James  was  in  position  on  a  line  known  as 
the  Bermuda  front,  the  Eighteenth  Corps,  under  General 
Smith,  holding  the  left  at  the  Appomattox  and  the  Tenth 
Corps  the  right.  General  Heckman  was  sent  the  same  day 
with  a  strong  brigade  to  seize  the  Richmond  and  Petersburg 
railroad,  about  three  miles  in  front.  Guarding  the  road  at  the 
time  were  only  nine  companies  from  two  South  Carolina  regi- 


100     PETERSBURG  — FT.  HARRISON:  A   COMPARISON 

merits  officially  reported  as  numbering  six  hundred  men.1 
After  a  contest  lasting  an  hour  at  long  range,  Heckman  re 
treated  back  to  camp,  reporting  that  he  had  developed  two 
brigades  which  he  might  have  overcome  only  at  the  possible 
annihilation  of  his  command.2  General  Smith  reported3  this 
misadventure  to  General  Butler,  informing  him  that  to  accom 
plish  the  object  in  view  he  required  five  brigades,  "  enough 
for  a  feint  attack  and  a  real  one  with  an  irresistible  force" 
to  use  his  own  expression.  Early  the  next  morning  he  drew 
out  the  five  brigades  and  started  to  repair  the  misfortune  of 
the  day  before  —  Heckman 's  brigade  for  the  feint  attack,  and 
the  other  four  for  the  real  one.  The  former  went  forward 
from  the  left  for  two  miles  and  there  remained  during  the 
day,  not  firing  a  shot  except  from  a  light  battery  supporting 
him.  There  were  now  two  small  Confederate  brigades  in  front 
of  the  railroad,  Bushrod  Johnson's,  numbering  1168,  and 
three  regiments  just  up  from  Charleston,  under  General  Ha- 
good  counting  1500,  a  total  of  2668.  The  four  brigades  took 
the  Bermuda  road,  and  when  about  two  miles  out  received  a 
half-dozen  shots  from  a  picket  post,  then  stopped,  formed  in 
two  lines  of  battle,  Drake's  brigade  next  to  Heckman,  then 
Burnham's,  Barton's  with  Plaisted  on  the  right,  —  more  than 
8000  men  with  muskets  in  their  hands.  The  three  left  bri 
gades  did  not  move  forward  three  hundred  yards  from  the 
position  first  taken,  and  only  the  skirmishers  of  Burnham's 
brigade  were  in  any  way  engaged.  It  is  singular,  but  Drake 
and  Johnson,  facing  each  other,  each  reported  one  killed  and 
three  wounded  by  shells  —  their  total  loss.  The  Eighth  Con 
necticut  was  thrown  out  as  skirmishers  by  General  Burnham 
and  kept  up  a  pretty  sharp  contest  with  the  enemy,  but  no 
other  part  of  his  command  was  in  any  way  engaged.  Five 
were  killed  and  sixty-eight  wounded,  nearly  all  of  the  Eighth 
Connecticut. 

In  the  early  afternoon  a  small  squadron  of  cavalry  on  the 
1  68  W.  R.  255.  2  68  W.  R.  153.  8  68  W.  R.  521. 


PETERSBURG  —  FT.  HARRISON:  A   COMPARISON     101 

extreme  right,  pioneering  on  their  own  account,  reached  the 
railroad  without  meeting  a  Confederate  soldier.  When  Gen 
eral  Smith  was  informed  of  this,  he  ordered  the  two  right 
brigades  to  move  forward.  General  Plaisted  reached  the  road 
without  opposition ;  but  General  Barton,  overlapping  the  short 
line  of  the  enemy,  struck  the  left  flank  of  Hagood's  three 
regiments  and  compelled  him  after  a  sharp  conflict  to  aban 
don  his  position  and  form  a  new  line  at  a  right  angle  to  the 
road,  his  right  connecting  with  Johnson's  left.  After  this  some 
telegraph  poles  were  cut  down  and  a  short  piece  of  the  road 
was  wrecked,  but  not  badly,  for  the  next  day  trains  were  run 
ning  as  usual  between  Richmond  and  Petersburg.  The  two 
brigades  were  then  ordered  to  retire  to  their  former  position 
in  line,  for  the  reason,  as  officially  stated,  "  that  all  the  troops 
were  engaged  in  fighting  and  none  were  left  to  destroy  the 
road  "  ; 1  and  for  hours  thereafter  8000  men  stood  facing  2600 
of  the  enemy,  the  distance  between  the  two  varying  from  one 
half  a  mile  to  double  that  distance !  At  sundown  this  "  irre 
sistible  force  "  was  marching  back  to  camp.  The  loss  for  the 
day  was  339,  nearly  all  by  Barton's  brigade  and  the  Eighth 
Connecticut. 

When  General  Butler  read  the  reports  that  came  to  him. 
the  following  day,  he  came  to  the  front  in  hot  wrath  at  the 
comedy  of  the  last  two  days,  and  issued  a  sharp  order  for  the 
Tenth  Corps  to  move  on  the  9th  at  daylight  to  Chester  Junc 
tion,  four  miles  in  front,  and  the  Eighteenth  to  Walthall 
Junction,  three  miles  out,  at  the  same  hour.  General  Pickett 
sent  directions  at  ten  o'clock  in  the  evening  of  the  7th  to 
Generals  Johnson  and  Hagood  to  retire  with  their  brigades 
to  the  south  side  of  Swift  Creek  and  fortify  a  defensive  line 
there,2  leaving  a  small  force  sufficient  to  picket  the  roads  lead 
ing  to  Bermuda  Hundred.  Gillmore  reached  the  Junction 
without  opposition.  A  mile  and  a  half  out  on  the  Bermuda 
road,  Smith  met  the  enemy's  pickets,  at  once  halted,  and 
1  68  W.  R.  124.  2  68  W.  R.  242. 


102     PETERSBURG  — FT.  HARRISON:  A   COMPARISON 

ordered  the  Eighteenth  Corps  into  line  of  battle.  About  half- 
past  nine  his  skirmishers  reported  back  that  they  had  discov 
ered  the  enemy  at  or  near  the  Junction.  Without  any  attempt 
to  find  out  what  the  reported  force  consisted  of,  he  sent  a  note 
to  General  Gillmore,  three  or  four  miles  away  to  the  north, 
stating  that  some  of  the  enemy  were  reported  at  Port  Wal- 
thall  Junction  and  requesting  him  to  move  the  Tenth  Corps 
down  the  railroad  to  capture  them.  *  Gillmore  sent  a  message, 
dated  10.15,  to  General  Butler,2  informing  him  of  Smith's 
request  with  which  he  soon  complied.  The  date  of  Gillmore's 
message  to  Butler  establishes  the  fact  that  the  Eighteenth 
Corps  had  consumed  the  time  from  daylight  to  about  10  A.M. 
in  going  forward  about  a  mile  and  a  half,  possibly  two  miles, 
with  no  enemy  in  front.  Before  noon  the  two  corps  had  sur 
rounded  the  Junction,  but  on  reaching  there  no  enemy  was 
found.  The  two  corps,  forming  in  line  across  the  railroad, 
then  moved  down  near  Swift  Creek  and  returned  to  Bermuda 
the  next  day.  Gillmore  reported  that  no  ford  for  crossing  the 
creek  could  be  found.  No  attempt  had  been  made  to  find  one, 
of  which  there  were  many — a  very  good  one  in  the  immediate 
front  of  the  army,  through  which  the  enemy's  pickets  crossed 
in  our  sight. 

After  resting  two  days  in  camp,  at  seven  o'clock  in  the 
morning  of  the  12th,  the  movement  toward  Richmond  com 
menced,  the  advance  being  given  to  the  Eighteenth  Corps,  to 
which  was  added  Turner's  division  of  the  Tenth  Corps.  At 
the  Richmond  turnpike,  Smith  ordered  the  army  into  line  of 
battle,  which,  when  formed,  extended  from  the  James  River 
a  division's  length  west  of  the  pike.  Two  days  were  consumed 
in  reaching  the  Halfway  House,  about  four  miles  north  of 
Butler's  intrenched  camp.  There  is  no  mention  of  any  attempt 
to  resist  our  advance  in  any  official  Confederate  reports  or  in 
Southern  books  as  yet  discovered.  There  was,  of  course,  some 
skirmish  firing,  but,  at  times,  for  hours  not  a  shot  could  be 
1  68  W.  R.  589.  2  68  W.  R. 


PETERSBURG  — FT.  HARRISON:  A   COMPARISON     103 

heard.  There  were  many  witty  things  said  by  the  men  in  the 
line  at  the  expense  of  our  corps  commander,  generally  with 
a  sarcastic  flavor  to  them.  As  to  his  movements  toward  the 
enemy,  they  described  them  as  being  made  at  the  "  double- 
slow  step."  The  conundrum  was  early  started  around  the 
camp-fires  —  "  How  long  is  it  going  to  take  to  get  to  Rich 
mond  if  we  go  out  three  miles  a  day  and  come  back  at  night  ?  " 
On  the  morning  of  the  16th  the  army  had  been  in  posses 
sion  for  two  days  of  about  three  miles  of  the  Confederate 
outer  line  of  works  for  the  defence  of  Fort  Darling  on  the 
James  River,  the  Eighteenth  Corps  on  the  right  and  the  Tenth 
Corps  on  the  left.  During  the  night  General  Beauregard 
massed  in  front  of  the  Eighteenth  Corps,  of  which  seventeen 
regiments  only  were  present,  Ransom's  division  of  nineteen 
regiments  and  two  battalions  and  Hoke's  division  of  ten  regi 
ments,  with  the  ambitious  intention  of  breaking  through  on 
our  right  and  capturing  the  whole  army.  During  a  dense  fog 
in  the  early  morning,  Ransom  went  forward,  wheeling  con 
siderably  to  the  right,  and  came  in  contact  at  first  with  Heck- 
man's  brigade  holding  the  Union  right.  Heckman's  men 
opened  a  rapid  fire  as  well-directed  as  the  obscurity  of  the 
fog  would  permit.  Gracie's  brigade  was  not  able  to  over 
come  the  resistance ;  his  men  hesitated  and  dropped  upon  the 
ground  to  escape  the  destructive  fire.  Kemper  in  the  rear 
went  to  Gracie's  aid,  and  only  after  an  hour  of  desperate  fight 
ing  was  a  break  made  in  the  line  by  overlapping  the  Ninth 
New  Jersey  and  coming  in  to  its  rear.  During  this  time  the 
rest  of  Ransom's  division  was  making  furious  assaults  on 
Weitzel's  division  except  his  three  left  regiments.  Soon  after, 
General  Hoke  advanced  with  his  ten  regiments,  when  the 
whole  front  of  the  Eighteenth  Corps  was  a  blaze  of  fire.  For 
more  than  two  hours  these  attacks  were  continued,  but  at  every 
point,  save  the  one  alluded  to,  they  were  repulsed  with  heavy 
losses.  Three  regiments  from  the  reserve  division  were  sent, 
at  Ransom's  request,  to  his  assistance  and  put  in  between  his 


104     PETERSBURG  — FT.  HARRISON:  A    COMPARISON 

division  and  Hoke,  which  met  with  the  same  disastrous  re 
pulse  as  the  other  brigades.  Thirty-four  regiments  and  bat 
talions  out  of  the  forty-four  constituting  Beauregard's  com 
mand  had  met  only  with  disaster,  except  the  early  success 
over  Heckman's  brigade,  which  was  stayed  by  two  regiments 
brought  up  from  the  rear.  Ransom's  great  division  was  scat 
tered,  out  of  ammunition,  and  incapable  of  further  offensive 
work.  Gracie  said  that  his  brigade  was  reduced  to  a  skirmish 
line  as  early  as  half -past  six.  It  was  not  until  ten  o'clock  that 
Ransom  had  gathered  the  remnants  of  his  command  together, 
and  then  told  Beauregard  he  could  not  advance  without  en 
dangering  his  division.1  "The  severity  of  the  enemy's  fire," 
General  Hagood  reported,  "  is  illustrated  by  the  fact  that 
57  bullet  marks  were  found  on  the  flag  of  the  7th  S.C.  bat 
talion  after  the  fight,  and  in  one  of  the  companies  there  were 
65  casualties,  of  which  19  were  killed  outright.  The  general 
list  will  show  that  the  losses  of  this  battalion  were  scarcely 
exceptional." 2  There  was  not  fighting  strength  left  in  the  two 
divisions  to  meet  a  fresh  brigade  if  sent  against  them. 

It  may  seem  that  this  is  a  far  wandering  from  my  theme, 
but  it  is  only  preliminary  and  necessary  to  illustrate  later  the 
conduct  of  General  Smith  which  is  closely  related  to  it.  When 
the  crash  came  in  the  morning  General  Smith  left  his  head 
quarters  near  the  front  at  the  Friend  house  and  took  a  new 
station  by  the  Halfway  House,  a  mile  in  the  rear,  and  sent 
word  to  the  division  commanders  where  he  could  be  found. 
First  making  request  for  reinforcements  he  sent  orders  to  all 
the  corps  batteries  to  retire  "in  all  haste."3  When  the  muf 
fled  roar  of  the  Confederate  guns,  that  had  been  pressed  up 
to  within  a  half-mile  of  our  main  lines,  was  heard,  ours  were 
seeking  safety  in  flight.  General  Smith  apologizes  for  the 
capture  of  Belger's  battery  because  the  order  to  retire  did  not 
reach  him.  Captain  Belger  in  his  report  says  the  order  was 
sent  and  delivered  to  a  sergeant  with  the  caissons  a  mile  in 
i  68  W.  R.  202.  2  68  W.  R.  254.  8  68  W.  R.  116-48. 


PETERSBURG  —  FT.  HARRISON:  A   COMPARISON     105 

the  rear,  who  was  killed  while  carrying  it  to  the  front.  The 
Confederate  reports  furnish  ample  evidence  of  the  efficient 
service  it  was  enabled  to  render  by  the  intelligent  act  of  send 
ing  an  order  a  mile  to  the  rear  to  a  battery  in  a  fierce  struggle 
on  the  firing  line.  Very  near  the  end  of  the  assaults  already 
described  and  just  before  the  fog  lifted,  General  Weitzel  sent 
word,  for  what  it  was  worth,  to  Smith  that  there  was  a  rumor 
or  report  that  a  Confederate  force  was  moving  farther  to  his 
right.1  Smith  at  once  sent  orders  for  the  whole  corps  to  re 
treat,  first  Weitzel,  then  Brooks.  There  was  no  truth  in  this 
report  and  no  reason  for  belief  in  it.  A  cavalry  picket  ex 
tended  from  Weitzel's  division  to  the  James  River,  and  it  had 
not  been  disturbed.  Weitzel's  division  had  retreated  only  a 
short  distance  when  the  sun  came  out  bright  and  clear,  and 
Smith  saw  that  on  a  wild  camp  rumor  he  had  abandoned  a 
battlefield.  Attempting  to  repair  what  was  irreparable,  he 
ordered  Weitzel  to  retake  the  abandoned  line.  In  his  report 
Weitzel  states  that,  while  executing  the  order,  Smith  directed 
him  again  to  retreat,  which  resulted  in  the  Army  of  the  James 
returning  leisurely  back  to  the  Bermuda  line. 

I  now  make  a  short  intentional  digression  from  my  sub 
ject.  Having  served  in  the  Army  of  the  James  during  the 
whole  time  of  its  existence,  I  take  naturally  a  deep  interest  in 
its  history,  have  read  and  carefully  digested  every  report 
made  by  its  officers  from  the  general  commanding  down  to 
captains  of  companies.  I  see  clearly  its  opportunity  for  great 
achievements  and  think  I  know  the  reason  of  its  lamentable 
failures.  General  Butler  has  been  the  object  of  merciless  crit 
icism,  some  of  which  is  without  excuse.  Soon  after  the  battle 
of  Drury's  Bluff  began,  it  was  clearly  apparent  that  Beaure- 
gard  had  massed  the  bulk  of  his  army  ,against  the  Union 
right.  General  Butler  being  of  this  opinion  sent  an  order  to 
General  Gillmore  to  attack  the  enemy  on  his  front  at  once. 
There  were  before  him  at  the  time  only  five  small  regiments. 
1  68  W.  R.  153. 


106     PETERSBURG  — FT.  HARRISON:  A   COMPARISON 

Gillmore  replied  that  he  would  attack  as  soon  as  his  troops 
were  ready,  and  at  the  same  time  notified  the  division  com 
manders  to  be  ready,  but  no  word  as  to  where,  when,  or  in 
what  manner,  the  attack  was  to  be  made.  An  hour  and  one 
minute  later  he  informs  Butler  by  letter1  that  three  assaults 
had  been  made  on  Terry's  front  which  had  been  handsomely 
repulsed,  closing  with  this  ominous  sentence :  "  If  I  move  to 
the  assault  and  meet  a  repulse  our  loss  would  be  fearful." 
What  the  three  assaults  on  Terry's  front  were  are  revealed 
by  General  Hawley,  who  had  captured  a  hill  just  in  front  of 
his  picket  line  on  which  were  the  ruins  of  some  burnt  build 
ings  and  there  stationed  the  Seventh  Connecticut.  From  time 
to  time  a  group  of  skirmishers  made  rushes  toward  this  point, 
when  the  regiment  opened  fire  for  a  minute  or  two  and  stopped 
at  the  call  of  a  bugle.  This  is  all  there  was  to  the  three  as 
saults,2  reported  doubtless  as  an  excuse  for  his  intended  inac 
tion.  No  assault  was  made  or  preparation  for  making  one  at 
ten  o'clock  when  Gillmore  was  directed  to  retire,  which  he  did 
in  such  hasty  and  heedless  manner  that  the  corps  lost  more 
men  in  retreating  than  it  probably  would  have  lost  in  captur 
ing  the  enemy's  works. 

When  the  order  was  given  to  Brooks'  division  at  Baylor's 
farm,  on  June  15,  to  deploy  into  lines  of  battle,  it  had  to  the 
men  an  old  and  familiar  sound.  The  skirmish  line  consisting 
of  the  Thirteenth  New  Hampshire,  one  hundred  and  twenty 
men  from  the  Eighth  Connecticut,  two  companies  of  the  One 
Hundred  and  Eighteenth  and  one  hundred  and  fifty  men  from 
the  Ninety-second  New  York,  was  put  under  command  of  Col 
onel  Stevens,  of  the  regiment  first  named,  a  brave  and  effi 
cient  officer.  From  Baylor's  farm  to  the  main  line  of  the 
enemy  was  a  mile  and  a  half,  and  three  hours  were  consumed 
in  making  the  distance.  If  Colonel  Stevens  had  been  in 
structed  to  press  back  the  enemy  with  all  possible  speed,  he 
would  have  accomplished  it  by  ten  o'clock.  The  men,  now 
i  68  W.  R.  834.  2  68  W.  R.  53. 


PETERSBURG  — -  FT.  HARRISON:  A   COMPARISON     107 

thoroughly  familiar  with  the  methods  of  their  corps  com 
mander,  followed  a  well-established  precedent,  dawdled  along, 
and  took  three  hours  for  an  hour's  work.  The  opposition  to 
their  advance  was  as  nothing  compared  with  that  which  Col 
onel  Donohoe  met  north  of  the  James.  There  was  only  one 
man  hit  in  the  Thirteenth  New  Hampshire,  his  thumb  just 
grazed  by  a  bullet.  This  dawdling  was  no  fault  of  the  men. 
"  Like  officer,  like  men,"  is  an  adage  older  than  Roman  Mili 
tary  history,  the  truth  of  which  each  succeeding  generation 
has  confirmed.  The  Second  Corps  was  the  most  efficient  and 
powerful  corps  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  because  some 
thing  of  the  spirit  of  its  first  commander  —  the  gallant  and 
impetuous  Sumner — flowed  down  through  division  and  bri 
gade  commanders  until  it  reached  the  last  man  in  the  last  file 
of  its  regiments.  Under  its  succeeding  leaders  —  Couch,  Han 
cock,  and  Humphreys  —  its  warlike  spirit  never  grew  less. 

Martindale's  division  marched  by  the  river  road,  near  the 
Appomattox,  and  was  in  connection  with  Brooks  at  noon  and 
Hincks  was  only  a  few  rods  in  the  rear,  and  if  there  was  any 
necessity  for  it,  of  which  there  was  none,  could  have  been  on 
the  same  alignment  in  a  few  minutes,  the  whole  force  in  the 
exact  position  they  were  ordered  to  take  from  which  to  make 
an  immediate  assault.  From  noon  to  seven  in  the  evening  is  a 
long  wait  for  a  surprise  attack.  Many  things  might  happen 
in  seven  hours,  and  one  did  happen  —  four  regiments  came 
to  strengthen  the  defence  and  Beauregard  might  have  aban 
doned  Bermuda,  as  he  did  the  next  morning,  and  made  the 
line  impregnable,  and  this,  perhaps,  he  ought  to  have  done. 
Nothing  was  expected  nor  could  happen  by  delay  to  be  of 
assistance  to  the  attacking  force. 

Of  these  two  considerations  General  Smith  seems  to  have 
taken  no  account.  In  the  paper  written  in  his  defence  he 
says :  "  I  am  very  confident  that  any  man  standing  at  12  M. 
on  that  day  before  those  works,  who  would  at  once  have 
ordered  an  assault,  belongs  at  one  extreme  or  the  other  of  the 


108     PETERSBURG  —  FT.  HARRISON:  A   COMPARISON 

long  scale  of  human  intellect,"  —  meaning  that  such  rashness 
and  folly  would  put  him  at  the  low  extreme.  This  is  merely 
a  phrase  without  meaning  as  applied  to  the  situation.  I  can 
think  of  only  two  corps  commanders  in  the  army,  who,  stand 
ing  in  the  supposed  situation  at  the  hour  named,  with  the 
orders  and  the  information  given  to  General  Smith,  would  not, 
after  a  short  examination  in  front,  have  made  an  assault  and 
carried  out  the  essential  further  part  of  his  mission  by  the 
capture  and  holding  of  Petersburg,  neither  of  whom  stood,  how 
ever,  at  either  end  of  the  two  extremes  of  human  intellect.  It 
was  a  sad  day  when  these  two  officers  were  assigned  to  the 
Army  of  the  James.  In  the  year  1878  the  historian  of  the 
Thirteenth  New  Hampshire  carefully  measured  the  distance 
from  the  position  at  the  edge  of  the  woods  where  the  skirmish 
line  was  located  to  Battery  No.  5.  To  the  French  riflepits 
was  four  hundred  yards  and  from  there  to  the  battery  three 
hundred  yards.  The  smooth  grass  land  sloped  gently  all  the 
way  to  the  deep  ravine  just  in  front  of  Battery  No.  5,  which 
a  charging  line  would  reach  so  quickly  that  the  guns  could  be 
fired  not  more  than  twice  and  probably  only  once.  The  mo 
ment  the  picket  line  was  reached,  the  danger  to  their  own 
men  would  have  been  such  that  further  firing  would  very 
likely  have  ceased.  The  seven  hours  of  fatal  hesitation  were 
spent  as  follows,  according  to  Smith's  own  story :  three  in 
making  reconnoissances  along  the  front  of  the  divisions  of 
Brooks  and  Hincks,  two  in  a  ride  over  to  the  right  and  back, 
and  two  in  getting  the  troops  ready,  including  the  artillery, 
which  is  said  to  have  delayed  the  assault  for  an  hour.  We 
have  never  been  informed  of  anything  of  value  gained  by 
the  three  hours  spent  in  reconnoissances  along  the  front  of 
the  centre  and  left  divisions,  the  very  thing  General  Smith 
had  been  cautioned  against  by  his  commanding  officer,  which 
in  the  service  would  generally  be  construed  as  a  command. 
The  weak  point  in  the  enemy's  line  was  the  salient,  immedi 
ately  in  front  of  the  centre  division,  which  is  revealed  to  an 


PETERSBURG  — FT.  HARRISON:  A    COMPARISON     109 

educated  or  experienced  soldier  at  a  glance,  the  view  being 
unobstructed  for  a  long  distance  along  the  front  of  Hincks' 
division  and  on  the  right  clear  to  the  Apporaattox.  It  seems 
evident  that  General  Smith  was  consuming  time  in  making 
preparations  for  a  faulty  method  of  attack,  which  required 
that  the  three  divisions  should  first  be  on  a  common  align 
ment,  touching  elbows,  as  it  were,  so  that  all  could  move  for 
ward  together.  As  the  capture  of  the  fortifications  was  only 
an  incident  of  no  consequence  in  itself,  but  merely  a  prelimi 
nary  step  to  the  capture  and  occupation  of  Petersburg,  which 
was  the  real  object  of  the  movement,  the  preparations  for  their 
capture  should  have  been  confined  to  the  centre  division,  and 
when  the  wide  door  was  opened,  the  other  divisions  should 
have  been  held  in  readiness  to  pass  through  it  and  press  for 
ward  into  the  city.  As  the  door,  in  fact,  was  opened  by  the 
skirmishers  alone,  the  three  divisions  would  have  been  avail 
able. 

Any  one  familiar  with  the  terrain  to  the  east  of  Petersburg 
must  be  aware  that  it  would  have  been  impossible  for  the 
enemy  to  move  troops  from  the  line  running  across  the  low 
Appomattox  valley  in  season  to  reenforce  the  salient,  even  if 
there  were  any  available,  before  it  would  be  taken,  or  the 
attack  repulsed,  and  the  two  hours  spent  by  Smith  in  a  visit 
to  Martindale,  simply  to  direct  him  to  move  forward  with  the 
other  divisions  for  a  useless  purpose,  was  pure  waste;  in  any 
view  it  was  a  duty  that  should  have  been  performed  by  a  mem 
ber  of  his  staff. 

The  delay  of  the  assault  for  an  hour  for  the  reason  that  the 
chief  of  artillery  had  sent  all  the  horses  away  for  water  is 
additional  evidence  that  information  of  a  surprise  attack  had 
not  been  sufficiently  communicated  to  the  army,  unless  the 
existing  long  wait  was  a  justification  of  Captain  Elder  in  the 
belief  that  all  thought  of  it  had  been  given  up,  and  further 
operations  postponed  until  the  following  morning.  It  may 
well  be  questioned  whether  there  was  excuse  for  delaying  the 


110     PETERSBURG  — FT.  HARRISON:  A   COMPARISON 

attack  so  long  a  time,  or,  indeed,  any  time,  by  reason  of  the 
absent  artillery.  There  was  a  tendency  to  overrate  the  value 
of  this  arm  of  the  service  during  the  war.  There  was  a  too 
generally  accepted  belief  that  little  or  nothing  could  be  done, 
nor  ought  to  be  attempted,  without  it.  The  estimate  made, 
that  only  from  three  to  five  per  cent  of  the  losses  suffered  by 
either  army  during  the  war  came  from  the  artillery,  is  prob 
ably  very  near  the  truth,  though  the  data  on  which  the  esti 
mate  was  made  are  rather  meagre.  Its  relative  power  and 
effectiveness  at  the  present  time  is  well  known  to  be  far 
greater.  The  one  hundred  and  forty-seven  guns  on  the  Staf 
ford  hills  that  poured  shot  and  shell  for  half  a  day  into  Fred- 
ericksburg  did  not  disturb  the  small  Confederate  brigade  that 
held  it,  and  which  would  have  held  it  indefinitely  but  for  the 
infantry  sent  over  in  pontoon  boats,  who  drove  them  away. 
The  great  cannonade  at  Gettysburg  between  one  hundred  and 
fifty  guns  on  Seminary  Ridge  and  eighty  on  Cemetery  Ridge, 
lasting  two  hours,  said  to  have  been  the  most  noted  in  the 
history  of  war  up  to  that  time,  gave  notice  of  the  place  where, 
and  the  time  when,  the  attack  was  coming,  scattered  quickly 
numerous  sutler's  wagons  and  other  teams,  and  killed  about  an 
equal  number  on  either  side,  but  had  not  the  slightest  influ 
ence  on  the  battle.  It  found  its  proper  and  efficient  field  of 
action  in  defence  of  a  line,  either  fortified  or  open,  against 
which  infantry  is  moving  either  in  line  or  column.  This  was 
illustrated  at  Gettysburg.  After  the  cannonade  ended,  and  the 
Confederate  infantry  came  on  to  attack,  —  the  same  here  as 
on  many  other  fields,  its  destructive  power  was  manifest  until 
what  was  left  of  the  shattered  columns  were  lost  to  sight. 

You  will  search  the  records  in  vain  to  find  an  instance 
where  field  artillery  has  been  of  much  service  in  preparing  an 
attack  or  as  a  cover  to  one  made  by  infantry  against  fortifica 
tions.  Hancock  stormed  the  salient  at  Spottsylvania  without 
it,  capturing  a  Confederate  division.  Sheridan,  Wood,  and 
Johnson  carried  Missionary  Ridge  with  infantry  alone.  It  has 


PETERSBURG  — FT.  HARRISON:  A   COMPARISON     111 

previously  been  said  that  no  batteries  were  allowed  to  cross 
the  James  in  aid  of  the  assault  on  Fort  Harrison.  Fort  Wag 
ner  cannot  be  cited  adversely  to  this  contention,  for  it  was 
evacuated  after  a  long  siege  ;  nor  Fort  Fisher,  where  the  navy 
destroyed  its  guns,  and  made  all  necessary  preparation  for  a 
successful  assault.  At  Petersburg  General  Smith  might  as  well 
have  turned  Elder's  guns  toward  City  Point,  for  they  were  not 
and  could  not  have  been  of  any  service  on  that  occasion. 

Not  until  seven  o'clock  or  a  little~ later  was  everything  ar 
ranged  for  the  assault  which  was  to  be  made  by  five  hundred 
men  of  Brooks'  division,  Hincks  and  Martindale  to  advance 
as  soon  as  the  skirmishers  were  seen  to  be  in  motion.  Of  this 
plan  General  Smith  says :  "  The  plan  adopted  was  evolved 
only  after  a  long  and  laborious  reconnoissance,  and  as  the 
difficulties  of  finding  a  place  to  assault  in  the  usual  way  were 
developed.  It  was  to  me  a  novelty  in  the  art  of  war ;  educated 
soldiers  who  are  not  geniuses  treat  novelties  with  wariness; 
and  therefore  it  took  time  to  get  hold  of  the  plan  and  to  deter 
mine  to  adopt  it."  Though  the  idea  of  the  plan  occurred  to 
Smith  earlier,  he  did  not  decide  to  adopt  it  until  after  his  re 
turn  at  five  o'clock  from  General  Martindale,  being  then  con 
vinced  that  in  no  other  way  could  the  salient  be  carried.  In  1878, 
after  all  the  evidence  from  Confederate  sources  as  to  their 
numbers  was  well  known,  he  still  expressed  the  same  opinion. 
When  the  order  was  given  to  the  five  hundred  skirmishers  to 
advance,  General  Smith  certainly  must  have  expected  they 
would  be  able  to  succeed,  else  he  would  not  have  sent  them 
forward.  Here,  then,  is  the  strange  phenomenon  of  a  man, 
who  at  noon  placed  among  the  lowest  ranks  of  human  intel 
ligence  any  one  possessed  of  the  rashness  to  order  an  assault 
on  a  position  with  a  division  of  three  thousand  men,  at  seven 
o'clock  in  the  evening  of  the  same  day,  with  no  more  knowl 
edge  of  the  Confederate  forces  than  he  possessed  at  noon,  send 
ing  five  hundred  men  of  the  same  division  to  do  what  he  says 
three  thousand  could  not  do,  when  the  line  had  been  strength- 


112     PETERSBURG  —  FT.  HARRISON:  A   COMPARISON 

ened  by  reinforcements  amounting  to  four  regiments.  He  was 
convinced  in  his  own  mind,  and  acted  on  it,  that  the  works  were 
well  manned  in  the  forenoon  from  the  abundance  of  artillery 
that  would  not  be  left  for  capture  without  sufficient  infantry 
support,  from  the  fact  that  the  enemy  had  sent  out  a  mile  and 
a  half  to  Baylor's  farm  a  force  to  fortify  and  defend  a  cause 
way,  from  the  persistence  with  which  his  advance  from  that 
place  was  resisted,  and  also  by  the  negative  argument  that 
because  only  a  few  were  seen  inside  the  fortifications  was  no 
sufficient  proof  that  many  were  not  there.  To  justify  his  in 
action  the  best  military  authority  is  cited  to  show  that  one 
man  behind  breastworks  is  equal  to  three  outside.  Having,  as 
he  claimed,  sufficient  evidence  that  there  were  at  least  three 
thousand  Confederates  confronting  him,  he  drew  the  conclu 
sion  that  with  only  about  ten  thousand  he  would  not  be  jus 
tified  to  act  until  after  the  most  thorough  investigation.  All 
this  work  was  carried  on  for  seven  hours  to  quote  his  own 
language,  in  order  "  that  when  I  did  strike  the  blow  I  might 
make  no  failure  and  murder  no  men."  Oppressed  with  the 
thought  that,  by  acting  in  accordance  with  his  orders  and 
what  the  situation  demanded,  he  might  sacrifice  the  lives  of  a 
few  more  men  on  the  15th,  he  faltered.  Not  gifted  with  an 
historic  imagination,  that  far-off  vision  of  other  fields,  distant 
and  near,  which  his  inaction  was  to  redden  with  the  blood  of 
tens  of  thousands  was  not  for  him.  If  there  had  been  basis  for 
his  belief  that  not  less  than  three  thousand  men  were  behind 
the  works  on  the  front  to  be  assaulted,  or  even  any  consider 
able  fraction  of  that  number,  the  fate  of  his  five  hundred 
would  have  been  that  of  the  famous  six  hundred  at  Balaklava 
or  worse. 

There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  General  Smith  did  not 
give  the  order  to  some  one  to  attack  the  salient  with  skir 
mishers  alone;  but  it  is  certain  that  no  such  order  was  ever 
given  to  them;  they  were  sent  forward,  as  such  troops  usually 
are,  expecting  to  be  followed  by  the  division  in  line  or  column. 


PETERSBURG  —  FT.  HARRISON:  A   COMPARISON     113 

They  formed  a  line  half  a  mile  long.  If  a  work  of  such  appar 
ent  magnitude  was  to  be  given  to  a  few  men  to  perform,  at 
least,  they  should  have  been  informed  of  it  and  instructed,  as 
they  advanced,  to  converge  toward  the  centre,  so  that  the 
whole  number  might  join  in  the  attack  of  the  battery  on  its 
various  faces  at  the  same  time,  the  front  having  an  extension 
of  only  one  hundred  yards.  No  instructions  of  any  kind  were 
given.  The  men  rushed  forward  in  a  straight  line  quickly 
overrunning  the  French  rifle-pits,  capturing  or  killing  nearly 
all  within  them,  and  then  straight  forward  again,  so  that  when 
the  ravine  in  front  of  the  battery  was  reached  by  those  ad 
vancing  toward  it,  more  than  four  hundred  of  the  whole  skir 
mish  line  were  moving  down  into  the  Appomattox  Valley  far 
from  the  fort  they  were  expected  to  assist  in  capturing.1  In 
the  ravine,  soon  coming  together  into  a  group,  were  Captain 
Julian,  who  had  shot  dead  with  a  pistol  in  one  of  the  pits  a 
man  in  the  act  of  making  ready  to  fire  at  him,  Captain 
Stoodley,  Captain  Goss,  and  less  than  twenty  men,  all  of  the 
Thirteenth  New  Hampshire.  As  they  were  looking  up  to  the 
works  forty  feet  above  them,  Captain  Stoodley,  the  most  un- 
warlike-looking  and  appearing  officer  in  the  regiment,  but 
possessed  of  initiative  and  true  courage,  said,  in  a  half-fem 
inine  voice,  "  If  we  follow  this  thing  right  up  now,  we  can  take 
this  battery,"  to  which  Captain  Julian,  one  of  the  bravest  of 
the  brave,  replied,  "  Then  we  will  take  it,  follow  me,"  and  the 
whole  group  instantly  commenced  climbing  upward.  Julian 
was  the  first  in  the  fort,  and  for  a  few  seconds  was  there  alone, 
but  was  joined  by  the  rest  as  soon  as  each  could  get  there. 
There  were  not  over  a  dozen  Confederates  in  the  battery,  offi 
cers  and  men.  There  was  one  gunner  remaining  for  each  of 
the  six  guns,  indicating  that  the  intention  was  to  fire  once 
when  the  expected  column  should  appear  and  then  for  all  to 
retire.  Colonel  Council,  of  the  Twenty-sixth  Virginia  Regi 
ment,  and  Major  Beatty  readily  surrendered  their  swords  to 

1  See  map. 


114     PETERSBURG  — FT.  HARRISON:  A   COMPARISON 

Julian ;  and  Captain  Stoodley  secured  Captain  Sturtevant's, 
the  commander  of  the  battery.  From  the  captured  work  a 
clear  view  was  had  for  a  long  distance  to  the  right  and  left, 
and  those  within  reported  that  only  a  few  Confederate  sol 
diers  were  seen  making  hasty  steps  toward  Petersburg.  It 
occurred  to  the  mind  of  an  uneducated  soldier,  a  simple  cap 
tain  of  infantry,  looking  up  to  a  vast  pyramid  of  earth  above 
him,  that  the  less  than  twenty  men  about  him  could  capture 
the  battery,  and  they  did  it,  before  which  the  commander  of 
an  army  of  thirteen  thousand  men  had  been  standing  for 
seven  hours  acting  on  the  belief  that  he  had  not  a  sufficient 
force  even  to  make  an  attempt  to  capture.  The  discovery  of 
a  new  method  of  attack,  unknown  before  in  war,  had  nothing 
to  do  with  it.  It  was  captured  simply  for  the  reason  that 
there  was  no  force  for  its  defence,  and  could  have  been  taken 
as  easily  at  12  M.  as  at  7.30  in  the  evening. 

Hincks  moved  forward  as  ordered  and  captured  all  in  front 
of  him  up  to  and  including  Battery  No.  11.  The  small  loss 
suffered  was  proof  enough  that  the  resistance  encountered  was 
not  great.  As  soon  as  the  salient  was  taken,  Smith  moved 
Brooks'  division  forward  and  placed  it  in  position  near  the 
Friend  house  "  to  resist  an  attack."  The  failure  of  General 
Smith  to  go  forward  into  Petersburg  after  breaking  through 
the  enemy's  lines,  I  will  not  touch  upon,  as  it  has  been  thor 
oughly  discussed  and  a  correct  conclusion  reached  in  the  paper 
by  Colonel  Livermore. 

General  Smith  was  one  of  the  few  highly  educated  men  in 
the  army.  He  was  gifted  with  a  scientific  mind  to  which  was 
not  added  the  gift  of  imagination.  It  is  characteristic  of  the 
scientist  to  reach  his  conclusions  and  establish  his  theories 
only  after  minute  and  painstaking  investigation.  He  carried 
with  him  this  spirit  and  sought  for  certainty  in  war,  where 
certainty  is  not  to  be  found.  So  far  as  education  goes,  he  was 
more  highly  educated  than  any  of  our  great  soldiers  —  than 
Grant,  Thomas,  Sherman,  or  Sheridan.  He  was  familiar  with 


PETERSBURG— FT.   HARRISON:  A   COMPARISON     115 

the  history  of  wars  during  the  ages,  and  the  lives  of  the 
world's  great  captains,  as  also  the  spirit  with  which  they  car 
ried  on  their  campaigns  which  gave  them  name  and  fame ; 
nor  could  he  have  shut  his  eyes  and  locked  his  mind  to  the 
deeds  of  those  in  the  Civil  War  on  either  side  of  the  line,  and 
the  methods  by  which  they  were  won.  But  for  him,  as  an 
incentive,  all  the  teachings  of  history  and  contemporaneous 
events  were  as  a  sealed  book.  There  can  only  be  sympathy, 
or  even  pity,  for  one  who  had  devotedThis  life  to  prepare  him 
self  to  be  of  use  to  his  country  in  times  of  stress  and  storm, 
who,  by  constitutional  limitations,  was  prevented  from  achieve 
ments  that  would  place  his  name  among  those  of  her  illustri 
ous  soldiers. 

A  coarse,  uneducated,  perhaps  brutal,  slave-dealer  from 
Memphis,  Tennessee,  became  the  first  cavalry  leader  of  the 
South,  who  early  learned  all  of  the  art  of  war  he  thought  of 
any  value,  summed  up  in  the  words,  "  Get  there  first  and 
then  strike  quick  and  hard,"  —  General  Nathan  B.  Forrest. 


VIII 
CEDAR  CREEK,  OCTOBER  19,  1864 

EXTRACT  FROM  LETTER  TO  COLONEL  BENJAMIN  W. 
CROWNINSHIELD  FROM  GENERAL  W.  H.  EMORY 

(Referring  to  Volume  6,~p.  155) 

I  RECEIVED  your  note  and  the  pamphlets  on  the  battle  of 
Cedar  Creek.  It  is  the  best  and  truest  account  of  that  ex 
traordinary  battle  yet  written.  I  could  have  wished  that  you 
had  mentioned  two  repulses  I  had  given  the  enemy,  one  on 
the  banks  of  Cedar  Creek  early  in  the  morning,  when  not 
much  was  done,  and  one  in  the  afternoon,  when  the  repulse 
was  decided,  after  we  got  into  line  of  battle.  But  these  re 
pulses  were  of  minor  importance,  and  do  not  seriously  obstruct 
the  flow  of  your  description,  truthful  in  all  essential  particu 
lars,  of  the  most  remarkable  development  of  negligence  and 
stupidity  that  ever  was  shown  in  the  conduct  of  a  battle  in  its 
beginning,  and  of  energy  in  its  close,  and  glorious  termina 
tion  for  our  arms. 

The  day  before  the  battle,  on  my  invitation,  Crook  and 
Wright,  who  both  ranked  me  at  the  time,  rode  to  the  left  of 
the  line  (our  left),  where  I  pointed  out  to  them  the  exact 
point  at  the  foot  of  the  mountain,  where  the  enemy  could,  and 
did,  mass  his  men,  unobserved,  and  attack  us  if  they  chose. 
Crook  pooh-poohed  the  thing  as  impossible,  saying  the  enemy 
was  crushed,  and  dare  not  attack  us,  and  Wright  maintained, 
if  we  were  attacked,  it  would  be  on  the  back  road,  where  he 
placed  some,  if  not  the  great  mass,  of  his  cavalry.  I  got  no 
thanks  for  this,  but  the  probable  ill-will  of  both.  Neither 
mentioned  the  fact  in  their  reports,  and  Wright  never  men 
tioned  the  fact  that  he  had  ordered  me  to  leave  a  command 
ing  position,  which  I  had  already  commenced  to  strengthen. 


IX 

THE  CAPTURE  AND  OCCUPATION  OF 
RICHMOND 

BY 

COLONEL  GEORGE   A.   BRUCE 


Read  before  the  Society  April  16,  1915 


THE  CAPTURE  AND  OCCUPATION  OF 
RICHMOND 

No  event  of  the  war  gave  rise  to  more  legends  than  the 
capture  and  occupation  of  the  Confederate  capital.  All  the 
early  general  histories  of  our  civil  conflict  gave  the  credit  of  this 
achievement  to  the  colored  troops,  none  of  whom  came  within 
about  two  miles  of  the  city,  except  a  regiment  of  cavalry, 
which,  in  violation  of  orders,  found  its  way  into  Broad  Street 
an  hour  or  more  after  its  complete  occupation  by  one  of  the 
brigades  of  General  Devens'  division.  The  origin  of  this  tale 
was  in  a  speech  of  General  Butler  in  Washington  on  the  eve 
ning  of  the  3d  of  April,  who  in  exultant  language  spoke  of  the 
poetic  justice  which  had  overtaken  the  proud  Southrons  in 
having  their  capital  first  occupied  and  guarded  by  their  former 
slaves. 

The  original  publication  of  the  "  Life  of  Lincoln  "  by  Nico- 
lay  and  Hay  in  the  "  Century  Magazine  "  followed  General 
Butler's  Washington  speech ;  but  from  evidence  furnished  by 
me  they  corrected  this  error  when  the  work  was  afterwards 
published  in  book  form.  Mr.  Hay  told  me  that  they  admitted 
no  fact  into  their  history  that  was  not  supported  by  contem 
porary  written  evidence.  As  this  paper  will  contain  only  what 
came  within  my  observation  and  experience,  and  is  written 
with  the  hope  of  correcting  more  than  one  error  that  has  crept 
into  what  are  considered  historic  publications,  it  is  not  im 
proper  for  ine  to  say  that  I  wrote  an  official  account  of  occur 
rences  during  the  night  of  April  2,  published  in  Serial  95  of 
the  "  Records  of  the  War,"  and  soon  after  a  rather  full  ac 
count  of  the  occupation  of  Richmond  which  is  substantially 
the  body  of  this  article.  This  fact  is  mentioned  solely  to  show 
that  what  follows  is  not  a  record  made  up  from  memory  stretch- 


122     CAPTURE  AND  OCCUPATION  OF  RICHMOND 

ing  back  through  the  haze  of  half  a  century,  but  a  transcript 
of  events  and  experiences  seen,  participated  in,  and  felt,  as 
recorded  by  the  writer  at  the  time. 

In  the  spring  of  1865  the  forces  confronting  General  Lee 
south  of  Richmond  and  Petersburg  formed  two  distinct  di 
visions,  —  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  commanded  by  General 
Meade,  and  the  Army  of  the  James,  commanded  by  General 
Ord.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  held  a  line  extending  around 
Petersburg  from  the  Appomattox  on  the  right  to  or  near 
Hatcher's  Run  on  the  left;  while  the  Army  of  the  James 
held  the  Bermuda  front,  and  north  of  the  James  the  line  cap 
tured  on  the  29th  of  the  previous  September,  extending  from 
the  river  across  Chaffin's  farm  beyond  the  New  Market  road 
and  then  retiring  until  the  right  reached  a  point  near  Deep 
Bottom,  —  a  continuous  line  of  intrenchments  from  thirty  to 
forty  miles  in  unbroken  extent,  save  where  the  Appomattox 
and  the  James  passed  through  them.  The  Confederate  lines 
ran  throughout  their  entire  length  nearly  parallel  with  our 
own,  the  distance  between  the  two  varying  from  a  hundred 
yards  to  nearly  a  mile  on  the  extreme  flanks. 

The  situation  was  quite  like  that  existing  to-day  between 
the  Allied  and  German  armies  on  the  western  front  of  the 
present  war,  except  that  neither  flank  of  the  European  armies 
is  liable  to  be  turned,  resting  as  they  do  on  the  North  Sea 
and  the  territory  of  a  neutral  state.  It  is  probable  that  if  the 
French  and  English  had  at  first  resorted  to  the  system  of  de 
fence  by  intrenchments  so  fully  developed  by  us  during  the 
Civil  War,  the  Germans  would  not  have  been  able  to  overrun 
Belgium,  —  certainly  not  have  gained  so  advanced  a  foothold 
on  French  soil. 

During  the  late  fall  of  1864  and  the  winter  of  1865  little 
or  no  change  took  place  in  the  relative  positions  of  the  two 
armies.  Never  before  during  the  season  when  earth  and  sky 
placed  an  embargo  on  campaigning  in  Virginia  had  the  hostile 
forces  been  so  near  to  each  other.  So  close  was  the  contact 


CAPTURE  AND  OCCUPATION  OF  RICHMOND     123 

that  we  could  almost  feel  the  pulse  and  hear  the  breathing  of 
the  hostile  army.  It  was  the  most  laborious  and  trying,  yet 
the  most  interesting,  of  all  our  winter  encampments ;  for  we 
were  looking  forward  with  feelings  of  certainty  to  the  not  dis 
tant  day  when  through  the  smoke  of  battle  we  should  see  the 
sun  of  peace  shine  once  more  on  a  united  land.  The  season 
was  one  of  more  than  average  severity.  Snow  fell  on  ten  dif 
ferent  occasions.  From  November  to  April  there  were  forty- 
three  days  of  rain,  varying  from  moderate  showers  to  storms 
of  almost  tropical  violence. 

The  extensive  pine  forests  in  rear  of  the  Army  of  the  James 
furnished  the  right  material  for  comfortable  houses  and  plenty 
of  fuel  for  the  necessary  fires.  Though  the  labors  of  the  army 
were  very  onerous,  yet  its  health  remained  good  and  its  spirit 
rose  to  the  height  of  the  greatest  achievements. 

The  Army  of  the  James  was  reorganized  in  December,  the 
Tenth  and  Eighteenth  Corps  discontinued,  the  white  troops 
brought  together  to  form  the  Twenty-fourth  Corps,  and  the 
colored  men  united  into  the  Twenty-fifth.  The  former  were 
placed  upon  the  right,  holding  the  line  from  near  Fort  Har 
rison  to  Deep  Bottom,  and  the  latter  on  the  left.  In  January 
General  Ord  succeeded  General  Butler  in  command  of  the 
Army  and  Department  of  Virginia.  General  John  Gibbon 
was  transferred  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  be  chief 
of  the  Twenty-fourth  Corps,  with  Generals  Alfred  H.  Terry, 
Adelbert  Ames,  and  Charles  Devens  in  command  of  its  di 
visions. 

There  still  remained  three  months  of  "  watchful  waiting." 
Though  nothing  could  have  been  more  pleasing  than  an  attack 
by  the  enemy,  anywhere  or  at  any  time,  yet  the  utmost  vigi 
lance  was  maintained  day  and  night  in  order  that  it  should  be 
promptly  and  successfully  met.  The  picket  details  were  very 
large.  At  three  o'clock  every  morning  a  staff  officer  left 
General  Devens'  headquarters  for  the  front  line,  and  there 
remained  until  long  after  daylight.  At  five  o'clock  the  whole 


124     CAPTURE  AND  OCCUPATION  OF  RICHMOND 

division  was  in  line  of  battle  in  rear  of  their  intrenchments. 
Fortunately  a  truce  or  tacit  understanding  existed,  at  least  so 
far  as  the  white  troops  were  concerned,  that  no  firing  between 
pickets  should  occur,  and  none  did  occur  during  the  winter. 

Though  desertions  to  the  rear  had  been  very  numerous  from 
all  the  Confederate  armies  after  the  passage  of  the  Conscript 
Act  in  April,  1862,  it  was  not  until  1865  that  they  became 
numerous  into  our  own  lines.  It  was  at  this  time  considered 
a  very  poor  night  when  none  came  in,  for  there  was  a  record 
of  forty  in  twenty-four  hours  on  the  front  of  a  single  brigade. 
So  eager  were  the  later  conscripts  to  escape  the  perils  of  the 
service  that  the  prejudice  of  the  color  line  was  ignored,  and 
more  or  less  came  in  to  the  Twenty-fifth  Corps,  happy  when 
having  gained  the  protection  of  their  former  slaves.  From 
this  source  much  valuable  information  was  gained.  So  accu 
rate  were  their  descriptions  of  the  Confederate  defences  and 
the  strength  of  their  armament,  that  we  had  all  the  informa 
tion  in  regard  to  them  that  General  Longstreet  himself  pos 
sessed.  Their  report  of  the  buried  torpedoes,  where  they  began 
and  where  they  ended,  proved  later  to  have  been  absolutely 
correct.  We  gained,  also,  a  pretty  correct  impression  of  con 
ditions  inside  the  Confederate  lines,  the  feeling  of  despondency 
pervading  not  only  the  army  but  the  whole  community.  The 
Confederacy  was  then  on  its  sick-bed,  and  for  those  who  still 
gathered  around  it  for  support  there  came  much  during  that 
trying  winter  to  discourage  —  little,  if  anything,  to  cheer. 
They  were  compelled,  from  time  to  time,  to  hear  the  hundred- 
shotted  guns  that  informed  them  of  the  destruction  of  Hood's 
army  at  Nashville,  the  capture  of  Savannah  by  Sherman,  the 
fall  of  Charleston  and  Fort  Sumter,  the  loss  of  Fort  Fisher, 
and  the  occupation  of  Wilmington.  Such  events,  following  in 
quick  succession,  were  enough  to  try  the  nerves  of  heroic  men 
in  any  cause.  Yet  through  all  ill-fortune  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia  displayed  its  wonted  courage  and  kept  its  honor 
bright,  nightly  setting  its  guards,  ill-fed  and  thinly  clad, 


CAPTURE  AND  OCCUPATION  OF  RICHMOND     125 

through  tangled  swamps  and  over  bleak  and  storm-swept  hills 
around  its  beleaguered  capital. 

The  last  fall  of  snow  came  on  the  24th  of  March  —  what 
we  call  in  New  England  the  robin  snow —  that  gives  the  first 
touch  of  green  to  our  lawns  and  the  promise  of  renewed  life  to 
all  the  throbbing  earth.  Three  days  later,  during  the  night  of 
the  27th  of  March,  the  Army  of  the  James  was  secretly  trans 
ferred  to  the  south  of  Petersburg,  except  Devens'  division  of 
the  Twenty-fourth  Corps  and  Kautz's  division  of  the  Twenty- 
fifth,  which  were  left  to  hold  the  lines  north  of  the  James, 
under  General  Weitzel. 

At  Weitzel's  request  General  Devens  moved  from  his  camp 
to  the  headquarters  of  the  army,  as  the  telegraph  line  termi 
nated  at  that  point.  For  this  reason  it  happened  that  I,  being 
on  General  Devens'  staff,  first  received  and  read  all  the  dis 
patches  sent  by  General  Grant  to  Weitzel,  informing  him 
almost  every  hour  of  events  about  Petersburg  and  his  wishes 
of  what  should  be  done  or  attempted  along  our  line. 

On  the  1st  of  April  General  Sheridan  turned  the  enemy's 
right  at  Five  Forks,  which  was  followed  by  the  grand  attack 
along  the  whole  line  on  the  morning  of  the  2d.  General  Grant, 
in  telegraphic  communication  with  every  corps  commander 
of  the  army,  directed  with  unerring  judgment  over  a  field 
twenty  miles  in  extent  the  storm  of  battle  that  was  hurled 
like  an  avalanche  against  the  Confederate  right,  left,  and 
centre. 

The  2d  of  April  was  a  day  of  intense  interest  and  anxiety 
to  those  of  us  who  were  fully  aware  of  the  magnitude  of  the 
events  that  were  transpiring  about  us  and  divined  what  the 
morrow  might  reveal.  In  Virginia  the  spring  comes  forward 
suddenly  and  with  greater  splendor  than  in  our  more  northern 
latitude.  It  seemed  to  me  that  a  more  perfect  day  could  not 
have  dawned  on  the  earth  since  the  creation  than  that  battle- 
Sunday  about  Petersburg.  The  sky  was  cloudless,  and  through 
the  hushed  air  I  heard  distinctly  for  the  first  time  the  church 


126     CAPTURE  AND  OCCUPATION  OF  RICHMOND 

bells  of  Richmond  some  seven  miles  to  the  north,  and  at  the 
same  time,  though  less  distinctly,  the  subdued  murmur  and 
roar  of  the  battle  fifteen  miles  to  the  south.  About  eleven 
o'clock  in  the  forenoon  I  rode  along  the  picket  line,  climbed  a 
pine  tree  which  commanded  a  good  view  of  the  Confederate 
works  for  some  distance,  and  concluded  from  the  slight  evi 
dence  of  life  within  them  that  the  forces  on  our  front  were 
small  in  numbers.  On  reporting  my  observations  and  impres 
sions,  General  Devens  requested  me  to  ride  over  to  see  Gen 
eral  Weitzel.  Having  reported  to  the  latter,  he  quickly  replied 
that  "  we  should  find  plenty  of  rebel  heads  showing  them 
selves  the  moment  we  got  within  firing  distance  of  them."  A 
few  moments  after  my  return  I  had  the  pleasure  of  sending  to 
him  a  telegram  from  General  Grant  stating  that  Fields'  divi 
sion  had  left  his  front  and  was  then  at  Petersburg.  Weitzel 
was  an  officer  of  much  ability,  but  lacked  confidence  and  the 
spirit  of  enterprise.  From  our  maps  I  traced  out  the  move 
ments  and  achievements  of  the  army  in  front  of  Petersburg, 
as  reported  during  the  day,  and  was  convinced  that  Lee  would 
certainly  retreat  during  the  night.  I  told  General  Devens 
that  I  should  remain  up  during  the  night,  and  if  anything  of 
importance  occurred  would  at  once  inform  him. 

With  evening  there  was  no  further  intelligence  from  Pe 
tersburg.  The  sullen  boom  of  artillery  at  long  intervals  indi 
cated  that  the  contest  had  not  ended  in  that  quarter.  The 
closest  watch  was  ordered  along  our  lines.  At  midnight  I  ob 
served  a  bright  fire,  but  the  direction  of  it  being  toward  the 
Chesterfield  Court-House  it  was  not  considered  indicative  of 
any  movement  of  importance.  A  few  hours  later  two  deserters 
from  the  Tenth  Virginia  Battalion  came  in,  who  assured  me 
that  the  enemy  were  then  retiring  from  our  front.  Having 
informed  General  Devens  of  their  report  I  was  authorized  by 
him  to  take  possession  of  the  Confederate  works,  if  I  found  it 
could  be  done  without  too  much  risk  or  danger.  I  at  once 
rode  to  the  various  brigades  with  orders  for  them  to  be  placed 


CAPTURE  AND  OCCUPATION  OF  RICHMOND     127 

under  arms,  and  then  to  the  line  of  pickets  to  make  them 
ready  for  a  move. 

It  was  a  warm,  still  night.  A  soft  wind,  touched  with  the 
perfumes  of  earliest  flowers  and  the  first  buds  of  spring,  was 
moving  gently  from  the  west.  The  sky  to  the  zenith  was  free 
from  clouds,  but  toward  the  horizon  a  bank  of  smoky  mists 
had  settled,  as  is  usual  in  that  climate  during  the  later  hours 
of  night.  I  cannot  express  the  emotions  with  which  I  was 
stirred,  as  I  rode  alone  through  the  night,  with  no  sound 
heard  and  no  object  seen  save  the  stars  above  and  the  wavy 
swells  of  the  dusky  earth  beneath,  with  full  authority,  and 
with  a  full  determination,  to  set  in  motion  the  right  wing  of 
the  army,  which  I  well  knew  would  result  in  the  immediate 
occupation  of  the  Confederate  capital  and  the  speedy  fall  of 
the  Confederate  Government  itself. 

The  long  line  of  fires,  marking  the  position  of  the  sentinels 
standing  guard  for  the  safety  of  the  army,  were  burning  dimly 
at  the  approach  of  morning.  The  report  of  the  rebel  deserters 
had  passed  along  the  line  and  every  soldier  was  standing, 
with  musket  leaning  against  the  ground,  peering  into  the 
gloom,  with  every  faculty  strained  to  catch  some  note  in  con 
firmation  of  the  glad  tidings.  Everything  beyond  was  hid  in 
obscurity.  The  deep  baying  of  a  watch-dog,  as  if  disturbed  by 
some  unaccustomed  visitor,  was  occasionally  heard  in  the  dis 
tance.  Save  that,  all  was  still. 

Presently  a  bright  fire  was  observed  in  the  direction  of 
Richmond.  Soon  other  fires  appeared,  spreading  rapidly  and 
increasing  in  volume,  which  quickly  lighted  up  the  whole 
northern  circle  of  the  heavens.  Then  the  line  of  the  James 
River  was  marked  by  the  burning  of  the  Confederate  fleet. 
No  words  can  adequately  picture  the  burning  fleet  and  town. 
The  scenic  display  was  equal  to  the  catastrophe  in  the  great 
est  tragedy  of  history.  While  we  were  standing  almost  speech 
less,  wondering  at  the  scene,  just  to  our  left  a  huge  volume  of 
smoke  like  an  illuminated  balloon  shot  high  into  the  air,  fol- 


128     CAPTURE  AND  OCCUPATION  OF  RICHMOND 

lowed  by  an  explosion  that  shook  the  earth  under  our  feet. 
The  echoes  rumbled  heavily  along  the  banks  of  the  river  and 
then  died  away  in  the  distance.  The  ironclad  Richmond  had 
blown  up.  This  was  followed  by  other  explosions  of  greater 
or  less  magnitude,  and  in  a  few  moments  the  James  Eiver 
fleet,  which  had  so  long  been  the  pride  of  the  citizens  of  Rich 
mond,  was  no  more.  Then,  in  the  name  of  the  commanding 
general,  I  ordered  the  pickets  to  advance  to  the  front  line 
held  by  the  Confederates.  This  having  been  safely  accom 
plished,  with  private  Duncan  of  the  Ninth  Vermont  I  rode 
forward  through  the  main  works  of  the  enemy.  Meeting  a 
Confederate  soldier  on  his  way  towards  us,  I  turned  him 
about  and  directed  him  to  lead  us  to  the  path  used  by  the 
enemy  in  passing  out  daily  for  picket  duty.  He  conducted  us 
to  a  well-beaten  track  that  took  us  safely  to  our  goal.  It 
passed  through  three  well-constructed  lines  of  abatis,  chevaux- 
de-frise,  and  fraise.  Between  the  abatis  and  chevaux-de-frise 
to  the  right  and  left,  as  far  as  could  be  seen,  was  a  row  of 
sticks,  a  few  feet  apart,  bearing  a  strip  of  red  cloth,  each 
indicating  the  position  of  a  buried  torpedo.  The  tents  were 
all  standing  in  lines  at  right  angles  to  the  parapet,  but  the 
occupants,  as  we  expected,  were  all  gone.  Riding  back,  I  di 
rected  that  the  men  were  to  file  to  the  right  and  left  and  fol 
low  me  as  guide,  and  they  were  deployed  again  into  line  about 
a  hundred  yards  beyond  the  Confederate  fortifications.  One 
man  of  the  Ninth  Vermont,  who  attempted  his  own  pioneer 
ing,  was  killed  by  a  torpedo.  Guards  were  placed  over  the 
guns  in  the  forts  and  batteries  on  the  line,  and  I  was  partic 
ular  to  place  sentinels  in  the  forts  covering  half  a  mile  of  the 
Twenty-fifth  Corps  front.  As  this  work  was  completed,  day 
light  began  to  appear.  As  I  was  starting  to  return  to  head 
quarters,  I  was  met  by  an  orderly  sent  by  General  Devens 
with  instructions  not  to  advance  the  pickets,  fearing  lest  some 
serious  accident  might  occur,  the  responsibility  for  which  had 
better  rest  with  the  commander  of  the  army.  I  rode  rapidly 


CAPTURE  AND  OCCUPATION  OF  RICHMOND     129 

back  to  the  General,  who  was  standing  in  front  of  his  head 
quarters,  and  told  him  that  his  message  came  too  late,  as  I 
had  already  taken  possession  of  Fort  Gilmer  and  the  whole 
Confederate  line.  He  extended  his  hand  to  me  and  said  in  his 
courtly  way,  "  Hail  to  thee,  Count  of  Gilmer."  Word  was  im 
mediately  sent  to  Weitzel,  and  in  his  report  he  says,  "  Gen 
eral  Devens  was  the  first  to  report  to  me  (at  about  5  o'clock) 
that  his  picket  line  was  in  full  possession  of  the  enemy's 
works  in  his  front."  Soon  thereafter  orders  came  for  the  di 
vision  to  move  forward  to  Richmond  at  six  o'clock.  I  was 
directed  to  return  to  the  picket  line  at  once,  and  move  them 
forward  as  fast  as  possible,  as  skirmishers.  As  I  came  near  to 
the  point  where  the  New  Market  road  passed  through  our 
breastworks,  Major  Atherton  H.  Stevens,  with  a  squadron  of 
the  Fourth  Massachusetts  Cavalry,  passed  by  me  under  orders 
to  enter  Richmond.  I  observed  that  the  pickets  of  the  Twen 
ty-fifth  Corps  had  just  then  commenced  to  move  forward.  I 
joined  our  picket-skirmishers  at  the  station  where  I  had  left 
them,  impatient  to  hear  the  word  "  forward,"  and  when  it  was 
given  they  pressed  on  joyously,  with  a  quick  step  and  light 
hearts.  It  was  a  refreshing  march  in  the  pleasant  hour  of  a 
delightful  morning.  The  green  fields  on  either  side  furnished 
a  pleasing  contrast  to  the  district  about  our  encampments, 
pulverized  as  it  was  into  dust  by  the  constant  passage  of  our 
innumerable  trains.  The  road  was  dotted  here  and  there  with 
comfortable  farmhouses,  which  were  generally  closed,  with 
no  evidence  of  life  about  them,  —  not  even  a  dog  to  protest 
against  our  pollution  of  the  sacred  soil.  Stragglers  in  consid 
erable  numbers  (about  two  hundred)  were  gathered  in,  some 
on  their  way  to  meet  us,  while  others  quietly  waited  for  our 
approach  by  the  sides  of  the  road.  The  first  one  I  met  saluted 
me  with  the  financial  question,  "  What  are  you  paying  now 
when  deserters  bring  in  their  arms  and  equipments  ?  "  —  and 
then  added,  as  if  for  the  purpose  of  getting  a  favorable  re 
ply,  "  I  guess  the  Confederacy  is  about  played  out  at  last." 


130     CAPTURE  AND  OCCUPATION  OF  RICHMOND 

As  the  roads  on  which  the  divisions  were  marching  gradu 
ally  converge,  until  they  meet  about  two  miles  from  the  capi 
tal,  when  about  four  miles  out  the  skirmishers  were  covering 
the  two,  and  I  then  passed  over  from  the  New  Market  road 
to  the  Osborne  Pike.  From  there  I  saw  that  Kautz's  division 
was  marching  rapidly  by  the  flank  about  a  mile  and  a  half  in 
our  rear.  General  Edward  A.  Wilde,  the  commander  of  the 
leading  brigade,  seeing  that  there  was  a  force  far  ahead  of  him, 
rode  rapidly  forward  until  he  overtook  me,  when  he  informed 
me  that  the  whole  army  was  ordered  to  move  to  Richmond  and 
advised  that  I  should  fall  back  and  join  my  appropriate  col 
umn.  As  the  information  was  not  new,  and  his  advice  was  un 
heeded,  he  soon  turned  about  and  joined  his  own  command. 

On  a  hill  just  by  the  line  of  inner  defences  we  gained  our 
first  sight  of  Richmond — a  sight  that  none  will  ever  forget. 
The  city  was  wrapped  in  a  cloud  of  densest  smoke,  through 
which  great  tongues  of  flame  leaped  in  madness  to  the  skies. 
A  few  houses  on  the  higher  hills,  a  spire  here  and  there  half 
smothered  in  smoke,  and  the  hospitals  to  the  east,  were  the 
only  buildings  that  could  be  seen.  Added  to  the  wild  tumult 
of  the  flames,  ten  thousand  shells  bursting  every  minute  in  the 
Confederate  arsenals  and  laboratories  were  making  an  uproar 
such  as  might  arise  from  the  field  when  the  world's  artillery 
joins  in  battle.  But  just  on  the  verge  of  this  maelstrom  of 
smoke  and  fire,  cattle  were  grazing  undisturbed  on  the  opposite 
hillside,  and  I  saw  a  farmer  ploughing  in  afield  while  cinders 
from  the  burning  capital  were  falling  at  his  feet. 

A  little  beyond  the  junction  of  the  New  Market  road  and 
the  Osborne  Pike,  the  skirmish  line  was  halted  to  await  the 
arrival  of  the  division.  This  point  was  just  below  Rockett's, 
now  a  ward  of  Richmond,  at  that  time  an  independent  muni 
cipality.  Here  Joseph  Mayo,  the  Mayor  of  Richmond,  soon 
appeared  in  an  open  barouche  for  the  purpose  of  surrendering 
the  city.  With  him  came  his  brother,  who,  in  a  state  of  ex 
treme  excitement  and  alarm,  told  me  that  Richmond  was  in 


CAPTURE  AND  OCCUPATION  OF  RICHMOND     131 

control  of  a  mob  and  would  soon  be  totally  destroyed  by  fire 
which  no  one  was  attempting  to  control.  In  his  opinion  every 
body  would  be  arrested  and  their  property  confiscated.  He 
expressed  surprise  when  I  assured  him  that  no  one  conducting 
himself  properly  would  be  disturbed  or  deprived  of  his  prop 
erty.  He  was  the  owner  of  a  fine  estate  on  the  James  River, 
called  "  Powhatan,"  the  entrance  to  which  was  nearly  opposite 
where  we  then  were.  On  account  o£  his  fears  that  his  planta 
tion  might  be  overrun  and  plundered,  at  his  request,  I  gave 
him  a  reliable  man  for  guard  and  went  with  them  to  his  home 
—  a  large  colonial  mansion  having  a  fine  view  along  the  river 
valley.  The  estate  took  its  name  from  King  Powhatan,  and  was 
formerly  his  abode  and  the  headquarters  of  his  tribe.  With 
some  pride  the  owner  took  me  into  his  garden  and  pointed  out 
the  rock  on  which  the  head  of  Captain  John  Smith  was  laid 
for  the  execution  averted  by  the  intercession  of  Pocahon- 
tas,  the  historic  Indian  princess.  During  our  conversation  he 
said  to  me,  "My  sister  married  your  General  Scott,"  putting 
marked  emphasis  on  the  pronouns  "my"  and  "your."  A 
few  days  later  he  came  to  me  in  Richmond  and  expressed  his 
thanks  for  the  favor  I  had  rendered  him.  The  young  guard 
had  relieved  him  of  all  his  fears  ;  and  not  the  least  disturbance 
had  happened  to  the  peace  of  his  family,  nor  any  loss  to  his 
property.  He  was  in  a  more  cheerful  and  hopeful  state  of  mind 
than  at  our  first  meeting.  Order  had  then  been  restored  in  the 
city,  and  it  seemed  likely  that  the  reduction  to  slavery  of  the 
whole  population  foretold  by  General  Lee,  Davis,  and  other 
leaders  would  not  be  realized.  He  said  that  as  I  had  granted 
him  one  great  favor,  he  was  going  to  ask  one  more,  which  was 
the  privilege  of  buying  some  sugar,  coffee,  tea,  and  flour  of  our 
commissary,  as  he  had  no  food  in  his  house  save  potatoes,  corn 
meal,  hams,  and  bacon.  Taking  from  his  pocket  a  twenty-dollar 
gold  piece,  he  told  me  that  it  was  the  only  good  money  he  pos 
sessed,  and  this  he  had  kept  sacredly  during  the  war.  Thinking 
our  commissary  might  forget  to  make  any  distinction  between 


132     CAPTURE  AND  OCCUPATION  OF  RICHMOND 

coin  and  paper  money,  I  gave  him  twenty-eight  dollars  in  green 
backs  in  exchange  for  his  gold,  and  with  my  note  to  the  proper 
officer  he  left  me  and  we  never  met  again.  I  was  afterward 
informed  that  Mr.  Mayo  was  one  of  the  wealthiest  men  of 
Virginia. 

Returning  to  the  junction  I  soon  had  the  pleasure  of  seeing 
our  division  pass  out  of  the  New  Market  road  into  the  one 
broad  highway  to  Richmond,  a  few  moments  only  before  the 
arrival  of  the  colored  troops.  Poetic  justice  required  that  the 
advance  into  the  Confederate  capital  and  its  subsequent  occu 
pation  should  fall  to  Devens'  division,  which  on  the  29th  of 
the  previous  September,  unaided  and  alone,  had  captured  Fort 
Harrison  and  the  Confederate  line  north  of  the  James,  and 
on  the  following  day  had  held  it  against  the  supreme  effort  of 
two  divisions  of  the  Confederate  army  under  the  direction  of 
General  Lee  to  recapture  it. 

Major  D.  D.  Wheeler,  Assistant  Adjutant-General  of  the 
Twenty-fifth  Corps,  very  soon  came  up  with  an  order  from 
General  Weitzel  to  send  the  first  brigade  he  met  into  Rich 
mond,  and  to  encamp  the  remainder  of  the  army  outside  the 
city  by  the  circle  of  inner  forts.  As  he  first  met  the  brigade 
of  General  Edward  H.  Ripley,  the  leading  brigade  of  Devens' 
division,  the  honor,  as  also  the  responsibility,  of  first  entering 
and  guarding  the  Confederate  capital  fell  to  this  organization. 
As  the  situation  was  critical,  Ripley's  command  was  moved 
rapidly  forward.  Passing  through  Rockett's  we  were  forced 
to  witness  something  of  the  misery  and  suffering  the  war  had 
brought  upon  the  people  living  in  what  appeared  to  be  the 
lower  suburb  of  the  capital.  It  was  the  shipping  port  of  Rich 
mond,  and  was  the  home  of  the  class  of  people  who  find  em 
ployment  in  loading  and  unloading  vessels  and  other  labors 
incident  to  such  a  locality.  Handkerchiefs  and  strips  of  cotton 
cloth  as  flags  of  truce  were  pinned  on  the  door-casements  of 
the  houses,  from  which  women  and  children  came  out  with 
piteous  appeals  for  food,  which  then  we  could  not  but  later  did 


CAPTURE  AND  OCCUPATION  OF  RICHMOND     133 

furnish  with  a  free  hand.  As  we  approached  the  river  a  gun 
boat  was  seen  anchored  in  midstream,  from  which  a  Con 
federate  flag  was  still  flying.  Captain  William  J.  Ladd,  of 
Devens'  staff,  jumped  from  his  horse  and  rowed  in  a  boat  to 
the  ship.  He  quickly  ran  up  the  mast,  secured  the  flag,  and 
had  just  stepped  ashore  when  the  magazine  blew  up  and  scat 
tered  the  gunboat  in  fragments  from  bank  to  bank.  This  flag 
he  now  retains  in  his  home  in  Milton. 

There  have  been  numerous  claimants  to  the  honor  of  hav 
ing  been  the  first  man  to  enter  Richmond  on  this  morning. 
I  have  read  several  obituary  notices  of  deceased  soldiers  in 
Vermont,  New  Hampshire,  and  Massachusetts  who  had  gained 
the  reputation  in  their  own  locality  of  being  thus  distinguished. 
In  historic  publications  Major  Atherton  H.  Stevens,  of  the 
Fourth  Massachusetts  Cavalry,  has  been  often  mentioned  as 
the  man.  Captain  Ladd  was  my  tent-mate.  Soon  after  arriv 
ing  at  the  picket  line  at  three  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  April 
3,  I  sent  a  note  back  to  Ladd,  advising  him,  if  he  wished  to 
be  in  at  the  ','  killing,"  to  join  me  at  once.  Being  the  owner 
of  a  fleet  horse  he  was  very  soon  thereafter  by  my  side.  At 
five  o'clock  I  returned,  as  above  related,  to  division  head 
quarters,  at  which  time,  or  a  few  moments  later,  Major  J.  C. 
Brooks,  of  the  Ninth  Vermont,  and  Ladd  started  together  to 
ride  into  Richmond.  It  soon  after  occurred  to  Brooks,  who 
was  in  command  of  the  pickets  of  Ripley's  brigade,  that  duty 
required  him  to  be  with  his  men,  and  he  returned.  Ladd 
rode  on  alone  and  within  an  hour  entered  Capitol  Square.  As 
he  was  riding  up  Franklin  Street  near  the  Bullard  and  Ex 
change  Hotel,  one  of  a  group  of  sailors  from  a  Confederate 
gunboat  rushed  out  from  the  sidewalk  with  a  drawn  cutlass 
and  endeavored  to  stab  him.  Warding  off  the  blow,  he  rode 
on,  and  after  wandering  through  the  city  without  further  mo 
lestation  he  came  back  and  joined  General  Devens.  It  was 
5.45  by  the  clock  when  Major  Stevens  passed  through  our 
breastworks  at  the  New  Market  road  with  his  squadron  of 


134     CAPTURE  AND  OCCUPATION  OF  RICHMOND 

cavalry,  and  by  this  time  Ladd  must  have  been  in  or  very 
near  Richmond.  Whatever  of  honor  or  distinction  attaches 
to  the  man  who  first  entered  the  Confederate  capital  belongs, 
without  a  doubt,  to  Captain  Ladd. 

The  news  of  our  approach  was,  of  course,  known  in  Rich 
mond,  and  as  we  passed  over  the  ridge  that  at  the  time  sepa 
rated  Rockett's  from  the  capital,  we  were  met  by  a  delegation 
from  the  Loyal  League  that  had  come  out  to  meet  and  to 
greet  us.  The  temptation  to  remain  behind  and  share  in  the 
general  plunder  of  the  city  was  great,  but  the  feeling  of  grati 
tude  in  the  breasts  of  the  freedmen  was  greater ;  and  there  they 
were  in  strong  numbers,  to  extend  to  us  such  a  welcome  as 
king  or  conqueror  never  knew.  From  the  colored  population 
of  Richmond  we  received  such  a  reception  as  could  only  come 
from  a  people  who  were  returning  thanks  for  the  deliverance 
of  their  race.  There  was  something  peculiarly  affecting  in  the 
exhibition  of  feeling  manifested  by  these  unlettered  children 
of  Africa  which  communicated  itself  to  all.  I  well  remember 
General  Devens,  by  whose  side  I  was  riding,  turning  to  me, 
his  eyes  filled  with  tears  and  voice  stifled  with  emotion,  and 
saying,  "  This  is  a  great  sight  for  us  to  behold  —  the  deliver 
ance  of  a  race." 

As  soon  as  the  column  turned  into  Main  Street,  all  the 
bands  were  brought  to  the  front,  and  then,  with  all  the  regu 
larity  of  a  parade,  colors  flying  and  every  musician  doing  his 
best  at  "  Yankee  Doodle,"  followed  by  "  Rally  round  the 
Flag,"  with  its  refrain,  "  Down  with  the  Traitor  and  Up  with 
the  Stars  "  and  the  "  Battle  Cry  of  Freedom,"  through  vari 
ous  streets  to  Capitol  Square,  —  up  Main  to  27th  Street,  up 
27th  to  Franklin,  from  Franklin  to  Governor,  from  Gov 
ernor  into  Capitol  Street,  where  the  brigade  was  brought  to 
the  front  and  there  stacked  their  arms.  Sweeter  music  never 
reached  the  human  ear  than  the  rattling  of  those  Union  mus 
kets  on  the  pavements  of  Richmond  as  they  dropped  upon 
the  ground. 


CAPTURE  AND  OCCUPATION  OF  RICHMOND     135 

The  square  was  a  scene  of  indescribable  confusion.  The 
inhabitants  fleeing  from  their  burning  houses  —  men,  women, 
and  children,  white  and  black  —  had  collected  there  for  a 
place  of  safety  bringing  with  them  whatever  was  saved  from 
the  flames.  Bureaus,  sofas,  carpets,  beds  and  bedding,  in  a 
word,  every  conceivable  article  of  household  furniture,  from 
baby-toys  to  the  most  costly  mirrors,  were  scattered  promiscu 
ously  on  the  green.  As  the  flames  approached,  as  if  in  antici 
pation  of  the  destruction  of  the  whole  city,  the  sick  and 
infirm  had  been  hurried  from  the  houses,  and,  attended  by  a 
few  friends,  were  lying  on  their  extemporized  beds  in  the 
more  secluded  parts  of  the  yard. 

The  wind,  increasing  with  the  conflagration,  was  blowing 
like  a  hurricane,  hurling  cinders  and  pieces  of  burning  wood 
with  long  trails  of  flame  over  the  houses  to  distant  quarters 
of  the  city.  The  heated  air,  dim  with  smoke  and  filled  with 
the  innumerable  particles  that  float  from  the  surface  of  so 
great  a  fire,  rendered  it  almost  impossible  to  breathe.  At 
every  gust  the  crowd  turned  to  escape  its  fury  as  men  turn  to 
escape  the  fury  of  a  driving  snowstorm.  Rising  among  the 
trees  in  the  centre  of  the  Square,  amid  this  carnival  of  ruin, 
stood  the  great  statue  of  Washington,  against  which  fire 
brands  thumped  and  rattled,  little  respecting  the  majestic 
form  of  the  Father  of  his  Country. 

The  citizens  were  entirely  helpless.  A  committee  of  respect 
able  gentlemen  had  remonstrated  to  the  Confederate  military 
authorities  against  the  burning  of  the  army  stores  as  sure  to 
bring  destruction  upon  the  city;  but  the  remonstrance  was 
disregarded.  As  the  last  Confederate  troops  filed  across 
Mayo's  Bridge,  all  attempts  at  government  ceased.  The  civil 
authorities  made  no  effort  to  preserve  order.  It  is  not  prob 
able  that  the  mob  would  have  respected  an  authority  that  had 
no  longer  the  power  to  enforce  its  decrees.  The  doors  of  the 
buildings  containing  the  food-supplies  were  first  thrown  open, 
and  there  at  once  commenced  a  contest  for  the  bread  and 


136     CAPTURE  AND  OCCUPATION  OF  RICHMOND 

flour.  The  colored  men,  quick  to  assert  their  freedom,  entered 
into  the  contest,  and,  for  the  first  time  in  their  lives,  were 
unmindful  of  stepping  on  a  white  man's  toes.  Hunger,  too, 
sent  crowds  of  women  into  the  streets  to  obtain  a  share  of  the 
few  loaves  and  fishes  which  Mr.  Davis  left  as  a  legacy  to  his 
people.  After  rifling  the  public  storehouses,  the  mob  com 
menced  their  attacks  on  the  buildings  that  were  in  danger 
from  the  fire,  and  retreating  slowly  as  the  destructive  element 
approached,  left  only  naked  walls  to  be  consumed.  As  is  usual 
in  the  breaking-up  of  governments,  the  doors  of  the  jail  and 
prison  had  been  opened,  and  all  the  convicts  set  at  liberty. 
The  better  part  of  the  community  were  paralyzed  at  the  mag 
nitude  of  their  calamity.  There  was  no  one  to  take  charge  of 
the  few  fire-engines  in  working  order,  and  the  flames  at  their 
own  wild  will  leaped  on  from  house  to  house  in  triumphant 
glee.  Men  living  in  places  of  no  immediate  danger  remained 
at  home  to  protect  their  own  property  from  being  burned 
from  cinders  that  were  falling  upon  every  part  of  the  town. 
Those  who  were  already  homeless  looked  on  in  utter  dismay. 
Such,  in  brief,  was  the  condition  of  Richmond  when  the 
Union  troops  stacked  their  arms  in  front  of  Capitol  Square. 
General  Weitzel  remained  constantly  on  duty  at  the  State 
House.  General  Shepley  was  appointed  military  governor  and 
General  Devens  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  city  troops. 
The  execution  of  all  orders,  and  a  thousand  details  in  restor 
ing  order  and  providing  for  the  peace  and  safety  of  the  city, 
fell  upon  General  Ripley.  No  one  better  fitted  for  such  an 
important  and  delicate  task  could  have  been  found.  He  was 
one  of  the  youngest  officers  of  his  rank,  just  arrived  at  the 
age  of  twenty-three.  He  was  a  scholar,  a  gentleman  in  the 
true  sense  of  the  word,  and  a  soldier  of  much  experience  and 
proved  courage.  Tall,  possessed  of  a  fine  figure  and  an  open 
and  attractive  countenance,  with  an  eye  that  beamed  with 
kindness  and  inspired  confidence,  he  possessed  a  maturity  of 
judgment  beyond  his  years.  What  seemed  to  many  recipients 


CAPTURE  AND  OCCUPATION  OF  RICHMOND     137 

as  favors  were  regarded  by  him  not  as  favors,  but  requests 
granted  or  acts  done  only  in  the  line  of  duty.  Firmness  there 
was  when  firmness  was  required,  but  it  was  never  accompanied 
with  the  harshness  too  often  characteristic  of  military  com 
manders.  The  many  appreciative  letters  received  from  the 
leading  citizens  of  Richmond,  and  the  commendation  of  his 
superiors,  were  the  evidence  of  a  just,  firm,  and  kindly  ad 
ministration  of  a  conquered  city. 

All  of  these  experienced  officers  at  once  applied  themselves 
to  their  important  duties.  The  few  fire-engines  in  order  were 
sought  out  and  placed  in  the  hands  of  our  boys  in  blue,  who 
worked  as  earnestly  to  save  the  city  of  Richmond  from  de 
struction  as  if  performing  a  like  duty  for  their  native  towns. 
A  police  was  organized,  and  within  an  hour  every  street  was 
under  the  protection  of  a  Union  sentinel.  The  printing-presses 
were  brought  into  action,  and  by  noon  circulars  had  been  pre 
pared  and  distributed,  announcing  the  rules  deemed  necessary 
for  the  temporary  government  of  the  inhabitants.  Not  a  sol 
dier  was  allowed  to  come  within  the  city  limits,  excepting 
those  detailed  for  its  special  protection.  The  men  seemed  to 
understand  that  they  were  called  upon  to  uphold  the  name  of 
the  American  soldier  in  a  new  sphere  of  duty,  and  right  nobly 
did  they  perform  it. 

By  night  the  fires  had  been  subdued.  In  accordance  with 
orders,  the  citizens  remained  in  their  own  or  their  neighbors' 
houses.  The  streets  were  unlighted,  silent,  and  deserted. 
Above,  the  stars  shone  out  bright  in  the  bending  blue.  Hour 
after  hour  I  walked  alone  through  the  streets  of  that  proud 
but  conquered  capital,  —  past  the  luxurious  abodes  of  wealth 
then  knowing  the  first  pangs  of  hunger,  —  past  doors  where 
had  proudly  entered,  and  as  proudly  departed,  great  military 
heroes,  the  tread  of  whose  armies  had  made  the  continent  to 
tremble  and  filled  the  world  with  their  fame, — past  homes 
but  yesterday  tenanted  by  the  rulers  of  an  empire,  now  fleeing 
to  escape  the  threatened  punishment  of  their  acts,  —  through 


138     CAPTURE  AND  OCCUPATION  OF  RICHMOND 

narrow  lanes  and  filthy  alleys  where  dwelt  the  sons  of  toil 
upon  whose  humble  roofs  the  calamities  of  the  war  had  fallen 
with  a  double  stroke,  consigning  fathers  and  sons,  with  all  the 
savagery  of  an  unpitying  fate,  to  their  untimely  graves,  bring 
ing  at  last  to  those  desolated  hearthstones  the  horrors  of  a 
famine  which  had  blanched  the  cheek  and  thinned  the  blood 
of  wife  and  child  till  the  coming  of  that  hated  army  was 
looked  upon  as  their  only  hope  of  deliverance,  —  while  over 
all  alike,  palace,  hall,  and  hut,  I  could  seem  to  feel  the  shadow 
of  a  great  sorrow  resting,  darker  than  the  shadows  of  the 
night  which  no  star  then  broke  through  to  let  in  the  rays  of 
hope. 

From  the  Governor's  mansion,  which  General  Devens  had 
taken  as  his  headquarters,  one  looked  over  the  wide  expanse 
of  ruin.  The  whole  valley  stretching  west  of  Franklin  Street 
to  the  river,  which  embraced  the  whole  business  portion  of 
the  town,  seemed  like  a  lake  of  liquid  flame  agitated  by  a  gen 
tle  wind.  The  spectral  walls,  edged  here  and  there  with  tufts 
of  flame  fluttering  in  the  breeze,  were  all  that  remained  of 
the  great  shops  and  warehouses  that  once  adorned  the  beauti 
ful  city  that  sits  at  the  head- waters  of  the  James.  There  were 
many  sad  hearts,  no  doubt,  about  us,  and  some  happy  ones,  too, 
for  the  silken  folds  of  the  Union  banner  were  floating:  once 

O 

more  above  Virginia's  capital  and  Richmond  was  sleeping 
securely,  if  sleep  they  could,  under  its  protecting  power. 

And  there,  too,  amid  the  ruins  of  that  heroic  city,  we,  the 
victors,  slept ;  while  to  the  west,  through  the  long  reaches  of 
the  night  we  heard,  or  in  dreams  we  seemed  to  hear,  the  steady 
tramp  of  our  brothers  of  the  Potomac  and  the  James,  who,  in 
their  fierce  pursuit,  paused  not  through  the  darkness  of  the 
night  or  the  heat  of  the  day  until  that  9th  of  April,  when  amid 
the  acclamations  of  the  civilized  world  our  Northern  oak  struck 
down  the  Southern  pine. 

The  4th  of  April,  in  all  the  qualities  of  beauty  and  loveli 
ness,  was  a  fitting  successor  to  the  preceding  day.  About  three 


CAPTURE  AND  OCCUPATION  OF  RICHMOND     139 

o'clock  in  the  afternoon  I  was  sitting  on  the  broad  step  in 
front  of  the  Governor's  mansion,  our  headquarters.  Gover 
nor  Smith's  wife  and  daughter  were  still  occupying  some  of 
the  upper  chambers,  as  also  a  young  lady  from  Warrenton 
Springs,  who,  a  year  before,  had  come  there  for  a  short  visit, 
and  by  reason  of  the  advance  of  the  Union  army  had  not  been 
able  to  return.  An  uproar  had  broken  out  which,  gradually 
approaching  nearer  and  nearer,  so  startled  Miss  Smith  that  she 
came  to  the  window  and  asked  me  what  the  trouble  was.  Not 
knowing,  I  told  her  I  would  soon  find  out  and  let  her  know. 
Going  to  the  rear  of  the  house  and  through  the  garden  to  the 
embankment  wall  at  Governor  Street,  I  saw  President  Lin 
coln  in  the  middle  of  the  road  leading  his  little  son  Tad,  sur 
rounded  on  either  side,  front  and  rear,  by  a  dozen  or  more 
sailors  arranged  by  Admiral  Porter  for  his  protection.  The 
uproar  was  caused  by  thousands  of  freedmen  who  thronged 
about  and  followed  their  emancipator.  No  attempt  will  be 
made  to  describe  the  demonstrations  made  by  them  when  they 
first  beheld  the  man  on  whom  they  looked  as  something  more 
than  human,  and  little,  if  at  all,  less  than  the  Saviour  of  man 
kind. 

When  I  reported  to  Miss  Smith  the  occasion  of  the  noise 
which  she  thought  might  be  an  uprising  of  dangerous  char 
acter,  she  quickly  withdrew  without  remark.  Soon  there 
after  I  received  a  note  from  General  Devens,  who  was  with 
General  Weitzel  at  the  late  residence  of  Jefferson  Davis,  re 
questing  me  to  send  to  him  at  once  our  headquarters  wagon 
and  come  myself  to  meet  the  President,  who  was  holding  an 
informal  reception.  The  reception  over,  President  Lincoln, 
Tad,  General  Devens,  and  Admiral  Porter  entered  the  carriage 
I  had  sent.  It  was  a  light  carriage,  with  three  seats  and  cov 
ered  with  black  oilcloth.  The  President  and  the  General  took 
the  middle  seat,  Admiral  Porter  and  Tad  the  rear  one.  I  am 
particular  in  giving  these  details  for  the  reason  that  the  New 
York  illustrated  papers  represented  Mr.  Lincoln  riding  through 


140     CAPTURE  AND  OCCUPATION  OF  RICHMOND 

Richmond  in  an  open  barouche,  with  hat  in  hand,  bowing  to 
the  crowds  lining  the  streets  through  which  he  passed. 

From  the  Confederate  White  House  he  was  driven  out  to 
Camp  Lee,  with  perhaps  twenty-five  officers  galloping  along 
on  either  side  or  in  rear  of  the  carriage.  There  were  then  no 
people  in  the  streets,  but  when  a  quarter  of  a  mile  out,  the 
carriage  road  -in  advance  of  the  cortege  was  seen  to  be  filled 
with  hacks  and  carriages.  General  Weitzel  rode  forward  for 
the  purpose  of  ordering  them  one  side  just  as  the  body  of 
General  A.  P.  Hill  was  being  brought  out  of  a  house  to  be  placed 
in  a  hearse.  The  President's  carriage  was  then  turned  about 
and  took  a  parallel  street.  From  Camp  Lee  President  Lin 
coln  was  driven  to  Capitol  Square  and  stopped  immediately 
in  front  of  Crawford's  great  statue  of  Washington,  which 
faces  to  the  west,  holding  in  the  right  hand  a  baton  pointing 
in  the  same  direction.  After  looking  at  it  for  a  moment,  the 
President  quietly  said,  "  Washington  is  looking  at  me  and 
pointing  to  Jeff  Davis."  He  was  then  taken  to  a  point  where 
a  view  of  the  ruins  was  had,  and  from  there  to  the  river  and 
on  the  Admiral's  ship.  Not  leaving  it  again  he  returned  to  City 
Point  in  the  afternoon  of  the  following  day. 

In  reference  to  this  visit,  the  following  entry  was  made  in 
"A  Rebel  War  Clerk's  Diary,"  under  date  of  April  3,  the 
most  noted  and  often-quoted  Southern  diary:  "  4  P.M.  Thirty- 
four  guns  announced  the  entry  of  President  Lincoln.  He  flitted 
through  the  mass  of  human  beings  in  Capitol  Square,  his  car 
riage  drawn  by  four  horses,  preceded  by  outriders,  motioning 
the  people,  etc.,  out  of  the  way,  and  followed  by  a  mounted 
guard  of  thirty.  The  cortege  passed  rapidly,  precisely  as  I  had 
seen  royal  parties  in  Europe."  There  is  a  misstatement  in 
every  sentence  of  this  extract.  No  gun  was  fired,  and  there 
were  not  a  dozen  people  in  the  Square  when  the  carriage 
passed  through  it,  the  two  horses  walking.  The  President  did 
not  call  upon  any  person  in  Richmond  save  General  Weitzel,  or 
enter  any  house  except  the  late  residence  of  President  Davis. 


CAPTURE  AND  OCCUPATION  OF  RICHMOND     141 

There  was  a  sudden  and  great  change  in  the  everyday  aspect 
of  Richmond  when  it  ceased  to  be  the  Confederate  capital. 
The  Confederate  uniform  disappeared,  as  by  magic,  from 
the  streets.  Some  two  thousand  of  those  wearing  it  having 
failed,  for  reasons  known  only  to  themselves,  to  join  the  ranks 
of  the  retreating  army,  were  placed  in  Libby  Prison  and  Castle 
Thunder,  together  with  a  few  private  citizens  whom,  for  the 
public  welfare,  it  was  thought  best  to  deprive  of  their  liberty 
for  a  short  time. 

In  the  previous  November,  Lieutenant  H.  H.  Murray,  of 
the  Thirteenth  New  Hampshire  Regiment,  with  two  other  offi 
cers,  had  been  selected  by  the  Confederates  for  execution,  in 
the  event  of  the  sentence  of  death  passed  upon  three  Southern 
raiders  being  carried  into  effect,  and  for  three  months  he  was 
confined  in  a  basement  cell  of  Libby,  at  the  corner  of  East 
Cary  and  Twentieth  Streets.  He  endured  untold  misery  at  the 
hands  of  Dick  Turner,  the  notorious  jailer,  until  February  20, 
1865,  when  he  was  exchanged  for  a  nephew  of  Vice-President 
Alexander  H.  Stephens.  Being  reduced  to  a  mere  skeleton  by 
his  treatment,  he  was  not  able  to  return  to  his  regiment  until 
after  the  fall  of  Richmond.  While  a  prisoner,  he  and  his  two 
associates  had  labored  for  several  weeks  in  digging  a  tunnel 
for  escape,  which  was  nearly  completed  when  his  exchange  was 
effected.  Learning  on  his  return  that  Turner  was  a  prisoner  in 
his  own  cell,  he  went  immediately  to  Libby,  with  the  double 
purpose  of  seeing  Turner  in  his  appropriate  situation,  and  in 
forming  the  new  jailer  of  the  possibility,  through  the  labor  of 
his  own  hands,  of  Turner's  escape.  Murray  told  me  that  he 
was  so  excited  by  the  pleasure  of  seeing  his  persecutor  in  his 
own  former  place  of  torment  that  he  could  form  no  opinion 
of  the  length  of  time  he  spent  in  gazing  at  him,  and  finally 
came  away  entirely  forgetting  the  most  important  object  of 
his  visit.  That  night  Turner  escaped  and  never  was  recaptured. 

The  lines  of  communication  with  the  North  being  again 
open,  crowds  of  visitors  poured  into  Richmond  to  see  some- 


142     CAPTURE  AND  OCCUPATION  OF  RICHMOND 

thing  of  war  now  that  it  was  ended.  Senators  and  Representa 
tives  were  walking  the  streets  in  numbers,  probably  sufficient 
to  hold  a  session  of  Congress  in  the  late  Confederate  capitol.  I 
had  been  appointed  recorder  of  a  military  commission  for  the 
trial  of  all  persons  charged  with  crime  in  the  department.  We 
were  trying,  in  the  Confederate  Senate  Chamber,  a  person 
charged  with  having  killed  a  woman,  when,  on  the  6th  of  April, 
Vice-President  Johnson  and  Preston  King,  of  New  York,  entered 
the  room.  The  court  took  an  intermission  and  received  its  vis 
itors  with  the  respect  due  their  position.  The  Vice-President  sat 
down  beside  me,  in  the  seat  of  Senator  Hunter,  of  Virginia,  and 
was  soon  in  a  full  tide  of  denunciation  of  the  men  who  had 
instigated  and  carried  on  the  rebellion.  What  he  most  feared 
was  the  tender  heart  of  President  Lincoln.  "If  I  was  Presi 
dent,"  he  said,  "  I  would  order  Davis,  Lee,  Longstreet,  and 
all  the  most  prominent  leaders  before  a  military  commission, 
and,  when  convicted  of  treason,  they  should  be  hung,"  — bring 
ing  down  his  fist  with  vigor  on  the  desk  before  him.  Nine  days 
later  he  was  President  of  the  United  States,  and  not  one  of 
them  was  even  tried. 

On  the  10th  of  April  information  of  the  surrender  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was  received,  which  was  con 
sidered  as  the  end  of  the  war.  No  such  fitting  close  of  a  great 
civil  conflict  was  ever  before  known.  When  our  exulting  sol 
diers  were  preparing  to  fire  a  hundred  guns  in  honor  of  the 
event,  General  Grant,  rising  to  the  height  of  a  great  event, 
bade  them  stop.  He  would  not  permit  notes  of  triumph  over 
his  fellow-citizens,  or  those  soon  to  be.  Charles  Sumner  later 
rose  to  the  same  level  of  statesmanship  when  introducing  in 
the  Senate  a  resolution  prohibiting  the  names  of  battles  to  be 
inscribed  on  the  regimental  flags  of  the  army.  Massachusetts 
now  applauds  what  once  she  harshly  censured.  The  spirit  of 
Lincoln,  "  With  malice  towards  none,  with  charity  for  all," 
has  gradually  won  over  all  feelings  of  enmity  and  distrust, 
and  become  national. 


CAPTURE  AND  OCCUPATION  OF  RICHMOND     143 

For  three  months  longer  we  remained  in  Virginia  awaiting 
the  expiration  of  our  terms  of  service,  a  little  impatient  at  last 
to  take  up  the  thread  of  life  so  suddenly  dropped  at  the  out 
break  of  the  war. 

Never  can  I  forget  that  pleasant  morning  in  June  when,  in 
obedience  to  orders  from  the  War  Department,  in  company 
with  three  New  Hampshire  regiments,  I  embarked  on  board 
a  steamer  at  Richmond  for  our  homeward-bound  voyage  to 
Boston.  It  was  a  day  of  supernal  splendor,  and  as  we  sailed 
down  Virginia's  imperial  river  to  the  ocean,  and  saw  for  the  last 
time  her  blue  hills  fade  away  in  the  distance,  I  began  to  ex 
perience  that  strange  sensation  of  awe  and  uncertainty  that 
comes  over  one  as  he  stands  on  that  mysterious  borderland 
between  one  sharply  contrasted  mode  of  life  and  another. 

The  great  war  was  over.  Our  battles  had  been  fought,  our 
marches  ended ;  our  tents  would  no  longer  glisten  on  hillside 
and  in  valley ;  the  voice  of  the  bugle  was  hushed ;  the  throb 
bing  war  drum  would  be  heard  no  longer;  the  long-sought 
peace  had  fallen  like  a  blessing  from  God  over  the  land,  and 
we  were  once  more  at  home.  How  glad  we  were  to  leave  be 
hind  us  Virginia  and  come  back  once  more  to  our  ancestral 
homes  by  the  mountains  and  by  the  sea !  How  glad  to  lose 
sight  of  fields  blighted  by  the  curse  of  war  and  to  look  out  on 
the  pleasant  hillsides  and  fertile  valleys  of  New  England,  then 
smiling  with  the  prospects  of  a  generous  harvest !  How  glad 
to  escape  the  burning  skies  and  almost  tropical  suns  of  the 
South,  and  to  drink  in  the  pure  air  that  blows  off  our  rough 
old  granite  hills !  How  glad  to  leave  behind  us  a  people  whom 
we  had  conquered  by  our  swords,  and  come  again  to  live  among 
those  who  quite  conquered  us  by  their  kindness !  How  glad 
forever  to  lose  sight  of  the  desolation  and  suffering  with  which 
for  three  long  years  we  had  been  surrounded,  and  to  live  once 
more  amidst  peace,  happiness,  contentment,  and  abundance! 

The  survivors  of  the  great  war,  now  with  a  backward  vision 
of  half  a  century,  have  some  cause  for  pride  in  what  has  resulted 


144     CAPTURE  AND  OCCUPATION  OF  RICHMOND 

from  their  labors  and  sufferings.  They  have  lived  to  the  time, 
and  beyond  it,  when  the  great  majority  of  the  Southern  peo 
ple  feel  and  acknowledge  that  victory  over  them  was  better 
than  victory  for  them.  They  have,  among  the  other  permanent 
satisfactions  of  life,  the  consciousness  that  their  valor,  joining 
with  and  aiding  that  of  their  fellows,  has  been  wrought  into 
deeds  that  will  live,  though  many  of  their  names  are  unre 
corded. 

The  veteran  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  who  in  these  lat 
ter  years  revisits  the  scenes  of  his  army  life,  enjoys  an  expe 
rience  which  others  cannot  share.  As  he  crosses  the  Potomac 
into  Virginia  he  is  stirred  by  emotions  which  he  cannot  else 
where  feel.  The  general  features  of  the  landscape,  once  so 
familiar  to  him,  remain  unchanged,  but  its  local  color  is  gone. 
He  sees  no  longer  fields  blighted  by  the  curse  of  war,  for  the 
intervening  years  have  repaired  its  infinite  waste  and  healed 
its  multitudinous  scars.  Within  the  limits  of  the  Old  Domin 
ion  five  hundred  and  nineteen  conflicts  of  which  history  has 
taken  notice  have  their  place.  What  centuries  wrought  for 
the  Netherlands,  four  years  did  for  Virginia,  —  scarred  her 
surface  with  battlefields. 

By  a  renewal  of  those  old  associations  he  finds  all  his  facul 
ties  kindling  to  an  unwonted  glow  and  memory  bringing  back 
remembered  and  forgotten  events  with  a  distinctness  at  times 
almost  startling.  Scenes  and  incidents  of  every  kind  and 
every  description,  the  grand,  the  heroic,  the  sad,  the  mourn 
ful,  the  tender,  the  pathetic,  the  happy,  the  comical,  the  dis 
heartening,  the  hopeful,  crowd  upon  him  with  all  the  bewil 
dering  distinctness  and  confusion  of  the  kaleidoscope.  Smiles 
and  tears  gain  alternating  control.  To  revisit  a  great  battle 
field  is  a  red-letter  day  in  a  soldier's  life.  He  approaches  it 
with  feelings  of  awe  and  in  silence.  From  afar  he  pauses  and 
listens,  —  as  if  expecting  to  hear  again  that  most  impressive 
sound  that  ever  reached  the  human  ear,  the  first  indistinct 
notes  of  a  distant  battle.  As  he  stands  again  on  the  old  bat- 


PETERSBURG. 
CAPTURE  "/RICHMOND, 


-<f ; 


** 


CAPTURE  AND  OCCUPATION  OF  RICHMOND     145 

tie-line,  he  will  perhaps  be  disturbed  to  find  things  so  out  of 
proportion  to  impressions  stamped  on  his  memory  in  the  in 
tense  excitement  of  that  distant  day.  The  earth  has  lost  that 
aspect  of  savagery  which  it  wore  as  it  seemed  to  rise  up 
frowning  at  his  approach.  Yonder  ridge  so  low,  so  calm  and 
peaceful,  so  near  and  easy  of  ascent,  can  it  be  the  same  that 
once  appeared  almost  Alpine  in  height,  instinct  with  life,  and 
crowned  with  all  the  enginery  that  war  carries  in  her  train  ? 
But  it  matters  not  whether  our  battle-ridges  be  high  or  low, 
our  battle-plains  be  broad  or  narrow,  over  and  about  them  all 
will  forever  remain  the  fascination  and  charm  which  valor 
gives  the  spot  where  patriot  armies  in  freedom's  cause  have 
faced  and  met  its  foes. 


X 

MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH 

BY 
MAJOR  JOHN  CHESTER  WHITE,  U.S.A.,  RETIRED 


Read  before  the  Society,  December  5,  1916 

Being  one  of  the  appendices  to  the  History  of  the  Regulars  in  the  Civil  War, 
of  which  Major  White  is  the  author. 


MILITAEY  PRISONS :  NORTH  AND  SOUTH 

HAVING  undertaken  to  add  to  the  histories  of  the  Civil 
War,  the  writer  approached  this  phase  of  it  with  extreme  re 
luctance,  and  only  through  a  sense  of  it  as  a  duty  incumbent 
upon  him  through  his  ability  to  personally  vouch  for  certain 
irrefutable  facts  involved  in  it. 

For  the  sake  of  our  vaunted  civilization,  these  would  be 
better  consigned  to  oblivion,  were  it  not,  that  after  the  lapse 
of  a  quarter  of  a  century  (when  a  large  part  of  the  survivors 
of  the  Southern  prison-pens  had  succumbed  to  wrecked  con 
stitutions),  certain  writers  from  that  section  have  had  the 
audacity  to  assert  that  the  same  barbarous  treatment  of  pris 
oners  of  war  had  been  meted  out  to  the  Confederates  in  North 
ern  military  prisons  as  were  authentically  administered  at 
such  infamous  pens  in  the  South  as  those  at  Florence,  Ander- 
sonville,  Salisbury,  "  Camp-Sorghum,"  near  Columbia,  South 
Carolina,  Libby  Prison,  Belle  Isle,  etc. 

One  of  the  most  aggressive  in  this  direction  has  been  Dr. 
John  Wyeth,  who  is  therefore  largely  responsible  for  arousing 
a  quasi-controversy  on  the  topic.  In  an  article  entitled  "  Cold 
Cheer  at  Camp  Morton,"  which  appeared  in  the  "  Century 
Magazine"  for  April,  1891,  he  made  allegations  as  to  the 
treatment  of  its  inmates  that  called  forth  a  vigorous  rejoinder 
which  was  published  in  the  September  number  of  that  periodi 
cal,  and  attested  by  officers  of  such  unassailable  character  as 
Generals  O.  B.  Willcox,  Lewis  Wallace,  A.  P.  Hovey,  and 
Governor  Oliver  P.  Morton,  of  Indiana,  among  others. 

This  was  in  refutation  of  these  assertions  by  Wyeth,  through 
an  exhaustive  presentation  of  evidence  from  responsible  par 
ties  directly  connected  with  the  administration  of  the  prison 
(which  was  near  Indianapolis).  This  is  at  such  length  as  to 


150       MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH 

be  impracticable  for  quotation  in  this  paper,  so  that  to  it,  as 
well  as  to  Wyeth's  reply  in  the  same  number,  those  interested 
must  be  referred.  The  subject-matter  of  his  statements  he  has 
reproduced  in  his  later  work,  "  With  Sabre  and  Scalpel,"  pub 
lished  in  1914.  As  before  suggested,  a  possible  explanation 
of  his  efforts,  at  that  late  date,  to  make  the  treatment  of  Con 
federate  prisoners  of  war  appear  to  have  been  akin  to  "  the 
terrible  trials  of  Northern  prisoners  "  (to  use  his  own  words), 
may  be  found  set  forth  in  chapter  XI,  p.  121  et  seq.>  entitled 
"  A  Dissertation  on  the  Perversion  of  Facts." 

While  the  writer  possessed  no  personal  knowledge  of  the 
conditions  at  Camp  Morton,  it  so  happened  that  he  gained 
such  at  first  hand  about  certain  other  military  prisons  in  the 
North.  Keleased  upon  parole  (as  one  whom  it  was  reasonable 
to  expect  would  either  shortly  die,  or,  at  best,  would  never 
be  fit  for  active  field  service  again),  when  newspapers  were 
brought  aboard  the  flag-of-truce  boat  off  Fort  Monroe,  he 
learned  that  a  brother-officer  to  whom  he  was  much  attached 
was  lying  severely  wounded  in  a  hospital  at  Georgetown,  out 
side  of  Washington.  So  soon  as  his  vermin-infested  rags  could 
be  gotten  rid  of,  some  medical  assistance  received,  with  some 
proper  nourishment,  that  hospital  was  visited.  The  comrade 
was  found  in  occupation  of  a  ward,  in  which,  in  close  proxim 
ity  lay  a  wounded  Confederate  officer,  beside  whose  cot  was 
a  small  table  laden  with  delicacies,  and  over  him  were  hover 
ing  two  ministering  women  friends,  devoting  themselves  to 
his  alleviation. 

The  production  of  a  parallel  case,  south  of  Mason  and 
Dixon's  line,  is  hereby  challenged ! 

The  wounded  Federal  officer,  noticing  that  his  visitor's  at 
tention  was  being  largely  directed  towards  the  other  occupant 
of  the  ward,  and  having  remarked  that  he  appeared  to  be  more 
interested  in  the  Confederate  than  in  him,  the  response  was 
made :  "  Not  at  all !  But  if  you  could  realize  what  a  contrast 
there  is  in  this  sight  and  with  what  was  left  behind  in  Libby, 


MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH       151 

you  would  not  wonder  that  my  gaze  is  thus  riveted  " ;  adding, 
at  once,  "  But  thank  God  !  for  such  humanity  on  our  side." 
(It  may  be  also  stated  that  in  an  adjoining  ward  lay  Lieuten 
ant-Colonel  Elwell  Stephen  Otis,  One  Hundred  and  Fortieth 
New  York  Volunteers,  later  the  commander  in  the  Philip 
pines  under  the  McKinley  Administration.) 

Again,  upon  his  arrival  at  his  home  in  Philadelphia,  the 
writer  having  learned  that  some  wounded  men  of  the  regular 
brigade  were  to  be  found  in  a  hospital  in  Germantown,  upon 
visiting  them,  saw  a  number  of  Confederates  upon  cots,  inter 
spersed  throughout  the  same  wards  among  the  Union  victims, 
and  receiving  exactly  the  same  attention  as  they. 

The  challenge  is  renewed  as  to  this  instance ! 

An  invitation  was  extended  to  him  to  make  a  visit  to  Fort 
Delaware,  upon  what  was  called  "  chicken  day." 

At  Elmira,  New  York,  while  en  route  to  rejoin  his  regiment 
which  was  being  rehabilitated  at  Buffalo,  he  made  an  inspec 
tion  of  the  large  prison-camp  at  the  former  place,  then  being 
guarded  by  the  Twelfth  United  States  Infantry.  As  a  regular 
officer  himself,  he  was  at  liberty  to  move  about  freely,  and  he 
now  gives  testimony  to  the  fact  that  the  said  camp  provided 
all  requisite  shelter  and  suitable  rations  for  its  inmates,  while 
its  control  was  being  administered  with  due  reference  to  mili 
tary  propriety. 

This  is  set  forth  in  detail,  and  at  great  length,  in  a  work 
entitled  "  The  Elmira  Prison,"  by  Clay  W.  Homes,  and  pub 
lished  by  G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons,  New  York,  being  a  work  of 
over  four  hundred  pages,  including  in  its  attestations  those  of 
sundry  Confederates.  As  this  was  about  the  largest  Federal 
prison,  it  is  well  to  make  a  careful  examination  of  the  facts 
involved. 

It  had  been  selected  for  the  purpose  in  the  early  days  of 
July,  1864,  and  to  receive  the  overflow  from  Point  Lookout, 
Maryland.  Its  area  comprised  nearly  thirty  acres;  having 
been  previously  used  as  a  draft  rendezvous,  and  also  as  one  for 


152       MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH 

recruited  volunteers,  and  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Seth  Eastman,  Fifth  United  States  Infantry.  The  site 
was  contiguous  to  the  Chemung  River.  The  barracks  provided 
for  the  occupants  were  "  in  excellent  condition  "  and  "  well 
ventilated,"  according  to  the  official  reports ;  among  which 
were  those  of  Surgeon  Charles  M.  McDougall,  Volunteers  ; 
the  Medical  Director  of  the  "  Department  of  the  East,"  Sur 
geon  Charles  T.  Alexander,1  U.S.A.;  Captain  Philip  W. 
Stanhope,  Twelfth  Infantry ;  Captain  Henry  W.  Freedley, 
Third  Infantry;  and  Lieutenant  James  R.  Reid,  Tenth  In 
fantry,  —  all  commending  the  conditions,  and  up  to  two  days 
prior  to  the  closing  of  the  camp.  Miss  Dorothea  Dix  (the 
Florence  Nightingale  of  the  war)  reported,  in  the  interest  of 
the  "  Sanitary  Commission  "  :  "  Have  visited  the  prison  and 
hospital  at  Elmira ;  in  both  of  which  the  rebels  are  receiving 
all  necessary  care  and  provisions,  fully  adequate  to  all  neces 
sities."  The  buildings  were  provided  with  double  bunks  for 
four  thousand  men,  while  tentage  could  be  furnished  for  from 
three  thousand  to  four  thousand  more.  A  kitchen  had  been 
constructed  to  cook  for  five  thousand,  daily,  with  a  bakery 
capable  of  turning  out  six  thousand  rations  of  bread  per  diem. 
A  pond  in  the  centre  of  the  camp  having  been  found  to  be  of 
an  objectionable  character,  the  remedy  was  applied  later  in  the 
fall.  In  the  reports  above  referred  to,  the  dirty  condition  of 
the  prisoners  upon  arrival,  is  commented  upon.  Colonel  Ben 
jamin  Franklin  Tracy  (afterwards  Secretary  of  the  Navy), 
then  of  the  One  Hundred  and  Twenty-seventh  United  States 
Colored  Infantry,  relieved  Colonel  Eastman  in  September ; 
himself  being  succeeded  by  Brigadier-General  H.  W.  Wes- 
sells,  in  December. 

As  stated  in  the  preface  to  the  book  under  quotation,  "  The 
strongest  evidence  produced  in  support  of  the  good  character 
and  wise  administration  of  these  officers  in  charge  and  of  the 
treatment  of  the  inmates  comes  from  the  Confederates  them- 

1  Of  strong  Southern  sympathies. 


(5) 


A  STUDY  IN  CONTRASTS 


(1)  Col.  Rob't  Quid,  C.S.A.,  Confederate  Commissioner  of  Exchange.         (2)  Major  Henry 
Wirz,  C.S.A.,  and  his  defender,  (3)  Lt.  Jas.  Madison  Page,  6th  Mich.  Cav.        (4)  Bvt.  Mai. 


MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH       153 

selves,"  as  found  in  the  succeeding  pages  of  the  volume.  Thus, 
the  written  testimony  of  Sergeant  Benjamin  Benson,  First 
South  Carolina  Volunteers,  should  be  consulted  upon  page 
209 ;  that  of  Joseph  M.  Womack,  on  page  169,  wherein 
he  says  that  "there  need  be  no  blush  for  the  memories  of 
the  Elmira  prison-camp  "  -  both  of  these  being  escaped  pris 
oners  ;  and  also  that  of  A.  M.  Kelly,  Twelfth  Virginia  In 
fantry,  on  page  301,  as  to  his  being  "treated,  in  the  main, 
here  with  a  courtesy  and  kind  indulgence  that  I  can  never  for 
get,  though  it  comes  from  foes."  When  compared  with  the 
vitriolic  and  viciously  falsified  speech  in  Congress  assembled 
on  January  10.  1876,  by  Benjamin  H.  Hill,  the  demand  for 
such  an  expose  as  this  of  such  fabrications  will  doubtless  be 
recognized.  The  winter  of  1864-65  proved  to  be  a  very  severe 
one  all  over  the  country,  and  the  prisoner  from  the  Southland 
no  doubt  suffered  to  a  serious  extent  from  its  rigors  at  such 
Northern  points  as  Elrnira,  Johnson's  Island,  and  Camps 
Douglas,  Chase,  and  Morton.  At  the  latter,  near  Indianapolis, 
the  thermometer  had  registered  the  unprecedented  record  of 
zero.  During  a  part  of  the  previous  summer  there  had  been 
a  severe  drouth,  and  in  August,  when  there  were  9300  prison 
ers,  there  had  been  793  cases  of  scurvy  making  their  appear 
ance,  but  it  is  to  be  taken  into  consideration  that  these  men 
had  been  previously  for  a  long  ^ime  at  Point  Lookout.  A 
smallpox  epidemic,  also,  broke  out,  the  treatment  of  which  will 
be  found  set  forth  in  the  reports  of  Surgeons  McDougall  and 
E.  F.  Sloan  —  to  be  found  in  the  same  work.  One  remark 
therein  is  peculiarly  pertinent  —  to  the  effect  that  there  had 
been  "a  tendency  to  over  eat  on  the  part  of  the  prisoners  — 
an  indiscretion  of  which  we  were  never  chargeable  at  Libby, 
and  elsewhere!  "  As  before  expatiated  upon,  that  distressing 
malady,  nostalgia,  seems  to  have  been  more  pronounced  among 
the  Southerners  than  their  opponents,  and  not  a  few  suc 
cumbed  to  its  devitalization. 

In  volume  7  of  the  "  Review  of  Review's  Photographic  His- 


154       MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH 

tory  of  the  Civil  War,"  upon  pages  75,  79,  81, 119,129, 131, 
151,  168,  175,  177,  and  179,  can  be  found  photographs  show 
ing  the  actual  conditions  at  Andersonville  and  Elmira,  re 
spectively.  The  contrast  to  conditions  and  results  obtaining  at 
Camp  Alger  and  at  Chickamauga,  at  the  time  of  the  Spanish 
War  of  1898,  was,  likewise,  greatly  in  favor  of  the  military 
prison  at  Elmira,  in  1864-65.  No  doubt  exceptional  instances 
of  abuse  of  authority  by  guards  or  their  superiors  may  have 
occurred ;  but  if  regarded  as  exceptional  in  the  North,  it  can 
justly  be  asserted  as  habitual  in  the  South. 

It  should  likewise  be  brought  to  the  knowledge  of  the  pres 
ent-day  reader  that  at  the  period  under  mention  foodstuff  was 
abnormally  high  in  cost,  while  the  premium  on  gold  was  near 
its  top-notch.  There  appears  to  have  been  some  twenty-four 
Federal  prisons  in  all,  including  detention  camps  and  jails, 
such  as  the  "  Old  Capitol "  prison  in  Washington,  Belle  Plain 
on  the  Potomac  shore  of  Virginia,  near  the  terminus  of  the 
Fredericksburg  and  Potomac  Railroad,  which  had  been  pre 
pared  for  the  reception  of  the  captives  in  the  Wilderness  and 
Spotsylvania  campaigns,  and  at  Rock  Island  and  Alton,  Il 
linois,  where  at  the  latter  place  an  abandoned  penitentiary 
was  utilized  for  a  short  time.  At  Rock  Island,  which  was  con 
tinued  as  a  prison-camp  for  some  sixteen  months,  there  had 
been  9536  in  confinement,  from  among  whom  there  had  been 
1940  deaths  and  45  escapes ;  which  compare  with  the  12,112 
deaths  recorded  against  Salisbury,  and  the  13,765  at  Ander 
sonville. 

The  Gratiot  Street  and  Myrtle  Street  prisons  at  St.  Louis 
were  also  of  but  temporary  occupation  ;  the  one,  an  old  medi 
cal  college ;  the  other,  a  former  negro  market. 

Camp  Butler,  at  Springfield,  Illinois,  was  one  of  similar 
character,  being  in  use  but  for  a  short  period  of  time. 

There  were  also  the  two  old  forts,  Lafayette  and  Colum 
bus,  in  New  York  Harbor,  and  Warren,  in  Boston  Harbor, 
as  also  Fort  McHenry,  near  Baltimore,  and  Fort  Delaware, 


MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH       155 

near  Philadelphia.  These  held  political  as  well  as  military 
prisoners. 

Photographs  of  the  interiors  and  of  some  of  the  occupants 
can  be  examined  in  the  book  mentioned  above. 

Lying  upon  the  writer's  desk  is  a  holographic  note  from 
Colonel  Thomas  L.  Livermore,  well  known  as  a  historian  and 
statistician  of  that  war,  in  which  he  states :  "  My  knowledge 
of  the  treatment  of  Confederate -prisoners  was  confined  to 
Point  Lookout.  There,  they  were  well  treated  in  every  respect 
—  food,  clothing,  quarters,  and  discipline."  Colonel  Livermore 
also  informs  the  writer  that  he  was  on  duty  at  Johnson's  Island 
at  the  very  time  to  which  Dr.  Wyeth  makes  reference. 

The  most  authoritative  information  obtainable  as  to  actual 
conditions  at  Johnson's  Island,  in  Sandusky  Bay,  Ohio,  which 
had  been  originally  selected  as  an  ideal  situation,  about  which 
so  much  had  been  wildly  averred,  would  appear  to  be  found 
in  the  following  excerpt  from  Croffut's  "  Fifty  Years  of  Camp 
and  Field:  Diary  of  General  Hitchcock"  (page  460).  This 
seems  to  meet  the  case  as  fully  as  would  a  whole  volume  of 
refutations  of  charges  of  ill-treatment :  "  General  Hitchcock 1 
brought  back  from  Johnson's  Island  one  piece  of  most  impor 
tant  news ;  out  of  1882  rebel  prisoners  of  war,  only  362  men 
were  willing  to  be  exchanged !  The  residue  preferred  to  re 
main  in  prison.  This  fact  was  a  striking  commentary  both  on 
the  lack  of  enthusiasm  for  the  rebel  cause  and  on  their  treat 
ment  in  the  *  Yankee  prison ! ' "  Upon  this  the  diarist  com 
ments  :  "Who  cannot  see  in  the  above  fact  the  state  of  feel 
ing  that  would  be  manifested  in  the  whole  rebel  army  if  an 
opportunity  were  offered  for  declaring  itself?  Secession  was 
one  of  those  infatuations  which  sometimes  seizes  large  bodies 
of  people  who  only  need  a  wholesome  lesson  to  enable  them 
to  recover  their  senses,  and  cast  off  their  delusions  as  a  horrid 
nightmare." 

1  General  Hitchcock  had  been  deputed  by  the  War  Department  in  September, 
1864,  to  proceed  to  inquire  into  and  report  upon  these  conditions. 


156        MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH 

To  substantiate  this  exposition  of  facts  the  following  is  the 
statement  of  Captain  John  A.  Walsh,  C.S.A.,  in  a  book  en 
titled  "  Camp,  Field,  and  Prison  Life,"  as  to  his  experiences 
at  Johnson's  Island :  "  I  am  glad  to  say  that  prison-life  —  in 
so  well  selected,  arranged,  and  conducted  a  place  as  this  —  has 
been  far  more  agreeable  than  I  anticipated.  ...  I  got  a  room 
.  .  .  having  four  beds  in  it.  Myself  and  three  lieutenants 
filled  the  beds.  We  did  not  have  to  increase  our  number." 
Each  building,  according  to  his  account,  contained  eighty 
prisoners  —  divided  into  two  messes  —  with  a  dining-  and  cook- 
room  for  each,  and  a  stove,  well  supplied  with  culinary  uten 
sils.  His  own  mess  employed  two  regular  cooks,  at  fifteen 
dollars  per  month  each.  He  drew  such  clothing  as  he  desired 
from  the  United  States,  and  quotes  one  "  jolly  fellow  "  as  hav 
ing  declared,  "  If  a  body  could  n't  live  easy,  laugh  and  grow 
fat  here,  he  ought  to  die,  for  we  have  nothing  to  do  but  to 
eat,  drink,  sleep,  and  be  merry."  Further  he  states:  "All 
things  considered,  the  whole  premises  are  kept  remarkably 
clean  and  healthy.  Captain  Scoville,  who  has  charge  of  the 
internal  affairs  of  the  prison,  visits  all  parts  of  the  institution 
frequently,  and  is  very  kind  in  listening  to  the  various  ques 
tions,  and  in  supplying  the  wants  of  the  prisoners." 

Added  to  this  is  the  verification  of  a  Confederate  surgeon, 
published  in  the  "  Richmond  Examiner,"  as  to  his  experiences 
at  Johnson's  Island :  "  The  sleeping  accommodations  were 
very  comfortable,  consisting  of  a  bunk,  with  straw  bed,  and 
if  the  individual  has  no  blanket,  one  is  furnished,  and  he  is 
allowed  to  buy  as  many  more  as  he  wants.  Every  room  has  a 
good  stove,  and  is  furnished  with  a  sufficiency  of  wood.  .  .  . 
The  rations  are  exactly  the  same  as  issued  to  the  garrison " 
(this  being  followed  by  an  enumeration  of  them). 

Among  the  first  Federal  prisoners  taken  by  the  Confeder 
ates  were  three  officers  of  the  United  States  Navy,  Lieuten 
ants  John  L.  Worden,  George  L.  Selden,  and  Albert  Kautz. 
The  first-named,  it  will  be  remembered,  was  seized  by  the 


MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH       157 

Secessionists,  while  acting  as  an  emissary  for  the  Federal 
Government  to  the  commands  at  Pensacola,  early  in  1861 ; 
the  last  had  been  captured  off  Cape  Hatteras  by  a  Confeder 
ate  privateer,  on  June  25,  while  in  command  of  a  prize  brig 
which  had  been  taken  near  Charleston.  Kestrained  of  his  lib 
erty  for  a  couple  of  months  in  North  Carolina,  Kautz  was 
then  removed  to  Henrico  Jail,  in  Eichmond,  being  thus  incar 
cerated  and  held  in  retaliation  for  the  imprisonment  in  the 
"  Tombs,"  in  New  York  City,  of  certain  privateers.  On  the 
last  of  October  he  was  released  upon  parole,  in  order  that  he 
might  proceed  to  Washington,  where  (after  having  held  an 
interview  with  the  Confederate  officials,  Benjamin  and  Mai- 
lory,  looking  to  effecting  an  understanding  with  the  Federal 
authorities  as  to  future  exchanges)  he  was  successful  in  ob 
taining  the  exchange  of  himself  and  the  two  other  naval  offi 
cers.  This  also  led  up  to  the  release  of  three  hundred  and 
fifty  Union  captives  who  had  been  taken  at  First  Bull  Run, 
through  their  exchange  with  the  same  number  of  Confeder 
ates  who  had  been  captured  in  the  fight  at  Hatteras  Inlet  in 
August.  This  was  the  first  exchange  authorized  by  the  Presi 
dent  and  his  Cabinet. 

The  humanitarian  offices  of  Miss  Van  Lew  were  already 
being  extended  to  those  in  confinement  at  "Libby,"  particu 
larly,  among  the  sick  and  wounded.  So  much  has  been  writ 
ten  about  what  this  loyal  and  devoted  woman  did  later  on  for 
escaping  prisoners,  who  sought  a  hiding-place  at  her  home 
prior  to  striking  out  upon  their  desperate  efforts  to  regain 
their  freedom,  as  well  as  to  her  conveyance  of  important  in 
formation  to  the  Federal  authorities,  that  it  is  not  considered 
to  be  necessary  to  recount  any  of  it  here. 

Some  sixty-eight  places  appear  to  have  been  in  use  in  the 

South  as  military  prisons.  Among  these  the  most  conspicuous 

were  eight  in  Richmond ;  Liggon's,1  the  Smith  and  Pember- 

ton  buildings ;  the  Laundry,  Crew's,  Scott,  and  Castle  Thun- 

1  Where  most  of  the  First  Bull  Run  captives  were  at  first  immured. 


158       MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH 

der  —  at  the  latter  place  the  inmates  were  usually  limited  to 
political  offenders  and  criminals.  In  the  James  River,  oppo 
site  the  city,  was  Belle  Isle,  one  of  the  most  infamous  of  them 
all !  At  Danville,  Virginia,  there  were  six  prisons  which  were 
designated  by  numbers.  Another  Castle  Thunder,  at  Peters 
burg  had  been  so  named  on  account  of  the  noise  of  the  con 
tinual  bombardment  to  which  the  "  Cockade  City  "  was  being 
subjected. 

At  Salisbury,  North  Carolina,  was  a  prison-pen  where  there 
was  the  highest  death-rate  of  them  all,  in  proportion  to  the 
numbers  confined  there  — 12,034  graves!  At  Charleston, 
South  Carolina,  the  Roper  Hospital  and  the  city  Jail;  at 
Florence,  where  the  mortality  had  been  about  as  great,  pro 
portionally,  as  at  Salisbury ;  near  Columbia,  Camp  Asylum, 
or,  as  it  became  known,1  Camp  Sorghum,  from  its  almost  ex 
clusive  diet,  was  likewise  equally  distinguished.  Castle  Pinck- 
ney,  in  Charleston  Harbor,  was  at  first  selected  for  the  reten 
tion  of  some  of  those  First  Bull  Run  captures,  among  whom 
was  that  Colonel  Michael  Corcoran,  Sixty-ninth  New  York 
Volunteers,  who  had  been  for  a  time  segregated  as  a  hostage 
for  a  privateer  under  sentence  of  death  in  the  United  States 
courts.  In  Georgia  there  were  prisons  at  Macon,  Millen,  and 
the  jail  at  Savannah ;  the  most  notorious  of  them  all  being 
Camp  Sumter,  or,  as  it  is  known  to  the  history  of  that  period, 
Anderson ville.  Camp  Lawton,  at  Millen,  had  been  created 
late  in  '64  to  relieve  that  crowded  sink  of  infamy.  In  Ala 
bama  there  were  prisons  at  Cahaba  and  Tuscaloosa. 

Besides  Camp  Groce,  near  Hempstead,  and  that  "  Camp 
Ford  "  in  Texas  (already  referred  to),  there  were  many  others 
of  minor  importance  as  containing  but  a  few  prisoners,  and 

1  Since  writing  the  above  the  information  has  been  supplied  by  Major  Henry 
Goddard  Dorr,  Volunteers,  who  was  a  prisoner  of  war  at  both  places,  that  the 
Camp  Asylum  was  established  as  a  stockade  in  the  city  of  Columbia,  and  later 
than  the  Camp  Sorghum,  being  two  separate  places  ;  and  also  that  a  jail  in  the 
town  was,  likewise,  in  use  for  similar  purposes,  and  where  Major  Charles  B. 
Amory,  Volunteers,  had  been  confined  with  others. 


MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH       159 

these  but  for  a  short  time,  as  merely  transients,  such  as  Ra 
leigh,  Charlotte,  and  Goldsboro,  North  Carolina,  and  Green 
ville,  South  Carolina,  Shreveport,  Louisiana,  and  the  Parish 
Prison  at  New  Orleans.  The  conditions  obtaining  at  these 
places  have  been  further  set  forth,  and  at  length,  in  a  report 
made  to  the  Fortieth  Congress,  by  W.  F.  G.  Shanks ;  and  in 
scores  of  books,  of  which  the  following  is  but  a  partial  bibliog 
raphy  furnished  for  the  inquiring  minds  :  — 

Lights  and  Shadows  in  Confederate  Prisons,  by  Homer  H.  Sprague, 
Brevet  Colonel  Thirteenth  Connecticut  Infantry.  Published  by  G.  P. 
Putnam's  Sous,  New  York  City. 

Southern  Prisons,  by  Morgan  E.  Dowling.  William  Graham,  Detroit. 

Story  of  Camp  Chase,  by  Wm.  H.  Knauss.  Publishing  House,  M.  E. 
Church,  Nashville. 

Prisoners  of  War,  by  Thos.  Sturgis,  Lieutenant  Fifty-seventh  Massa 
chusetts  Infantry.  G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons,  New  York  City. 

Dark  Days  of  the  Rebellion,  by  B.  F.  Booth,  Twenty-second  Iowa  In 
fantry.  Booth  Publishing  Company,  Indianola,  Iowa. 

Fourteen  Months  in  Southern  Prisons,  by  H.  M.  Davidson,  First  Ohio 
Light  Artillery.  Daily  Wisconsin  Printing  House,  Milwaukee. 

Eighteen  Months  a  Prisoner  under  the  Rebel  Flag,  by  S.  E.  Boggs, 
Twenty-first  Illinois  Infantry.  Lovington,  Illinois. 

Life  Struggles  in  Rebel  Prisons,  by  Joseph  Ferguson,  Captain  First 
New  Jersey.  John  Ferguson,  Philadelphia. 

A  Captive  of  War,  by  Solon  Hyde,  Seventeenth  Ohio  Infantry.  Mc- 
Clure,  Phillips  Company,  New  York  City. 

The  Prisoner  of  War,  and  How  Treated,  by  A.  C.  Roach,  Lieutenant 
and  A.D.C.  A.  D.  Streight,  Indianapolis,  Indiana. 

Twenty-two  Months  a  Prisoner  of  War,  by  Stephen  Schwartz,  Ord 
nance  Sergeant,  U.S.A.  A.  F.  Nelson,  St.  Louis. 

Nineteen  Months  a  Prisoner  of  War,  by  Lieutenant  G.  E.  Sabre  (nom 
de  plume  .?),  Second  Rhode  Island  Cavalry.  American  News  Com 
pany,  New  York  City. 

Journal  of  Alfred  Ely,  as  a  prisoner  in  Richmond,  edited  by  Chas. 
Lanman.  D.  Appleton  &  Company,  New  York  City. 

Richmond  Prisons,  1861-62,  by  W.  H.  Jeffrey.  Republican  Press,  St. 
Johnsbury,  Vermont. 

Seven  Months  a  Prisoner,  by  J.  V.  Hadley,  of  the  staff  of  J.  C.  Rice. 
Charles  Scribner's  Sons,  New  York  City. 

Field,  Dungeon  and  Escape,  by  Albert  Dean  Richardson  and  Junius 
Henri  Browne.  New  York  Tribune  Company. 

A  Race  for  Liberty,  by  Wm.  Bursar,  Thirty-second  Ohio  Infantry. 
W.  G.  Foster,  Wellsville,  Ohio. 


160       MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH 

Experiences  in  the  Civil  War,  by  Sol.  Woolworth.  Newark,  New  Jer 
sey. 

In  and  Out  of  Rebel  Prisons,  by  Lieutenant  A.  Cooper,  Twelfth  New 
York  Cavalry.  R.  J.  Oliphant,  Oswego. 

Life  and  Death  in  Rebel  Prisons,  by  R.  H.  Kellogg,  Sixteenth  Connec 
ticut  Infantry.  L.  Stebbins,  Hartford. 

Battlefield  and  Prison-Pen,  by  J.  W.  Urban,  First  Pennsylvania  Re 
serves.  Hubbard  Bros.,  Philadelphia. 

Prison  Life  in  the  South,  by  W.  W.  Glazier  Harris,  Lieutenant,  Cav 
alry.  H.  E.  Goodwin,  Hartford. 

Five  Hundred  Days  in  Rebel  Prisons,  by  Chas.  Fosdick,  Fifth  Iowa. 
(A  brochure.) 

Cahaba — a  Story  of  Captivity  in  Alabama,  by  Jesse  Hawes,  M.D., 
Ninth  Illinois  Cavalry.  Burr  Printing  House,  New  York  City. 

Chronicles  from  the  Diary  of  a  War  Prisoner  in  1864,  by  J.  W.  North 
rop,  Seventy-sixth  New  York  Infantry.  Wichita,  Kansas. 

Fast  and  Loose  in  Dixie,  by  J.  M.  Drake.  Authors'  Publishing  Com 
pany,  New  York  City. 

Beyond  the  Lines,  by  Captain  J.  J.  Gaer,  of  the  Staff  of  General  Buck- 
land.  J.  W.  Daugherty,  Philadelphia. 

Prison  Life  in  Dixie,  by  Rev.  J.  B.  Vawton.  Central  Book  Concern, 
Chicago. 

Lib  by  Life,  by  Lieutenant  Colonel  F.  F.  Cavada,  One  Hundred  and 
Fourteenth  Pennsylvania  Infantry.  J.  B.  Lippincott,  Philadelphia. 

Prison  Life  in  Richmond,  by  W.  C.  Harris,  Seventy-first  Pennsylvania 
Infantry.  Geo.  W.  Child,  Philadelphia. 

Ten  Months  in  Libby,  by  Louis  D.  Cesnola,  Colonel  Fourth  New  York 
Cavalry.  (A  leaflet.) 

Martyrdom  of  Andersonville  Prison,  by  E.  R.  Hamlin,  Medical  In 
spector.  Lee  &  Shepard,  Boston. 

Andersonville.    Harper  &  Brothers,  New  York  City. 

Horrors  of  Andersonville.  Statement  of  John  Lynch,  Report  of  Com 
mittee.  Merrihew  &  Son,  Philadelphia. 

Twelve  Months  in  Andersonville,  by  Lessel  Long,  Thirteenth  Indiana 
Infantry.  Thos.  &  Mark  Butler,  Huntington,  Indiana. 

The  Tragedy  of  Audersonville,  by  General  N.  P.  Chipman.  Published 
by  the  author,  Judge-Advocate  of  the  Wirz  Court  Martial. 

Andersonville  Diary,  by  J.  L.  Ransom,  Ninth  Michigan  Cavalry.  Doug 
lass  Bros.,  Philadelphia. 

Andersonville,  by  John  McElroy,  Eighteenth  Illinois  Infantry.  D.  R. 
Locke,  Toledo. 

Captivity  at  Andersonville  and  Belle  Isle,  and  Other  Rebel  Prisons,  by 
Warren  Lee  Goss,  Second  Massachusetts  Heavy  Artillery.  Lee  & 
Shepard,  Boston. 

Narrative  of  Audersonville,  by  Ambrose  Spencer. 


MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH       161 

Narrative  of  Amos  E.  Shaw.    F.  P.  Rice,  Worcester. 

List  of  Dead  at  Andersonville.    Tribune  Association,  New  York  City. 

Capture  and  Escape,  by  J.  A.  Kellogg,  Brevet  Brigadier-General  and 

Colonel,  Sixth  Wisconsin  Infantry.  Wisconsin  Historical  Commission. 
Story  of  the  Tunnel  Escape  from  Libby,  by  Major  A.  G.  Hamilton. 

J.  L.  Ransom,  Chicago. 

Days  in  Confederate  Prisons.   Magazine  article. 
Prison  Life.   Harper's  Magazine,  July,  1865. 
And  more  than  a  score  of  other  magazine  articles  and  leaflets. 

Two  very  interesting  newspaper  articles  upon  this  topic 
exist,  and  are  in  the  possession  of  the  writer;  one,  to  the 
«  New  York  Times,"  under  date  of  September  27,  1912,  re 
lates  the  "fearful  imprisonment  "  of  some  six  months  in  Libby, 
of  Captain  Emil  Frey,  Eighty-second  Illinois  Infantry,  and 
later  President  of  Switzerland,  and  with  whom,  as  he  states, 
the  horror  of  it  lingers  in  all  the  reminiscences  of  the  war ; 
the  cold,  the  hunger,  the  disease;  the  other,  to  the  same 
periodical,  under  date  of  December  8,  1912,  retailing  the 
experiences  of  Surgeon  Simon  Baruch,  C.S.A.,  as  a  prisoner 
of  war  on  two  occasions  in  which  he  describes  them  as  "  delight 
ful  captivity."  Even  the  most  skeptical  and  bigoted  would 
refrain  from  asserting  that  all  these  writers  had  conspired  to 
put  forth  their  narratives  in  an  exaggerated  or  falsified  form  I 

It  is  but  proper  to  state,  however,  that  Jefferson  Davis, 
many  years  after  the  close  of  the  war  (December  10,  1888), 
writing  from  his  seclusion  at  Beauvoir,  for  "  Belford's  Maga 
zine,"  sought  to  make  a  defense,  entitled  "  Andersonville,  and 
Other  War  Prisons,"  to  which  those  interested  may  be  referred. 
There  is  also  a  work  labelled  "  Annals  of  the  War,"  and 
edited  by  Colonel  Kobert  Otild  and  General  E.  S.  Northcott. 
In  passing,  the  writer  pauses  to  affirm  that,  in  all  this  litera 
ture  he  has  had  occasion  to  carefully  and  critically  examine, 
among  the  rest  was  a  work  published  shortly  after  the  close 
of  the  war  by  Harper  &  Brothers,  under  the  title  of  "  Prison 
Life  in  the  South,"  being  a  collection  of  statements  furnished 
by  inmates  of  the  various  prisons  at  Kichmond,  Macon,  Sa- 


162       MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH 

vannah,  Charleston,  Kaleigh,  Goldsboro',  and  Andersonville, 
and  that  he  had  long  and  intimate  acquaintance,  even  from 
boyhood,  with  the  following  parties  under  quotation  in  said 
book,  and  can  personally  testify  that  they  were  men  of  high 
character  and  reliable  responsibility:  Captains  S.  S.  Elder, 
Edward  N.  Carpenter,  E.  J.  Pennypacker,  J.  E.  Wenrick, 
and  Lieutenants  John  Quincy  Carpenter  (a  classmate),  Henry 
G.  Dorr,  H.  B.  Freeman,  Henry  C.  Potter,  D.  D.  Vanvalzah, 
C.  E.  Widdis,  and  E.  DeC.  Loud. 

A  peculiar  work  from  the  pen  of  a  James  Madison  Page, 
Sixth  Michigan  Cavalry,  which  he  terms  "  A  Defence  of  Wirz," 
in  his  story  of  Andersonville,  appeared  some  years  ago.  Further 
remarks  upon  this  will  be  found  at  the  close  of  this  paper, 
when  a  reply  may  be  received  to  enquiries  sent  to  the  author, 
whose  address  has  just  been  discovered  in  Montana.  Those 
who  are  desirous  of  probing  into  this  subject  still  further  are 
informed  that  they  can  find  all  these  books  upon  the  shelves 
of  the  Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts,  or  the 
Massachusetts  Commandery  of  the  Military  Order  of  the  Loyal 
Legion,  at  the  Armory  of  the  First  Corps  of  Cadets,  corner 
of  Columbus  Avenue  and  Ferdinand  Street,  Boston.  From  all 
these  voluminous  recitals  of  individual  and  collective  experi 
ences  a  summary  may  be  compiled  which  is  strikingly  in  accord, 
and  in  confirmation  of  a  systematized  treatment  of  Federal  pris 
oners  of  war  such  as  was  indefensible  upon  the  grounds  of  a 
common  humanity.  It  will,  also,  be  found  upon  a  close  exami 
nation  of  these  tales,  of  differing  dates,  that  this  treatment 
increased  in  severity,  and,  indeed,  cruelty,  as  the  war  pro 
gressed  in  its  development,  and  reflected  the  ups  and  downs  of 
Confederate  operations,  until  after  Gettysburg  and  Vicksburg 
there  is  evidence  that  a  settled  policy  had  been  determined 
upon  to  render  the  prisoners  in  the  hands  of  the  Confederate 
authorities,  who  might  yet  survive  such  inhumanity,  unfit  for 
further  active  service  when  exchanged. 

In  reference  to  the  "Richmond  Examiner"  of  January  21, 


MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH       163 

1864,  and  to  the  House  of  Representatives  documents  No. 
1109,  together  with  such  rebel  records  as  were  seized  at  the 
occupation  of  the  Confederate  capital  (and  which  were  formerly 
among  the  files  of  the  United  States  War  Department),  all 
tend  to  indicate  a  directing  hand  as  connecting  these  various 
places  of  confinement  with  a  common  centre,  and  a  concerted 
course  of  treatment  through  a  system  of  indignity,  deprivation, 
and  severity  "  by  officers,  soldiers,  and  citizens." 

In  the  letter  of  Colonel  Robert  Ould,  as  Confederate  Com 
missioner  of  Exchange,  —  which  in  itself  sufficiently  attests 
this,  —  under  date  of  March  17, 1863,  and  addressed  to  General 
Winder,  in  his  capacity  as  directly  in  charge  of  the  prison 
camps,  he  remarks :  "  The  arrangement  I  have  made  works 
largely  in  our  favor.  We  get  rid  of  a  set  of  miserable  wretches 
and  receive  some  of  the  best  material  I  ever  saw."  l 

Commander s-in-chief  in  the  field,  such  as  Lee  and  Joseph 
Johnston,  quite  probably  regarded  the  control  of  such  matters 
as  beyond  their  domain  and  responsibility ;  but  that  it  was  not 
known  to  those  in  power  at  Richmond,  even  if  not  instituted 
and  encouraged  by  Davis  and  his  adherents,  is  scarcely  credible 
by  the  most  credulous. 

Belle  Isle,  lying  as  it  was  in  the  river,  in  plain  sight  of  the 
windows  of  residents  in  the  Confederate  capital,  and  contain 
ing  those  thousands  of  unfortunate  Federals,  a  large  portion 
of  whom  were  compelled  to  find  what  shelter  was  possible  in 
holes  in  the  ground  for  want  of  other  protection  from  the  in 
clemencies  of  the  weather,  eliminates  all  possibilities  of  ex 
tenuation  ! 

The  Regulars,  surrendered  in  Texas  through  the  treachery 
of  Twiggs,  had  constituted  the  first  body  of  prisoners,  and 
these  were  confined,  for  the  most  part,  at  "  Camp  Ford,"  which 
was  situated  about  six  miles  from  Tyler,  in  that  State,  and 
about  one  hundred  miles  due  west  from  Shreveport,  Louisiana. 
At  first  merely  a  camp  in  the  woods,  it  later  became  a  stock- 

1  Vide  Nicolay  and  Hay's  Lincoln,  vol.  7,  pp.  459,  460. 


164       MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH 

ade  enclosing  some  two  and  one  half  acres,  subsequently  in 
creased  to  six.  Without  any  shelter  provided  for  them  (at  a 
period  when  the  South  could  hardly  plead  the  impoverishment 
of  war),  the  men  sought  to  protect  themselves  as  best  they 
could  by  their  own  ingenuity  and  energy,  and  with  such  con 
trivances  as  restricted  opportunity  afforded.  Fortunately, 
water  was  abundant ! 

An  imaginary  line  was  established  some  ten  feet  from  the 
stockade  as  a  "  dead-line,"  and  as  to  which  the  sentry  on 
post  was  constituted  the  sole  judge !  "  Camp  Groce,"  near 
Hempstead,  in  the  same  State,  was  of  like  character.  Just  at 
this  writing  the  privilege  has  been  accorded  to  examine  a  state 
ment  made  to  the  Congressional  Committee  as  to  the  treat 
ment  of  Union  prisoners,  from  the  pen  of  Hon.  John  Head, 
recently  deceased  in  Cambridge.  He,  with  one  hundred  and 
ten  other  naval  officers  and  men,  and  whom  he  describes  as 
"  strong,  healthy  men,"  was  captured  at  Calcasieu  Pass,  Louisi 
ana,  May  6,  1864,  and  after  undergoing  their  experiences  at 
this  place  "  equalling  in  their  horror  the  terrible  records  of 
Andersonville  and  Libby,"  "  seventy-nine  of  that  number  had 
succumbed  to  the  mental  and  physical  strain  and  to  exposure  " 
by  December  of  that  year.  It  appears  that  in  the  whole  war 
there  was  no  greater  suffering  or  larger  percentage  of  mortality 
than  in  the  Texas  swamp  prison  camps.  "  All  were  herded  on 
the  muddy  ground,  in  so  small  a  compass  that  it  was  almost 
impossible  to  walk  through  the  camp."  His  detailed  descrip 
tion  of  conditions  and  environment  typify  it  as  a  sink  of  the 
most  revolting  corruption,  from  which  even  "  the  dead  were 
buried  like  dogs,  and  often  a  corpse  lay  for  several  days  un- 
buried  in  the  camp  in  the  midst  of  its  late  mess-mates." 

After  the  battle  of  First  Bull  Run  (or  Manassas),  many  of 
the  captured  Federals  (including  the  Congressman,  Alfred 
Ely)  were  immured  in  a  tobacco  factory  in  the  district  of 
Richmond  known  as  Rockett's,  and  located  at  Twenty-fifth 
and  Main  Streets.  There  they  were  under  the  jurisdiction  of 


MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH       165 

General  John  B.  Winder,  a  former  captain  in  the  First 
United  States  Artillery,  with  Lieutenant  Todd  (a  brother  of 
Mrs.  Lincoln),  in  direct  charge,  and  Wirz  as  "  Orderly  Ser 
geant."  Todd  appears  to  have  determined  to  demonstrate  his 
sentiments  towards  his  brother-in-law  by  his  brutality  towards 
the  "  hirelings  "  of  the  President,  as  they  were  eomplimen- 
tarily  termed,  and  among  other  choice  epithets,  as  "  Yankee 
mudsills,"  " blue-bellied  Yanks,"  "vandals,"  and  "plunder 
ing  hordes,"  *  both  in  their  public  press  and  even  by  certain 
high  ranking  officers.  Their  physical  appearance  being  thus 
described  as  furnished  "  with  horns  on  their  heads "  and 
"  with  hair  on  their  teeth,"  the  "  poor  whites  "  and  the  more 
ignorant  of  the  Southern  populace  had  been  led  to  believe 
that  the  Union  armies  were  composed  of  a  low  type  of  hu 
manity  that  was  very  little  above  mere  animals,  and  which 
accounted  for  the  vile  vituperation  to  which  we  were  subjected 
during  our  enforced  movements  as  captives.  Always  de 
nounced  as  "  invaders,"  it  was  not  unnatural  for  them  to  de 
sire  to  wreak  vengeance  on  us  as  such. 

With  the  restriction  of  trade  occasioned  by  the  state  of 
war,  vacant  tobacco  factories  appear  to  have  been  the  most 
available  places  for  the  confinement  of  prisoners  of  war,  while 
civilian  offenders  and  criminals  were  relegated  to  such  places 
as  "  Castle  Thunder."  Among  the  earlier  prisons  was  an 
Atkinson  tobacco  factory. 

Subsequent  to  the  incumbency  of  Lieutenant  Todd,  a 
Major  J.  T.  W.  Hairston  had  been  ordered  to  take  charge  of 
the  Richmond  prisons  by  Adjutant-General  Cooper ;  this  was 
in  the  autumn  of  1861.  To  quote  his  own  words,  he  "  found 
the  prescribed  duties  of  a  prison-keeper  anything  but  con 
genial  to  a  liberal  and  enlightened  mind,"  or  "  pleasant  to  a 
man  of  human  inclinations,  and  mine  were  intensely  disagree- 

1  The  only  epithet  the  writer  ever  heard  used  for  the  Confederates  was 
either  "  Johnny  Reb  "  or  "  Grayback,"  certainly  no  description  of  them  as  dif 
fering  from  ordinary  was  ever  fed  out  to  the  Northern  troops  or  public. 


166        MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH 

able  when  the  retaliatory  policy  of  our  government  compelled 
me  to  put  in  irons  fourteen  of  the  highest  ranking  officers  and 
confine  them  in  a  dungeon."  He  claims  to  have  "  endeavored 
to  make  "  his  "  regimen  as  mild  as  possible  " ;  and  this  seems 
to  have  been  the  fact,  since  he  states  that  he  "  circulated 
among  the  prisoners  at  all  hours  of  the  day  and  night  un 
armed  and  without  a  guard/' 

As  it  had  become  evident  that  he  would  be  required  to  dis 
charge  imposed  duties  of  a  repugnant  character,  he  succeeded 
in  obtaining  an  assignment  to  field  service. 

While,  as  a  general  thing,  the  treatment  extended  to  Federal 
prisoners  during  the  earlier  stages  of  the  war  had  not  been  so 
malignant  as  it  became  later,  that  appears  to  have  been  due 
to  the  initial  success  of  the  insurgents ;  while  later  defeats 
aroused  violence  of  passion  and  greater  asperities  were  intro 
duced  in  their  course  of  action. 

This  would  seem  to  be  evidenced  by  a  statement  that,  upon 
the  arrival  of  those  first  captures  at  Manassas  (among  whom 
had  been  Congressman  Ely),  General  Winder  "  called  and 
apologized  for  the  uncomfortable  quarters  by  saying  that  the 
arrival  of  the  prisoners  was  unexpected,  and  he  was,  there 
fore,  unprepared  for  them,  but  that  a  separate  apartment  for 
the  officers  in  another  building  was  nearly  ready,  etc." 

The  sequel  of  Winder's  notorious  attitude  towards  and 
treatment  of  prisoners  would,  therefore,  logically  be  account 
able  as  inspired  by  the  highest  authority. 

That  there  may  not  be  room  for  the  charge  that  a  wilful 
reprobation  of  Winder's  character  is  herein  attempted,  the 
following  true  copy  of  a  letter  written  long  after  the  war  by 
a  Confederate  soldier,  who  had  been  on  guard  at  the  time  of 
the  escape  of  the  "  tunnellers  "  from  Libby  Prison,  and  who 
therein  gives  his  reason  for  aiding  them  in  their  flight,  is 
presented :  — 


MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH        167 

COWIKEK,  P.O.,  BARBOUK  Co.,  ALA. 

You  may  wonder  why  I,  a  true  Confederate  soldier,  should 
connive  at  the  escape  of  "  the  damned  Yankees "  as  they 
were  then  called.  Well,  my  motives  were  varied.  .  .  .  An 
other  reason  for  my  conduct  was  revenge.  I  had  received  a 
mortal  insult  from  no  less  a  person  than  Major-General  Win 
der,  at  that  time  commandant  of  the  post  of  Richmond.  I 
was  passing  up  Main  Street  one  day,  and  seeing  a  nice-look 
ing  bar-room,  I  thought  I  would  go  in  and  get  a  drink.  En 
tering  the  door  I  approached  the  counter,  behind  which  stood 
a  bold,  black-eyed  girl.  Those  who  were  familiar  with  the 
bar-rooms  of  Richmond,  during  the  war,  know  they  were  all 
kept  by  women.  The  men  having  all  gone  to  the  war,  their 
places  were  supplied  by  women,  and  the  girl  who  could  swear 
the  loudest,  and  was  the  most  brazen,  commanded  the  highest 
wages.  Well,  I  approached  the  bar,  and  remarked :  "  Hello ! 
Moll,  sling  me  a  little  apple-toddy  out  here."  She  shoved  the 
decanter  and  glass  on  the  counter,  and  I  poured  out  and 
drank  the  liquor.  I  was  standing  at  the  counter,  toying  with 
the  spoon  in  the  glass,  when,  hearing  a  noise  behind  me,  I 
turned  and  saw  an  old,  gray-haired  man,  whom  I  recognized 
as  Major-General  Winder,  approaching.  As  he  came  up,  he 
said  to  me,  "  Get  out  of  the  way,  God  damn  you ! "  I  was  a 
little  dilatory  about  moving,  and  flashed  a  look  of  defiance 
and  hatred  on  him,  when  he  raised  his  foot  as  if  to  kick  me ; 
but  on  hearing  the  click  of  a  pistol  behind  me,  I  turned  and 
saw  the  girl  with  a  cocked  six-shooter  in  her  hand,  pointing 
directly  at  Winder.  "  Kick !  Kick !  "  she  ejaculated, "  and  I  '11 
bore  you  through."  With  that  Winder  lowered  his  foot,  and 
I  turned  and  walked  out.  The  girl  knew  it  was  to  her  inter 
est  to  protect  the  private  soldiers,  for  they  were  their  princi 
pal  customers ;  and  she  told  me  afterwards  that,  had  Winder 
kicked,  she  would  have  killed  him  in  his  tracks.  Now,  I  come 
to  the  main  reason  which  induced  me  to  act  as  I  did.  I  saw 
a  large  number  of  gentlemen  in  that  pen.  They  were  gentle- 


168       MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH 

men,  indeed,  if  they  were  "damned  Yankees."  They  were 
educated,  many  of  them  highly  so,  and  many  of  them  were 
as  devoted  Christians  as  I  have  ever  seen  in  my  life;  and 
then,  again,  a  number  of  them  were  from  New  Jersey,  my 
father's  native  State.  Some  two  or  three  were  from  Eliza- 
bethtown,  where  he  was  born,  and  knew  my  grandmother, 
old  Mrs.  Marshall.  There  were  as  brave  men  in  that  pen  as 
I  have  ever  seen,  for  I  had  faced  them  on  the  bloody  fields 
of  Fredericksburg,  Chancellorsville,  and  Gettysburg.  In  fact, 
I  had  assisted  in  putting  them  where  they  were.  Well,  I  saw 
these  men  subjected  to  every  indignity  and  cruelty  which  the 
devilish  ingenuity  of  "  Dick  "  Turner  could  devise.  He  even 
applied  to  the  Secretary  of  War  for  permission  to  inflict  cor 
poral  punishment  to  the  prisoners,  but  to  Seddon's  credit,  he 
refused,  not  because  he  was  opposed  to  it  on  principle,  for  he 
was  a  tiger-hearted  old  rascal  himself,  but  because  he  knew 
it  was  contrary  to  the  laws  of  war  as  conducted  by  civilized 
nations.  Then,  too,  he  feared  the  United  States  Government 
would  retaliate.  Turner,  however,  found  other  means  to  pun 
ish  the  prisoners,  and  resorted  to  abuses  too  indecent  to  men 
tion.  He  was  a  villain  of  the  deepest  dye,  and,  after  the  war, 
I  fully  expected  to  hear  that  he  had  been  hanged.  The  weather 
was  cold,  very  cold,  and  the  poor  prisoners  were  never  allowed 
to  have  more  than  a  handful  of  fire. 

I  have  thus,  my  dear  sir,  given  you  my  agency  in  releasing 
the  prisoners,  in  durance  vile,  in  Libby  Prison,  and  my  mo 
tives  for  it;  and  now,  after  the  lapse  of  more  than  twenty- 
seven  years,  I  am  still  unable  to  decide  whether  my  conduct 
was  more  praiseworthy  or  blameworthy. 
I  remain,  yours  truly 

(s'd)  W.  F.  CRANE. 

This  epistle  is  thus  quoted,  as  it  bears  the  earmarks  of 
verisimilitude,  and  gives  free  expression  to  his  opinion  of  some 
of  the  factors  in  the  management  of  this  monumental  disgrace 
to  modern  civilization. 


MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH       169 

Winder,  who  had  been  one  of  the  inciters  of  the  mob  in  its 
attack  upon  the  Sixth  Massachusetts  in  Baltimore,  in  1861, 
readily  became  the  chief  instrument  in  the  infliction  of  cruel 
ties  upon  the  Federal  prisoners  under  his  control  when  he 
had  sensed  the  policy  of  those  in  power.  So  notorious  did  he 
become  in  the  exercise  of  his  methods  that  even  the  malevo 
lent  "  Richmond  Examiner  "  had  a  paragraph  to  this  effect, 
when  he  was  transferred  to  Georgia :  "  Thank  God,  Rich 
mond  has,  at  last,  got  rid  of  old  Winder !  God  have  mercy 
upon  those  to  whom  he  has  been  sent ! " 

It  seems  strange  that  mere  chance  should  have  determined 
the  selection  of  a  commander  with  such  brutal  instincts  as 
appear  to  have  characterized  Winder.  In  General  Cullum's 
44  Biographical  Register  of  the  Graduates  of  the  United  States 
Military  Academy,"  the  closing  of  Winder's  record  is  thus 
phrased :  u  Joined  the  rebellion  .  .  .  and  became  the  inhu 
man  jailer  of  the  Libby  and  other  Southern  prisons." 

The  published  report  that  had  been  made  by  Colonel  Dan 
iel  T.  Chandler,  Assistant  Inspector-General,  C.S.A.,  to  his 
chief,  Colonel  Robert  Hall  Chilton,  at  Richmond,  to  the 
effect  that  "  the  condition  of  this  prison,  Anderson ville,  is  a 
reproach  to  us  as  a  nation,"  leaves  the  higher  authorities  with 
out  any  palliation  for  their  responsibility. 

Andersonville,  through  the  largest  number  of  prisoners 
having  been  confined  there,  partakes  of  the  greatest  infamy, 
on  account  of  the  barbarous  treatment  that  was  administered 
to  them  by  Wirz,  under  the  direction  of  Winder,  who  had 
taken  him  with  him  when  relieved  from  duty  at  Richmond 
and  given  the  assignment  that  called  for  the  establishment 
of  the  prison.  Formerly,  the  sergeant  on  duty  at  Libby,  Wirz 
was  not  commissioned  at  Winder's  instance,  being  just  the 
sort  of  brute  who  could  be  depended  upon  to  execute  the 
ruthless  policy  that  had  been  determined  on  to  wreck  the  un 
fortunates  who  might  yet  survive  their  immurement.  Its  fright 
ful  mortality  list,  likewise,  increased  its  infamy,  having  reached 


170       MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH 

the  total  of  more  than  thirteen  thousand,  which  is  about  the 
average  of  the  varying  statistics  obtainable  and  verified  by 
existent  graves. 

The  site  was  about  sixty-five  miles  from  Macon,  Georgia, 
to  the  southeast,  and  was  thus  selected  by  a  son  of  General 
Winder  (so  it  has  been  asserted),  who  was  at  this  time  "  Com 
missary-General  of  Prisoners."  Its  establishment  was  to  pro 
vide  for  the  overflow  of  the  Richmond  prisons,  which  was 
arising  through  the  cessation  of  the  exchange  of  prisoners, 
under  orders  of  General  Grant.  It  consisted  of  a  roofless  en 
closure  of  some  fifteen  and  a  half  acres,  and  was  located  upon 
both  sides  of  a  little  creek,  the  banks  of  which  were  swampy. 
Pieces  of  shelter  tents  or  remnants  of  blankets  stretched  upon 
boughs  afforded  such  meagre  shelter  for  but  a  few,  while  the 
vast  majority  had  either  no  covering  at  all,  or  had  dug  holes 
in  the  ground  into  which  they  could  crawl.  When  it  is  given 
as  a  matter  of  official  record  that  its  population  had  reached, 
as  its  high-watermark  (in  August,  1864),  32,911,  some  idea 
can  be  formed  of  the  crowded  and  unprotected  conditions 
that  existed. 

In  the  northeastern  and  southeastern  corners  were  spaces 
about  eight  rods  in  length  by  four  in  width,  and  having  canvas 
stretched  across  the  bare  earth,  which  constituted  the  "hos 
pitals  "  of  "  Camp  Sumter,"  as  it  was  denominated  in  the 
Confederacy.  Under  this  flimsy  intermediary  against  the  fierce 
heat  of  the  sun  in  that  latitude,  the  miserable  victims  of  su 
perinduced  disease  soon  sweltered  to  their  doom  !  The  number 
of  miserables  in  that  hospital  on  August  7  is  given  as  2687; 
the  deaths  for  that  week  being  560.  In  Sergeant  Benson's  state 
ment  he  avers  that  2990  bodies  were  deposited  in  and  around 
the  dead-house,  previous  to  burial — an  average  of  more  than 
ninety-six  per  diem.  Established  in  February,  by  the  middle 
of  June  the  number  of  prisoners  had  grown  to  nearly  20,000 ; 
an  order  from  the  Confederate  War  Department  requiring  all 
such,  east  of  the  Mississippi,  to  be  concentrated  there.  In  con- 


MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH       171 

sequence,  it  became  necessary  to  increase  the  dimensions  of 
the  stockade  which  surrounded  it.  This  was  accomplished  by 
taking  in  about  ten  acres  more,  through  the  work  of  the  more 
able-bodied  of  the  prisoners  under  a  parole.  Constantly  in 
creasing  occupancy,  however,  shortly  brought  about  the  former 
congestion. 

Since  the  horrible  details  of  the  daily  misery  dragged  out 
by  the  wretched  survivors  are  to  be  readily  found  in  so  many 
blood-curdling  narratives,  they  will  not  be  recounted  here. 
One  of  the  most  succinct  and  exhaustive  is  that  which  has 
been  furnished  by  Sergeant  Henry  M.  Davidson,  Battery  A,  First 
Ohio  Artillery,  who,  having  been  detailed  by  Major  Wirz  as 
surgeon's  clerk  in  the  hospital  upon  parole,  appears  to  be 
peculiarly  well  acquainted  with  the  facts  under  his  daily  ob 
servation,  while  his  personal  responsibility  for  his  statements 
has  been  thoroughly  substantiated.  The  revolting  story  can 
be  brought  to  a  conclusion  in  the  "  summing  up "  by  the 
Judge-Advocate  (Holt)  before  the  Military  Commission  that 
tried  and  convicted  Wirz:  "The  annals  of  our  race  present 
nowhere,  and  at  no  time,  a  darker  field  of  crime  than  that  of 
Andersonville,  and  it  is  fortunate  for  the  interests,  alike  of 
public  justice  and  of  historic  truth,  that  from  this  field  the 
veil  has  been  so  faithfully  and  so  completely  lifted.  All  the 
horrors  of  this  pandemonium  of  the  Kebellion  are  laid  bare  to 
us  in  the  broad,  steady  light  of  the  testimony  of  some  one 
hundred  and  fifty  witnesses  who  spoke  what  they  had  seen 
and  heard  and  suffered,  and  whose  evidence,  given  under  oath, 
and  subjected  to  cross-examination,  and  to  every  other  test 
which  human  experience  has  devised  for  the  ascertainment  of 
truth,  must  be  accepted  as  affording  an  immovable  foundation 
for  the  sentence  pronounced."  1 

For  the  details  of  the  trial  and  evidence,  the  reader  may  be 

1  General  Winder  having  died  February  9,  1865,  he  had  escaped  the  condign 
punishment  that  was  thus  meted  out  to  his  jackal.  It  may  be  mentioned  that 
the  writer  was  present  at  this  trial. 


172       MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH 

referred  to  General  Chipman's  book,  as  mentioned  in  the 
foregoing  list. 

The  predominant  desire  among  all  prisoners  was  to  effect 
an  escape,  while  cherishing  the  delusion  of  a  possible  rescue 
by  Federal  troops.  Nowhere  was  such  delusion  more  exposed 
than  at  this  remote  place  in  the  South.  When  the  possibility 
that  the  threatened  raid  by  General  Stoneman  might  result  in 
the  release  of  these  prisoners,  work  was  energetically  insti 
tuted  in  preparing  for  defence  of  the  place,  ostensibly,  but 
really  looking  to  the  destruction  of  the  wretched  inmates  under 
guise  of  such  defence.  A  strong  earthwork  was  thrown  up  by 
a  large  force  of  conscripted  negroes.  This,  located  about  thirty 
rods  from  the  southeastern  corner  of  the  stockade,  mounted  nine 
light  guns,  five  of  which  were  trained  to  bear  diagonally  across 
the  enclosure.  About  twenty-five  rods  from  the  northern  gate 
another  earthwork  was  constructed,  mounting  five  guns,  three 
of  which  also  bore  upon  the  prison-pen.  Two  lines  of  stock 
ades  were  built  to  encompass  the  original  enclosure,  and  an 
earthwork  was  thrown  up  at  each  corner  of  these  latter,  ex 
cept  on  the  southwestern  corner.  A  low  entrenchment  was 
then  excavated  around  the  northern  end  of  the  whole,  and  so 
arranged  as  to  enfilade  every  approach  from  the  northeastern 
and  western,  and  in  case  of  any  attack  upon  the  guards,  it 
would  result  in  one  upon  the  captives.  In  fine,  any  attempt 
to  take  the  place  now,  by  force  of  arms,  must  have  resulted  in 
the  extermination  of  the  hapless  prisoners.1 

The  post-bellum  story  told  by  General  Richard  Taylor, 
C.S.A.,  with  the  view  of  exonerating  Wirz  from  responsibility 
for  the  horrible  conditions  of  the  pen,  is  scarcely  commensu 
rate  with  the  evidence  brought  out  in  the  trial  by  "  some  one 
hundred  and  fifty  witnesses,"  the  recorded  report  of  Colonel 
D.  T.  Chandler,  a  Confederate  medical  officer,  and  letters 
extant  (some  of  which  are  quoted  in  the  book  above  referred 

1  Vide  Winder's  Order  No.  13,  dated  July  27,  1864,  as  quoted  in  Major  Put 
nam's  A  Prisoner  of  War,  p.  127. 


MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH       173 

to),  and  addressed  to  Davis.1  So  that  the  plea  of  ignorance 
of  these  inhuman  conditions  on  the  part  of  the  authorities  is 
hardly  tenable,  while  the  power  to  investigate  and  control  was 
unquestionably  theirs.  That  some  knowledge  of  the  facts  had 
been  forced  upon  them  is  also  evidenced  by  the  orders  that 
were  issued  in  September  to  reduce  the  numbers  by  sending 
prisoners  to  Savannah  and  Charleston,  and,  still  later,  by  the 
establishment  of  another  pen  at  Millen. 

This,  like  Andersonville,  was  an  open  enclosure,  nearly 
square,  and  contained  about  forty  acres.  The  conditions  were, 
however,  much  improved.  A  stream  of  clear  water  ran  through 
it.  The  stockade  had  been  located  in  the  midst  of  a  pine  for 
est,  which  had  been  denuded  of  its  timber  up  to  a  narrow  strip 
of  small  trees  near  the  stream,  and  had  been  constructed 
from  the  unhewn  logs.  From  their  refuse  a  number  of  rough 
huts  had  been  built  by  some  of  the  prisoners  as  a  protection 
against  the  inclemency  of  the  approaching  winter  season ; 
others,  not  so  fortunate,  dug  holes  in  the  ground,  where  they 
burrowed.  A  battery  of  eight  guns  was  planted  in  a  fort  near 
the  southeastern  corner,  so  as  to  rake  the  enclosure  in  case  of 
an  insurrection  on  the  part  of  the  four  thousand  inmates  dur 
ing  the  winter. 

At  Savannah,  a  prison-pen  had  been  hastily  constructed  on 
a  part  of  the  grounds  belonging  to  what  had  been  the  United 
States  Marine  Hospital.  Nearly  two  acres  had  been  enclosed 
by  a  ten-brick  wall  upon  three  of  the  sides,  and  by  a  tight 
board  fence  upon  the  fourth.  Several  fine  live-oak  trees  were 
embraced  in  the  enclosure,  affording  a  grateful  shade.  At 
first,  brackish  water  was  obtainable  in  a  limited  quantity  from 
a  well,  but  later  pipes  were  laid  to  the  city  waterworks.  Tents 
and  bunks  were  supplied,  and  altogether  it  has  been  described 
as  "the  Paradise  of  Southern  prisoners"  —  no  inmate  was 
murdered  by  the  guard  —  "  and  there  was  no  special  abuse  to 
complain  of,"  the  rations  being  "  generous  and  of  good  qual- 

1  Vide  Richmond  Examiner,  January  21,  1864  j  also  H.R.  Doc.  No.  1109. 


174        MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH 

ity."  A  different  story,  however,  is  told  by  H.  M.  Davidson,1 
as  referring  to  a  "  prison  south  of  the  old  jail,  which  had  been 
built  by  the  British,"  and  where  between  four  thousand  and 
five  thousand  prisoners,  mainly  from  Anderson ville,  were  con 
fined  in  October,  without  shelter  of  any  kind,  and  where  the 
rations  were  "  too  small  to  satisfy  our  needs."  The  death-rate 
ran  into  the  hundreds,  although  only  two  are  to  be  found  in 
the  Confederate  reports. 

Among  the  earlier  captures  of  Federals  had  been  those 
taken  from  Sherman's  command  at  Chickasaw  Bayou,  in  that 
first  attempt  upon  Vicksburg  in  the  latter  part  of  1862.  The 
officers  of  this  detachment,  fourteen  in  number,  were  taken  to 
the  jail  in  that  city,  and  confined  in  a  cell  fourteen  feet  by 
twelve,  upon  starvation  ration ;  while  the  men  were  corralled 
in  the  jail-yard  without  any  shelter  against  the  cold  weather.2 
Later,  to  the  number  of  more  than  two  hundred,  such  were 
confined  in  the  wretched  remains  of  an  old  bridge  across  the 
Pearl  Kiver,  near  Jackson.  Without  fuel  or  lights,  their  food 
was  practically  limited  to  a  corn-meal  mush,  in  which  the  cob 
was  the  most  pronounced  ingredient.  The  death-rate  was  in 
proportion  with  this  treatment. 

From  that  time  it  would  appear  to  have  become  the  settled 
policy  (although  not  publicly  announced)  of  those  in  whose 
power  it  was  to  direct  and  control  such  matters  to  render  such 
as  might  survive  unfit  for  further  service  in  the  Union  armies. 
Letters  are  on  record  in  which  various  brutalities  are  sug 
gested  and  recommended  by  the  writers,  such  as  handcuffing 
them,  putting  them  in  chain-gangs  and  employing  them  upon 
hard  labor,  or  placing  them  on  a  diet  of  bread  and  water.  One 
humanitarian  proposes  that  the  left  leg  of  each  prisoner 
should  be  broken  and  he  then  turned  loose!  Another,  that 
they  should  be  corralled  at  some  point  easily  accessible  to  the 
United  States  Government,  which,  being  duly  notified,  should 

1  Vide  ante. 

3  .Testimony  of  Governor  Thomas  C.  Fletcher  (Missouri) .   H.R.  Doc.  No.  4064. 


MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH       175 

it  fail  to  feed  and  clothe  them,  they  were,  as  an  alternative, 
to  be  left  to  starve!  These  allegations  rest,  by  no  means 
solely,  upon  the  testimony  of  survivors,  but  is  buttressed  by 
the  captured  Confederate  records  containing  the  reports  of 
their  own  surgeons  and  citizens,  who  were  intimately  ac 
quainted  with  the  conditions  at  various  points,  as  noted.  Fur 
ther  corroboration  is  to  be  found  in  the  testimony  taken  before 
the  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United  States  Congress. l 

At  another  place  in  Georgia,  a  Camp  Oglethorpe,  outside 
of  Macon,  where  the  prison-grounds  comprised  some  three 
acres,  the  conditions  were  somewhat  better  than  at  the  places 
just  mentioned.  The  grounds  were  surrounded  by  a  tight 
board  fence,  which  included  the  customary  "  dead-line."  A 
stream  of  good  potable  water  passed  through  one  corner  of 
the  camp,  although,  below  the  spring,  it  became  an  open  sewer 
for  the  excrement,  and  when  there  was  a  heavy  rainfall  the 
flat  surface  of  the  grounds  became  overflowed.  In  the  centre 
of  the  grounds  there  was  an  old  one-story  frame  building, 
seventy  feet  by  twenty,  standing  upon  posts.  There  were  also 
some  sheds,  open  on  the  sides,  with  a  roofing  of  boards ;  but 
these  were  not  enough  to  furnish  shelter  for  all  the  twelve 
hundred  to  fourteen  hundred  inmates. 

At  Cahaba,  a  city  of  the  past,  which  had  been  originally 
selected  as  the  capital  of  Alabama,  but  was  then  but  a  mere 
village  in  Dallas  County,  about  ninety-two  miles  south  of 
Montgomery,  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Alabama  River,  was 
a  prison  known  as  "  Castle  Morgan."  It  consisted  of  about 
sixteen  hundred  feet  of  open  space,  enclosed  by  a  brick  wall, 
and  included  an  old  building  with  a  leaky  roof.  It  came  first 
into  this  use  in  the  fall  of  1863,  and  with  the  design  of 
making  it  the  principal  Southern  prison.  This  "  old  cotton 
and  corn  shed  "  had  been  the  private  property  of  one  of  the 
local  merchants.  A  report  upon  its  conditions  by  Surgeon 
B.  M.  Whitfield,  C.S.A.,  in  March,  1864,  may  be  found  em- 
1  401-804,  1051-80,  961-1  111,  passim. 


176        MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH 

bodied  in  the  book  upon  this  place,  and  included  in  the  fore 
going  list. 

In  the  early  part  of  1864  there  were  from  six  hundred  to 
seven  hundred  internes,  but  as  the  year  wore  on  the  numbers 
largely  increased,  reaching  the  height  of  eleven  hundred  and 
fifty-one  by  the  middle  of  October.  According  to  the  testi 
mony  to  be  found  in  House  of  Kepresentatives,  Documents, 
No.  199  (Fortieth  Congress),  they  were  treated  with  studied 
neglect.  An  artesian  well  on  the  outside  supplied  water  through 
an  open  gutter  for  some  two  hundred  yards,  and  thence  under 
the  street  into  the  prison,  thus  becoming  but  "  an  open  sewer 
in  the  midst  of  a  small  town  "  and  virtually  "  the  receptacle 
of  the  filth,  solid  and  liquid,  which  the  careless,  indifferent 
or  vicious  might  cast  into  it."  l  In  many  particulars,  this  is 
alleged  to  have  been  the  worst  prison,  not  even  excepting 
Andersonville,  both  in  the  treatment  of  the  captives  and  as 
reflected  in  the  death-rate. 

At  Charleston,  the  jail-yard  was  the  place  of  confinement  for 
the  enlisted  men  who  had  been  captured.  It  is  described  as  '  a 
filthy,  lousy  place,  with  an  insufficient  supply  of  tepid,  brackish 
water.  A  few  "  A  "  tents  had  been  supplied.  The  privy  vaults 
were  overflowing,  while  from  the  heat  of  the  sun,  and  the  build 
ings  (workhouses  and  jail)  cutting  off  all  the  sea-breeze,  the 
atmosphere  became  stifling. 

Here  the  Federal  captives  were  mixed  up  with  the  vilest  of 
the  "  jail-birds."  They  were  also  at  all  times  exposed  to  the  fire 
of  the  Union  guns  on  Morris  Island,  as  were  the  officers  for 
a  short  period,  and  who  were  confined,  for  the  most  part,  in 
Roper  and  Charity  Hospitals.  A  classmate  of  the  writer,  Lieu 
tenant  John  Quincy  Carpenter,  One  Hundred  and  Fiftieth 
Pennsylvania  Infantry,  and  another  fellow-townsman,  Lieu 
tenant  William  Blanchard,  Second  United  States  Cavalry, 
were  held  the  better  part  of  two  years — their  exceptional  ex 
periences  being  due  to  their  families  in  each  case  (being  people 
1  H.R.  732,  ut  supra. 


MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH        177 

of  liberal  means)  having  forwarded  ample  funds,  which  never, 
however,  reached  them :  still  another  confirmation  of  the  wis 
dom  of  the  heathen  philosopher  Seneca's  well-known  invoca 
tion  :  "  Heaven  save  me  from  my  friends !  " 

Three  hundred  and  fifty-one  graves  have  been  found  near 
the  jail,  although  but  one  hundred  and  sixty-two  deaths  are 
recorded  in  the  Confederate  reports. 

It  is  to  be  remarked  that  when  it  became  known  to  the 
Federal  authorities  that  their  officers  and  soldiers  were  being 
thus  exposed  to  the  gun-fire  of  the  bombardment,  a  number  of 
Confederate  prisoners  were  transferred  "  from  Fort  Delaware 
to  Morris  Island,  and  there  confined  in  a  stockade  in  front 
of  the  Federal  lines,  where  the  projectiles  from  the  Federal 
artillery  passed  over  them.  Little  or  no  damage  was  done." 
This  retaliatory  measure  had  its  anticipated  effect. 

A  few  miles  from  Columbia  was  Camp  Asylum,  or  "  Sor 
ghum  "as  it  came  to  be  called  from  the  principal  article  of 
diet  furnished.  Here  some  fourteen  hundred  men  were  con 
fined  ;  and  "  this  sorghum  molasses,  with  the  corn-meal,  con 
stituting  the  sole  ration,  it  gave  rise  to  an  active  dyspepsia 
and  diarrhoea."  As  of  some  historical  significance,  it  is  to  be 
recalled  that  as  Sherman's  army  was  entering  Columbia  in  its 
"march  to  the  sea,"  the  van  had  passed  through  the  site  of 
this  misery,  and,  if  there  be  any  justification  for  Wade  Hamp 
ton's  charge  that  the  place  was  fired  by  Union  soldiers,  it  is  to 
be  estimated  what  effect  had  been  instilled  into  their  minds 
by  what  they  had  learned  of  the  atrocities  inflicted  upon  their 
comrades,  and  when  still  further  inflamed  by  the  lavish  man 
ner  in  which  they  had  been  plied  with  liquor  by  injudicious 
or  malevolent  citizens. 

To  digress  still  further,  the  writer  has  this  to  affirm,  that  he 
was  stationed  no  less  than  three  times  in  Columbia  after  the 
war,  and  made  it  his  business  to  probe  into  this  matter  as 
deeply  as  was  in  his  power,  with  the  resultant  conviction  that 
the  conflagration  had  its  genesis  in  the  firing  of  cotton-bales 


178        MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH 

under  Wade  Hampton's  own  orders  to  prevent  them  from 
falling  into  the  hands  of  the  Yankees  ;  just  as  was  the  case  at 
the  evacuation  of  Richmond,  and  against  the  representations 
of  Ewell  as  to  the  inevitable  dangers  to  surrounding  property. 

But  to  return;  from  July  to  December,  1864,  about  one 
hundred  and  fifty  prisoners  of  war  were  confined  in  the  Rich- 
land  County  Jail,  where  they  were  placed  in  cells  in  the  second 
story. 

At  Florence,  which  is  about  one  hundred  miles  due  north 
of  Charleston,  in  Darling  County,  and  on  the  railroad,  another 
prison-camp  had  been  established  about  two  miles  from  the 
town.  Something  like  twenty-five  acres  were  enclosed  by  a 
stockade,  surrounded  by  a  ditch.  As  more  than  a  quarter  of 
the  space  was  swampy,  it  was  not  available  for  camping  pur 
poses.  A  large  stream  that  ran  through  the  enclosure  furnished 
the  drinking-water,  while  it  also  supplied  a  certain  amount  of 
facility  for  washing  and  bathing.  Upon  the  lower  part  of  the 
stream  the  sinks  were  located.  A  furrow  marked  the  "  dead 
line."  The  only  shelter  the  inmates  had  was  what  they  might 
be  able  to  provide  for  themselves  by  digging  and  covering  with 
what  they  could  find.  Others  lay  on  the  bare  ground.  When 
fuel  was  furnished,  at  rare  intervals,  they  cooked  what  was 
issued  as  rations ;  when  not,  they  were  compelled  to  eat  them 
raw !  These  rations  were  even  less  than  at  Andersonville.  To 
wards  the  fall  of  1864  there  appears  by  the  report  that  there 
were  11,424  prisoners.  The  death-rate  is  given  as  having  been 
2793  in  three  months. 

The  place  selected  for  the  confinement  of  Federal  captives 
at  Salisbury,  North  Carolina  —  a  railroad  centre  in  Rowan 
County  —  was  a  four-storied  brick  factory,  with  five  smaller 
buildings  annexed.  It  was  enclosed  by  a  board  fence,  and 
covered  an  area  of  some  eleven  acres.  There  were  nine  wells 
within  the  enclosure,  while  water  was  otherwise  obtainable 
from  a  creek  a  half  a  mile  distant,  but  in  such  small  quantities 
as  to  only  afford  a  limited  amount  for  use  in  cooking  and 


MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH       179 

drinking.  This  lack  of  means  for  washing  and  bathing  became 
the  source  of  much  suffering,  as  the  soil  was  a  tenacious  red 
clay,  and  entirely  without  any  drainage  of  an  artificial  char 
acter,  so  that  when  there  were  rain  or  snow  falls,  the  place  was 
soon  converted  into  a  mass  of  mud,  while  the  sinks  became  a 
source  of  pestilence.  There  were  reported  to  have  been  8740 
inmates,  in  November,  1864;  and  over  1000  more  in  the  fol 
lowing  month.  These  found  what  shelter  they  could  by  digging 
under  the  buildings,  or  by  burrowing  in  holes,1  or  in  trenches 
partially  covered  with  pieces  of  shelter  tents  or  boughs,  with 
clay  spread  on  top.  Those  who  were  not  strong  enough  to  dig, 
had  to  huddle  together,  both  night  and  day,  for  warmth ;  and 
when  the  weather  was  inclement  —  the  ground  frozen  —  or 
after  a  snow-fall  of  several  inches,  the  wretched  prisoners  suf 
fered  from  frosted  extremities,  unless  released  by  a  more  mer 
ciful  death !  Eighteen  thousand  and  thirty-four  graves  have 
been  identified  since  the  war  ;  while  only  4694  deaths  are  re 
corded  in  the  Confederate  reports. 

It  is,  however,  proper  to  state  that  when  General  Bradley 
T.  Johnson  came  into  command,  early  in  1865,  these  con 
ditions  became  radically  changed  in  the  direction  of  com 
parative  humanity. 

Captain  Henry  Parkhurst  Cooke,  A.A.A.G.  Volunteers,  is 
on  record  that  at  Raleigh,  North  Carolina,  where  he  witnessed 
an  exchange  of  prisoners  being  made,  the  "  well-fed  and  clothed 
returned  Confederates  were  surprised  and  shocked  at  the  ap 
pearance  of  the  destitution  of  our  men  who  had  been  prisoners 
in  the  South." 

Major  George  B.  Fox,  Seventy-Fifth  Ohio  Infantry,  states 
that  a  Confederate  officer  remarked  to  him  upon  a  similar 
occasion :  "  If  I  had  been  the  Confederate  Commissioner  of 
Exchange,  my  regard  for  the  reputation  of  the  people  of  the 
South  would  have  never  permitted  me  to  turn  over  such  physi 
cal  wrecks  as  your  men  are  who  have  been  in  Southern  pris- 
1  H.  R.  704,  ut  supra. 


180        MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH 

ons,  to  proclaim  to  the  world  the  infamous  barbarity  of  the 
Confederate  Government ! " 

At  Danville,  Virginia,  the  places  designated  for  the  con 
finement  of  their  captives  were,  as  usual,  abandoned  tobacco 
warehouses,  and  known  by  numbers,  as  before  stated,  No.  3 
being  reserved  for  officers,  while  the  others  were  used  for  the 
enlisted  men,  both  white  and  colored.  A  fine  town  of  some 
two  thousand  inhabitants  at  this  time,  it  was  situated  on  the 
south  bank  of  the  Dan  River  and  near  the  boundary  line  of 
North  Carolina,  a  little  to  the  north-east  of  Greensboro.  It  had 
been  principally  devoted  to  commerce  in  tobacco,  and,  conse 
quently,  had  many  empty  warehouses  at  this  particular  period. 
In  such  places  the  windows  constituted  the  "dead-line,"  which 
meant  that  to  approach  them  was  to  draw  shots  from  the 
guards,  who  were,  generally  speaking,  and  particularly  during 
the  last  year  of  the  war,  either  boys  or  old  men,  and  having 
had  no  record  for  field  service  were  rather  desirous  of  being 
credited  with  having  killed  a  "  Yank."  Whatever  may  have 
been  the  reason  for  such  action  (presumably,  under  orders),  in 
all  these  prisons  it  was  the  custom  to  shoot  any  and  all  who 
approached  near  the  "dead-line,"  whether  it  was  a  window 
forty  feet  from  the  ground,  or  a  ditch  drawn  around  the  camp, 
or  even  an  imaginary  line  defined  by  the  untrained  eye  of  the 
sentinel  or  guard.  The  water-supply,  from  the  Dan  River,  and 
usually  procured  by  a  detail  from  the  prisoners  themselves, 
was,  according  to  various  accounts,  very  limited  —  at  one  time 
as  set  forth  in  House  of  Representatives  Document  No.  845, 
it  was  said  to  have  been  but  a  pint  per  man  each  day.  Cooked 
rations,  such  as  they  were,  formed  the  food-supply. 

At  Richmond,  the  most  important  as  well  as  the  best-known 
among  places  of  confinement,  was  Libby  Prison,  situated  at 
the  corner  of  Gary  and  Twentieth  Streets,  the  former  ware 
house  of  Libby  &  Sons,  ship-chandlers.  Its  varying  conditions 
and  the  remarkable  escapes  through  tunnelling  by  parties 
under  the  leadership  of  Colonels  A.  D.  Streight  and  T.  E. 


(3) 


(4)  (5) 

SOME  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  OFFICIALS  AT  "LIBBY  PRISON" 

(1)  Lt.  "  Dick  "  Turner,  C.S.  A.  (the  Turnkey).        (2)  Adjt.  La  Touche,  C.S.A.        (3)  Major 
Henry  Wirz,  C.S.A.,  (formerly,  Sergeant  at  Libby).        (4)  Brig.  Gen.  John  S.  Winder.  C.S.A. 


MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH       181 

Rose,  in  February,  1864,  have  given  it  a  prominence  due  to 
the  exhaustive  literature  extant  in  relation  to  these.  It  was 
several  months  after  these  escapes  that  the  writer  became  one 
of  its  inmates,  and  it  was  probably  also  due  to  them  that  there 
was  much  more  restriction  placed  upon  those  thus  incarcerated 
than  appears  in  the  narratives  of  Colonel  Cavada1  and  others 
of  an  earlier  date.  The  commandant  was  Major  Thomas  P. 
Turner.  He  had  been  an  appointee  to  West  Point,  as  from 
Virginia,  in  1860.  Having  been  detected  in  an  attempt  to 
purloin  certain  official  papers  from  the  headquarters  office  at 
the  Academy,  by  the  then  commandant  of  cadets,  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  John  Fulton  Reynolds,  he  had  been  thereupon  dis 
missed. 

There  appears  to  be  some  confusion  in  the  minds  of  certain 
writers  in  regard  to  another  man  bearing  the  same  surname, 
and  on  duty  at  the  prison.  Lieutenant  Dick  Turner,  the  turn 
key,  was  no  relation  of  the  Major's,  and  was  a  vulgar,  coarse 
brute,  who  was  reputed  to  have  been  an  overseer,  of  the 
"  Legree  "  type,  on  some  plantation  before  the  war.  Whether 
the  fact  that  Major  T.  P.  Turner  was  of  different  extraction 
and  equipment  might  tend  to  place  him  in  a  more  favorable 
light,  is  left  to  him  who  reads  to  form  his  own  opinion. 

As  above  remarked,  the  conditions  which  obtained  at 
"  Libby "  varied  under  different  regimes,  and  as  those  ante 
cedent  to  the  writer's  incarceration  there  have  been  delineated 
in  the  various  books  mentioned  in  the  foregoing  catalogue,  he 
confines  himself  to  testifying  as  to  what  he  doth  know.  Since 
Brevet  Major  George  Haven  Putnam,  One  Hundred  and 
Seventy-sixth  New  York  Volunteer  Infantry  (later  the  well- 
known  publisher),  became  an  inmate  of  the  place  about  the 
time  the  writer  left  on  parole,  his  narrative  concludes  the  con 
nected  story.  The  other  officials  were  a  Lieutenant  Latouche, 
Swiss  mercenary,  like  Wirz,  who,  as  above  stated,  had  been 

1  Colonel  Cavada,  a  fellow  Philadelphia!!,  met  his  death  in  Mexico,  after  the 
Civil  War,  "  as  a  soldier  of  fortune." 


182       MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH 

a  sergeant  under  Winder's  provost-marshalship  at  Richmond. 
Erastus  W.  Ross  —  a  civilian  —  was  the  clerk.  There  was  an 
undercurrent  of  belief,  generally  entertained  by  the  internes, 
that  Ross  was  disposed  to  be  in  sympathy  with  them,  while 
obliged  to  be  necessarily  careful  not  to  indicate  it  to  the  ob 
servation  or  knowledge  of  his  commandant.  In  a  paper  read 
before  the  Massachusetts  Commandery  of  the  Loyal  Legion 
(and  which  had  been  written  up  from  notes  left  by  Lieuten 
ant  David  Parker,  who  had  been  Superintendent  of  Mails  for 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac),  the  statement  was  made  that  after 
the  surrender  he  had  been  invited  to  dine  with  Miss  Van  Lew, 
and  at  her  table  he  met  Ross,  who,  Miss  Van  Lew  told  him, 
had  been  her  able  assistant  and  confidant  during  the  continu 
ance  of  the  war  in  aiding  the  escape  of  the  prisoners.  Ross 
lost  his  life  when  the  old  Spottswood  Hotel  was  burned  in 
1873.  Latouche  also  died  in  Richmond  in  1890.  Requiescat 
in  pace  ! 

"  Dick  "  Turner  became  a  prisoner  himself  in  one  of  the 
cells  through  the  bars  of  which  he  had  been  wont  to  jeer  at 
the  unhappy  occupants,  and  behind  which  he  then  exhibited 
the  craven  spirit  which  belonged  to  his  make-up,  until  he  was 
released  through  the  magnanimity  of  the  Government.1 

Major  Turner  made  a  rapid  departure  from  Richmond  when 
its  evacuation  had  been  determined  upon  (Professor  Thomp 
son  to  the  contrary,  notwithstanding),  being  well  aware  of 
the  threats  to  kill  him  on  sight.  So  does  the  passage  of  time 
soften  asperities  that  he  was  not  even  arrested  in  his  subse 
quent  place  of  residence.  He  never  showed  himself  among  the 
prisoners  after  he  had  personally  supervised  their  wholesale 
robbery,  and  was  never  again  seen  by  the  writer,  excepting 
when,  seated  in  front  of  the  building,  idly  whiling  away  the 
time,  he  was  wont  to  hiss  his  hounds  upon  any  barelegged 

1  General  Henry  Clay  Ward,  U.S.A.,  retired,  who  had  been  captured  at  Fort 
Stedman,  and,  after  the  close  of  the  war,  was,  for  a  time,  in  charge  of  the  prison, 
has  frequently  referred  to  this  period  and  its  incidents,  in  conversations  with  the 
writer. 


SOME  PRISONERS  OF  WAR  IN  "  LIBBY  PRISON 
RICHMOND,  VA. 


(1) 


(2) 


(4) 


(6) 

SOME  PRISONERS  OF  WAR  IN  "  LIBBY  PRISON  " 
RICHMOND,  VA. 

(1)  Lt.  Jas.  Jay  Emerson,  17th  U.S.  Inf.         (2)  Capt.  Geo.  T.  Brown.  1st  Mass.   H.A.   (the 
Good  Samaritan).        (3)  Brig.  Gen.  and  Bvt.  Maj.  Gen.  Joseph  Hayes,  Vols.        (4)  Capt.  John 


MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH       183 

negro  who  should  chance  to  pass  on  the  other  side  of  the  street 
—  this  being  one  of  his  "  sources  of  merriment." 

In  trenching  upon  his  own  personal  experiences,  the  writer 
has  sought  to  emancipate  himself  as  much  as  possible  from 
the  not  unnatural  resentful  sentiments  arising  from  more  than 
a  half -century's  suffering  from  intestinal  disease  established 
during  his  incarceration,  and  while  aiming  to  be  too  honest  a 
historian  to  allow  his  personal  treatment  to  influence  his  nar 
rative. 

General  William  Smith  (known  as  "Extra-Billy")  was  the 
military  governor  at  this  time,  and  to  his  one-armed  son  was 
our  "  mess  "  indebted  for  some  gratefully  received  additions 
to  its  meagre  menu  upon  several  occasions.  The  dawn  of  the 
first  morning  after  his  internment  (there  never  were  any  lights 
at  night  during  that  period)  revealed  to  the  writer  the  person 
of  an  old  Philadelphia  friend,  in  Captain  Benjamin  P.  Sloan, 
Second  Pennsylvania  Cavalry.  It  seems  that  Captain  Sloan 
at  one  time  had  been  in  command  of  troops  in  the  immediate 
vicinity  of  the  Smith  homestead,  and  had  placed  a  safeguard 
over  it,  as  well  as  having  extended  such  consideration  to  the 
family  as  was  in  his  power.  Hence  these  visits  of  mercy  from 
the  crippled  son  were  in  reciprocation  of  the  bread  of  kind 
ness  thus  cast  upon  the  waters.  General  Joseph  Hayes,  with 
whom  the  writer  had  been  made  prisoner  in  that  debacle  on 
the  second  day  of  the  battle  on  the  Weldon  Kailroad,  had  re 
quested  the  Regular  officers  to  lie  around  him  on  the  floor 
(there  being  no  seats  or  benches  of  any  kind  for  us),  and 
what  was  derisively  termed  our  "  mess  "  through  the  pooling 
of  our  issues,  was  thereupon  formed  with  the  accessions  of 
Colonel  Francis  A.  Walker,  A.A.A.G.  Volunteers,  Lieuten 
ant-Colonels  Arthur  R.  Curtis,  Twentieth  Massachusetts  In 
fantry,  Charles  H.  Hooper,  Twenty-fourth  Massachusetts 
Infantry  and  Captain  W.  P.  Huxford,  One  Hundred  and 
Sixty-second  New  York  Infantry.  We  also  included  an  inter 
esting  personality  in  a  Captain  William  Cook,  Ninth  United 


184        MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH 

States  Colored  Infantry,  and  a  graduate  of  Yale.  He  had 
been  a  prisoner  for  a  long  time,  possibly  due  to  his  having 
given  a  somewhat  injudicious  play  to  his  sense  of  humor 
through  having  had  a  pair  of  trousers  improvised  (when  his 
own  had  completely  disintegrated)  out  of  an  old  rebel  blanket. 
This  had  been  accomplished  with  the  aid  of  a  comrade  who 
had  followed  the  contour  of  his  nether  limbs  with  his  knife, 
and  so  deftly  as  to  bring  the  letters  "  C.  S."  where  they  be 
longed.  His  connection  with  the  colored  troops  had  also  made 
him  persona  non  grata. 

The  description  of  the  building  and  its  interior  arrange 
ments  have  been  so  profusely  given  that  it  is  unnecessary  to 
reproduce  them  here;  suffice  it  to  say  that  the  two  upper 
rooms  on  the  southwest  corner  of  the  building  were  crowded  by 
some  four  hundred  officers,  while  the  upper  floors  of  the  cen 
tral  division  of  the  structure  held  the  enlisted  men,  as  a  tem 
porary  receiving  station,  prior  to  their  being  transferred  to 
points  farther  South,  for  more  permanent  confinement ;  the 
Confederate  capital,  by  this  time,  being  regarded  as  somewhat 
insecure.  On  the  ground-floor  of  the  western  end  was  located 
what  was  euphemistically  termed  the  "  hospital."  A  paroled 
Federal  hospital  steward  (whose  name  has  escaped  the  mem 
ory  of  the  writer)  was  in  charge.  In  passing,  it  should  be 
told  that  he  proved  to  be  a  rascal,  since  the  money  left  in  his 
hands  by  those  of  us  who  were  released  upon  parole,  to  be 
turned  over  to  our  less  fortunate  comrades  who  remained  in 
confinement,  was  never  so  transferred,  as  we  later  were  in 
formed.  A  Dr.  Semple  was  the  attending  surgeon,  but  his 
visits  were  few  and  far  between  during  the  months  when  the 
writer  was  in  the  hospital ;  he,  however,  made  the  examina 
tions  that  resulted  in  the  paroles  to  correspond  to  the  numbers 
of  Confederates  released  from  Northern  prisons.  Only  one 
issue  per  diem,  and  that  about  mid-day,  was  made  here.  As 
the  writer  chanced  to  be  transferred  thither,  before  the  issue 
had  been  made  upstairs,  and  after  the  one  at  the  hospital,  he 


MILITARY  PRISON'S:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH       185 

would  have  had  to  go  without  food  for  over  twenty-four  hours, 
had  it  not  been  for  the  Samaritanism  of  Captain  George  T. 
Brown,  First  Massachusetts  Heavy  Artillery,  who  forced  upon 
him  a  half  of  a  small  loaf  of  bread  that  he  had  gotten  from 
outside.  It  may  also  be  remarked  that,  when  captured,  until 
his  first  so-called  meal  in  Libby,  he  had  been  entirely  with 
out  food  for  more  than  forty-eight  hours !  Also,  that  these 
loaves,  which  were  smuggled  in  through  the  negroes  employed 
in  a  perfunctory  cleaning  of  the  floors,  were  about  the  size 
of  a  large  bun,  were  highly  aerated,  and  cost  a  dollar  in  Con 
federate  money,  —  which  was  exchanged  for  us  by  these  same 
negroes,  at  five  for  one,  —  the  outside  exchange  being  fifteen 
for  one.  In  furtherance  of  a  clear  understanding  of  how 
any  of  us  came  to  have  any  money,  it  should  be  explained 
that  in  the  search  for  such  which  was  made  upon  our  arrival 
at  Libby,  and  under  Turner's  personal  direction,  a  few  of  the 
more  ingenious  had  managed  to  secrete  a  little  beyond  detec 
tion,  when  all  valuables,  including  pocket-knives,  were  confis 
cated.  The  writer  had  been  relieved  of  his  pocket-book  and 
contents  upon  the  field,  by  a  cavalry  officer,  still  holding  a 
smoking  revolver,  with  which  he  had  just  shot  one  of  the 
writer's  command  because  he  had  not  hurried  fast  enough  to 
suit  the  Confederate ;  and,  consequently,  with  whom  his  pris 
oner  did  not  regard  him  as  open  to  argument.  However,  when 
being  marched  with  the  others  in  the  rain,  without  hat  or 
rain-coat  —  which  had  also  been  taken  from  him  by  violence, 
having  his  hands  in  his  pockets  in  his  chilled  condition,  he 
felt  a  wad  of  something,  which  his  experience  caused  him  to 
examine  furtively,  and  which  he  discovered  to  be  a  twenty 
dollar  bill  which  he  had  forgotten.  That  night,  when  corralled 
in  an  open  field  with  the  several  hundred  other  victims  of 
that  disaster  (and  for  which  they  were  in  no  way  responsible), 
he  secreted  the  bill  under  his  shoulder-strap,  where  it  soon 
became  as  soaked  as  the  cloth  itself,  and  so  escaped  detection 
upon  scrutiny.  For  this  he  got  one  hundred  dollars  in  Con- 


186        MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH 

federate  scrip;  while  for  a  plain  gold  ring  he  received  twenty 
dollars  more.  These  proceeds  went  to  eke  out  his  meagre  food, 
which  consisted,  while  in  the  upper  rooms,  of  two  issues  per 
diem  ;  one,  in  the  morning,  about  nine  o'clock,  of  a  piece  of 
corn-bread,  about  two  feet  square,  and  made  with  the  cob 
ground  up  into  the  meal,  and  a  small  piece  of  bacon  fat,  usu 
ally  in  a  rancid  condition.  The  other  issue,  by  poetic  license 
called  dinner,  was  a  movable  feast,  anywhere  before  or  after 
three  o'clock,  and  repeated  the  morning  repast,  with  the  addi 
tion,  generally,  of  an  infinitesimal  amount  of  bean-soup,  in 
which  the  occasional  bean  had  anything  but  an  irreproachable 
character ;  a  modicum  of  rice  —  full  of  weevils  —  also  made 
an  occasional  appearance.  No  cooking  was  done  at  this  period, 
and,  indeed,  there  was  no  fuel  or  utensils  for  such  purpose. 
There  were  no  chairs,  stools,  or  anything  else  to  sit  upon,  for 
us,  as  "  fresh  fish  " ;  only  a  very  few  of  the  uold  hands  "  had 
such,  improvised  out  of  half-barrels  or  old  wooden  spittoons 
which  they  had  hoarded,  and  which  had  been  passed  down  as 
heirlooms,  under  an  unwritten  law,  from  their  former  owners 
who  had  been  released  or  had  died.  These  latter  were  used  as 
seats  in  the  daytime  and  as  pillows  at  night.  The  others,  of 
whom  the  writer  was  one,  had  to  depend  upon  their  boots  or 
shoes  (if  they  had  been  so  fortunate  as  to  be  allowed  to  retain 
them),  or  else  to  rest  the  head  upon  one  arm  — on  the  bare 
floor  —  until  numbness  necessitated  a  change  of  pillows  ! 

Having  been  robbed  on  the  battlefield  as  completely  as  if 
"  held  up  by  highwaymen,"  and  clad  in  such  clothing  as  the 
heated  season  had  required,  while  the  windows  possessed  noth 
ing  but  iron  bars,  the  chill  of  night  and  early  dawn  made  the 
need  of  blankets  most  desirable,  but  none  were  ever  thrown 
in  to  us  during  the  writer's  stay.  No  candles  or  lights  of  any 
description  were  to  be  had,  and  after  darkness  had  fallen 
there  were  the  seemingly  interminable  hours  to  endure,  in 
restless  attempts  to  sleep,  made  the  more  so  by  the  hardness 
of  the  floor  and  the  rapacity  of  the  crawling  vermin. 


MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH       187 

The  upper  floor  had  been  preempted  by  the  older  prisoners, 
because  it  was  supposed  to  possess  somewhat  better  ventila 
tion,  owing  to  the  pitch  of  the  roof. 

There  was  no  reading  matter ;  on  one  occasion  only  the 
trapdoor  was  raised  and  some  old  paper  novels  were  thrown 
through  the  aperture,  but  were  sadly  torn  by  the  struggling 
crowd  who  strove  for  their  possession.  (It  should  be  explained 
that  the  stairs  had  been  removed  lest  a  rush  be  made  in  some 
attempt  at  escape,  and  movable  steps  had  been  substituted  to 
reach  this  trapdoor.)  Consequently,  even  worse  than  the  mere 
animal  hunger  was  the  starvation  of  the  mind  thus  begotten. 

Surely,  the  plea,  habitually  put  forth  by  would-be  apolo 
gists  for  the  conditions  in  these  Southern  prison-pens,  that 
the  impoverishment  of  the  section  entailed  by  the  war  pre 
cluded  the  possibility  of  bettering  them,  can  scarcely  be  enter 
tained  as  tenable  in  this  and  other  similar  directions. 

During  the  writer's  personal  experience  there  were  none  of 
those  entertainments  resorted  to  as  are  to  be  found  in  rela 
tion  to  the  earlier  periods ;  nor  were  there  any  of  those  classes 
of  study  which  appear  to  have  been  wisely  gotten  up  at  other 
times.  Probably  that  very  dearth  of  mental  occupation  had 
given  vent  to  such  tendencies  to  melancholia  and  morbidity 
as  the  hopelessness  of  exchange  had  evoked  in  the  individual, 
leading  up  to  that  "  leafless  desert  of  the  mind,"  as  it  has 
been  symbolized. 

The  Christian  and  Sanitary  Commissions,  as  well  as  inter 
ested  families  and  individuals,  were  frequently  forwarding 
supplies  for  our  benefit,  but  although  it  is  stated  in  the  ear 
lier  narratives,  and  later,  when  arrangements  had  been  made 
for  the  distribution  of  such  under  the  supervision  of  selected 
representatives  from  both  sides,  none  were  allowed  to  reach 
the  consignees,  so  far  as  the  writer  knew,  while  he  continued 
to  be  a  guest  at  Hotel  Libby,  although  the  boxes  and  pack 
ages  containing  these  contributions  were  piled  up  within  our 
exasperated  view  in  the  shed  through  which  the  escaping  tun- 


188        MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH 

nellers  had  emerged — besides  those  that  had  been  rifled  by 
the  guards  and  others. 

There  exists  no  responsible  record  that  Federal  prisoners 
were  ever  supplied  with  clothing  by  the  Confederate  authori 
ties,  although  there  is  such  that  what  had  been  forwarded 
from  the  North  for  their  needs  had  been  appropriated  by  their 
jailers  at  certain  places.  On  the  other  hand,  those  who  had 
the  opportunity  to  observe  paroled  Confederates  while  passing 
through  the  lines  can  testify  that  they  were  better  equipped 
than  the  rank  and  file  of  the  "  Army  of  Northern  Virginia." 

Our  food  was  received  in  wooden  pails,  and  we  ate  what 
we  could  of  it  out  of  a  few  old  tin  cups  and  plates  which  had 
been  passed  down  from  predecessors.  After  that  second  meal 
had  been  disposed  of,  we  had  to  satisfy  our  cravings  "for 
more"  through  the  Barmecide  feasts  of  our  imaginations. 
(One  unfortunate  Major  of  a  New  York  regiment  had  been 
so  shattered  in  his  intellect,  that,  upon  the  slightest  encour 
agement,  he  would  dilate,  with  the  greatest  avidity,  upon  his 
dreams  of  six  course  dinners,  with  champagne  accompaniment. 
So  degraded  had  this  unhappy  human  being  become  that  he 
would  help  himself  out  of  the  refuse  of  our  food  placed  in  a 
corner  for  removal.) 

A  very  few  of  us  have  been  so  favored  by  fortune,  or  aided 
by  their  own  cunning,  as  to  have  succeeded  in  saving  their 
pocket-knives,  thus  being  constituted  as  friends  worth  cultivat 
ing. 

Such  pretence  at  sanitation  as  was  undertaken  merely  con 
sisted  of  those  occasional  visitations  of  the  aforesaid  negroes 
who  perfunctorily  flushed  the  floors  in  the  same  way  the  decks 
of  vessels  are  swabbed,  while  we  in  the  lower  room  had  to  be 
careful  to  stand  from  under  during  the  process. 

The  only  water-supply  in  our  room  was  laid  down  through 
a  single  faucet  attached  to  a  lead  pipe  that  fed  into  a  wooden 
trough  —  this,  for  both  drinking  and  washing  purposes  !  But 
as  no  soap  or  towels  were  to  be  had,  "  it  made  no  differ- 


MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH       189 

ence,"  as  the  immortal  Mr.  Toots  was  wont  to  declare.  Unless 
this  trough  represented  the  "  bathtub  "  depicted  in  Cavada's 
book,  any  other  must  have  fallen  into  the  condition  of  Dr. 
Holmes'  "  one-horse  shay  " ;  or  had  been  secreted  about  the 
person  of  one  of  the  oldest  inhabitants,  unless  one  of  the 
escaping  prisoners  had  become  so  in  love  with  it  that  he  had 
pulled  it  after  him  in  the  tunnel  as  a  souvenir.  From  the  un- 
plastered  ceilings  and  beams,  the  iestive  cockroach,  and  his 
equally  objectionable  associate,  the  Confederate  "  grayback," 
were  ever  wont  to  drop  upon  our  persons  —  the  latter  to  start 
a  new  colony  unless  promptly  detected  and  immolated. 

In  the  southwest  corner  of  our  room  was  a  closet  for  the 
privacy  of  the  inmates.  When  the  trapdoor  would  be  opened 
for  the  admittance  of  some  new  arrivals  (ever  hailed  with  the 
announcing  shout  of  "  Fresh  fish !  "  and  the  sympathetic  in 
junction  to  " leave  all  valuables  with  the  clerk!"),  a  self-ap 
pointed  committee  would  conduct  the  arrival  (if  it  were  night) 
to  that  closet  (with  the  shouted  instruction  to  "  show  the  gen 
tleman  to  the  bridal  chamber !  "),  where  he  would  be  left  to 
grope  his  way  out,  after  he  had  satisfied  himself,  as  well  as  he 
could  in  the  dark,  as  to  the  uses  of  the  compartment.  All  this, 
while  coarse  enough,  furnished  laughter  ;  and  oh !  the  value  of 
that  laughter ! 

That  the  prohibition  against  approaching  closely  to  the  win 
dows  had  been  ruthlessly  enforced,  was  evidenced  by  the  bul 
let-marks  on  the  casings  and  walls :  tradition  recorded  that 
deaths  had  been  occasioned  by  some  of  these  shots,  but  none 
such  occurred,  to  the  writer's  knowledge,  during  his  tenancy. 

As  pertinent  to  this,  the  following  excerpt  from  the  "  Army 
and  Navy  Journal "  for  September  19, 1914,  p.  70,  reads  thus : 
"  In  1864,  a  wounded  sergeant  of  Fitzhugh  Lee's  cavalry,  said 
in  Richmond,  Virginia,  '  after  a  soldier  has  been  in  battle  he 
respects  his  enemy.  If  the  men  guarding  Libby  prison  had 
been  in  battle,  the  Union  prisoners  would  have  been  treated 
like  gentlemen,  but  the  damned  home-guard  and  civilians 


190        MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH 

attached  to  that  place  are  brutes,  and  a  disgrace  to  the  Con 
federacy,  and  I  am  sorry  to  say  that  most  of  them  are  Vir 
ginians  M  " 

In  thus  skimming  over  the  surface  of  affairs  that  came 
under  his  observation  or  within  his  own  experience,  the  writer 
has  conscientiously  confined  himself  to  absolute  facts,  but  yet 
which  he  is  prepared  to  believe  were  not  allowed  to  come 
within  the  knowledge  of  the  ordinary  citizen  of  the  metropolis, 
and  that  they  could  scarcely  be  brought  to  credit  an  account 
of  what  was  taking  place  in  their  neighborhood.  Indeed,  in 
his  own  case,  two  witnesses  of  high  character  could  have  been 
produced  to  refute  these  statements  from  the  writer's  own 
mouth.  To  explain :  An  uncle  of  his  (an  Episcopal  clergyman 
in  Philadelphia),  having  written  to  former  classmates  of  his 
at  the  Theological  Seminary  at  Alexandria  in  behalf  of  his 
nephew,  the  latter  was  somewhat  startled  one  day  by  hearing 
his  name  called  by  Adjutant  Latouche.  Hesitating,  at  first,  to 
declare  himself,  as  a  momentary  recollection  of  the  unpleasant 
custom  that  had  obtained  of  selecting  hostages  flashed  across 
his  mind,  he  soon  recognized  the  ultimate  futility  of  remain 
ing  incognito,  and,  upon  stepping  forward,  found  that  the 
Adjutant  was  accompanied  by  a  gentleman  in  clerical  garb, 
who  announced  himself  as  the  Reverend  J.  Peterkin  (Rector 
of  St.  James'  Protestant  Episcopal  Church,  in  the  city),  and 
that  his  kindly  offices  had  been  thus  sought.  Upon  question 
ing  whether  there  was  any  ground  for  complaint,  he  received 
a  reply  in  the  negative,  the  youth,  thus  catechized,  possessing 
enough  acumen  to  appreciate  the  certainty  of  much  worse 
conditions  to  follow  any  representations  of  the  actual  circum 
stances,  and  contenting  himself  by  stating  that  he  was  quite 
comfortable  and  in  need  of  nothing,  since  the  Adjutant  was 
remaining  beside  the  clergyman  all  the  time.  The  relief  to  his 
mind  in  thus  learning  that  his  widowed  mother  had  knowledge 
of  his  being  alive,  and  realizing  the  sparse  larders  of  the  aver 
age  Richmond  citizen  at  that  period,  he  limited  his  request 


MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH       191 

for  largess  to  some  article  of  an  anti-scorbutic  nature.  The 
reverend  gentleman,  upon  his  departure,  promised  to  return 
with  some  such  supply,  but  he  was  never  seen  or  heard  from 
again  by  the  writer,  until  after  our  occupation  of  Richmond, 
when  it  was  learned  that  he  had,  indeed,  been  true  to  his 
promise,  but  had  been  told  by  Turner  that  "  Lieutenant  White 
was  no  longer  there,  having  been  sent  to  Lynchburg,"  which, 
of  course,  was  a  lie. 

This  incident  was  exactly  duplicated  in  the  case  of  the 
Eeverend  R.  Mason,  who  called  in  the  same  way,  and  under 
the  same  circumstances,  made  the  same  kind  tender  of  assist 
ance,  which  was  followed  with  a  similar  sequel. 

As  an  additional  illustration  of  how  these  gentlemen  were 
being  deceived,  the  writer  (who  has  their  letters  now  before 
him  in  an  excellent  state  of  preservation)  finds,  in  that  of 
the  Reverend  Peterkin,  the  statement  that  "  the  Rev.  Dr. 
McCabe,  our  Government  Chaplain,  .  .  .  visits  the  prisoners 
and  officiates  for  them  regularly."  As  a  matter  of  fact,  during 
the  writer's  incarceration  no  such  visit  or  discharge  of  his 
office  came  within  his  observation  or  knowledge !  Dr.  Semple, 
the  attending  surgeon,  made  occasional  visits  to  the  "hospital " 
while  the  writer  was  an  occupant,  but  they  appeared  to  be 
merely  of  a  perfunctory  character,  as  a  general  rule,  and  not 
infrequently  accompanied  by  cursory  remarks  and  interroga 
tions  of  a  more  or  less  offensive  nature,  particularly  when  di 
rected  at  a  horribly  mutilated  officer  1  of  a  colored  regiment 
who  had  been  taken  from  the  "  crater"  in  the  "mine  "  fiasco. 

Thus  showing  how  even  those  who  had  been  able  to  gain 
admittance  to  the  prison  were  hoodwinked  as  to  its  actual 
conditions,  and  when  one  reflects  upon  the  fact  that,  in  former 
years,  the  residents  on  lower  Fifth  Avenue,  in  New  York  City, 
were  absolutely  ignorant  as  to  the  squalor  and  crime  then 
rampant  in  the  Five  Points  District,  just  around  the  corner, 

1  Captain  George  Henry  Seagrove,  Thirtieth  United  States  Colored  Infantry, 
from  Uxbridge,  Massachusetts. 


192        MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH 

it  can  better  be  comprehended  how  the  average  citizen  of 
Richmond  should  know  nothing  of  the  facts  which  existed  at 
Libby  and  other  such  places,  and  that  they  could  scarcely  be 
brought  to  credit  any  exposure  of  them. 

As  before  remarked,  there  was  ever  entertained  the  hope 
that  some  opportunity  might  occur  which  would  make  an  up 
rising  with  the  view  of  concerted  escape ;  and  occasional  con 
ferences  were  held  with  General  Hayes,  as  our  selected  leader, 
looking  to  such  measures  as  might  be  adopted,  each  of  us 
having  something  secreted  to  use  as  a  weapon,  and  "  Dick  " 
Turner  to  start  with,  since  he  was  accustomed  to  swagger  into 
our  midst  with  a  brace  of  revolvers  in  his  belt.  Captain  Daly, 
a  powerful  man,  had  been  told  off  to  throttle  him,  should  a 
favorable  moment  for  such  procedure  present  itself.  But  with 
the  belief  that  there  were  spies  among  us,  and  that  we  might 
be  permitted  to  progress  so  far  in  such  an  attempt  as  to  gain 
the  street,  where  we  could  be  shot  down  by  the  guards  in 
waiting,  no  project  under  consideration  ever  matured.  The 
condition  of  our  garb  was  such  that  it  would  have  been  diffi- 

O 

cult  to  recognize  friend  from  foe  upon  the  outside. 

Notwithstanding  such  environment,  the  writer  recalls  that 
he  ever  felt  thankful  that  his  lot  had  been  cast  at  Libby,  in 
stead  of  at  Belle  Isle,  as  often  he  looked  across  the  canal  to 
that  acme  of  misery  in  the  James  River,  where  the  thousands 
of  Federal  prisoners,  from  ten  thousand  to  twelve  thousand  at 
one  period,  who  were  represented  by  a  committee  appointed 
by  the  United  States  Sanitary  Commission  as  lying  in  ditches 
"like  hogs  in  winter"  to  keep  warm,  while,  according  to 
the  testimony  before  the  House  of  Representatives,  some 
four  thousand  were  "  absolutely  shelterless  upon  the  frozen 
sand." 

The  place,  embracing  less  than  one  hundred  acres,  had 
been,  originally,  in  1862,  selected  as  a  summer  camp,  and 
had  then  passed  into  winter  occupation,  without  preparation 
for  the  protection  of  the  prisoners  from  the  rigor  of  that  sea- 


MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH       193 

son.  A  treeless  expanse  of  sand,  the  few  who  had,  as  first  ar 
rivals,  been  furnished  with  some  old  tents,  formed  the  aristoc 
racy  of  the  place,  while  the  great  majority  were  compelled  to 
seek  the  bosom  of  Mother  Earth  for  such  shelter  and  warmth 
as  contact  of  bodies  could  produce. 

About  a  tenth  of  this  acreage  had  been  enclosed  by  earth 
works,  and  being  of  sandy  and  barren  soil,  "  without  a  tree 
for  shelter  against  the  heat  of  summer  sun,  or  to  break  the 
force  of  the  bleak  winds  of  winter  that  sweep  down  the  river 
from  the  mountains  to  the  northwestward,"  it  was  in  marked 
contrast  to  that  occupied  by  the  Confederate  guards,  which 
was  "  a  high  and  rolling  bluff  covered  with  trees  and  sward." 
That  low  part  where  the  Federal  captives  were  confined  "  was 
but  little  elevated  above  the  waters  of  the  river,  and  when  the 
river  was  in  flood  became  frequently  flooded  to  the  depth  of 
several  inches."  Although  surrounded  on  three  sides  by  the 
river,  "  the  prison-camp  had  but  meagre  access  to  it  for  ob 
taining  water  —  and  this  was  only  possible  through  a  lane, 
constructed  of  boards  twelve  feet  high,  and  to  which,  indeed, 
all  access  was  cut  off  at  night  by  the  closing  of  a  gate.  Here, 
on  the  water-front,  at  the  end  of  the  lane,  were  located  the 
sinks,  the  close  proximity  to  which  rendered  the  place  reserved 
for  getting  the  water-supply  an  unfit  one  for  uncontaminated 
drinking  purposes.  Wells,  to  be  sure,  had  been  sunk  by  a  few 
of  the  men  within  the  enclosure,  but  these  became  soon  im 
pregnated  by  the  excreta  from  the  sink,  confined  to  the  limits 
during  the  night,  and  the  water  correspondingly  vitiated." 
Further  details,  unprintable  and  indescribable,  will  not  be 
entered  into  here  ;  they  can  be  readily  found  by  the  prurient, 
who  so  desire. 

When  it  is  considered  that  these  excavations  had  been 
made  "  with  pieces  of  bone,  sticks  of  wood,  and  in  many  in 
stances  with  their  fingers  alone,  as  no  tools  or  material  to 
construct  a  shelter  were  allowed  them,"  it  will  throw  more 
light  upon  their  deplorable  condition.  They  had  "  no  means 


194        MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH 

of  living  as  civilized  men,  nor  any  way  of  helping  themselves 
as  savages."  l 

Lest  all  this  be  set  down  as  exaggeration,  the  following 
is  quoted  from  the  "Richmond  Examiner"  of  January  21, 

1864:- 

« WARNING  TO  DOGS" 

"  According  to  a  statement  of  '  A  Citizen,'  who  writes  us  on 
the  subject,  Belle  Isle,  the  depot  of  the  Yankee  prisoners  in 
Richmond,  is  unhealthy  for  dogs  —  especially  well-conditioned 
dogs.  The  Yankees  eat  them ;  and  this  our  correspondent 
knows  from  facts  that  have  come  within  his  knowledge.  Sev 
eral  gentlemen  on  that  '  lone  barren  isle '  have  lost,  recently, 
their  favorite  heel-companions,  and  our  correspondent  affirms 
that  it  is  well  known  to  the  guard  that  the  Yankees  caught, 
fricasseed,  and  eat  [sic]  them !  And  that,  moreover,  the 
Yankees  have  begged  some  citizens  to  c  let  them  have  their 
dogs  to  eat.'  Horrible  !  We  are  advised,  if  we  doubt  the  state 
ment  of  our  correspondent,  to  visit  the  island  and  take  a  dog 
along,  and  we  will  come  away  alone,  and  convinced.  All  we 
have  to  append  to  this  dog  story  is,  that  we  never  did  admire 
Yankee  taste  in  anything ;  but  if  they  prefer  a  steak  of  canine 
meat  to  the  rations  of  beef,  bread,  potatoes,  and  soup,  fur 
nished  them  from  the  Commissary  Department  by  the  prison 
officials  [ !  ]  it  is  to  their  liking,  not  ours.  Some  animals  of  a 
carnivorous  nature  rather  like  the  flesh  of  another  animal  of 
a  like  nature.  In  the  above  case  it  is  4  dog  eat  dog,'  perhaps." 

Towards  the  end  of  January,  1864,  the  fear  of  an  uprising 
of  the  eight  thousand  prisoners  among  whom  smallpox  had 
broken  out  and  the  decimation  was  being  rapidly  increased  by 
the  scourge,  there  was  a  general  removal  to  Danville.  That 
same  paper,  under  date  of  the  26th,  stated :  "  The  fatality 
among  the  prisoners  from  this  and  other  maladies  is  very 

1  Lieutenant  A.  C.  Roach,  The  Prisoner  of  War,  and  How  Treated,  p.  61  et  seq. 


MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH       195 

great.  Several  wagon-loads  are  hauled  out  to  the  graveyard 
every  day  from  the  general  hospital,  besides  those  who  die  of 
smallpox."  Before  turning  from  this  amiable  sheet,  its  humane 
characteristics  can  be  more  fully  appreciated  by  quoting  from 
it,  when,  in  the  previous  October,  through  the  fear  that  some 
Federal  force  might  be  able  to  enter  Richmond  and  release 
them,  it  had  counselled  their  ultimate  removal  in  these  words : 
"  The  Yankee  Government,  under  the  laws  of  civilized  war 
fare,  are  entitled  to  these  men,  and  if  they  will  not  take  them, 
let  them  be  put  where  cold  weather  and  scant  fare  will  thin 
them  out  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  nature."  (!) 

When  it  is  made  known  to  the  present-day  reader  that  the 
writer  of  the  inhuman  advice,  Mr.  Edward  A.  Pollard,  when 
later,  a  captive  himself  in  the  North,  was  treated  with  the 
greatest  consideration,  and,  indeed,  with  marked  respect,  — 
was  finally  paroled  and  remained  for  some  time  with  friends 
in  the  city  of  Baltimore,  where  he  also  received  attention  from 
uninformed  Unionists,  —  the  reader  will  be  able  to  better 
comprehend  the  total  absence  of  any  parallelism  between  the 
treatment  of  war  prisoners,  in  the  respective  sections. 

The  refusal  of  the  Confederate  authorities  to  exchange 
prisoners,  man  for  man,  through  the  issue  raised  regarding 
the  recognition  of  negro  troops  and  their  officers,  had  created 
a  hitch  between  the  then  Federal  Commissioner  of  Exchange, 
General  Butler,  and  the  Confederate  official,  Robert  Ould. 
This  had  even  been  preceded  by  the  rejection  of  Butler  on 
the  ground  of  the  absurd  pronunciamento  of  Davis  declaring 
him  "an  outlaw,"  and  putting  a  price  upon  his  head.  This 
inevitably  increased  the  sufferings  of  the  Federal  captives  in 
their  "  durance  vile." 

The  rankling  remembrance  of  the  manner  in  which  the 
paroles  granted  on  the  field  to  the  surrendered  forces  under 
Pemberton  at  Vicksburg,  had  been  then  violated,  together 
with  a  clear  recognition  of  what  constituted  the  realism  in 
such  exchanges  as  were  being  effected,  and  as  announced  in 


196        MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH 

that  letter  of  Quid's  to  Winder,1  caused  Grant  to  write  the 
War  Department,  August  18,  1864,  that  while  "  it  is  hard 
upon  our  men  held  in  Southern  prisons,  not  to  exchange  them, 
yet  it  is  humanity  to  those  left  in  the  ranks  to  fight  our  bat 
tles.  At  this  particular  time,  to  release  all  rebel  prisoners  in 
the  North  would  secure  Sherman's  defeat  and  compromise  our 
safety  here." 

Such  paroles  and  subsequent  exchanges  as  were  thereafter 
made  from  Confederate  prisons  simply  followed  upon  the 
arrival  of  a  quota  of  released  Confederates,  and  seemed  to  be 
confined  to  those  holding  the  lowest  rank  and  who  were  the 
most  reduced  in  vitality.  (In  the  writer's  case,  he  was  but  a 
lieutenant,  and  was  not  expected  to  last  much  longer.) 

The  report  rendered  by  the  eminent  Dr.  Valentine  Mott,  of 
New  York,  as  chairman  of  the  United  States  Sanitary  Com 
mission,  in  1864,  will  be  found  to  be  direct  and  conclusive  as 
to  the  terrible  conditions  through  which  these  Union  prison 
ers  were  being  rendered  physically  and  mentally  useless  as 
soldiers  thereafter.  It  records  its  conclusion  in  these  words : 
as  being  "  unavoidable,  therefore,  that  these  privations  and 
sufferings  have  been  designedly  inflicted  by  the  military  and 
other  authorities  of  the  rebel  Government,  and  cannot  have 
been  due  to  causes  which  such  authorities  could  not  control." 

As  early  as  September,  1862,  Augustus  R.  Wright,  as  the 
chairman  of  a  committee  of  the  Confederate  House  of  Repre 
sentatives,  had  made  a  report  to  their  Secretary  of  War, 
George  W.  Randolph,  stating  that  their  conditions  were  "  ter 
rible  beyond  description  " ;  .  .  .  that  the  committee  could  not 
stay  in  the  room  over  a  few  seconds ;  .  .  .  that  a  change  must 
be  made  .  .  .  and  that  the  report  was  thus  made  to  the  Secre 
tary  of  War,  and  not  to  the  House,  because,  in  the  latter  case, 
it  would  be  printed,  and  "  for  the  honor  of  the  nation  such 
things  must  be  kept  secret." 

In  December,  1863,  Henry  S.  Foote,  another  member  of 
1  Ante,  p.  163. 


MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH       197 

that  House,  offered  a  resolution  for  the  appointment  of  a  com 
mittee  of  enquiry  concerning  the  alleged  ill-treatment  of  Union 
prisoners  (voted  down).  In  the  course  of  his  remarks  Mr. 
Foote  had  read  testimony,  which  he  said  was  on  record  in 
their  War  Department,  to  prove  the  charges  of  cruelty ;  and 
that  Northrop  (Lucius  Ballinger),  the  Commissary-General, 
had  placed  their  Government  in  the  attitude  charged  by  the 
enemy,  and  "has  attempted  to  starve  the  prisoners  in  our 
hands  " ;  while  citing  an  elaborate  report  made  by  that  offi 
cial  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  which  course,  he  further 
declared,  had  been  endorsed  by  Seddon,  the  later  Secretary 
of  War.  This  same  Mr.  Foote  also,  in  a  letter  written  from 
Montreal,  in  the  spring  of  1865,  stated  that  "  a  government 
officer  of  respectability "  had  told  him  "  that  a  systematic 
scheme  was  on  foot  for  subjecting  these  unfortunate  men  to 
starvation." 

The  seemingly  logical  deduction  has  been  since  drawn  that 
in  view  of  the  attitude  assumed  by  the  Federal  Administra 
tion  as  to  exchange,  the  Confederate  authorities  determined 
upon  this,  hoping  to  compel  the  former  to  recede  from  their 
refusal. 

It  is  also  a  matter  of  record  that  a  committee  of  the  United 
States  Sanitary  Commission  sought  access  to  the  prisons  in 
Kichmond  and  on  Belle  Isle,  in  order  to  afford  relief,  with 
the  understanding  that  similar  commissions  would  be  allowed 
to  visit  Confederate  captives,  but  this  was  refused  for  obvious 
reasons,  as  above  indicated. 

It  is  being  continually  asserted  by  certain  Southern  writers 
that  the  same  sustenance  was  distributed  to  the  Federal  pris 
oners  as  that  which  was  issued  to  the  rank  and  file  of  the  Con 
federate  armies ;  but  no  one  who  had  had  actual  experience 
with  the  virility  of  the  "  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,"  in  cam 
paign  and  engagement,  could  ever  be  brought  to  entertain  the 
belief  that  they  accomplished  what  they  did  on  those  occasions 
upon  any  such  starvation  and  injurious  diet.  That  the  former 


198        MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH 

were  legally  entitled  to  the  same  ration  was  indubitably  estab 
lished  by  the  enactment  of  the  (so-called)  Confederate  Con 
gress  at  Montgomery,  Alabama,  in  May,  1861,  to  this  effect: 
"  That  all  prisoners  of  war  should  be  given  the  same  rations, 
of  the  same  quantity  and  quality  as  those  furnished  the  en 
listed  men  of  the  Army  of  the  Confederacy"  Also  by  Gen 
eral  Order  No.  159,  from  their  Adjutant-General's  Office,  it 
was  directed  that  "  Hospitals  for  prisoners  of  war  be  placed 
upon  the  same  footing  in  all  respects,  as  other  Confederate 
state  hospitals." 

That  clerk  in  their  War  Department  (before  had  in  quota 
tion)  makes  an  entry  in  his  "  Diary,"  in  these  words :  "  On 
dit  —  that  the  only  persons  in  the  Confederacy  who  were  in 
enjoyment  of  anything  like  plenty  and  luxury  were  those  en 
gaged  in  blockade-running,  the  army  contracts,  the  officials 
about  Richmond,  and  those  who  had  charge  of  the  prisons  for 
United  States  soldiers.  Officials  connected  with  the  Richmond 
prisons  appeared  to  be  the  most  prosperous  individuals  in  the 
Confederacy."  (!) 

This  statement  from  one  of  their  own,  and  from  behind  the 
penetralia,  would,  in  itself,  seem  to  characterize  such  conten 
tions,  as  referred  to  above,  as  at  once  inadequate  and  futile, 
as  well  as  all  else  that  has  been  adduced  to  the  contrary. 

The  report  submitted  to  the  (so-called)  Confederate  Con 
gress  on  the  3d  of  March,  1865,  in  an  attempted  refutation 
of  the  Federal  charges  of  "  deliberate  and  wilful  cruelty  to 
prisoners  of  war"  which  had  been  brought  in  the  United 
States  Congressional  Committee's  report,1  and  by  the  "  Sani 
tary  Commission,"  with  appended  photographs  (copies  of  a 
few  of  which  accompany  this  paper),  would  seem  to  fall  short 
of  carrying  conviction  to  any  fair-minded  examination  of  its 
claims  upon  the  matters  in  disputation ;  unless  on  the  basis 
of  the  exasperated  Psalmist's  dictum,  "  all  men  are  liars." 

As  an  example  of  how  such  statements  can  be  distorted, 

1  H.R.,  Fortieth  Congress,  3d  Session,  No.  45. 


MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH       199 

the  writer's  attention  having  been  called  to  a  statement  of  the 
explorer,  Henry  M.  Stanley,  as  to  his  unhappy  experiences 
at  "  Camp  Douglas,"  x  he  made  a  critical  examination  of  the 
text  of  the  "  Biography,"  where  he  found  that  Stanley,  while 
deprecating  his  enlistment  in  the  Confederate  service  as  a 
"  blunder,"  relates  his  capture  on  the  second  day's  battle  at 
Shiloh,  and  that  (on  p.  215)  he  speaks  of  the  "filthy  condi 
tion  "  of  himself  and  comrades  prior  to  that  action.  That  a 
liberal  distribution  of  such  foreign  population  was  effected, 
upon  reaching  their  place  of  confinement,  cannot  be  surpris 
ing.  He  gives  a  description  of  the  place  and  its  provisions  for 
its  occupants  (who  are  stated  to  be  about  three  thousand  upon 
his  arrival),  and  speaks  of  "bilious  disorders,  dysentery,  and 
typhus"  making  their  appearance,  which  he  attributes,  some 
what,  to  "  reaction  from  the  excitement  and  activity  of  cam 
paigning,"  as  well  as  to  what  he  claims  was  the  "  exclusion 
of  any  medical,  pious,  musical,  or  literary  charity  that  might 
have  alleviated  our  sufferings."  On  the  other  hand,  there  are 
statements  from  others  that  they  were  allowed  visits  from 
friends,  and  who  supplied  them  plentifully  with  funds.  Stan 
ley  himself  records  that  bunks  upon  platforms  were  furnished 
for  a  certain  number  of  men,  —  the  others  lying  upon  the 
floor,  —  while  hay  was  provided  for  bedding  and  blankets  to 
each  man.  He  quotes  the  ration  furnished  as  of  fresh  beef, 
soft  bread,  coffee,  tea,  potatoes,  and  salt  for  each  mess.  As 

1  This  camp  had  originally  been  established  for  the  occupation  of  State 
troops,  when  responding1  to  the  call  of  the  President.  It  was  located  on  land 
belonging  to  the  estate  of  Stephen  A.  Douglas  (hence  its  name),  on  the  out 
skirts  of  Chicago.  The  barracks  were  enlarged  when  it  was  hastily  converted 
for  the  reception  of  the  prisoners  from  Forts  Donelson  and  Henry.  At  that  pe 
riod  no  anticipation  of  such  large  bodies  of  captures  had  ever  been  entertained, 
and,  without  any  antecedent  experience  of  such  requirements,  the  conditions 
were  unquestionably  not  only  crude,  but  unfit  to  meet  the  necessities  that  arose. 
This  is  borne  out  in  the  report  of  President  H.  W.  Bellows,  of  the  Sanitary 
Commission,  June  30,  1862.  The  reader,  however,  might  form  his  own  conclu 
sions  after  examining  the  counterfeit  presentment  of  the  prisoners  and  their 
environment  as  given  on  pp.  22,  73,  and  159  of  Vol.  7,  of  that  Photographic  His 
tory  of  the  Civil  War,  already  had  in  reference. 


200        MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH 

to  the  then  commandant,  Colonel  James  Albert  Mulligan,1 
Twenty-third  Illinois  Infantry,  he  has  no  complaint  to  make, 
although  he  claims,  in  reference  to  the  ignorance  which  gen 
erally  obtained  at  that  period  as  to  requisite  sanitary  meas 
ures,  that  "  one  intelligent  and  humane  supervisor  would  have 
wrought  wonders." 

In  bringing  to  a  close  this  reference,  it  may  be  added  that 
Stanley  was  "persuaded"  to  transfer  his  allegiance  to  the 
United  States  service,  a  change  of  fealty  that  does  not  appear 
to  have  agreed  with  him,  as  he  was  shortly  "  taken  ill  and 
discharged." 

It  may  also  interest  some  reader  to  be  informed  that  the 
Confederate  Burgevine  referred  to  in  his  book  (p.  166)  en 
tered  the  Chinese  service  after  the  close  of  the  Civil  War, 
and  became  the  commander  of  the  "  mercenaries  "  against  the 
Taipings.  Later  dismissed  by  the  Imperialists,  he  sought  ser 
vice  under  the  Taipings.  "  Wearied  of  his  new  masters,"  he 
conceived  a  project  of  dethroning  the  Emperor  and  reigning 
in  his  stead ;  he  even  went  so  far  as  to  try  to  tempt  Gordon 
to  be  his  accomplice.  Finally,  falling  into  the  hands  of  the 
Imperial  Army,  he  was  sentenced  to  death  by  Ling  Chi,  and 
was  hacked  to  pieces  in  small  morsels,  as  the  punishment  of 
his  high  treason,  the  remains  being  shipped  in  a  large  packing- 
case  to  Chefu,  a  quaint  little  town  in  Northern  China.2 

It  was  the  custom  for  paragraphers  in  sympathy  with  the 
"  Lost  Cause,"  for  some  years  after  the  war  ended,  to  refer 
to  Jefferson  Davis'  incarceration  at  Fort  Monroe  as  in  a 
"  cell."  As  already  noted  in  the  foregoing  text,  the  casemate 
assigned  to  him  was  identically  the  same  as  had  been  used 
for  years,  anterior  and  since,  by  United  States  officers,  and 
as  a  matter  of  fact  became  later  the  quarters  of  the  writer  as 
well  as  of  others. 

A  still  more  recent  and  notable  falsification  came  to  the 

1  Killed  at  Winchester,  Virginia,  July  24,  1864. 

2  See  Lord  Redesdale's  Memoirs,  vol.  I,  p.  337. 


MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH       201 

notice  of  the  writer  in  the  "Boston  Globe,"  where  it  was 
stated,  in  appropriate  headlines  in  "  bold-faced  type,"  that 
the  Confederate  "  General  Buckner  finds  the  cell  he  occupied, 
in  1863,  at  Fort  Warren."  General  Buckner  at  this  date  was 
making  a  visit  to  Boston,  and  had  been  given  receptions  at 
the  principal  clubs  as  a  possible  gold-money  Democratic 
nominee  for  the  Presidency ;  at  two  of  which  the  writer,  be 
ing  a  member,  met  him,  and  elsewhere.  When  this  article 
appeared,  the  chronicler  wrote  General  Buckner,  requesting 
him  to  designate  the  particular  "  cell  "  he  had  occupied ;  since 
during  a  period  when  he  was  in  command  of  Fort  Warren 
(in  1878,  and  subsequently),  he  himself  had  been  unable  to 
discover  any  "  cells "  or  "  dark,  damp  dungeons,"  as  men 
tioned  in  said  article,  where  prisoners  of  war  had  ever  been 
confined.  Failing  in  eliciting  any  reply  from  General  Buck 
ner,  and  determined  to  stamp  this  atrocious  perversion  of 
facts  as  it  should  be,  he  then  addressed  the  then  comman 
dant,  Major  Carle  A.  Woodruff,  Second  Artillery  (to  whom, 
of  course,  he  was  well  known),  requesting  official  information 
as  to  the  exact  "  cell "  which  had  been  designated  by  General 
Buckner  as  the  one  in  which  he  had  been  confined.  The  re 
sponse  was  accompanied  by  a  diagram  on  which  this  was  duly 
marked,  and  which,  as  had  been  well  known  before,  was  simply 
one  of  the  casemate  quarters  had  in  occupancy  by  us  officers 
for  years  prior,  and  subsequently.  That  General  Buckner 
neglected  to  reply  to  the  polite  inquiry  of  the  writer  may  have 
been  due  to  his  time  having  been  taken  up  with  the  various 
receptions  tendered  him,  and  for  the  delivery  of  a  homily  he 
read  to  Bostonians,  then  and  there,  in  a  lecture  entitled  "  Tha 
Duty  of  the  Patriot  to  his  Country  "  ! 

"  Can  such  things  be, 
And  overcome  us  like  a  summer's  cloud, 
Without  our  special  wonder  ?  " 

Still  later  (November  30,  1908),  in  the  "Boston  Herald," 
an  article  made  its  appearance,  purporting  to  represent  prison 


202       MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH 

life  at  Fort  Warren,  and  illustrated  with  a  cut  representing 
an  outwork,  opposite  the  sally-port,  which  the  text  repre 
sented  as  the  "  dungeon  "  in  which  "  Mason  and  Slidell " 
were  confined :  this  in  the  face  of  the  fact  that  it  was  merely 
an  obsolete  possible  means  of  defence  against  a  landing-party 
from  the  city  side,  and  had  never  been  used  "  as  an  old  mili 
tary  prison  long  fallen  into  disuse,"  as  the  text  has  it. 

The  consensus  of  testimony  of  many  Confederates,  includ 
ing  these  same  commissioners,1  General  Walker  and  other 
notables,  is  extant,  and  so  distinct  as  to  the  considerate  treat 
ment  they  received  at  the  hands  of  kindly  old  Colonel  Justin 
Dimick,  and  the  statement  of  the  post  surgeon  of  that  period 
to  the  effect  that  these  prisoners  were  furnished  with  ample 
and  nutritious  diet  such  as  the  Government  issues  and  good 
cooks  could  supply,  as  well  as  from  purchases  in  the  market 
of  such  delicacies  as  their  money,  liberally  furnished  by  friends 
and  sympathizers,  could  purchase,  while  also  allowed  to  take 
exercise  upon  the  parapet,  at  certain  hours,  under  proper  sur 
veillance,  that  it  seems  unnecessary  to  dwell  further  upon  the 
subject. 

Reference  having  previously  been  made  to  the  "  Photo 
graphic  History  of  the  Civil  War,"  published  by  the  "  Re 
view  of  Reviews  Company,"  the  writer,  as  one  of  its  earliest 
subscribers,  feels  himself  fully  justified  in  expressing  not  only 
his  own  dissatisfaction  and  even  indignation,  but  in  voicing 
that  of  many  others  with  whom  the  publication  has  been  dis 
cussed.  This  is  directed  not  only  at  the  inaccuracies  in  label- 

1  In  a  letter  to  his  wife  Commissioner  Mason  stated,  as  to  his  experiences  at 
Fort  Warren :  "I  have  nothing  but  the  detention  of  my  person  to  complain  of. 
No  privilege  consistent  with  that  is  refused.  The  Commissioners  occupied  one 
large  room ;  their  secretaries  another.  Received  daily  mail  and  papers  ;  played 
cards ;  saw  visitors  ;  wrote  letters  and  had  the  freedom  of  the  fort  for  exercise, 
being  treated  with  every  consideration  by  the  officers.  Besides  supplies  ad  libi 
tum,  and  daily  from  Boston,  everything  that  is  good  and  homelike  comes  to  us 
from  Baltimore  —  fine  hams,  by  the  dozen;  turkeys;  saddle  of  mutton,  and 
canvas-backs.  Indeed,  we  have  a  better  table  than  any  hotel  affords,  and  what 
ever  wine  or  other  luxuries  we  choose." 


MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH       203 

ling  some  of  the,  otherwise,  excellent  photographic  reproduc 
tions,  but,  particularly,  at  the  manner  in  which  the  text  has 
been  prepared,  indicating  a  bid  for  wide  sales  in  the  South 
and  among  the  sympathizers  with  its  "  Lost  Cause." 

Confining  himself  for  the  present  to  the  topic  of  this  appen 
dix,  the  scribe  would  invite  attention  to  the  irresponsibility 
of  the  editor  of  the  articles  on  "  Prisoners  of  War,"  Profes 
sor  Holland  Thompson.  This  is  at  Dnce  evinced  in  his  remark 
on  page  24,  volume  7,  "  naturally  a  South  which  did  not  believe 
that  there  would  be  a  war,  and  therefore  did  not  adequately 
provide  for  the  contest,"  etc.,  etc. ;  in  view  of  the  now  well- 
recognized  fact  that  such  preparation  had  been  going  on  for 
more  than  a  previous  quarter  of  a  century  —  a  fact  as  patent 
as  the  "  preparedness  "  of  the  Teutonic  onslaught  on  August  1, 
1914. 

Born  a  North  Carolinian,  and  dating  from  1873,  and  be 
longing  to  a  generation  that  has  grown  up  since  the  war,  and 
imbibing  his  opinions,  through  hearsay,  from  the  local  sec 
tional  bias  of  the  older  group,  he  presumes  to  set  himself  up 
as  an  authority  in  the  premises,  and  in  contravention  of  the 
testimony  of  scores  of  the  victims  of  the  inhuman  treatment 
of  Federal  captives  at  the  hands  of  the  Confederate  author 
ities,  while  attempting  to  sweep  them  aside  with  the  sneering 
remark,  "as  sensational,"  and  "so  popular  after  the  war" 
(p.  80).  It  has  been  this  sort  of  thing  which  has  stimulated 
the  writer,  as  one  with  personal  experience  and  observation 
as  to  the  facts  under  discussion,  to  expose  the  sophistries  set 
forth  in  the  effort  of  Confederates  to  exculpate  themselves, 
and  to  establish  a  parallelism  between  the  Northern  and 
Southern  prisoners  of  war  experiences  while  in  duress. 

Before  passing  from  this  would-be  historian,  the  reader  is 
invited  to  compare  his  contention,  on  page  157,  that  "  the 
South  had  nothing  wherewith  to  feed  its  own  soldiers,  and 
went  to  the  extent  of  liberating  thirteen  thousand  sick  pris 
oners"  (?),  with  his  other  intimation,  on  page  182,  "even  to 


204        MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH 

the  end  there  was  food  in  the  South,  but  it  was  in  the  wrong 
place." 

While  the  writer  does  not  entertain  that  regard  for  statis 
tics  which  appears  to  be  so  fully  accorded  by  some,  the  fol 
lowing  statements  are  given,  probably  as  accurate  as  may  be, 
although  differing  to  some  extent  from  others  of  reputable 
authority :  — 

211,4H  Federals  were  captured  during  the  war;  of  whom 

30,218  Federals  died  in  captivity. 

16,668  Federals  were  paroled  on  the  field. 
462,634  Confederates  were  captured  during  the  war;  of  whom 
247,769  Confederates  were  paroled  on  the  field,1  and 

25,796  Confederates  died  in  captivity. 

Although  in  possession  of  memoranda  respecting  the  author 
ized  ration  allowance  at  these  Southern  prisons,  he  does  not 
think  them  entitled  to  space  in  this  paper,  since  their  actual 
issue  was  so  far,  in  most  cases,  from  that  stated  allotment. 

In  bringing  to  a  close  this  grievous  and  deplorable  chapter 
of  the  Civil  War,  the  writer  recommends  those  interested  to 
examine  the  photographs  accompanying  the  report  of  the 
Sanitary  Commission  (copy  to  be  found  in  the  Library  of  the 
Commandery),  as  furnishing  indisputable  proofs  of  the  alle 
gations  made  in  the  works  above  listed,  and  so  inhumanly 
mentioned  in  that  letter  of  Colonel  Robert  Ould,  the  Confed 
erate  Commissioner  of  Exchange.2  These  wretched  wrecks  of 
humanity  were  forwarded  on  flag-of-truce  boats  only  to  drag 
out  their  miseries  for  a  short  time  after  their  exchanges  were 
effected  ;  and  the  writer  here  goes  on  record  with  the  state 
ment  that  while  awaiting  his  own  final  exchange  at  "  Camp 
Parole,"  near  Annapolis,  Maryland,  he  personally  met  certain 
of  these  transports  upon  their  arrival  at  the  dock,  where  he 
saw  some  of  these  moribund  survivors.  E.  A.  Abbott  is  the 
authority  for  the  statement  that  there  were  two  hundred  and 

1  This  difference  is  due  to  the  inclusion  of  the  Confederate  armies  surrendered 
under  Lee,  Johnston,  Taylor,  and  Kirby  Smith. 

2  Vide  ante. 


MILITARY  PRISONS:  NORTH  AND  SOUTH       205 

eighty-seven  of  such  cases  at  Anderson  ville  alone.  It  is  safe 
to  assert  that  if  any  such  specimens  of  undone  humanity  ex 
isted  among  the  exchanged  Confederates,  their  photographs 
would  be  found  on  the  pages  of  that  "Photographic  History" 
published  by  the  "  Review  of  Reviews  Company." 

The  chronicler  fully  realizes  that  there  will  not  be  wanting 
those  who  are  at  once  so  short-sighted,  as  to  the  effect  misin 
formation  must  necessarily  exert  upon  those  ignorant  of  the 
facts,  or  so  shuffling  in  their  adherence  to  temporizing  poli 
cies,  as  to  vent  a  Pecksuiffian  deprecation  of  what  they  will 
be  pleased  to  stigmatize  as  tending  to  revive  sectional  bitter 
ness  and  the  "  waving  of  the  bloody  shirt." 

He  therefore,  again,  religiously  disclaims  any  such  Corsi- 
can  impulse,  and  as  conscientiously  asserts  that  this  paper  has 
been  written,  not  without  many  painful  reminiscences  which 
had  been  relegated  to  forgiveness  (but  not  forgetfulness), 
until  made  indignant  at  the  invidious  efforts  of  certain  advo 
cates  of  that  "  Lost  Cause  "  to  have  the  uninformed  deceived 
into  the  belief  that  the  same  barbarous  treatment  of  prisoners 
of  war  was  administered  in  the  North  as  in  the  South.  He 
would,  therefore,  feel  that  he  had  been  recreant  to  the  mem 
ories  of  those  thousands  whose  lives  had  been  thus  lingeringly 
sacrificed,  should  he  fail  to  discharge  this  trying  duty  in  re 
cording  the  facts  as  found,  not  only  in  research,  but  through 
personal  experience  and  observation ;  nor  would  he  feel  pre 
pared  to  join  those  who  have  gone  before  without  having 
done  so ! 


XI 


THE  EFFECT   OF  PRESIDENT  LINCOLN'S 
REELECTION  UPON   THE  WANING 
FORTUNES  OF  THE    CONFED 
ERATE   STATES 

BY 
BREVET   MAJOR   HENRY  S.   BURRAGE 


Read  before  the  Society,  February  2,  1915 


THE   EFFECT  OF  PRESIDENT  LINCOLN'S   RE- 

ELECTION   UPON  THE   WANING  FORTUNES 

OF  THE   CONFEDERATE   STATES 

WE  are  approaching  the  fiftieth  anniversary  of  that  sad 
April  day  on  which  tidings  came  to  us  of  the  assassination 
of  President  Lincoln.  How  heroically  he  had  fought  a  good 
fight,  how  nobly  he  had  kept  the  faith !  Glowing  eulogies 
were  spoken  in  the  high  places  of  Church  and  State  through 
out  the  North,  and  here  and  there  in  the  South.  In  the  half- 
century  that  has  followed,  he  has  come  before  us  in  even 
grander  proportions,  and  he  stands  out  now,  not  only  as  the 
first  American,  to  use  Lowell's  words,  but  as  the  one  command 
ing  figure  of  the  nineteenth  century,  as  Washington  was  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  and  Cromwell  of  the  seventeenth  century. 

Yet  you  and  I  can  easily  recall  the  names  of  men  distin 
guished  for  public  service,  and  ardent  lovers  of  their  country, 
who  failed  to  estimate  Mr.  Lincoln  at  his  true  worth,  and 
who  were  strenuously  opposed  to  his  renomination  and  re 
election.  There  were  evidences  of  such  opposition  in  the  lat 
ter  part  of  1863,  and  especially  after  the  meeting  of  Congress 
in  December  of  that  year ;  but  the  movement  received  greatly 
added  strength  with  the  opening  of  1864.  Late  in  February, 
a  secret  circular  made  its  appearance  in  the  interest  of  this 
movement.  Secretary  Welles,  in  his  "  Diary,"  makes  a  refer 
ence  to  it  under  date  of  February  22.  "A  circular  'strictly 
private';  signed  by  Senator  Pomeroy,  and  in  favor  of  Mr. 
Chase  for  President,  has  been  detected  and  published."  1  In 
it,  as  making  against  the  renomination  of  the  President,  there 
was  mention  of  the  "  one  term  principle  "  as  essential  to  the 
safety  of  our  institutions ;  but  plainly  other  objections  to  the 
i  Vol.  1,  p.  529. 


210       THE  EFFECT  OF  LINCOLN'S  REELECTION 

renomination  were  more  forceful.  The  reelection  of  Mr.  Lin 
coln  was  declared  to  be  "  practically  impossible,"  while  equally 
positive  was  the  assertion  that  "  more  of  the  qualities  needed 
in  a  President  during  the  next  four  years "  were  to  be  found 
in  Mr.  Lincoln's  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  the  Honorable 
Salmon  P.  Chase,  than  were  "combined  in  any  other  avail 
able  candidate."  Although  the  circular  was  marked  "  con 
fidential,"  it  soon  found  its  way  into  the  newspapers,  and  Sec 
retary  Chase,  in  a  letter  to  Mr.  Lincoln,  hastened  to  disclaim 
any  knowledge  of  it  before  its  public  appearance.  He  admit 
ted,  however,  the  fact  of  his  candidacy,  and  added,  "  If  there 
is  anything  in  my  action  or  position,  which,  in  your  judgment, 
will  prejudice  the  public  interest  under  my  charge,  I  beg  you 
to  say  so."  l  In  his  reply  Mr.  Lincoln  let  it  be  known  that  he 
"  was  not  shocked  or  surprised  "  by  the  circular,  as  he  was 
not  without  information  concerning  Senator  Pomeroy's  activi 
ties  in  connection  with  the  matter.  But  he  had  known  "  just 
as  little  of  these  things  "  as  his  friends  had  reported,  and  he 
added :  "  Whether  you  shall  remain  at  the  head  of  the  Treas 
ury  Department  is  a  question  which  I  will  not  allow  myself 
to  consider  from  any  standpoint  other  than  my  judgment  of 
the  public  service ;  and,  in  that  view,  I  do  not  perceive  occa 
sion  for  a  change."  2 

1  Private  Life  and  Public  Services  of  Salmon  Portland  Chase,  by  Robert  B. 
Warden,  p.  574. 

2  Complete  Works,  vol.  2,  pp.  489,  490.    In  his  Diary,  John  Hay  says  that, 
on  returning  from  a  short  stay  in  New  York,  he  told  the  President  what  he  had 
heard  concerning  Secretary  Chase's  efforts  "  to  cut  under"  for  the  Republican 
nomination.  He  had  determined,  Mr.  Lincoln  said,  to  shut  his  eyes  to  all  these 
performances,  that  Chase  made  a  good  Secretary,  and  that  he  would  keep  him 
where  he  is.  "  If  he  becomes  President,  all  right !  "  He  added :  "  I  hope  we 
may  never  have  a  worse  man.  I  have  all  along  seen  clearly  his  plan  of  strength 
ening  himself.  Whenever  he  sees  that  an  important  matter  is  troubling  me,  if  I 
am  compelled  to  decide  it  in  a  way  to  give  offence  to  a  man  of  some  influence, 
he  always  ranges  himself  in  opposition  to  me,  and  persuades  the  victim  that  he 
would  have  arranged  it  very  differently.  ...  I  am  entirely  indifferent  to  his 
success  or  failure  in  these  schemes  so  long  as  he  does  his  duty  as  the  head  of 
the  Treasury  Department."  (Harper's  Monthly  Magazine,  January,  1915,  p.  171.) 


UPON  THE  CONFEDERATE  STATES      211 

Prominent  among  the  Senators  who  were  opposed  to  the 
renomination  of  the  President  were  Benjamin  F.  Wade, 
James  W.  Grimes,  and  Henry  Winter  Davis.  The  objection 
urged  against  Mr.  Lincoln  by  these  men,  and  others  outside 
of  the  Senate  who  were  in  agreement  with  them,  have  been 
summarized  as  follows  :  "  He  was  felt  to  be  too  easy-going ;  to 
be  disposed  to  give  too  much  time  to  trifles  ;  to  be  unbusiness 
like  in  his  methods  ;  slow  and  hesitating  where  vigorous  action 
was  required ;  and  the  objection  in  general  was,  that  in  ca 
pacity  and  temperament  he  was  inadequate  to  the  responsibili 
ties  of  the  head  of  the  Nation  at  such  a  momentous  period."  l 
There  can  be  no  question  as  to  the  sincerity  of  the  men  who 
had  come  to  this  conviction  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  unfitness  for  the 
position  in  which  he  had  been  placed.  But  how  imperfect 
their  judgment !  How  completely  and  surprisingly  they  failed 
to  make  any  just  estimate  of  the  President's  true  character 
and  work !  "  Easy-going  "  ;  giving  "  too  much  time  to  trifles  " ; 
in  other  words,  "  a  man  of  infinite  jest."  Yes !  but  who  does 
not  know  that  just  those  characteristics  enabled  Abraham  Lin 
coln  to  bear  his  heavy  burden  of  public  duty  and  responsibil 
ity —  a  burden  heavy  enough  to  crush  one  less  favored  with 
resources  for  change  and  cheer  ?  But  even  if  these  were  de 
fects,  who  does  not  see  that  they  were  greatly  outweighed  by 
the  President's  many  excellences,  recognized  then  and  now 
as  the  outstanding,  shining  qualities  of  mind  and  heart  that 
made  Mr.  Lincoln  the  man  he  was  ? 

As  might  have  been  expected,  the  opposition  weakened 
when  the  country  was  heard  from ;  early  in  June,  1864,  Lin 
coln  was  nominated  at  Baltimore  for  reelection.  But  even 
then,  within  the  ranks  of  his  own  party,  opposition  to  the  Presi 
dent  did  not  cease.  August  14,  there  was  a  meeting  at  the 
house  of  David  Dudley  Field  in  New  York,  at  which  Horace 
Greeley,  Parke  Godwin,  Henry  Winter  Davis,  and  twenty 
or  more  others  were  present,  and  as  a  result  of  the  meeting 

1  Memoir  and  Letters  of  Charles  Sumner,  vol.  4,  p.  195. 


212       THE  EFFECT  OF  LINCOLN'S  REELECTION 

a  committee  was  appointed  to  request  Mr.  Lincoln  to  with 
draw  as  a  candidate.  Charles  Sumner,  it  is  said,  shared  in  the 
opinion  held  by  the  opposition,  as  to  the  President's  "limita 
tions,"  and  thought  a  change  of  candidate  desirable,  "  but  only 
with  Mr.  Lincoln's  free  and  voluntary  withdrawal."  *  The 
same  position  was  taken  by  Senator  Collamer  and  the  Honor 
able  John  Hay. 

A  little  more  than  a  week  later,  Thurlow  Weed,  a  political 
leader  of  ability  and  long  experience,  addressed  a  letter  to  Mr. 
Seward,  in  which  he  used  these  words :  "  When,  ten  days 
since,  I  wrote  to  Mr.  Lincoln  that  his  reelection  was  an  im 
possibility,  I  also  told  him  that  the  information  would  soon 
come  to  him  through  other  channels.  It  has  doubtless  ere  this 
reached  him.  At  any  rate,  nobody  here  doubts  it,  nor  do  I  see 
anybody  from  other  States,  who  authorizes  the  slightest  hope 
of  success.  Mr.  Raymond,2  who  has  just  left  me,  says  that 
unless  some  prompt  and  bold  step  be  now  taken,  all  is  lost. 
The  people  are  wild  for  peace."  3  Who  does  not  now  see  that 
Thurlow  Weed  and  Henry  J.  Raymond  misunderstood  the 
people  as  seriously  as  they  misunderstood  Mr.  Lincoln! 

Evidently  Thurlow  Weed's  visit  to  the  President,  and  the 
emphatic  way  in  which  he  declared  the  impossibility  of  the 
President's  reelection,  together  with  the  "  information  "  that 
doubtless  soon  reached  the  White  House  "  through  other 
channels,"  made  the  designed  impression.  Indeed,  on  the  very 
day  in  which  Mr.  Weed  wrote  to  Mr.  Seward,  the  President 
penned  the  following  memorandum  :  "  This  morning,  as  for 
some  days  past,  it  seems  exceedingly  probable  that  this  Ad 
ministration  will  not  be  reflected.  Then  it  will  be  my  duty  to 
so  cooperate  with  the  President  elect  as  to  save  the  Union 
between  the  election  and  the  inauguration  ;  as  he  will  have 
secured  his  election  on  such  ground,  that  he  cannot  possibly 

1  Memoir  and  Letters  of  Charles  Sumner,  vol.  4,  p.  197. 

2  Editor  of  the  New  York  Times. 

3  Abraham  Lincoln.    A  History,  by  John  G.  Nicolay  and  John  Hay,  vol.  9, 
p.  250. 


UPON  THE  CONFEDERATE  STATES  213 

save  it  afterwards."  Upon  the  back  of  this  memorandum, 
which  was  so  folded  that  it  could  not  be  read,  Mr.  Lincoln 
asked  the  members  of  his  Cabinet  to  write  their  names,  with 
holding  from  them  even  a  hint  as  to  the  nature  of  the  mem 
orandum.  Not  until  after  the  reelection  of  Mr.  Lincoln  did  it 
become  known  that  this  was  the  President's  way  of  pledging 
himself  and  the  members  of  his  Cabinet  to  a  loyal  acceptance 
of  an  anticipated  adverse  verdict  at  the  November  polls.1 

That  adverse  verdict,  however,  was  not  rendered.  The 
nomination  of  General  McClellan,  August  31,  on  a  platform 
designating  as  a  "failure  "  the  attempt  "  to  restore  the  Union 
by  the  experiment  of  war,"  aroused  deep  feeling  in  the  North, 
and  rallied  the  friends  of  the  President  enthusiastically  to  his 
side.  Tidings  from  the  Union  armies  greatly  added  to  this 
enthusiasm.  The  day  following  that  on  which  Thurlow  Weed 
wrote  to  Mr.  Seward,  stating  that  he  had  told  the  President 
he  could  not  be  reflected,  Mobile  surrendered.  A  few  days 
later,  Sherman  captured  Atlanta,  an  achievement  for  which 
Sherman  and  his  soldiers  received  the  thanks  of  the  Nation, 
and  in  honor  of  which  Grant  ordered  a  salute  to  be  fired  from 
shotted  guns  by  every  battery  in  his  lines  before  Richmond 
and  Petersburg.  The  first  of  Sheridan's  brilliant  victories 
over  Early  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  was  won  on  September 
19,  and  the  Nation  was  thrilled  by  the  victor's  report,  "  We 
have  sent  them  whirling  through  Winchester."  On  Septem 
ber  20,  Thurlow  Weed  wrote  to  Mr.  Seward,  announcing  the 
collapse  of  "  the  conspiracy  against  Mr.  Lincoln."  September 
23,  at  Fisher's  Hill,  Sheridan  again  defeated  Early,  captur 
ing  sixty  cannon  and  one  thousand  prisoners.  But  most  thrill 
ing  of  all  in  this  Valley  Campaign  was  the  announcement  of 
the  great  victory  at  Cedar  Creek  on  October  19,  when,  hur 
rying  from  Winchester  after  a  short  visit  to  Washington, 
Sheridan  arrived  in  season  to  turn  defeat  into  a  crowning 

1  Abraham  Lincoln.  A  History,  by  John  G.  Nicolay  and  John  Hay,  vol.  9, 
p.  251. 


214       THE  EFFECT  OF  LINCOLN'S  REELECTION 

victory  —  an  achievement  that  awakened  contagious  enthusi 
asm  throughout  the  North,  and  forever  silenced  the  voices  of 
those  who  had  declared  the  war  a  "failure."  In  fact,  before 
the  close  of  September,  Lincoln's  doubts  as  to  his  reelection 
had  fled.  The  September  elections  in  Maine  and  Vermont 
were  interpreted  as  prophetic  of  coming  victory.  The  Octo 
ber  election  of  the  great  States  of  Pennsylvania,  Ohio,  and 
Indiana  emphasized  the  significance  of  the  September  elec 
tions.  If  there  were  those  who  still  looked  forward  with  grave 
apprehensions  to  November  8  —  as  there  were  —  the  President 
was  not  one  of  them.  When  the  Honorable  E.  B.  Wash- 
burne,  of  Illinois,  one  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  strong  supporters, 
wrote  to  him  on  October  17,  "  It  is  no  use  to  deceive  our 
selves.  .  .  .  There  is  imminent  danger  of  our  losing  the  State," 
Mr.  Lincoln  wrote  on  the  envelope  "  Stampeded,"  and 
quietly  laid  the  letter  aside.1 

The  South,  meanwhile,  had  not  been  an  uninterested  spec 
tator  of  the  progress  of  political  feeling  in  the  North.  The 
importance  of  the  growing  opposition  to  the  reelection  of  Mr. 
Lincoln,  that  had  developed  in  the  loyal  States  in  the  early 
part  of  the  year,  had  been  fully  recognized  by  the  leaders  of 
the  Confederacy.  The  Honorable  Benjamin  H.  Hill,  Senator 
from  Georgia  in  the  Confederate  Congress,  writing  to  the 
Honorable  Alexander  H.  Stephens  on  March  14, 1864,  stated 
his  views  very  frankly.  Lincoln's  defeat  at  the  ensuing  election, 
he  said,  would  be  followed  by  peace.  Elaborating  his  thought, 
he  insisted  that  Mr.  Lincoln's  accession  to  power  was  the 
declaration  of  war.  His  continuance  of  power  had  resulted  in 
the  continuance  of  the  war.  Equally  clear  was  it  to  him  that 
Mr.  Lincoln's  ejection  from  power  would  be  the  end  of  the 
war ;  and  he  added :  "  I  think,  therefore,  that  policy,  as  well 
as  necessity,  indicates  that  we  should  now  make  a  direct  ap 
peal  to  the  people  of  the  United  States  against  Lincoln  and 

1  Abraham  Lincoln.  A  History,  by  John  G.  Nicolay  and  John  Hay,  vol.  9, 
p.  372. 


UPON  THE  CONFEDERATE  STATES  215 

his  policy  and  his  party,  and  make  them  join  issue  at  the  polls 
in  November  —  we  shaping  that  issue."  *•  Such  men  regarded 
with  satisfaction  the  efforts  of  Northern  peacemakers  with 
reference  to  the  Presidency,  while  later  in  the  year,  with  equal 
satisfaction,  they  looked  upon  the  nomination  of  General  Mc- 
Clellan  as  affording  ground  for  hope  that,  with  a  change  of 
administration,  favorable  terms  of  peace  could  be  arranged 
along  lines  mutually  agreeable.  The- "  Charleston  Courier  " 
of  September  7,  therefore,  only  a  few  days  after  the  nomina 
tion  of  McClellan,  gave  expression  to  this  general  feeling  in 
the  South  in  the  following  words :  "  All  of  us  perceive  the 
intimate  connection  existing  between  the  armies  of  the  Con 
federacy  and  the  peace  men  in  the  United  States.  These  con 
stitute  two  immense  forces  that  are  working  together  for  the 
procurement  of  peace.  .  .  .  Our  success  in  battle  insures  the 
success  of  McClellan.  Our  failure  will  inevitably  lead  to  his 
defeat." 2  The  actual  situation,  from  a  Southern  point  of  view, 
could  not  have  been  more  accurately  described. 

The  election  day,  November  8,  came.  In  Washington  the 
day  was  rainy  and  dark.  The  hours  as  they  passed,  however, 
were  not  hours  of  gloom  and  depression  with  the  President 
and  his  friends.  No  doubts  were  awakened  by  even  the  first 
returns  that  were  received  at  the  National  Capital;  and  as  the 
evening  wore  on,  and  from  more  and  more  distant  parts  of 
the  country  telegrams  multiplied,  it  was  made  clear  that  the 
people  of  the  North  had  rallied  in  the  spirit  of  the  soldiers  in 
the  earlier  part  of  the  war,  when  they  sang,  "  We  're  coming 
Father  Abraham,"  not  "  three  hundred  thousand  more,"  but 
a  mighty  host,  giving  the  President,  when  the  total  vote  was 
finally  registered,  212  electoral  votes  ;  while  only  22,  those  of 
New  Jersey,  Maryland,  and  Kentucky,  went  to  McClellan. 

The  public  rejoicings  in  Washington  that  followed  found 

1  Annual  Report  of  the  American  Historical  Association  (1911),  vol.  2,  p.  635. 

2  Abraham  Lincoln.  A  History,  by  John  G.  Nicolay  and  John  Hay,  vol.  9, 
pp.  352,  353. 


216       THE  EFFECT  OF  LINCOLN'S  REELECTION 

varied  expression  from  the  quiet,  undemonstrative  words  of 
the  President  to  the  most  enthusiastic  cheers  of  tumultuous 
crowds.  From  near  and  distant  States  congratulations  poured 
into  the  White  House,  while  General  Grant,  from  his  head 
quarters  at  City  Point,  hastened  to  express  his  own  conviction 
of  the  importance  of  the  victory  that  had  been  won  at  the 
polls.  The  feeling  of  many  a  loyal  heart  in  the  North  was  fit 
tingly  recorded  by  Professor  Charles  Eliot  Norton  in  a  letter 
soon  after  the  election :  "  The  reelection  of  Mr.  Lincoln  was 
a  greater  triumph  over  the  principles  of  the  rebellion  than 
any  military  victory  could  be.  The  8th  of  November,  1864, 
—  the  election  day,  —  will  stand  always  as  one  of  the  most 
memorable  days  in  our  history."  1 

November  1-3, 1864,  I  was  a  prisoner  at  the  headquarters 
of  General  A.  P.  Hill  in  the  outskirts  of  Petersburg ;  and  as 
I  was  paroled,  awaiting  some  inquiries  with  reference  to  my 
capture,  I  had  opportunities  for  frequent  conversations  with 
the  members  of  General  Hill's  staff.  Their  greatest  interest 
in  these  interviews  had  reference  to  the  impending  presidential 
election  in  the  North.  Without  exception  I  found  them  strong 
in  the  conviction  that  General  McClellan  was  to  be  the  suc 
cessful  candidate.  To  my  assertion  that  they  were  deceiving 
themselves  —  that  the  September  and  October  elections  fur 
nished  the  best  possible  evidence  of  the  prevailing  sentiment 
at  the  North  —  they  were  unwilling  to  give  any  consideration 
whatever.  Their  information  was  from  sources  they  evidently 
deemed  trustworthy  in  the  highest  degree,  and  they  remained 
as  firm  in  this  confidence  as  I  in  mine. 

When  in  Richmond,  Virginia,  a  few  years  ago,  I  called  at 
the  City  Bank  on  Colonel  W.  H.  Palmer,  General  Hill's  Ad 
jutant-General,  and  the  surviving  member  of  his  staff.  I  had 
not  seen  him  since  I  was  a  prisoner  at  General  Hill's  head 
quarters.  He  invited  me  to  dine  with  him  at  his  beautiful 
home  in  Richmond ;  and  in  the  course  of  a  long  conversation 
1  Letters  of  Charles  Eliot  Norton,  vol.  1,  p.  282. 


UPON  THE  CONFEDERATE  STATES      217 

that  followed  the  dinner,  Colonel  Palmer  referred  to  the  con 
fident  expectation  he  and  others  entertained  with  reference 
to  the  presidential  election  in  the  North  at  the  time  to  which 
allusion  has  just  been  made.  The  result  was  not  what  they 
expected,  and  it  was  at  once  seen,  he  said,  that  Mr.  Lincoln's 
reelection  could  have  no  other  meaning  than  the  continuance 
of  the  war  —  a  war  to  the  finish.  This  was  the  view  not  of 
the  leaders  only,  but  of  the  men  of  Lee's  army ;  desertions 
began  to  increase,  and  he  added,  "  From  that  time  on,  the 
only  way  we  held  our  army  together  was  by  our  military  execu 
tions."  I  was  greatly  impressed  by  this  statement,  and  also  by 
what  was  further  said  in  reference  to  the  condition  of  affairs 
in  Lee's  army  at  that  time.  Concerning  desertions  to  our  own 
lines  on  the  Petersburg  and  Richmond  front,  to  which  Colonel 
Palmer  referred,  we  had,  of  course,  the  best  of  testimony. 
Moreover,  we  knew  concerning  their  losses  in  battle,  and  were 
aware  that  they  must  have  had  losses  from  sickness.  But  I 
had  not  before  learned  how  great  were  their  losses  by  desert 
ers,  who  turned  their  feet  homeward,  or  to  places  of  security 
in  the  Confederacy.  Recently  I  have  had  the  opportunity  of 
examining  the  "Official  Records  of  the  Union  and  Confed 
erate  Armies  "  with  reference  to  Colonel  Palmer's  statement, 
and  I  find  in  them  abundant  testimony  confirming  it. 

Indications  of  the  general  depressing  effect  of  Lincoln's  re 
election  within  the  Confederate  States  are  not  lacking.  But 
naturally  the  feeling  was  strongest  in  Richmond  and  vicinity. 
In  that  interesting  record  known  as  "  A  Rebel  War  Clerk's 
Diary,"  under  date  of  November  15,  the  significance  of  Mr. 
Lincoln's  reelection  is  mentioned  in  these  words  :  "  The  large 
majorities  for  Lincoln  in  the  United  States  clearly  indicate  a 
purpose  to  make  renewed  efforts  to  accomplish  our  destruc 
tion."  i  But  for  the  most  complete  information  with  reference 
to  the  effect  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  reelection  on  the  Confederate 
army,  we  must  turn  to  the  army  reports.  General  Longstreet, 
i  Vol.  2,  p.  331. 


218       THE  EFFECT  OF  LINCOLN'S  REELECTION 

November  14,  1864,  reported  that  there  were  in  the  guard 
house  about  one  hundred  of  General  Pickett's  men  who  had 
deserted ;  and  he  accounted  "  for  this  state  of  things  by  the 
fact  that  every  man  sentenced  to  be  shot  for  desertion  in  his 
[Pickett's]  division  for  the  past  two  months  has  been  re 
prieved."  l  November  18,  ten  days  after  Lincoln's  reelection, 
General  Lee,  in  forwarding  General  Longstreet's  report,  added 
the  following  endorsement :  "  Respectfully  submitted  for  the 
information  of  the  Secretary  of  War.  Desertion  is  increasing 
in  the  army  notwithstanding  all  my  efforts  to  stop  it.  I  think 
rigid  execution  of  the  law  is  [s^c]  in  the  end.  The  great  want 
in  our  army  is  firm  discipline."  2  The  Secretary  of  War  sent 
General  Longstreet's  report  with  General  Lee's  endorsement 
to  President  Davis,  who  returned  it  November  29,  with  the 
following  somewhat  unamiable  comment :  "  When  deserters 
are  arrested,  they  should  be  tried,  and  if  the  sentences  are 
reviewed,  that  is  not  a  proper  subject  for  the  criticism  of  a 
military  commander."3  Evidently  a  tender  spot  had  been 
reached  by  these  references  to  President  Davis'  action  con 
cerning  court-martial  cases ;  but  the  criticisms  are  also  signifi 
cant  as  to  the  means  deemed  essential,  by  both  Lee  and  Long- 
street,  to  prevent  this  increased  loss  by  desertion,  namely, 
military  executions. 

December  1,  General  A.  P.  Hill,  commanding  the  Third 
Army  Corps,  wrote  as  follows  to  General  Lee :  "  I  have  the 
honor  to  report  the  following  desertions  from  my  command 
since  the  20th  of  November.  Nearly  all  of  the  deserters  went 
to  the  enemy.  Wilcox's  division.  Lane's  brigade,  1  officer 
and  10  men;  Scales'  brigade,  3  men ;  McGowan's  brigade,  4 
men  ;  total,  1  officer  and  17  men.  Mahone's  division,  Finegan's 
brigade,  27  men ;  Sorrel's  brigade,  3  men ;  Sanders'  brigade,  1 
man ;  Weisiger's  brigade,  3  men ;  total,  34  men.  Heth's  division, 
Archer's  brigade,  4  men ;  Cooke's  brigade,  3  men ;  McRae's  bri 
gade,  1  man ;  total,  8  men.  Grand  total,  1  officer  and  59  men."  4 
1  89  W.  R.  1213.  2  89  W.  R.  1213.  8  89  W.  R.  1213.  *  89  W-  R.  1249. 


UPON  THE  CONFEDERATE  STATES  219 

As  the  closing  weeks  of  the  year  passed,  the  same  condi 
tions  were  reported  all  along  the  Confederate  lines.  Presi 
dent  Davis'  message  to  the  Confederate  Congress,  in  which 
he  suggested  the  proposition  to  arm  and  free  forty  thousand 
slaves  to  be  employed  as  engineer  soldiers,  General  Meade 
regarded  as  the  President's  acknowledgment  of  the  exhaustion 
of  the  white  race  in  the  Confederate  States,  as  nothing  else, 
he  said,  would  have  made  President  Davis  willing  to  free  and 
arm  the  black  race;  and  General  Meade  added,  December 
23,  "  I  think  the  Confederacy  is  beginning  to  shake."  * 

In  January  these  disheartening  conditions  within  the  Con 
federate  lines  continued.  On  the  21st,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
J.  H.  Duncan,  Sixteenth  Mississippi  Infantry,  addressed  the 
following  communication  to  Brigadier-General  Joseph  Fine- 
gan,  then  in  command  of  Mahone's  division  of  Hill's  corps : 
"  Desertions  are  becoming  amazingly  numerous,  and  I  beg 
leave  to  submit  for  your  consideration  what  I  esteem  to  be 
the  main  cause  of  this  dissatisfaction,  and  is,  in  my  opinion, 
the  controlling  influence  that  prompts  our  men  thus  to  desert 
—  it  is  the  insufficiency  of  rations.  Our  men  do  not  get 
enough  to  eat.  I  have  been  long  convinced  of  this  important 
fact  from  my  own  careful  observation.  I  have  conversed  with 
the  field  and  line  officers  of  different  regiments  on  this  sub 
ject,  and  their  statements  all  concur  in  establishing  the  above 
facts,  and  unless  something  is  done  soon  to  remove  this  evil, 
which  of  all  others  weighs  most  heavily  on  the  minds  of  the 
troops,  I  fear  that  the  number  of  desertions  will  be  greatly 
increased  during  the  winter."  2  This  communication  General 
Finegan  forwarded  to  corps  headquarters  with  his  approval, 
and  General  Hill  added  the  following  endorsement :  "  I  believe 
that  the  ration  is  insufficient,  yet  nevertheless  other  troops  bear 
without  complaint  these  evils  they  know  we  cannot  help."  3 

January  22,  eight  company  officers  signed  the  following 

1  Life  and  Letters  of  General  Meade,  vol.  2,  pp.  241,  255. 

2  96  W.  R.  1144-45,  8  96  W.  E.  1145. 


220       THE  EFFECT  OF  LINCOLN'S  REELECTION 

communication :  "  The  undersigned,  company  officers  of  the 
9th  Florida  Regiment,  respectfully  call  the  attention  of  the  com 
manding  officer  of  the  regiment  to  the  discontent  of  the  men 
of  their  companies,  which,  noticeable  for  some  time  past,  is 
now  so  general  as  to  deserve  serious  consideration.  They 
give  it  as  their  opinion  that  the  recent  desertions  from  the 
regiment  are  mainly  the  result  of  this  discontentment,  and 
that  the  chief  causes  of  this  state  of  feeling  are  the  insuffi 
ciency  of  rations  and  the  failure  of  the  paymaster  to  pay  the 
men  off."  1  In  forwarding  this  communication,  Colonel  D. 
Lang,  commanding  Finegan's  brigade,  wrote :  "  The  same 
discontent,  resulting  from  the  same  cause,  prevails  to  some 
extent  throughout  the  brigade,  and  is,  I  think,  one  of  the 
main  causes  of  the  large  number  of  desertions  from  the  com 
mand  recently."  2 

Evidently  these  communications  with  reference  to  the  causes 
of  increasing  desertions  in  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia 
had  their  source  in  enquiries  proceeding  from  General  Lee, 
who,  on  January  27,  1865,  in  sending  the  information  thus 
secured  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  wrote  as  follows :  "I  have 
the  honor  to  call  your  attention  to  the  alarming  frequency  of 
desertions  from  this  army.  You  will  perceive  from  the  accom 
panying  papers,  that  fifty-six  deserted  from  Hill's  Corps  in 
three  days.  I  have  endeavored  to  ascertain  the  causes,  and 
think  that  the  insufficiency  of  food  and  non-payment  of  the 
troops  have  more  to  do  with  the  dissatisfaction  among  the 
troops  than  anything  else.  All  commanding  officers  concur 
with  this  opinion.  I  have  no  doubt  that  there  is  suffering  for 
want  of  food.  The  ration  is  too  small  for  men  who  have  to 
undergo  so  much  exposure  and  labor  as  ours.  I  know  there 
are  great  difficulties  in  procuring  supplies  ;  but  I  cannot  help 
thinking  that  with  proper  energy,  intelligence,  and  experience 
on  the  part  of  the  Commissary  Department  a  great  deal  more 
could  be  accomplished."  3 

1  96  W.  R.  1148.  2  96  W.  R.  1149.  8  96  W.  R.  1143. 


UPON  THE  CONFEDERATE  STATES  221 

This  unanimity  of  testimony  concerning  the  increase  of  de 
sertions  in  General  Lee's  army  during  the  closing  weeks  of 
1864,  and  the  beginning  of  1865,  is  noteworthy  as  proceed 
ing  from  officers  of  all  grades  in  the  Confederate  service.  But 
how  ill-informed  these  officers  were  as  to  actual  conditions, 
unless  General  Hill's  qualified  endorsement  may  indicate  that 
in  his  mind  there  was  some  other  cause  for  these  increased 
desertions,  which  he  did  not  deenf  it  best  to  mention !  Un 
questionably  there  was  insufficiency  of  food  in  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia,  and  the  paymaster,  doubtless,  was  destitute 
of  funds  with  which  to  meet  just  requirements ;  but  facts,  at 
hand,  conclusively  show  that  these  were  not  the  real  causes 
of  the  dissatisfaction  among  men  who  never  before  had  fal 
tered  in  their  support  of  their  beloved  commander ;  and  this 
General  Lee  himself  soon  came  to  know,  as  will  later  clearly 
appear. 

There  was  need,  however,  that  something  should  be  done 
if  with  the  opening  of  the  spring  campaign  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  was  to  receive  any  additions  to  its  depleted 
ranks.  Certainly,  Grant  would  not  lack  reinforcements,  and 
Sherman,  having  made  evident,  even  to  casual  observers,  the 
exhaustion  of  the  Confederacy  in  its  southern  parts,  was  now 
on  his  victorious  march  northward  from  Savannah  to  bring 
added  strength  to  the  Union  forces.  The  outlook  for  the  Con 
federacy  was  gloomy,  indeed,  and  it  was  becoming  more  and 
more  gloomy,  day  by  day.  If  the  war  was  to  continue,  the  ques 
tion  in  thoughtful  minds  might  well  arise  all  along  the  lines  in 
front  of  Richmond  and  Petersburg,  "To  what  end  is  the 
struggle  prolonged "  ?  Was  any  answer  possible  that  would 
bring  relief  to  anxious,  troubled  hearts?  Evidently  it  is  not 
too  much  to  say  that  hope  of  any  arrangement  for  peace  less 
than  that  of  unconditional  surrender  was  now  generally  aban 
doned.  To  General  Lee,  however,  it  occurred  to  make  a  per 
sonal  appeal  to  those  who  had  taken  this  hopeless  view  of  the 
situation,  and  singly  or  in  squads  had  dropped  out  of  the 


222       THE  EFFECT  OF  LINCOLN'S  REELECTION 

ranks  and  made  their  way  to  some  secure  retreat.  Would  they 
not  listen  to  the  call  of  their  old  commander,  and  with  the 
promise  of  a  full  and  free  pardon  once  more  take  their  old 
places  in  the  lines?  In  the  hope,  perhaps  in  the  belief,  that 
they  would,  General  Lee,  in  a  letter  to  President  Davis,  pro 
posed  that  a  proclamation  should  be  issued,  "  Calling  all  de 
serters  and  other  absentees  to  return  to  their  proper  commands 
on  the  ground  of  pardon,  if  they  would  do  so  within  a  certain 
time."  On  February  10,  the  President  replied,  approving  of 
such  a  proclamation ;  but,  he  added,  "  It  will  be  well  to  warn 
all  soldiers  that  this  is  the  last  interposition  by  an  amnesty 
for  deserters."  1 

The  proclamation  appeared  on  the  following  day  in  the 
form  of  "  General  Orders  No.  2."  The  soldiers  who  had  so 
long  and  so  nobly  borne  the  hardships  and  dangers  of  war, 
General  Lee  felt,  required  no  exhortation  from  him  to  respond 
to  calls  of  honor  and  duty ;  but  it  was  far  otherwise,  he  asserted, 
in  the  case  of  those  who  by  desertion  had  "  abandoned  their  com 
rades  in  the  hour  of  peril";  and  he  directed  his  words  espe 
cially  to  them,  offering  an  opportunity  in  which  "  to  wipe  out 
the  disgrace  "  they  had  brought  upon  themselves,  and  thus 
"  escape  the  punishment  of  their  crimes  "  by  accepting  the 
pardon  he  was  authorized  to  promise  on  the  authority  of  the 
President  of  the  Confederate  States,  and  by  returning  to 
the  commands  to  which  they  belonged  "  within  the  shortest 
possible  time,  not  exceeding  twenty  days  "  from  the  publica 
tion  of  his  order.  By  the  same  authority  it  was  also  declared 
in  these  orders  that  no  general  amnesty  would  again  be 
granted.2 

Little  consideration  could  have  been  given  to  this  procla 
mation.  Events  attracting  wide  attention  were  now  fast 
crowding  upon  one  another.  The  people  were  beginning  to  be 
heard  from  with  reference  to  the  discontinuance  of  the  war. 
Shortly  after  the  issue  of  General  Orders  No.  2,  the  editor  of 
1  96  W.  R.  1228.  2  96  W.  R.  1229,  1230. 


UPON  THE  CONFEDERATE  STATES  223 

a  newspaper  published  in  Raleigh,  North  Carolina,  discussed 
existing  conditions  in  words  that  were  designed  evidently  not 
only  for  his  regular  readers,  but  also  for  a  much  wider  circle. 
"  Peace  and  equality,"  it  was  claimed,  "  might  be  had  now 
by  conciliation  and  compromise ;  but  if  we  go  on  and  lose,"  it 
was  added,  "we  lose  all  and  become  the  slaves  of  the  con 
querors.  .  .  .  This  is  the  people's  war,  and  we  are  satisfied 
from  our  intercourse  with  them,  that  an  immense  majority  are 
for  stopping  it."  1  Such  freedom  of  expression  was  of  itself 
an  evidence  of  strong  public  feeling,  and  apparently  was  in 
spired  by  a  public  demand. 

Meanwhile  desertions  from  General  Lee's  lines  continued. 
On  February  24,  General  Grant  wrote  to  General  Schofield : 
"Deserters  from  the  rebel  army  are  growing  very  numerous. 
Many  are  now  bringing  their  arms  with  them.  This  morning 
forty-five  came  in  a  single  squad  and  from  a  single  regiment 
—  a  South  Carolina  regiment  at  that."  2 

At  the  same  time  General  Lee  was  receiving  new  light 
with  reference  to  his  losses  by  desertion.  He  now  knew  that 
the  occasion  of  these  losses  was  something  more  serious  than 
a  lack  of  food  and  the  absence  of  the  paymaster ;  and  on  the 
same  day  that  Grant  wrote  to  Schofield,  General  Lee  wrote  to 
the  Confederate  Secretary  of  War  as  follows  :  "  I  regret  to  be 
obliged  to  call  your  attention  to  the  alarming  number  of  de 
sertions  that  are  now  occurring  in  the  army.  Since  the  12th 
instant  [i.e.,  almost  from  the  time  of  the  issue  of  the  amnesty 
offer  to  deserters]  they  amount  in  two  divisions  of  Hill's  corps 
— those  of  Wilcox  and  Heth  —  to  about  400.  There  are  a 
good  many  from  other  commands.  The  desertions  are  chiefly 
from  the  North  Carolina  regiments,  and  especially  those  from 
the  western  part  of  the  State.  It  seems  that  the  men  are  influ 
enced  very  much  by  the  representations  of  their  friends  at 
home,  who  appear  to  have  become  very  despondent  as  to  our 
success.  They  think  the  cause  desperate  and  write  to  the  sol- 

1  Rhodes'  History  of  the  United  States,  vol.  5,  p.  75.  2  99  W.  R.  558. 


224       THE  EFFECT  OF  LINCOLN'S  REELECTION 

diers,  advising  them  to  take  care  of  themselves,  assuring  them 
that  if  they  will  return  home  the  bands  of  deserters  so  far 
outnumber  the  home  guards  that  they  will  be  in  no  danger  of 
arrest.  I  do  not  know  what  can  be  done  to  prevent  this  evil, 
unless  some  change  can  be  wrought  in  the  state  of  public  senti 
ment  by  the  influence  of  prominent  citizens  of  the  State.  The 
deserters  generally  take  their  arms  with  them.  I  shall  do  all 
in  my  power  to  remedy  the  evil  by  a  stern  enforcement  of  the 
law,  but  that  alone  will  not  suffice.  I  have  thought  that  you 
might  be  able  to  enlist  the  aid  of  prominent  citizens  of  North 
Carolina,  who  might  do  something  to  cheer  and  stimulate  the 
people.  These  desertions  have  a  very  bad  effect  upon  the 
troops  who  remain  and  give  rise  to  painful  apprehensions."  l 

In  all  the  Confederate  correspondence  in  the  "  Official 
Records"  connected  with  the  closing  months  of  the  Civil 
War,  I  know  of  nothing  more  pathetic  than  this  letter  of  the 
General-in-Chief  of  the  Confederate  armies.  Evidently,  how 
ever,  the  situation  was  not  one  that  could  be  aided  by  efforts 
along  the  lines  suggested  by  General  Lee.  As  we  have  seen, 
the  people  of  the  South,  and  especially  of  North  Carolina, 
were  beginning  to  take  things  into  their  own  hands.  Under 
these  circumstances,  General  Lee's  assertion  of  his  purpose  to 
do  all  in  his  power  to  put  an  end  to  desertions  in  his  army 
"  by  a  stern  enforcement  of  the  law,"  —  in  other  words  by 
military  executions,  —  opens  before  us  a  view  of  the  situation 
at  Petersburg  and  Richmond  that  no  one  of  us  at  the  time,  I 
am  sure,  could  hardly  have  imagined.  Yet  even  a  lower  depth 
of  despondency  in  the  heart  of  the  Confederate  leader  is  re 
vealed  in  a  letter  which  General  Lee,  on  the  following  day, 
February  25,  addressed  to  General  Cooper,  Adjutant  and 
Inspector-General,  replying  to  a  request  to  suspend  the  execu 
tion  of  a  soldier  who  had  been  condemned  to  death  for  deser 
tion.  "  Private  Huddleston's  execution,"  General  Lee  wrote, 
"  will  be  suspended  as  directed.  Have  reexamined  case,  and 
1  96  W.  R.  1254. 


UPON  THE  CONFEDERATE  STATES  225 

he  is  not  entitled  to  mercy  under  General  Orders  No.  2.  Hun 
dreds  of  men  are  deserting  nightly,  and  I  cannot  keep  the 
army  together  unless  examples  are  made  of  such  cases."  1 
These  last  words  are  almost  a  repetition  of  the  statement 
made  to  me  by  Colonel  Palmer  at  the  interview  mentioned 
already,  when  he  said  that  after  Lincoln's  reelection  "  the 
only  way  we  kept  our  army  together  was  by  our  military  exe 
cutions." 

Notwithstanding  these  extreme  measures  the  losses  by  de 
sertion  greatly  increased.  As  General  Lee  said,  hundreds  of 
men  at  Petersburg  and  Richmond  deserted  nightly.  This  was 
made  more  clearly  to  appear  three  days  later,  February  28, 
when,  from  his  headquarters  at  Petersburg,  General  Lee  wrote 
to  the  Honorable  J.  C.  Breckinridge,  Secretary  of  AYar,  con 
cerning  desertions  in  his  army  between  February  15  and  25. 
In  the  three  divisions  of  Longstreet's  corps  there  were  in  these 
ten  days  148  desertions ;  in  Early's  corps,  143  ;  in  Hill's 
corps,  586 ;  and  in  B.  R.  Johnson's  division  of  Anderson's 
corps,  21T.  The  total  number  was  1094.  "Most  of  these  men," 
General  Lee  said,  "  are  supposed  to  have  gone  to  their  homes, 
but  a  number  have  deserted  to  the  enemy.  In  B.  R.  Johnson's 
division  alone  178  are  reported  to  have  gone  over  to  the  en 
emy.  In  addition  to  the  above,  General  Gordon  reports  that 
on  the  night  of  the  26th  from  75  to  100  of  Grimes'  division 
deserted,  and  15  from  Johnson's  .  .  .  division.  These  men 
generally  went  off  in  bands,  taking  arms  and  ammunition ; 
and  I  regret  to  say  that  the  greatest  number  of  desertions 
have  occurred  among  the  North  Carolina  troops,  who  have 
fought  as  gallantly  as  any  soldiers  in  the  army."  A  large 
detachment  from  Heth's  division  of  Hill's  corps  had  been  sent 
to  certain  counties  in  North  Carolina  with  a  view  to  the  arrest 
of  the  deserters ;  and  a  brigade  had  been  detached  to  guard 
the  ferries  of  the  Roanoke.  "  I  have  only  heard  as  yet  of 
sixty-three  having  been  captured,"  the  writer  continues,  and 
i  96  W.  E.  1258. 


226       THE  EFFECT  OF  LINCOLN'S  REELECTION 

he  adds,  "  I  shall  do  all  in  my  power  to  arrest  the  evil ;  but  I 
am  convinced,  as  already  stated  to  you,  that  it  proceeds  from 
the  discouraging  sentiment  out  of  the  army,  which,  unless  it 
can  be  changed,  will  bring  us  calamity."  The  communication 
closed  with  words  that  reveal  the  depth  of  the  writer's  feel 
ings  occasioned  by  the  situation,  as  he  adds:  "  This  defection 
in  troops  who  have  acted  so  nobly  and  borne  so  much  is  so 
distressing  to  me  that  I  have  thought  proper  to  give  you  the 
particulars."  l 

The  failure  of  the  Hampton  Roads  Conference  seemed  to 
leave  no  opportunity  for  added  peace  considerations,  except 
upon  the  conditions  laid  down  by  Mr.  Lincoln  at  that  time. 
However,  a  few  weeks  later,  in  an  interview  between  General 
Longstreet  and  General  Ord,  of  the  Union  army,  with  refer 
ence  to  an  exchange  of  prisoners,  further  conversation  was 
held,  which,  as  reported  to  General  Lee,  led  him  to  suppose 
that  General  Grant  would  favor  a  military  convention  or  con 
ference  for  the  consideration  of  matters  relating  to  peace,  and 
General  Lee  at  once  seized  upon  the  opportunity  to  ask  Gen 
eral  Grant  for  such  a  meeting.  This  request  General  Grant 
forwarded  to  President  Lincoln,  who  promptly  replied  through 
Mr.  Stanton,  the  Secretary  of  War,  though  the  words  of  the 
reply  were  penned  by  the  President  himself.  Emphasizing  in 
this  way  his  complete  mastery  of  the  situation,  Mr.  Lincoln 
informed  General  Grant  that  he  was  not  to  have  any  confer 
ence  with  General  Lee  except  for  the  capitulation  of  his  army, 
or  on  some  purely  military  matters ;  adding  that  he  held  such 
matters  "  in  his  own  hands,"  and  would  "  submit  them  to  no 
military  conferences  or  conventions."2  This  reply  was  trans 
mitted  to  General  Lee  on  March  3  and  any  hopes  awakened 
by  the  suggestion  of  a  military  conference  or  convention  were 
at  once  destroyed. 

The  feeling  of  despondency  in  General  Lee's  army  was  now 
more  and  more  apparent,  and  it  was  no  less  apparent  among 
1  96  W.  R.  1265.  2  96  W.  R.  801,  802,  1264. 


UPON  THE  CONFEDERATE  STATES      227 

the  people  generally  throughout  the  South,  many  "  prominent 
citizens,"  to  whom  a  little  while  before  General  Lee  desired 
that  an  appeal  should  be  made  to  aid  in  preventing  desertions, 
now  sharing  in  this  feeling.  In  a  letter  written  on  March  5, 
Colonel  Walter  H.  Taylor,  Lee's  Adjutant-General,  made 
mention  of  what  had  now  come  to  be  a  general  conviction  as 
to  the  situation.  "  Some  high  in  authority,"  he  writes,  "  tell 
us  that  the  people  are  tired  ,  .  .  and  that  public  sentiment 
has  undergone  a  change.  Claiming  to  be  prompted  by  a  desire 
to  prevent  a  further  effusion  of  blood,  these  talk  of  terms  and 
reconstruction."  However,  he  did  not  consider  the  situation 
hopeless,  he  said,  by  any  means ;  and  yet  he  was  constrained 
to  add  :  "  I  confess  matters  are  far  worse  than  I  ever  expected 
to  see  them."  l  One  gleam  of  hope,  nevertheless,  now  seems  to 
have  been  discovered  in  dreams  of  a  possible  juncture  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia  with  Johnston's  army  in  North 
Carolina ;  but  it  proved  to  be  only  the  merest  glimmer. 

For  like  conditions  in  Virginia  were  discoverable  elsewhere 
if  one  only  looked.  On  the  same  day  in  which  Colonel  Tay 
lor  made  this  record,  the  Honorable  J.  A.  Campbell,  the  As 
sistant  Secretary  of  War,  gave  expression  to  his  views  con 
cerning  the  situation  in  a  letter  to  the  head  of  the  Department. 
"  General  Preston  2  reports  that  there  are  over  100,000  de 
serters  scattered  over  the  Confederacy;  that  so  common  is 
the  crime,  it  has  in  popular  estimation  lost  the  stigma  which 
justly  pertains  to  it,  and  therefore  the  criminals  are  every 
where  shielded  by  their  families  and  by  the  sympathies  of 
many  communities."  Nor  was  this  all.  "  The  States  of  North 
Carolina,  South  Carolina,  Georgia,  and  perhaps  others,"  he 
adds,  "  have  passed  laws  to  withdraw  from  service  men  liable 
to  it  under  existing  laws,  and  these  laws  have  the  support  of 
local  authorities."  3  This  was  an  application  of  the  doctrine 
of  States'  rights  that  could  hardly  have  been  anticipated. 

*  Four  Years  with  General  Lee,  p.  144. 

2  Head  of  Bureau  of  Conscription.  8  108  W.  R.  1065. 


228       THE  EFFECT  OF  LINCOLN'S  REELECTION 

The  use  of  negro  troops  in  the  service  of  the  Confederacy  had 
been  under  consideration  in  official  circles  for  some  time,  and 
a  bill  for  the  employment  of  such  troops  was  now  passed  by 
the  Confederate  Congress.  On  March  16,  advertisements  for 
recruiting  negro  soldiers  appeared  in  the  Richmond  papers.1 
This  action  by  the  Confederate  Congress  had  the  sanction  of 
General  Lee,  and  on  March  24,  evidently  under  the  pressure 
of  conditions  in  his  army,  he  wrote  to  President  Davis :  "I 
have  the  honor  to  ask  that  you  will  call  upon  the  governor  of 
the  State  of  Virginia  for  the  whole  number  of  negroes,  slave 
and  free,  between  the  ages  of  18  and  45,  for  services  as  sol 
diers  authorized  by  the  joint  resolution  adopted  by  the  Senate 
and  House  of  Delegates  of  the  State  [of  Virginia]  on  the 
4th  of  March.  The  services  of  these  men  are  now  necessary 
to  enable  us  to  oppose  the  enemy."  2 

When  General  Lee  wrote  these  words  he  was  making  his 
final  preparations  for  an  attack  upon  the  Union  lines  at  Fort 
Stedman  in  front  of  Petersburg.  General  Gordon,  to  whom 
General  Lee  entrusted  this  movement,  tells  us  that  it  had  as 
its  aim  "  the  disintegration  of  the  whole  left  wing  of  the  Fed 
eral  army,  or  at  least  the  dealing  of  such  a  staggering  blow 
upon  it  as  would  disable  it  temporarily,  enabling  us  to  with 
draw  from  Petersburg  in  safety,  and  join  Johnston  in  North 
Carolina."  This,  certainly,  was  quite  an  undertaking  for  an 
army  in  desperate  conditions.  The  venture,  however,  was 
carefully  planned,  and  the  dash  at  Fort  Stedman,  in  its  first 
reaches  as  outlined,  was  successful.  The  Union  pickets  were 
completely  surprised,  supposing  that  this  early  morning  on- 
rushing  was  that  of  a  still  larger  band  of  deserters.3  But  only 
the  first  rush  was  successful.4  This  was  to  have  been  followed 

i  A  Rebel  War  Clerk's  Diary,  vol.  2,  pp.  444,  450.  2  97  W.  R.  1339. 

8  "  The  six  hundred  prisoners  were  completely  surprised — their  pickets 
supposing  our  troops  to  be  merely  deserters.  This  indicates  an  awful  state 
of  things,  the  enemy  being  convinced  that  we  are  beaten,  demoralized,  etc." 
(A  Rebel  War  Clerk's  Diary,  vol.  2,  p.  459.) 

4  General  James  A.  Walker,  who  commanded  the  division  of  Gordon's  corps 


UPON  THE  CONFEDERATE  STATES  229 

by  an  equally  rapid  movement  upon  the  three  forts  in  the 
rear  of  Fort  Stedman.  But  the  meaning  of  the  attack  was 
already  revealed,  and  General  Hartranft,  with  his  division  of 
Pennsylvanians,  soon  made  it  impossible  for  Gordon  "to 
make  further  headway."  As  General  Gordon  says,  he  could 
not  carry  out  his  plan  in  the  face  of  "  Grant's  gathering  and 
overwhelming  forces."  Some  of  those  who  attempted  to  re 
turn  to  the  Confederate  lines  succeeded  in  the  venture,  but 
many  did  not  make  the  attempt.  Colonel  Taylor  says  the 
Confederate  loss  that  morning  was  between  2500  and  3000 
men.  General  Parke,  in  his  general  order  concerning  the 

that  held  the  line  of  trenches  from  which  the  assault  on  Fort  Stedman  was 
made  and  led  it,  relates  an  incident  that  illustrates  conditions  in  the  attacking 
forces  when  they  reached  this  point  in  the  movement.  He  says :  "  When  the 
head  of  the  column  reached  the  enemy's  works,  and  the  first  files  were  lying 
down  behind  the  breastworks  at  the  point  where  those  before  them  had  crossed, 
I  enquired  for  the  officer  in  command,  but  getting  no  answer,  ordered  the  men 
to  move  forward,  which  they  did.  We  had  just  crossed  over,  when  a  soldier 
sprang  in  front  and  said,  '  These  are  my  men  and  they  shall  not  go.'  I  de 
manded  who  he  was,  and  he  replied  that  he  was  captain  of  that  company,  and 
that  his  men  should  not  be  slaughtered.  He  was  ordered  to  lead  his  men  for 
ward,  but  positively  refused,  and  when  he  did  so  I  made  a  blow  at  his  head 
with  my  sabre,  which  he  dodged  and  then  rushed  at  me  with  the  point  of  his 
infantry  sword.  I  stepped  aside,  and  drawing  my  pistol  from  my  belt,  with  the 
muzzle  almost  touching  his  head,  pulled  the  trigger.  The  cap  did  not  explode 
and  then  his  men  ran  between  us,  as  I  was  about  to  make  a  second  attempt  to 
shoot,  saying,  '  Don't  shoot,  General.  He  is  our  captain  and  a  brave  man.' 
The  captain  then  said  he  was  ready  to  go  forward,  and  tried  to  excuse  his  con 
duct  by  pretending  that  he  did  not  know  me  by  the  starlight,  and  that,  if  he 
had  recognized  me,  he  would  have  obeyed  my  orders ;  but  I  refused  to  accept 
his  explanation,  and  told  him  that  I  would  have  him  oourt-martialled  and  shot 
if  we  both  came  out  of  the  battle  alive.  ...  As  to  the  captain,  I  never  saw 
him  again,  as  he  did  not  return  to  the  Confederate  lines.  What  his  fate  was  I 
do  not  know.  He  may  have  been  killed  that  morning,  but  it  is  most  likely  that 
he  suffered  himself  to  be  captured,  rather  than  return  and  be  shot  by  a  sen 
tence  of  court-martial.  I  have  always  declined  to  give  the  name  or  regiment 
of  this  man.  If  he  or  his  descendants  are  alive,  I  would  not  give  them  pain  by 
publishing  him.  He  had  a  good  record  as  a  soldier,  and  was  unquestionably  a 
brave  man.  Why  he  acted  as  he  did  on  that  occasion  can  readily  be  accounted 
for.  He  saw,  as  nearly  all  the  men  in  the  ranks  saw,  that  the  Confederate  cause 
was  hopeless,  and  that  they  were  shedding  their  blood  in  vain,  and  that  valor 
and  patriotism  must  inevitably  yield  to  the  overwhelming  numbers  and  re 
sources."  (Southern  Historical  Society  Papers,  vol.  31,  pp.  26,  27.) 


230       THE  EFFECT  OF  LINCOLN'S  REELECTION 

attack,  mentions  the  capture  of  1941  prisoners,  including  71 
commissioned  officers,  besides  many  killed  and  wounded. 
"  Lee  knew,"  says  General  Gordon,  "  as  we  all  did,  that  the 
chances  against  us  were  as  a  hundred  is  to  one.  ...  It 
seemed  better  therefore,  to  take  the  one  chance,  though  it 
might  be  one  in  a  thousand,  rather  than  to  stand  still  while 
the  little  army  was  being  depleted,  its  vitality  lessening  with 
each  setting  sun,  and  its  life  gradually  ebbing,  while  the 
great  army  in  its  front  was  growing  and  strengthening  day 
by  day."  1 

The  fight  at  Fort  Stedman,  as  has  already  appeared,  was 
in  the  early  morning  of  March  25.  On  that  day  General 
Longstreet  wrote  a  long  letter  to  General  Lee.  In  it,  how 
ever,  he  made  no  mention  of  the  attack  upon  the  Union  lines. 
His  thoughts  were  still  busy  with  the  alarming  increase  in 
the  number  of  desertions.  Referring  to  the  fact  that  Georgians 
at  home  were  writing  to  the  Georgia  troops  in  his  command, 
offering  to  them  inducements  to  return  and  join  home  organ 
izations,  increasing  desertions  in  this  way,  he  urged  "  the 
publication  of  a  general  order  warning  all  officers  or  persons 
authorized  to  raise  local  organizations  against  receiving  such 
deserters,  or  in  any  way  harboring  them,  and  cautioning  all  such 
parties  that  they  shall  be  punished  for  such  crimes  under  the 
22d  and  23d  articles  of  war."  The  letter  was  closed  with  the 
following  words :  "  If  these  matters  are  not  speedily  taken 
hold  of  by  a  firm  hand,  I  fear  that  we  shall  be  seriously  dam 
aged  by  them."  2 

Two  days  later,  March  27,  General  Lee,  in  a  report  to  the 
Secretary  of  War,  stated  that  from  March  9  to  18,  both  in 
clusive,  there  were  "1061  desertions,  with  only  partial  re 
ports  from  the  artillery  and  cavalry,  which  would  increase  the 

1  Reminiscences  of  the  Civil  War,  p.  412.  But  "to  stand  still"  was  not  the 
only  alternative.  The  deserters  evidently  held  that  it  was  better  to  stop  fight 
ing-  than  to  continue  with  chances  against  them  of  one  in  a  hundred  or  of  one  in 
a  thousand. 

2  From  Manassas  to  Appomattox,  pp.  651,  652. 


UPON  THE  CONFEDERATE  STATES      231 

number  considerably."  The  largest  number,  he  said,  was  from 
Longstreet's  corps,  Pickett's  division  "having  lost  512  men 
while  moving  recently."  Expressing  the  hope  that  some  of 
the  men  would  return,  he  added,  "  but  the  number  is  very 
large,  and  gives  rise  to  painful  apprehensions  as  to  the  fu 
ture."  i 

On  the  same  day,  in  accordance  with  General  Longstreet's 
suggestion,  General  Lee  issued  an  order  in  which,  referring 
to  persons  who  were  inducing  soldiers  to  return  home,  he  re 
minded  them  that  "  the  penalty  for  advising  or  persuading  a 
soldier  to  desert  is  death  "  ;  and  he  directed  that  this  order, 
and  the  23d  Article  of  War,  should  be  "  forthwith  read  to  each 
company  in  the  army  once  a  day  for  three  days,  and  to  every 
regiment  at  dress  parade  once  a  week  for  a  month  ;  and  at  such 
other  times  hereafter  ...  as  commanding  officers  may  deem 
proper."  2  Events  now  were  hastening  so  rapidly,  however, 
that  the  order  could  not  have  had  many  of  these  prescribed 
readings. 

Of  course  General  Grant  was  fully  informed  concerning 
these  conditions.  "I  knew  from  the  great  number  of  desert 
ers,"  he  writes,  "that  the  men  who  had  fought  so  bravely,  so 
gallantly,  and  so  long  for  the  cause  which  they  believed  in  — 
and  as  earnestly,  I  take  it,  as  our  men  believed  in  the  cause 
for  which  they  were  fighting —  had  lost  hope."  3  The  evidence, 
as  we  have  seen,  is  abundant.  The  large  losses  of  the  Con 
federates  at  Five  Forks  on  March  31  and  at  Petersburg  on 
April  1  and  2  —  at  the  former  7000  and  at  the  latter  6000, 
according  to  Colonel  Taylor  —  reveal  the  fighting  qualities  that 
were  still  exhibited  in  this  remnant  of  Lee's  army ;  but  it  also 
reveals  just  as  clearly  a  deep-seated  conviction  on  the  part  of 
many  of  its  rank  and  file  that  further  loss  of  life  was  uncalled 
for.  "Not  over  25,000,"  says  Colonel  Taylor,  "began  the  re 
treat  that  terminated  at  Appomattox  Court  House."  4 

1  97  W.  R.  1353.        2  97  W.  R.  1357.       3  Personal  Memoirs,  pp.  42(5,  427. 
*  Four  Years  with  General  Lee,  pp.  187,  188. 


232       THE  EFFECT  OF  LINCOLN'S  REELECTION 

The  losses  multiplied  during  the  retreat  of  the  Confederate 
army.  In  a  letter  dated  April  3,  General  Meade  wrote: 
"  Lee,  broken  and  dispirited,  has  retreated  towards  Lynch- 
burg  and  Danville.  .  .  .  The  last  estimate  of  our  prisoners 
amounted  to  15,000,  and  deserters  and  stragglers  are  being 
picked  up  by  the  thousands."  1  Lee,  however,  did  not  reach 
either  Lynchburg  or  Danville,  and  six  days  later  he  sur 
rendered  the  remnant  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  at 
Appomattox.  The  end  at  length  had  come.  It  was  the  only 
end  that  could  come  after  President  Lincoln's  reelection.  The 
sorrow  of  those  who  had  held  out  to  the  end,  and  had  failed 
in  the  endeavor  that  had  animated  them  through  four  long 
years,  we  can  well  understand.  Non-realization  naturally 
brings  disappointment  and  despondency.  In  the  lapse  of  years, 
however,  a  new  point  of  view  is  not  unf requently  reached,  and 
the  retrospect  shows  that  the  sorrow  has  been  healed.  In  the 
introduction  to  his  "  Military  Memoirs  of  a  Confederate,"  2 
General  E.  P.  Alexander,  who  directed  the  Confederate  artil 
lery  fire  at  Gettysburg  which  preceded  Pickett's  charge,  has 
recorded  his  own  change  of  view  in  these  memorable  words : 
"  The  world  has  not  stood  still  in  the  years  since  we  took  up 
arms  for  what  we  deemed  our  most  invaluable  right  —  that 
of  self-government.  We  now  enjoy  the  rare  privilege  of  see 
ing  what  we  fought  for  in  the  retrospect.  It  no  longer  seems 
desirable.  It  would  now  prove  only  a  curse.  We  have  good 
cause  to  thank  God  for  our  escape  from  it,  not  alone  for  our 
sake,  but  for  that  of  the  whole  country,  and  even  of  the 
world." 

1  Life  and  Letters  of  General  Meade,  vol.  2,  p.  269.  2  Page  viii. 


XII 
THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MANILA  IN  1898 

BY 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  CHARLES  A.  WHITTIER,  U.S.V. 


Read  before  the  Society  February  4, 1908 


THE   OCCUPATION  OF  MANILA  IN  1898 

ON  the  llth  of  May,  1898,  it  was  decided  in  "Washington 
that  Wesley  Merritt,  Major-General,  United  States  Army, 
should  be  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  expedition  to  the 
Philippines,  and,  upon  the  occupation  of  Manila,  be  made 
Military  Governor.  He  was  summoned  to  Washington  that 
night,  and  accepted  the  appointment.  About  the  30th  of 
May  he  arrived  in  San  Francisco. 

The  first  expedition,  under  command  of  Brigadier-General 
Anderson  (consisting  of  about  2380  men),  left  Honolulu  on 
the  4th  of  June.  Some  troops  were  already  at  San  Francisco, 
and  more  continued  to  arrive.  A  small  proportion  of  regular 
regiments  and  batteries,  in  which  there  were  many  raw  re 
cruits  (the  rest  volunteer  regiments  just  enlisted),  made  up 
this  force.  Fine-looking  men  from  California,  Idaho,  North 
Dakato,  Minnesota,  Oregon,  Utah,  Tennessee,  Kansas,  Wash 
ington,  Montana,  and  Nebraska  were  the  components  of  this 
army.  Much  time  was  necessary  to  accustom  these  raw  troops 
to  the  habits  of  camp  life,  drill,  and  discipline.  Their  adapt 
ability  was  wonderful,  and  it  was  an  extraordinary  circum 
stance  that  by  the  29th  of  June  all  the  troops  had  sailed  and 
reached  Manila,  with  very  few  casualties,  and  in  an  extraor 
dinary  state  of  efficiency. 

The  second  expedition  was  composed  of  about  2428  men, 
and  commanded  by  General  Francis  V.  Greene;  and  the 
third,  under  General  MacArthur,  about  4603. 

During  the  time  spent  in  San  Francisco,  there  was  constant 
talk  of  our  troops  on  the  Atlantic  Coast  going  to  Cuba,  and 
constant  postponements,  for  one  reason  or  another.  About 
the  25th  of  June,  there  were  rumors  that  Camara  had  sailed 
from  Spain  and  was  then  at  the  Isthmus  of  Suez,  and  was  to 


236          THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MANILA  IN  1898 

proceed  at  once  to  Manila.  On  the  26th  of  June  General 
Merritt  received  a  telegram,  urging  a  quick  despatch  to  Manila 
—  direct  if  possible ;  that  is,  without  stopping  at  Honolulu. 
But  the  agent  of  the  Pacific  Mail  Company  said  that  this  was 
impossible. 

On  the  27th  the  Indiana,  City  of  Para,  Ohio,  and  Morgan 
City  sailed.  On  the  28th,  the  Valencia,  and  on  the  29th,  the 
Newport,  with  General  Merritt  and  about  twenty-five  officers, 
and  Batteries  D  and  K  of  the  Third  Artillery,  and  the  Astor 
Battery  —  the  latter  an  excellent  organization  and  very  well 
officered,  a  fine  quality  of  men. 

In  the  doubt  attending  the  movements  of  Camara,  Gen 
eral  Merritt 's  instructions  were  to  proceed  to  a  point  six  hun 
dred  miles  due  east  of  Cape  Engano,  —  a  northern  point  of 
the  Island  of  Luzon,  —  there  to  be  met  by  a  war-vessel,  a 
convoy,  if  one  could  be  spared  by  Admiral  Dewey. 

On  the  4th  of  July  a  dinner,  rather  better  than  usual,  was 
served  to  the  men,  and  an  oration  given  by  the  chaplain.  The 
oratory  of  several  of  the  officers  was  aired  at  lunch.  In  the 
afternoon,  owing  to  some  deficiency  in  the  machinery,  there 
was  a  delay  of  a  few  hours.  The  "  blower  "  broke  —  probably 
with  envy  of  the  speech-makers. 

On  the  6th  of  July  the  transports  of  the  third  division  ar 
rived  at  Honolulu,  with  the  exception  of  the  Newport,  which 
arrived  at  about  seven  on  the  morning  of  the  7th.  While  the 
ship  was  coaling,  the  day  was  spent  by  the  Commanding  Gen 
eral  in  consultation  with  the  United  States  Minister,  Sewell, 
with  President  Dole,  in  the  establishment  of  a  hospital,  etc., 
and  the  next  day  (the  8th)  the  transport  departed. 

There  was  great  discussion  among  the  officers  on  the  New 
port  as  to  whether  it  was  better  for  the  ships  to  sail  separately 
or  to  keep  together,  and  all  sorts  of  plans  —  some  of  which 
might  be  deemed  impracticable  —  were  suggested.  One  — 
which  at  the  time  seemed  absurd  —  was  that  the  vessels  should 
keep  together,  and  in  the  event  of  any  Spanish  warships  ap- 


THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MANILA  IN  1898          237 

pearing,  should  bear  down  on  them  and  engage  their  men  in 
a  hand-to-hand  conflict  and  take  possession  of  their  ships, 
without  any  artillery  which  could  be  used  by  us.  After  the 
showing  made  by  the  Spaniards  in  their  naval  engagements, 
perhaps  this  was  not  so  absurd. 

General  Merritt  decided  to  go  on  with  the  Newport,  which 
was  faster  than  the  other  vessels.  On  the  19th  of  July,  at 
four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  Asuncion  Island  was  sighted; 
also  Farallon  de  Pajaros  (at  8.15),  an  active  volcano.  The 
view  at  sunset  and  during  the  evening  was  very  beautiful. 

On  the  23d  of  July  Point  Engano  was  sighted  —  about  426 
miles  from  Manila.  Almost  all  the  lights  on  the  Newport 
were  extinguished.  No  convoy  from  Admiral  Dewey  had  been 
met  and  there  was  complete  ignorance  as  to  events;  but  on  the 
24th  of  July,  at  about  eight  o'clock  in  the  morning,  a  steam 
ship,  with  the  American  flag,  was  sighted,  moving  towards 
China,  which  clearly  showed  that  no  Spanish  fleet  was  in  those 
waters.  This  was  the  last  day  of  the  long  journey,  of  which 
was  noted  at  the  time,  in  a  journal  kept  by  one  of  the  offi 
cers  :  "  The  most  noticeable  thing  is  the  admirable  quality  and 
conduct  of  all  the  men  on  board.  No  quarrelling,  no  unusual 
noises,  no  drunkenness  since  we  started.'* 

About  six  that  evening  the  blackest  rain-cloud  appeared, 
but  diminished  as  the  steamer  went  in.  There  was  hard  rain 
all  night,  and  strong  wind.  It  seemed  very  much  like  a 
typhoon,  but  fortunately  it  was  escaped.  The  daily  perform 
ance  of  the  steamer  was  292  miles;  303;  303;  311;  307; 
317;  312;  313;  327;  322;  303;  323;  333;  320;  285;  and 
275  miles;  and  on  the  25th  of  July,  at  9.30  A.M.,  Corregidor 
Island  was  passed  and  Manila  was  soon  reached.  The  ther 
mometer  registered  from  80°  to  89°  during  the  voyage. 

Admiral  Dewey  at  once  called  upon  General  Merritt  and 
gave  news  of  the  surrender  of  the  Spanish  army  at  Santiago, 
and  destruction  of  their  navy,  and  that  the  Spanish  fleet,  re 
ported  at  Suez  Canal  when  our  expedition  left  San  Francisco, 


238  THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MANILA  IN  1898 

had  returned  to  Spain.  The  Admiral  also  stated  that  he  had 
made  up  his  mind,  in  case  he  received  information  of  Camara 
coming  on  towards  Manila,  to  abandon  Manila  Bay  and  to 
sail  east  to  meet  his  monitors.  Also  the  annexation  of  Hawaii 
to  the  United  States  was  reported. 

This  was  the  rainy  reason  of  Manila  and  it  rained  pretty 
severely  every  day  and  night.  The  temperature  continued  at 
about  80°  at  all  times.  No  lights  were  permitted  to  be  dis 
played  on  any  of  the  vessels  during  the  night. 

A  peculiar  condition  of  things  existed.  The  Americans  and 
the  insurgents  both  occupied  Cavite.  The  latter  had  gradu 
ally  approached  Manila  from  the  south  and  confronted  the 
Spanish  line.  A  few  shots  were  exchanged  every  day  and 
night.  General  Greene  took  line  directly  in  rear  of  the  insur 
gents  and  up  to  that  time  had  taken  no  part  in  the  opera 
tions.  The  three  companies,  including  one  of  light  artillery, 
which  went  out  on  the  Newport,  reported  to  him  on  the 
26th. 

On  the  27th  of  July  a  delegation  of  bankers  and  merchants 
from  Manila  came  on  board  to  talk  with  General  Merritt.  On 
the  28th  the  Admiral  called,  and  he  and  General  Merritt  went 
together  on  the  former's  boat  to  the  Olympia,  where  they  met 
the  Belgian  Consul,  Mr.  Andre,  who  was  a  semi-intermediary 
from  the  Spanish  Governor-General.  The  Spaniards'  fear  at 
this  time  was  that  Aguinaldo  and  his  forces  would  get  into 
the  city,  and  their  wish  was  that  when  the  army  surrendered 
it  should  be  to  the  American  army  and  navy,  on  the  condition 
of  their  protecting  the  city  and  the  Spaniards  against  the  in 
surgents.  An  attempt  was  made  at  this  time  to  construct  a 
pier  at  Paranaque,  or  in  that  vicinity,  since  the  landing  of 
troops  and  stores  was  very  difficult  and  dangerous. 

The  Filipinos  at  Cavite  at  this  time  were  very  clean  and 
intelligent-looking  —  small,  but  active  and  strong.  A  few 
Spanish  prisoners  were  guarded  there  by  them  —  rather  thin 
and  emaciated,  the  privates  begging,  and  selling  their  em- 


THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MANILA  IN  1898          239 

blems  to  the  soldiers.  The  problem  was  immediately  forced 
upon  us  —  "  What  shall  we  do  with  the  insurgents  ?  " 

On  the  28th  of  July  General  Greene  had  been  instructed 
to  notify  them  that  he  would  replace  their  troops  on  the  left 
of  our  line  on  the  beach  for  some  hundred  yards.  They  had 
to  refer  this  question  to  Aguinaldo.  Answer  came  at  midnight 
that  there  was  no  objection. 

So  the  position  was  taken.  Two-field  guns  were  placed 
there,  and  two  more  ordered.  This  was  the  first  real  con 
fronting  of  the  enemy.  The  five  transports  which  left  Hono 
lulu  at  the  same  time  with  the  Newport  and  Monterey  were 
anxiously  awaited.  The  American  ships  of  the  navy  and  trans 
ports  were  all  anchored  about  two  miles  from  Cavite  and  four 
from  the  camp.  About  Manila  were  the  foreign  vessels  — 
English,  German,  Russian,  and  Japanese ;  also  Belgian  and 
Chinese  merchantmen.  Communication  between  our  fleet  and 
the  others  (with  the  exception  of  the  British  Immortalite) 
were  rare  —  purely  formal  —  no  social  visits.  All  lights  were 
covered  at  8  P.M.,  while  people  on  the  ships  would  look  on 
the  electric  lights  in  the  streets  of  Manila. 

An  extract  from  the  journal  of  an  officer  of  the  expedition 
is  as  follows :  — 

"  Two  of  the  English  friends  who  visited  us  a  few  days  ago 
came  to-day  with  a  written  request  for  some  understanding  or 
promise  of  protection  of  their  northern  properties — rice,  sugar 
refineries,  etc.  After  their  mission  was  complete  —  General 
Merritt  promising  them  a  reply  the  next  day  —  I  engaged  the 
principal  in  talk  and  asked  him  the  reason  of  the  hatred  of 
the  insurgents  for  the  priests.  He  said  it  was  on  account  of 
the  immorality  of  the  latter.  There  are,  among  the  Filipinos, 
men  of  property  and  some  taste  and  refinement  and  with  good 
ideas  of  life.  He  had  dined  with  some  where  there  was  silver- 
plate,  glass,  etc.,  from  London,  and  whose  manner  of  living 
indicated  respectability.  The  priests  would  claim  the  wives  or 
daughters  of  these  men,  and  upon  the  objection  or  refusal,  the 


240  THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MANILA  IN  1898 

husband  or  father  would  be  deported.  While  the  women  are 
not  particularly  virtuous  or  chaste,  yet  after  marriage  any  en 
croachment  is  regarded  with  the  same  indignation  as  it  is  with 
any  more  civilized  nation.  The  influence  of  the  clergy  is  great 
with  the  Spaniards,  yet  its  bad  conduct,  corruption,  and 
manner  of  living  have  made  them  odious  to  the  natives,  and 
they  are,  as  it  seems,  responsible  —  with  the  onerous  taxes, 
for  which  they  are  in  a  great  degree  accountable  —  for  the 
revolution.  A  most  extraordinary  condition  of  things.  Span 
iards  fear  the  insurgents.  Have  feared  us  and  believe 
everything  bad  of  us.  The  insurgents  are  cocky,  want  to 
rule,  and  we  must  suppress  both.  Hunger  is  pressing  the 
city." 

On  the  30th  of  July  there  was  considerable  firing  on  the 
American  line,  but  very  slight  casualties.  Before  this  it  had 
been  decided  to  send  a  brigade  to  the  north  of  Manila  to 
operate  there,  but  upon  examination  of  the  country,  and  on 
account  of  the  probable  difficulty  in  landing,  it  was  deemed 
unwise,  and  the  plan  was  abandoned. 

On  the  31st  the  other  ships  of  the  expedition  arrived,  one 
officer  and  four  men  having  died  on  the  voyage.  The  trans 
ports  were  all  crowded  and  were  not  loaded  with  any  dis 
crimination.  Commissary,  quartermaster,  and  medical  stores, 
entrenching  tools  were  all  mixed  up,  so  that  it  was  very  dif 
ficult  to  find  anything. 

On  the  1st  of  August  there  was  an  unfortunate  conflict 
which  seems  to  have  been  provoked  by  a  misunderstanding. 
The  generally  accepted  interpretation  was,  that  the  Spaniards 
fired  at  about  midnight  and  that  a  great  deal  of  sharp  and 
wild  musketry  and  artillery  firing  followed.  The  night  was 
very  dark.  Men  were  probably  wounded  as  they  advanced  to 
strengthen  the  picket  line.  The  American  line  was  rather  a 
poor  one,  being  enfiladed,  and  had  there  been  an  adversary 
with  more  gallantry  and  dash  than  the  Spaniards,  with 
the  heavy  rains,  it  would  have  been  almost  impossible  to 


THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MANILA  IN  1898          241 

hold  it.  Reports  of  casualties  were  nine  dead  and  forty-six 
wounded. 

The  plan  of  going  to  the  north  of  Manila  having  been 
abandoned,  a  division  was  organized  —  General  Anderson  to 
command  —  and  MacArthur's  brigade  was  ordered  to  join 
General  Greene's.  The  second  Oregon  and  an  artillery  de 
tachment  in  charge  of  prisoners  remained  at  Cavite. 

On  the  3d  of  August  a  report  came  by  Ruyter's  telegrams 
to  Hong  Kong,  that  peace  proposals  had  been  made.  Very 
bad  monsoons  and  continual  storms  raged  at  this  time.  Gen 
eral  Greene  wrote,  on  the  3d  of  August,  asking  that  the  Navy 
should  open  on  the  Spanish  battery  which  fired  upon  our 
lines.  Admiral  Dewey  declined,  being  unwilling  to  bring  on 
a  general  engagement  until  the  arrival  of  the  monitors,  at  the 
same  time  expressing  regret  at  the  exposure  of  the  men  and 
losses.  Difficulties  of  landing  troops  multiplied.  Two  cascos 
were  swamped  about  this  time  and  at  least  three  natives 
drowned  in  the  harbor  from  their  canoes. 

The  Monterey  arrived  about  9.30  on  the  evening  of  the 
4th.  The  place  of  landing  of  the  American  troops  was  at  this 
time  changed  to  Bacoor,  Aguinaldo's  new  headquarters.  But  all 
landing  was  attended  with  difficulties.  The  thermometer  at 
this  time  was  noted  at  86°  at  eleven  in  the  evening. 

On  the  6th  of  August  General  Merritt  proposed  to  Admiral 
Dewey  a  joint  letter  to  the  Spaniards,  suggesting  that  women 
and  children  should  be  moved  from  Manila,  as  bombardment 
would  follow  unless  firing  from  their  batteries  ceased  ;  also 
sent  a  letter  to  the  Governor  of  Cavite,  translating  letter  from 
Aguinaldo,  enclosing  copy  of  orders  to  American  troops  and 
suggesting  similar  one  to  be  issued  by  him,  enjoining  order 
and  abstinence  from  outrage  when  the  Americans  entered 
Manila,  the  letter  not  to  be  sent  until  just  before  attack. 

On  the  7th  General  Merritt  visited  the  Admiral  on  his 
flagship.  They  were  in  complete  accord.  The  meeting  resulted 
in  their  agreeing  on  and  signing  the  following :  — 


242  THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MANILA  IN  1898 

HEADQUARTERS  UNITED  STATES  ARMY  AND  NAVAL  FORCES. 

MANILA  BAY,  P.I.,  August  7th,  1898. 
To  the  General-iii-Chief  commanding  the  Spanish  forces  in 

Manila. 

SIR  :  —  We  have  the  honor  to  notify  Your  Excellency  that 
operations  of  the  land  and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States 
against  the  defences  of  Manila  may  begin  at  any  time  after 
the  expiration  of  forty-eight  hours  from  the  hour  of  receipt 
by  you  of  this  communication,  or  sooner,  if  made  necessary 
by  an  attack  on  your  part.  This  notice  is  given  to  afford 
you  an  opportunity  to  remove  all  non-combatants  from  the 

city. 

Very  respectfully, 

WESLEY  MERRITT,  Major-General,  U.S.  Army. 

Commanding  Land  Forces  of  the  United  States. 
GEORGE  DEWEY,  Rear  Admiral,  U.S.  Navy. 

Commanding  United  States  Naval  Forces  and 
Asiatic  Stations. 

The  Admiral  expressed  his  feeling  at  the  losses  (which 
were  inconsiderable)  every  night  by  the  firing  of  the  Span 
iards,  and  had  formed  his  plan  of  attack  in  various  localities 
by  the  Charleston,  Raleigh,  Boston,  Olympia,  and  Monterey. 
The  message  was  sent  on  the  9th  instant  to  the  commander 
of  the  British  ships,  by  him  to  be  sent  to  the  British  Vice- 
Consul,  who  represented  the  American  interests  in  Manila, 
with  letter  of  transmittal  to  the  latter,  requesting  him  to  de 
liver  it  in  person,  and  note  time  of  delivery. 

The  conduct  of  affairs  in  Manila  at  this  time  was  said  to  be 
vested  in  five  persons  —  the  Acting  Governor-General,  the 
Commander  of  the  Army,  Admiral  Montojo,  the  Minister  of 
Finance,  and  the  Archbishop.  Admiral  Dewey  read  a  letter 
received  that  morning  from  a  British  resident  upon  whom  he 
relied,  expressing  the  opinion  that  little  resistance  would  be 
made,  and  hoped  the  American  troops  would  be  comfortably 


THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MANILA   IN  1898          243 

housed  before  the  bad  weather  of  September.  The  Belgian 
Consul  had  lately  expressed  similar  opinions. 

A  despatch  boat  was  expected  to  arrive  from  Hong  Kong 
on  the  llth  or  12th  of  August,  and  there  were  many  specula 
tions  as  to  the  news  to  be  received  about  peace  negotiations. 
The  boat  arrived,  but  with  nothing  at  all  definite. 

On  the  9th  instant  Admiral  Dewey  went  on  the  Newport 
and  a  demand  for  surrender  was  prepared  as  follows :  — 

HEADQUARTERS  U.S.  ARMY  AND  NAVAL  FORCES. 

MANILA  BAY,  P.I.,  August  9th,  1898. 

To  the  Governor-General  and  Captain-General  of  the  Philip 
pines. 

SIR  :  —  The  inevitable  suffering  in  store  for  the  wounded, 
sick,  women  and  children,  in  the  event  that  it  becomes  our 
duty  to  reduce  the  defences  of  the  walled  town  in  which  they 
are  gathered,  will,  we  feel  sure,  appeal  successfully  to  the 
sympathies  of  a  General  capable  of  making  the  determined 
and  prolonged  resistance  which  Your  Excellency  has  exhibited 
after  the  loss  of  your  naval  forces  and  without  hope  of  succor. 
We  therefore  submit  without  prejudice  to  the  high  sentiments 
of  honor  and  duty  which  Your  Excellency  entertains,  that 
surrounded  on  every  side  as  you  are,  by  the  constantly  in 
creasing  force,  with  a  powerful  fleet  in  your  front,  deprived 
of  all  prospect  of  reinforcement  and  assistance,  a  most  useless 
sacrifice  of  life  would  result  in  the  event  of  an  attack.  And 
therefore  every  consideration  of  humanity  makes  it  impera 
tive  that  you  should  not  subject  your  city  to  the  horrors  of  a 
bombardment.  Accordingly  we  demand  the  surrender  of  the 
City  of  Manila  and  the  Spanish  forces  under  your  command. 
(Signed)  WESLEY  MERRITT,  Maj.-Gen.,  U.S.  Army, 

Commanding  Land  Forces  of  the  United 

States. 

GEORGE  DEWEY,  Rear  Admiral,  U.S.  Navy, 
Commanding  United  States  Naval  Forces 
and  Asiatic  Stations. 


244  THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MANILA  IN  1898 

The  letter  from  General  Merritt  and  Admiral  Dewey  was 
transmitted  by  the  British  Vice-Consul,  with  the  following 
letter,  which  is  quoted  verbatim :  — 

BRITISH  CONSULATE,  MANILA,  9th  of  August,  1898. 

MOST  EXCELLENT  SIR: — 

I  beg  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  Your  Excellency's  com 
munication  under  to-day's  date,  which  was  delivered  to  me  on 
the  wharf.  I  immediately  drove  to  see  His  Excellency,  the 
Governor-General,  and  handed  personally  the  communication 
addressed  to  His  Excellency  by  Your  Excellency  and  Major- 
General  Merritt.  It  was  half  past  twelve  P.M.  when  the  com 
munication  was  handed  to  His  Excellency  and  I  begged 
of  His  Excellency  to  cause  the  time  to  be  stated  in  His 
Excellency's  reply  when  the  communication  was  received. 
I  have  the  honor  now  to  transmit  here  enclosed  to  Your 
Excellency  the  answer  from  His  Excellency,  the  Governor- 
General. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be  Your  Excellency's 

Most  obedient  and  humble  servant, 
H.  A.  RAMSDEN, 

British  Vice-Consul  in  charge  of  the 
United  States  Consular  Interests. 

To  His  Excellency  Admiral  Dewey,  etc. 

The  answer  from  the  Captain-General  was  as  follows :  — 
Having  received  an  intimation  from  Your  Excellencies  that 

O 

in  obedience  to  sentiments  of  humanity  to  which  you  appeal, 
and  in  which  I  share,  I  should  surrender  this  city  and  the 
forces  under  my  orders,  I  have  assembled  the  Council  of 
Defence,  which  declares  that  your  request  cannot  be  granted. 
But  taking  into  account  the  unfortunate  circumstances  exist 
ing  in  this  city,  which  Your  Excellencies  recite,  and  which 
I  unfortunately  have  to  admit,  I  would  like  to  consult 
my  Government,  if  Your  Excellency  will  grant  the  time 


THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MANILA  IN  1898  245 

strictly  necessary  for  the  communication  by  way  of  Hong 

Kong.1 

(Signed)  FIRMIN  JAUDENES. 

This  proposal  or  suggestion  was  rejected  and  preparations 
were  ordered  for  extending  the  American  lines. 

This  Governor-General  Jaudenes  had  been  directed  by  the 
Madrid  Government  —  by  a  telegram -dated  24th  of  July —  to 
relieve  Governor-General  Don  Basilio  Augustin  Davila.  The 
reasons  for  the  latter' s  relief  were  not  known  to  the  American 
Army,  but  the  rumor  was  that  after  the  Cadiz  fleet  turned 
back  from  the  Canal,  Augustin  cabled  from  Hong  Kong  that 
further  resistance  was  useless.  He  is  best  known  by  his  proc 
lamation  of  23d  of  April,  1898,  as  follows :  — 

Spaniards :  — 

Between  the  United  States  and  Spain,  hostilities  have  broken 
out.  The  moment  has  arrived  to  prove  to  the  world  that  we 
possess  the  spirit  to  conquer  those,  who,  pretending  to  be 
loyal  friends,  take  advantage  of  our  misfortunes  and  abuse 
our  hospitality,  using  means  which  civilized  nations  count 
unworthy  and  disreputable. 

The  North  American  people,  constituted  of  all  the  social 
excrescences,  have  exhausted  our  patience  and  provoked  war 
with  their  perfidious  machinations,  with  their  acts  of  treach 
ery,  with  their  outrages  against  the  law  of  nations  and  inter 
national  conventions. 

The  struggle  will  be  short  and  decisive.  The  God  of  Vic 
tories  will  give  us  one  as  brilliant  and  complete  as  the  right 
eousness  and  justice  of  our  cause  demand.  Spain,  which  will 
count  upon  the  sympathies  of  all  the  nations,  will  emerge 
triumphantly  from  the  new  test,  humiliating  and  blasting  the 
adventurers  from  those  States,  that,  without  cohesion  and  with 
out  a  history,  offer  to  humanity  only  infamous  traditions  and 

1  Cable  communication  with  Manila  had  been  destroyed.  To  telegraph  and 
get  reply  from  Spain  would  have  required  seven  days  at  least. 


246  THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MANILA  IN  1898 

the  ungrateful  spectacle  of  chambers  in  which  appear  united 
insolence  and  defamation,  cowardice  and  cynicism. 

A  squadron  manned  by  foreigners,  possessing  neither  in 
struction  nor  discipline,  is  preparing  to  come  to  this  archi 
pelago  with  the  ruffianly  intention  of  robbing  us  of  all  that 
means  life,  honor  and  liberty.  Pretending  to  be  inspired  by  a 
courage  of  which  they  are  incapable,  the  North  American  sea 
men  undertake  as  an  enterprise  capable  of  realization  the  sub 
stitution  of  Protestantism  for  the  Catholic  religion  you  profess, 
to  treat  you  as  tribes  refractory  to  civilization,  to  take  possession 
of  your  riches  as  if  they  were  unacquainted  with  the  rights  of 
property,  and  to  kidnap  those  persons  whom  they  consider 
useful  to  man  their  ships  or  to  be  exploited  in  agricultural  or 
industrial  labor. 

Vain  designs  !  Kidiculous  boastings ! 

Your  indomitable  bravery  will  suffice  to  frustrate  the  at 
tempt  to  carry  them  into  realization.  You  will  not  allow  the 
faith  you  profess  to  be  made  a  mock  of ;  impious  hands  to  be 
placed  upon  the  temple  of  the  true  God  ;  the  images  you  adore 
to  be  thrown  down  by  unbelief.  The  aggressors  shall  not  pro 
fane  the  tombs  of  your  fathers ;  they  shall  not  gratify  their 
lustful  passions  at  the  cost  of  your  wives'  and  daughters' 
honor,  or  appropriate  the  property  your  industry  has  accumu 
lated  as  a  provision  for  old  age.  No,  they  shall  not  perpetrate 
any  of  the  crimes  inspired  by  their  wickedness  and  covetous- 
ness,  because  your  valor  and  patriotism  will  suffice  to  punish 
and  abase  the  people,  that,  claiming  to  be  civilized  and  culti 
vated,  have  exterminated  the  natives  of  North  America  instead 
of  bringing  to  them  the  life  of  civilization  and  of  progress. 

Filipinos,  prepare  for  the  struggle,  and  united  under  the 
glorious  Spanish  flag,  which  is  ever  covered  with  laurels,  let 
us  fight  with  the  conviction  that  victory  will  crown  our  efforts, 
and  to  the  calls  of  our  enemies  let  us  oppose  with  the  decision 
of  the  Christian  and  the  patriot  the  cry  of  "  Viva  Espana." 
Your  General, 

MANILA,  23d  April,  1898.  BASILIO  AUGUSTIN  DAVILA. 


THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MANILA  IN  1898          247 

The  priest  of  the  California  regiment  and  the  chaplain 
from  the  Newport,  at  the  request  of  the  Archbishop,  went, 
under  a  flag  of  truce,  into  the  city  about  this  time,  and  met 
the  Archbishop  and  Captain-General.  The  former  sent  his 
card  to  General  Merritt  as  follows :  — 

My  best  compliments  to  General  Merritt  from  the 
P.  NOZALEDA,  Arzohispo  de  Manila. 

During  all  this  time  Aguinaldo  had  been  conspicuous  by  the 
absence  of  any  communications  from  him  or  intercourse  with 
the  American  officers,  but  at  this  time  one  of  his  aides  called 
on  General  Merritt  and  asked  for  an  interview.  As  arrange 
ments  were  being  made  for  the  attack  and  surrender  of  the 
city,  and  as  the  commander  of  the  American  Army  had  already 
been  in  the  harbor  eighteen  days  without  any  advances  or 
visits  from  Aguinaldo,  it  was  not  practicable  to  receive  them 
then,  and  General  Merritt's  answer  was :  — 

"  My  compliments  to  the  General,  and  I  will  send  an  offi 
cer  to  him  to  indicate  when  I  can  see  him.  I  shall  be  busy 
to-morrow.  Among  other  things  I  wish  to  return  the  call  of 
the  Governor  of  Cavite  [who  was  Aguinaldo's  subordinate] 
and  I  have  an  engagement  on  Saturday."  (Saturday  being 
the  day  which  was  marked  for  the  attack.) 

The  Belgian  Consul  continued  his  intervention,  and  his 
latest  proposition  was  that  the  operations  nominally  threaten 
ing  the  city,  which  were  named  for  Saturday,  the  13th,  should 
be  called  a  reconnaissance ;  the  American  ships  to  anchor  off 
Manila,  not  to  bombard ;  the  Spaniard's  not  to  fire  their  large 
guns  (Krupps  —  possibly  they  had  no  ammunition)  ;  the  Navy 
was  to  attack  their  works,  the  powder  magazine,  batteries, 
etc. ;  slight  resistance  to  be  offered,  to  be  followed  by  sur 
render. 

The  attack  on  the  13th  was  ordered  for  nine  o'clock  in  the 
morning.  A  furious  rain-storm  occurred  at  six,  which  was 
followed  by  great  humidity,  interfering  somewhat  with  the 


248  THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MANILA  IN  1898 

accuracy  of  the  firing  from  the  Olympia.  General  Merritt, 
with  about  ten  of  his  staff  officers,  went  on  the  Zafiro  (Lieu 
tenant  McLain),  which  was  lent  by  the  Admiral,  at  8.30, 
steamed  to  the  flagship,  where  there  was  a  brief  interview 
with  the  Admiral.  At  9.35  the  naval  attack  began,  the  Olym 
pia,  Boston,  and  Raleigh  participating,  while  the  Callao  (a 
ship  captured  from  the  Spaniards  on  the  1st  of  May,  Lieu 
tenant  Tappan)  went  close  to  the  shore,  showing  great  dash 
and  gallantry.  The  firing  continued  about  one  and  a  half 
hours.  Then  the  signal  was  given  from  the  flagship :  "  Firing 
ceases."  Shortly  after  that  the  American  line  of  troops  ad 
vanced  up  the  beach,  the  soldiers  marching  in  the  water  of 
the  bay,  many  of  them  up  to  their  waists,  and  crossing  the 
creek  near  the  powder  magazine.  There  was  some  firing.  The 
casualties  were  slight.  The  fort  was  soon  taken  and  the 
American  flag  replaced  the  Spanish  at  11.35.  On  the  Amer 
icans'  right,  under  General  Mac  Arthur,  the  firing  and  casu 
alties  were  of  greater  volume,  but  not  very  heavy.  In  accord 
ance  with  the  arrangement,  the  Admiral  displayed  the  signal 
"  Surrender."  It  was  soon  responded  to  by  a  white  flag  dis 
played  on  the  fort  protecting  the  inner  or  walled  city.  The 
Admiral  then  asked  General  Merritt  to  send  an  officer  to  ac 
company  one  from  the  Navy,  to  arrange  preliminary  terms  of 
surrender. 

This  narrative  must  now  take  a  more  personal  form,  as  I 
had  the  good  fortune  to  be  selected  as  the  representative  of 
the  Army  to  receive  the  surrender.  I  went  in  the  launch  of 
the  Belgian  Consul,  with  Lieutenant  Brumby,  of  the  Navy; 
Mr.  Andre,  the  Consul ;  and  two  signalmen  of  the  Navy.  We 
landed,  with  some  difficulty,  on  a  stone  pier  —  or  rather  a 
wall  of  rocks  —  built  out  into  the  Bay.  Two  carriages  awaited 
us,  and  an  interpreter  —  Carlos  Casademunt  —  together  with 
Colonel  of  the  Staff  Don  Jose  M.  Olaguer,  and  Captain  of 
Artillery  Don  Francisco  Chavairi  —  who  also  spoke  English. 


THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MANILA  IN  1898          249 

On  the  way  to  the  palace  of  the  Captain-General  we  passed 
some  fifteen  hundred  Spanish  soldiers,  apparently  in  good 
condition,  marching  into  the  city  from  the  outer  works.  They 
had  some  rude  field  artillery  with  them.  At  the  palace  we 
found  some  forty  or  fifty  officers  —  among  them  Admiral 
Montojo.  They  had  a  number  of  pages  of  stipulations  in  re 
gard  to  the  surrender,  among  which  were  that  all  their  army 
should  be  sent  back  to  Spain ;  second,  that  in  case  they  or  we 
should  evacuate  the  country,  their  arms  should  be  returned  to 
them.  It  would  have  saved  considerable  trouble  and  expense 
if  the  first-named  condition  had  been  granted  them. 

Admiral  Montojo  was  more  self-possessed  than  any  of  the 
others.  The  Captain-General  seemed  very  excited  and  nerv 
ous.  He  soon  reported,  in  great  trepidation,  that  the  insur 
gents  were  moving  into  the  city.  I  assured  him  on  this  point 
that  it  was  impossible  (though  I  did  not  at  the  time  know 
how  near  they  were).  They  had,  in  the  morning,  before  the 
firing,  started  an  attack  which  was  suppressed  by  the  judi 
cious  action  of  our  officers.  But  they  followed  very  closely 
the  movements  of  our  troops,  nor  did  their  proximity  cease 
until  they  were  driven  away  and  beaten,  after  a  long  cam 
paign. 

The  Captain-General  next  reported  that  our  army  was  at 
their  walls  and  about  to  attack.  As  General  Greene's  orders 
had  been  to  go  around  the  walled  city  and  occupy  the  busi 
ness  section,  Binondo,  I  did  not  think  it  possible,  and  so  as 
sured  them,  but  the  proximity  of  the  insurgents,  and  other 
circumstances,  rendered  it  necessary,  in  General  Greene's 
judgment,  to  make  the  move  he  did.  I  sent  him  a  note  sub 
stantially  as  follows :  — 

Commanding  Officer  U.S.  Forces:  — 

It  is  reported  that  an  attack  is  being  made  by  our  troops 
on  the  walled  city.  As  the  negotiations  for  surrender  are 
being  made  by  Lieutenant  Brumby,  for  the  Navy,  and  myself 


250  THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MANILA  IN  1893 

for  the  Army,  it  seems  expedient  that  this  attack  should  be 
suspended. 

Lieutenant  Brumby  now  returned  to  the  ship,  carrying  a 
note  from  me  to  General  Merritt,  with  request  that  he  should 
land  at  once  and  bring  the  six  hundred  men  of  the  Oregon 
Regiment  who  had  embarked  at  Cavite  on  a  Chinese  chartered 
ship  which  had  followed  the  Zafiro. 

Asking  quarters  for  the  Commanding  General,  I  was  told 
that  the  Ayuntamiento  was  the  best,  and  the  Spanish  officers 
and  myself  went  there.  I  asked  to  have  all  of  the  troops  in 
the  city  marched  to  the  Plaza,  which  was  done  at  once ;  that 
their  arms  should  be  stacked  in  the  courtyard ;  but  they  de 
clined  to  do  this,  as  capitulation  articles  had  not  been  signed. 
After  this,  General  Greene  appeared,  remained  about  half  an 
hour,  leaving  a  note  for  General  Merritt,  saying  he  had  been 
unwilling  to  go  around  the  city  with  five  thousand  armed  men 
in  it,  but  that  I  had  assured  him  that  there  was  DO  danger  in 
doing  it,  so  he  had  left  to  carry  out  his  original  orders.  The 
Governor  of  the  city  (and  second  in  command  of  the  Army  — 
General  Bizzo)  arrived  and  was  introduced  as  the  officer  who 
had  surrendered  the  city  and  the  army  therein.  So  he,  the 
same  official  (interpreter),  myself,  and  two  signalmen  started 
with  two  carriages  to  meet  General  Merritt,  signalled  many 
times  from  the  beach  at  different  points,  but  got  no  reply. 
Then  we  drove  to  the  Pasig  Eiver  and  found  that  unfortu 
nately  he  had  landed  there  and  had  walked  up  to  the  city  — 
a  warm  walk  —  and  without  the  condition  of  things  being  ex 
plained  to  him. 

Then  long  conferences  followed  and  preliminary  conditions 
of  surrender  were  signed,  it  being  arranged  that  commission 
ers  should  meet  on  the  following  day  and  make  formal  terms. 
On  the  whole,  it  was  a  very  satisfactory  day  for  us.  Casualties 
were  very  slight  and  it  was  a  prearranged  show  of  resistance, 
rather  than  any  vigorous  defence  on  the  part  of  the  Spaniards. 


THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MANILA  IN  1898          251 

On  the  next  morning  —  the  14th  of  August  —  a  commis 
sion  to  determine  the  details  of  the  capitulation  of  the  city 
and  defences  of  Manila  met  at  the  Ayuntamiento  and  remained 
in  session  from  eleven  in  the  morning  until  about  five  in  the 
afternoon.  The  result  of  their  conference  is  expressed  in  the 
following :  — 

MANILA,  August  14th,  1898. 

THE  UNDERSIGNED,  having  been  appointed  a  Commission 
to  determine  the  details  of  the  capitulation  of  the  city  and 
defences  of  Manila,  and  its  suburbs,  and  the  Spanish  forces 
stationed  therein,  in  accordance  with  the  agreement  entered 
into  the  previous  day  by  Major-General  Wesley  Merritt,  U.S. 
Army,  American  Commander-in-Chief  in  the  Philippines,  and 
His  Excellency  Don  Firmin  Jaudenes,  Acting  General-in- 
Chief  of  the  Spanish  Army  in  the  Philippines, 

HAVE  AGREED  UPON  THE  FOLLOWING: 

1.  —  The  Spanish  troops,  European  and  native,  capitulate 
with  the  city  and  its  defences,  with  all  the  honors  of  war,  de 
positing  their  arms  in  the  places  designated  by  the  authorities 
of  the  United  States,  and  remaining  in  the  quarters  designated 
and  under  the  orders  of  their  officers  and  subject  to  control  of 
the  aforesaid  United  States  authorities,  until  the  conclusion 
of  a  treaty  of  peace  between  the  two  belligerent  nations. 

All  persons  included  in  the  capitulation  remain  at  liberty, 
the  officers  remaining  in  their  respective  homes,  which  shall 
be  respected  as  long  as  they  observe  the  regulations  prescribed 
for  their  government  and  the  laws  in  force. 

2.  —  Officers  shall  retain  their  side  arms,  horses  and  private 
property. 

3.  —  All  public  horses  and  public  property  of  all  kinds  shall 
be  turned  over  to  staff  officers  designated  by  the  United  States. 

4.  —  Complete  returns  in  duplicate  of  men  by  organiza 
tions,  and  full  lists  of  public  property  and  stores  shall  be  ren 
dered  to  the  United  States  within  ten  days  from  this  date. 


252  THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MANILA  IN  1898 

5.  —  All  questions  relating  to  the  repatriation  of  officers 
and  men  of  the  Spanish  forces  and  of  their  families  and  of  the 
expenses  which  said  repatriation  may  occasion,  shall  be  ren 
dered  to  the  Government  of  the  United  States  at  Washington. 

Spanish  families  may  leave  Manila  at  any  time  convenient 
to  them. 

The  return  of  the  arms  surrendered  by  the  Spanish  forces 
shall  take  place  when  they  evacuate  the  city  or  when  the  Amer 
ican  Army  evacuates. 

6.  —  Officers  and  men  included  in  the  capitulation  shall  be 
supplied  by  the  United  States,  according  to  their  rank,  with 
rations  and  necessary  aid  as  though  they  were  prisoners  of 
war,  until  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty  of  peace  between  the 
United  States  and  Spain. 

All  the  funds  of  the  Spanish  Treasury  and  all  other  public 
funds,  shall  be  turned  over  to  the  authorities  of  the  United 
States. 

7.  —  This  city,  its  inhabitants,  its  churches  and  religious 
worship,  its  educational  establishments  and  its  private  prop 
erty  of  all  descriptions  are  placed  under  the  special  safeguard 
of  the  faith  and  honor  of  the  American  Army. 

F.  V.  GREENE, 

Brigadier-General  of  Volunteers,  United  States  Army. 
B.  P.  LAMBERTON, 

Captain  United  States  Navy. 
CHAS.  A.  WHITTIER, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  and  Inspector-General. 

E.  H.  CROWDER, 

Lieutenant-Colonel  and  Judge-Advocate. 
NICHOLAS  DE  LA  PENA, 

Auditor  General  Excmo. 
CARLOS  KEYES, 

Coronel  de  Ingenieros. 
JOSE  MARIA  OLAQUEN  FELIU. 

Coronel  de  Estado  Major, 


THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MANILA  IN  1898          253 

That  afternoon  Aguinaldo's  Chief  of  Staff  and  three  other 
officers  of  his  army  called  and  wished  to  get  a  definite  state 
ment  of  their  status.  General  Merritt  gave  them  assurance 
of  his  friendship,  and  they  agreed  that  there  should  be  no  con 
flicts,  that  we  should  be  permitted  to  operate  the  waterworks, 
and  practically  that  they  would  withdraw  to  positions  accept 
able  to  us.  But  when  these  conditions  were  reported  to  their 
chief,  they  were  not  accepted  in  their  full  spirit  —  at  least  it 
was  quite  a  time  before  the  waterworks  part  was  carried  out 
and  before  they  retired  from  their  positions  adjoining  ours  in 
the  city. 

Major  Bement  was  sent  the  next  day  to  complete  the  water 
works  arrangement,  but  was  unable  to  do  anything  on  account 
of  the  presence  and  attitude  of  the  insurgents. 

On  the  15th  I  had  another  interview  with  the  Captain- 
General  about  the  silver  plate  in  the  palace  at  Malacanang 
(which  had  been  selected  as  General  Merritt's  headquarters), 
and  also  about  the  money  in  the  treasury,  of  which  there 
were :  bank  certificates  of  deposit,  $170,205 ;  bank-notes, 
$225,705;  silver,  $132,968  —  all  Mexican  currency;  copper, 
$295,700. 

The  Captain-General  was  in  a  state  of  great  agitation,  walk 
ing  up  and  down  the  room,  pressing  his  hands  to  his  head  and 
exclaiming :  "  Oh,  my  poor  head !  What  shall  I  do !  " 

The  plate  was  given  up  at  once,  but  the  matter  of  the 
treasury  funds  was  held  in  abeyance  and  finally  they  were 
taken  by  us,  under  protest  from  the  Spaniards. 

(On  Tuesday,  the  16th,  there  was  very  heavy  rain,  with 
typhoon.  The  streets  on  the  way  from  the  palace  to  town 
were  knee-deep  with  water,  the  whole  width.  At  about  3.30 
on  that  afternoon  messages  came  to  the  palace,  sent  through 
Admiral  Dewey,  announcing  that  a  protocol  had  been  signed 
by  the  Secretary  of  State  and  the  French  Minister,  acting  for 
Spain,  agreeing  upon  a  suspension  of  hostilities. 

Visiting  the  Captain-General  to  announce  this,  I  found  him 


254  THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MANILA   IN  1898 

in  bed,  in  a  squalid  room  —  a  cheap  iron  bedstead,  four  or 
five  cigar-stumps  on  a  rough  table  by  his  bedside ;  looking  ill 
and  evidently  suffering  mentally  and  physically.  It  was  very 
unfortunate  for  him  that  he  should  have  surrendered  on  the 
13th,  when  peace  was  practically  signed  on  the  12th,  and  had 
his  request  for  time  in  which  to  communicate  with  his  Govern 
ment  been  granted,  he  would  have  come  out  with  better  reputa 
tion,  and  not  as  the  very  doubtful  hero  of  an  inglorious  defence. 

So  far  as  the  insurgents  were  concerned,  our  position  was 
now  one  of  great  embarrassment.  Under  the  protocol  we  were 
entitled  to  hold  the  city,  port,  and  Bay  of  Manila.  Aguinaldo 
kept  a  portion  of  the  city.  We  demanded  that  he  should  give 
that  up  —  to  which  his  representative  agreed ;  but  in  seeking 
confirmation  from  him,  he  made  the  condition  that  in  case  we 
left  the  country  they  should  be  restored  to  the  positions  which 
they  had  taken.  This  would  involve  the  surrounding  of  the 
city,  the  occupation  of  the  waterworks  —  in  fact,  all  the  set 
tled  part  of  the  island,  except  Manila,  as  well  as  some  of  the 
southern  country.  Matters  were  patched  up  and  Aguinaldo 
moved  his  headquarters  to  Malolos,  twenty-three  miles  up  the 
railroad.  Besides,  he  felt  that  he  had  had  some  encourage 
ment  from  the  American  authorities,  from  the  fact  that  he 
was  sent  on  a  United  States  vessel  from  Hong  Kong ;  that  he 
raised  his  flag  at  Cavite ;  and  that  when  there  was  a  failure 
on  the  first  day  of  his  adherents  to  gather,  being  discouraged 
and  suggesting  a  return  to  Hong  Kong,  he  was  dissuaded  by 
our  Admiral  from  leaving  at  once ;  advised  to  try  it  a  little 
longer ;  and  in  the  next  two  or  three  days  crowds  of  insur 
gents  joined  him.  Without  doubt  his  action  in  surrounding 
the  city  and  occupying  the  waterworks  and  a  considerable 
portion  of  the  Island  of  Luzon  had  greatly  helped  our  opera 
tions  and  made  them  comparatively  easy. 

The  insurgents  had  managed  their  occupation  of  the  coun 
try  in  a  very  able  manner  —  were  brave,  tolerant  of  fatigue 
and  hunger ;  amenable  to  command  and  discipline ;  very  tern- 


THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MANILA  IN  1898          255 

perate  and  quiet ;  skilful  in  trade,  occupations,  and  professions; 
good  accountants;  quiet  and  diligent;  skilful  as  makers  of 
cigars,  cigarettes,  and  straw  hats  ;  as  mariners,  weavers  of  piiia 
and  jusi  cloth ;  as  station-masters  and  employees  of  the  Ma 
nila  railways,  comparing  favorably  with  any  I  have  ever  seen 
at  ordinary  way-stations;  good  musical  instrumentalists. 

The  railroad  (the  only  one  in  the  Philippines)  from  Manila 
to  Dagupan  was  soon  reopened  for  traffic.  At  the  invitation 
of  the  general  manager,  Mr.  H.  L.  Higgins  —  an  Englishman 
of  great  ability  —  and  Mr.  Robert  Wood,  of  Smith,  Bell  & 
Co.,  owners  of  rice-mills  on  the  line,  I  made  the  first  through 
trip  after  our  occupation  —  a  distance  of  123  miles;  a  most 
extraordinary  country  in  fertility.  Rice  is  the  principal  prod 
uct,  some  sugar  and  indigo,  with  possibilities  of  cotton,  coffee, 
cocoa,  etc.  Tobacco  is  not  grown  here,  its  production  being 
limited  to  the  northeastern  part  of  the  island,  over  the  moun 
tains,  in  the  valley  of  the  Rio  Grande. 

The  insurgents  were  apparent  in  small  numbers  all  along 
the  line,  but  were  mainly  distributed  in  pueblos  in  bands  of 
fifty.  Railway  stations  are  three  miles  apart,  as  directed  in 
the  charter  from  the  Spanish  Government. 

There  were  two  earthworks  in  process  of  construction  ;  four 
military  divisions  between  Manila  and  Dagupan,  each  com 
manded  by  a  division  general. 

We  spent  the  night  at  Bayamban  where  there  were  a  rice- 
mill  and  new  house  owned  by  Smith,  Bell  &  Co.  Seven  or 
eight  half-breeds  —  sons  and  daughters  of  Englishmen  and 
native  wives  —  joined  us  at  dinner.  A  small  orchestra  of 
natives  from  the  adjoining  town  came  after  dinner,  playing 
Spanish  and  Italian  airs  wonderfully  well. 

The  next  day,  at  seven  in  the  morning,  we  started  for 
Dagupan  —  a  different  quality  of  country,  prettier,  with  high 
cocoanut-palm  trees,  in  one  of  which  there  was  a  house  where 
had  lived  some  Frenchman  of  title  who  had  probably  tired  of 
his  native  land. 


256  THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MANILA  IN  1898 

"We  found  soldiers  strolling  through  the  town  and  about 
three  hundred  just  arrived  on  a  train,  who  said  they  had 
driven  eight  hundred  Spaniards  and  twelve  hundred  natives 
out  of  Vigan,  where  there  is  a  custom-house.  The  Spaniards 
went  north  on  a  steamer.  (All  of  which  we  regarded  as  a 
little  doubtful.) 

On  the  following  Sunday  I  went  up  the  Pasig  River  to  the 
Laguna  and  over  to  Banos,  an  old  health  resort  of  Spanish 
days.  We  saw  a  few  soldiers.  The  scenery  was  unique ;  per 
haps  not,  on  the  whole,  as  interesting  as  the  railroad  trip,  but 
very  good. 

On  the  29th  of  September  I  received  an  invitation  to 
breakfast  at  Malolos,  the  "  Solemne  Ratificacion  de  la  Inde- 
pendencia  Filipina,"  with  a  menu  enclosed  (on  one  side  of 
which  was  printed  "  Libertad,"  and  on  the  other,  "  Fraterni- 
dad  ")  in  type,  as  follows :  - 

DEJEUNER 


Hors  d'ceuvre 

Huitres  —  Crdvettes  roses  —  Beurre 

Radis  —  Olives  —  Saucisson  de  Lyon 

Sardines  aux  Tornates  —  Saumon  hollandais 


Coquilles  de  Crabes 

Vol-au-vent,  k  la  Financiere 

Abatis  de  Poulet,  a  la  Tagale 

Cotelettes  de  Mouton,  a  la  Papilotte 

Pommes  de  Terre  paille 

Dinde  Truffe'e,  a  la  Manilloise 

Filet,  a  la  Chateaubriand 

Haricots  verts 

Jambon  froid 

Asperges  en  branche 

Dessert 

Fromages  —  Fruits  —  Confitures 
f raises  —  Glacds 


THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MANILA  IN  1898          257 

Vins 
Bordeaux  —  Sauterne  —  Xeres  —  Champagne 

Liqueurs 

Chartreuse  —  Cognac 
Cafe'  —  Thd 

It  was  not  practicable  to  accept  this  invitation,  interesting 
as  the  occasion  would  have  been. 

All  this  time  the  insurgents  continued  throwing  up  little 
earthworks  in  sight  of  our  lines,  a  menace  which  should  have 
been  stopped  at  once. 

Rumors  of  collisions  in  Manila  and  Cavite  between  our 
troops  and  the  insurgents  were  frequent  —  generally  with 
absolutely  no  foundation. 

Business  was  resumed.  The  receipts  at  our  Custom-House^ 
from  August  22  to  September  16,  amounted  to  $548,735, 
Mexican. 

General  Merritt  was  relieved  from  command  and  ordered 
to  appear  before  the  Peace  Commission  at  Paris.  He  left  on 
the  27th  of  August. 

On  the  21st  of  October  I  received  a  similar  order  and,  be 
fore  going,  I  arranged  —  through  Mr.  Higgins,  general  man 
ager  of  the  railroad  —  an  interview  with  Aguinaldo,  that  I 
might  be  able  to  present  his  views  to  our  Commissioners. 

Early  that  morning  Mr.  Higgins  and  I  left  on  a  special 
train  and  soon  arrived  at  Malolos.  We  drove  to  Aguinaldo's 
headquarters,  about  a  mile  from  the  station.  He  was  occupy 
ing  a  large  house  —  very  clean  —  with  a  guard  of  thirty  or 
forty  men  in  the  courtyard  below.  We  were  met  by  Buen- 
camino  and  conducted  through  a  legislative  hall,  where  there 
were  about  two  hundred  chairs,  into  a  room  occupied  by  the 
insurgent  leader  —  very  neat,  very  clean,  well  furnished,  and 
with  a  beautiful  Spanish  flag  suspended  from  the  wall. 

Aguinaldo  was  attired  in  an  evening  undress  suit  of  black, 
with  a  large  white  tie.  I  began  the  talk  by  announcing  to  him 


258  THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MANILA  IN  1898 

that  I  was  to  leave  in  a  few  days  to  appear  before  the  Peace 
Commission  and  that  I  had  a  very  friendly  feeling  for  the 
Filipinos,  and  admiration  for  many  of  their  good  qualities  — 
their  quiet,  cleanliness,  great  imitative  power,  and  possibility 
of  learning  almost  any  profession  or  business;  that  I  would 
like  to  be  able  to  present  to  the  Commission  his  and  his  people's 
views  and  demands  and  what  relation  they  expected  to  hold  to 
the  United  States  in  case  we  decided  to  keep  the  Islands. 

Aguinaldo  replied,  rather  naively,  that  his  people  were  di 
vided  into  two  parties  —  those  in  favor  of  absolute  independ 
ence  and  those  of  an  American  protectorate ;  that  the  parties 
were  about  equal ;  that  he  was  waiting  to  see  who  would  have 
the  majority  and  then  to  take  his  position  with  them.  I  stated 
to  him  that  it  would  probably  be  useless  to  try  to  bring  those 
in  favor  of  absolute  independence  to  any  change  of  opinion, 
but  that  they  must  consider  that  they  are  without  any  navy 
and  without  capital  which  is  greatly  needed  for  the  develop 
ment  of  the  country;  that  the  Philippine  Government  alone 
would  not  possess  the  elements  of  strength  to  insure  the  re 
tention  of  the  Islands  without  the  assistance  of  some  other 
Government;  they  would  be  at  the  mercy  of  any  of  half  a 
dozen  powers  striving  to  take  either  a  part  or  the  whole  of 
the  Islands,  and  that  they  must  consider  that  their  greatest 
prosperity  would  come  by  the  gradual  accession  of  power  under 
American  auspices.  He  said,  "  But  the  civilized  nations  of  the 
world  would  see  that  our  possessions  are  not  taken  from  us." 

I  replied,  "  How  has  it  been  in  China,  where  England, 
Russia,  France,  Germany,  etc.,  all  strive  to  control  territory  ?  " 

To  this  he  could  make  no  reply.  I  further  asked  what  they 
would  expect  America,  acting  the  role  of  protector,  to  do. 
He  said  to  furnish  the  navy  while  the  Filipinos  held  all  the 
country  and  administered  civil  offices  for  its  own  people. 

"  And  what,  then,  would  America  get  from  this  ?  "  said  I. 

"  That  would  be  a  detail  which  would  be  settled  hereafter." 

After  discussing  the  subject  for  some  time,  Buencamino  re- 


THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MANILA  IN  1898          259 

turned,  and  Aguinaldo  reported  to  him  everything  he  had  said 
to  us.  After  a  little  talk  between  the  two,  Buencamino  said 
that  he  —  and  he  was  sure  that  the  President  —  was  in  favor 
of  an  American  protectorate,  and  seemed  to  approve  the  sug 
gestion  that  we  should  have  the  nucleus  of  an  army;  that  his 
people  should  be  joined  to  it,  filling  the  place  of  minor  offi 
cers,  with  the  possibility  and  the  hope  that  within  a  few  years 
they  shoidd  fill  the  most  important  civil  and  military  func 
tions  ;  also  that  1  could  be  certain  that  if  the  protectorate  were 
granted  they  would  do  their  best  to  have  it  accepted  by  their 
people  on  the  lines  I  have  stated,  agreeing  with  me  fully  that 
to  hold  one  island  and  to  give  the  others  to  other  powers, 
would  be  most  unfortunate  and  not  to  be  considered.  They 
expressed  pleasure  at  my  having  come  to  them,  feeling  that 
they  had  been  rather  neglected  by  the  Americans. 

In  my  judgment  the  exercise  of  a  little  tact  and  efforts  at 
conciliation  would  have  prevented  any  hostilities  and  have  left 
the  Islands  and  the  natives  in  the  same  conditions  as  to-day, 
without  the  immense  loss  of  life  accruing  in  the  last  three 
years. 

Aguinaldo,  in  a  letter  of  August  1,  1898,  to  our  late  Con 
sul  at  Manila,  Mr.  Williams,  said :  "  Say  to  the  Govern 
ment  at  Washington  that  the  Filipino  people  abominate  sav 
agery  ;  that  in  the  midst  of  their  past  misfortunes  they  have 
learned  to  love  liberty,  order,  justice,  and  civil  life." 

It  is  to  be  feared  that  they  have  had  a  sad  taste  of  savagery 
on  the  part  of  some  of  our  troops. 

The  day  before  I  left  Manila,  I  received  the  following  let 
ter  from  Aguinaldo  :  — 

MALOLOS,  October  30, 1898. 
To  Brigadier-General  C.  A.  Whittier, 
Manila. 

MY  DEAR  SIR  :  —  As  it  is  not  possible  for  me  to  see  you  off 
personally,  I  appoint  General  Pantaleon  Garcia,  and  Senor 
Trinidad  H.  Pardo  de  Tavera,  Director  of  Diplomacy,  accom- 


260  THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MANILA  IN  1898 

panied  by  my  Adjutant,  Senor  A.  Burgos,  to  pay  you  a  visit 
on  my  behalf. 

I  had  the  pleasure  of  receiving  your  photographs  and  the 
beautiful  cigar  case  you  kindly  sent  me  as  a  present,  for  which 
I  thank  you  heartily.  Allow  me  the  pleasure  of  reciprocating 
with  another  present,  although  not  so  valuable  as  yours.  It  is 
a  dagger,  locked  into  a  case,  which  will  be  handed  to  you  by 
the  bearers.  This  present  has  no  more  merit  than  that  it, 
at  the  same  time,  serves  as  testimony  of  my  friendship.  The 
weapon  has  been  used  by  me ;  it  may  serve  you  as  a  souvenir 
of  the  country,  inasmuch  as  the  dagger  and  the  case  were 
made  at  home. 

May  you  have  a  happy  passage ;  meanwhile  I  and  the  Philip 
pines  are  hoping  confidently  that  you  will  be  a  genuine  inter 
preter  and  a  very  vigorous  defender  of  our  aspirations  and 
legitimate  rights  before  the  Hispano-American  Peace  Com 
mission  in  Paris. 

I  am,  dear  sir, 

Yours  very  sincerely, 
(Signed)  EMILIO  AGUINALDO. 

That  the  Islands  are  very  rich,  there  can  be  doubt.  Sani 
tation,  cold-storage  houses,  railroads  to  the  mountains  — 
where  comfort  and  health  in  the  hot  season  can  be  obtained 
—  and  a  just,  firm  government,  are  the  essentials,  and  that 
the  latter  will  be  obtained  under  the  able  and  judicious  regime 
of  Governor  Taft  is  certain. 


XIII 

FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS  AS  MANI 
FESTED   IN  DIPLOMACY  AND  WAR 

BY 

MAJOR-GENERAL  E.   S.   OTIS,  U.S.A.,  RETIRED 


Read  before  the  Society,  April  7, 1903 


FILIPINO  CHAEACTEKISTICS   AS   MANIFESTED 
IN  DIPLOMACY  AND  WAK 

GENERALLY  I  have  successfully  resisted  all  invitations  to 
give  expression  to  any  opinion  I  might  have  regarding  Philip 
pine  conditions.  They  were  and  continue  to  be  a  subject  of 
animated  controversial  discussion,  attended  with  considerable 
political  significance :  and  as  an  old  soldier  relegated  to  the 
retired  list  for  both  physical  and  mental  disqualifications,  it 
does  not  become  me  to  enlighten  the  public  on  matters  which 
it  cannot  be  supposed  that  I  am  able  to  comprehend. 

Even  if  the  law  had  not  declared  me  incompetent  for  active 
military  service,  it  would  not  be  in  consonance  with  wise  dis 
cretion  to  advance  views  on  undetermined  questions  of  national 
importance.  It  is  the  province  of  the  soldier  to  act  and  not 
to  talk,  and  if  he  will  confine  himself  to  his  proper  sphere  of 
duty  he  may  rest  assured  that  others  will  do  all  the  talking 
necessary.  It  is,  therefore,  with  a  feeling  of  constraint  that  I 
am  here  to  remark  upon  the  mental  and  moral  complexion 
of  the  inhabitants  of  our  islands  in  the  China  Sea.  If  I  have 
erred,  may  the  responsibility  rest,  in  part  at  least,  with  the 
chairman  of  your  Executive  Committee,  whom  I  declare  an 
accessory  before  the  fact,  for  he  by  his  persuasive  methods  ap 
pealed  to  my  vanity  and  by  him  my  better  judgment  has  been 
warped. 

I  am  conscious  that  what  I  shall  say  may  not  meet  the  de 
mands  of  a  society  maintained  for  historical  discussion  ;  though 
what  time  is  required  to  crystallize  fact,  or  even  falsehood  for 
that  matter,  into  history,  I  know  not.  Nor  will  my  remarks 
specially  concern  military  affairs,  and  hence  it  would  seem  that 
I  shall  fail  to  meet  another  requisite  of  this  organization  ;  but 
I  hope  to  be  able  to  sufficiently  present,  by  way  of  illustration 


264  FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS 

and  in  proof  of  statement  and  theory,  Philippine  war  events 
to  save  criticism  in  this  particular. 

In  like  stages  of  development  all  people  exhibit  similar  men 
tal  and  moral  qualities,  varying  in  disposition  and  intensity  in 
accordance  with  racial  peculiarities.  True,  these  qualities  are 
affected  by  climate  and  environment,  so  that  people  of  iden 
tical  stock  may  be  differently  actuated  by  traits  of  character 
held  in  common,  but  not  to  such  an  extent  as  to  lose  the  dis 
tinguishing  racial  features  which  characterize  them.  In  the 
state  of  barbarism  all  men  are  suspicious,  deceitful,  supersti 
tious,  regardless  of  others  outside  of  family  or  community;  and 
the  primary  work  of  civilization  is  to  inculcate  confidence,  a 
knowledge  of  individual  rights,  and  self-imposed  restraint.  All 
types  of  men  have  been  undergoing  a  process  of  development 
since  the  world  began,  and  those  which  have  retained  nomadic 
habits  are  far  removed  from  the  savagery  of  prehistoric  ages. 
All  have  in  a  measure  elevated  themselves  in  the  scale  of  hu 
manity  :  some  very  slowly,  to  be  sure,  but  nearly  all  have  suc 
ceeded  in  establishing  domestic  and  social  customs,  precedents 
to  govern  individual  actions  in  their  relation  to  society,  some 
kind  of  political  system,  and  elaborate  ceremonials  expressive 
of  spiritual  belief.  Improvement  is  irresistibly  influenced  by 
racial  peculiarity.  In  the  nature  of  certain  races  craftiness 
and  the  tendency  to  commit  cruelties  may  be  more  deeply 
rooted  than  in  that  of  others,  hence  more  difficult  to  suppress, 
while  in  intellectual  advancement  divergent  directions  are 
given  by  unlike  mental  perceptions  and  processes,  by  dissimi 
larity  of  moral  and  religious  convictions. 

In  speaking  of  the  characteristics  of  the  Filipino  we  intend 
to  confine  our  remarks  to  those  which  appear  to  be  his  by  hered 
ity,  touching  occasionally,  it  may  be,  upon  practices  of  life 
which  he  has  acquired  by  his  three  hundred  years  of  inter 
course  with  the  Indo-European.  By  so  doing  we  may  give  sig 
nificance  to  this  statement,  since  our  people  are  engaged  in  an 
endeavor  to  impress  him  with  our  own  mental  conceptions  and 


FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS  265 

trends  of  thought ;  and  since,  as  we  think,  his  hereditary  traits 
of  character  will  pervade  whatever  form  of  higher  civilization 
he  may  be  induced  to  strive  for.  In  support  of  this  last  asser 
tion  it  might  not  be  amiss  to  comment  briefly  upon  the  result 
of  past  efforts  to  engraft  foreign  beliefs  and  customs  upon  an 
alien  stock,  in  order  to  convey  an  impression  of  the  immense 
regenerating  labor  this  country  must_perform  to  confine  Fili 
pino  tendencies  in  desired  channels  of  progress  and  the  im 
possibility  of  effecting  more  than  a  fairly  approximate  assimi 
lation. 

The  experience  of  the  United  States  in  proselyting  has  been 
confined  to  its  Indian  population,  and  we  all  know  that  our 
past  Indian  policy  has  accomplished  little  except  to  encourage 
Indian  demoralization  and  pauperism.  But  ever  since  the  dis 
covery  of  America  and  the  ocean  passage  by  the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope,  modern  European  nations  have  been  endeavoring  to  fix 
upon  alien  people  the  white  man's  ways ;  and  they  have  been 
constantly  extending  the  field  of  experiment  until  they  have 
brought  within  the  sphere  of  their  influences,  as  colonies  or 
dependencies,  one  third  of  the  world's  population  and  more 
than  one  third  of  the  land  area  of  the  earth.  And  what  has 
been  the  result  of  their  efforts  ?  Strange  as  it  may  appear, 
their  long-continued  labors  to  fasten  their  civilization  upon 
representatives  of  antagonistic  races,  whether  by  conquest  and 
military  rule  or  by  precept  and  example,  has  not  produced  a 
single  stable  political  organization,  unless  extensive  amalga 
mation  has  essentially  modified  original  proclivities. 

The  reason  of  this  failure  by  alien  people  to  acquire  a  prac 
tical  knowledge  of  our  social  and  political  economy  is  com 
monly  ascribed  to  erroneous  teaching.  It  is  widely  believed  by 
our  citizens  that  if,  instead  of  the  application  of  force  which 
has  been  and  is  still  being  applied  to  make  the  brown  and 
black  man  better,  persuasive  methods  had  been  employed,  ex 
pected  results  might  have  been  accomplished  !  In  our  estimate 
of  men  of  another  type,  we  assume  that  a  radical  change  in 


266  FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS 

thought,  action,  and  custom  is  essential  to  their  salvation  and 
must  consist  in  their  abandonment  of  cherished  habits  and 
superstitions  for  the  practices  which  we  follow.  We  assume 
that  ours  is  the  only  true  civilization ;  that  it  is  easy  of  com 
prehension  and  appeals  directly  to  the  intelligence  of  all  well- 
intentioned  people,  whether  cultured  or  uncultivated ;  that  the 
personal  comforts  and  benefits  it  bestows  are  so  immeasurably 
great  in  comparison  with  those  which  attend  other  codes  and 
customs  by  which  life  is  regulated,  that  its  acceptance  by  every 
class  of  the  world's  inhabitants  is  certain  when  they  are  fully 
informed  as  to  its  character.  We  forget  that  this  civilization 
is  the  product  of  centuries  of  determined  struggle  in  which 
the  opposing  mental,  moral,  and  religious  convictions  peculiar 
to  a  minor  portion  of  a  single  race  of  men  contended  for  the 
mastery ;  that  some  of  the  elements  which  entered  into  it,  and 
by  which,  indeed,  it  is  still  maintained  and  propelled,  are  the 
distinctive  features,  the  special  characteristics  of  the  race. 
The  intelligent,  moral,  practical  individualism  which  pervades 
it,  and  which  is  its  vitalizing  principle,  is  the  slow  growth  of 
time,  and  it  would  require  prolonged  study  on  our  part  to  dis 
cover  all  the  forces  with  which  that  individualism  has  been 
compelled  to  battle,  how  it  has  been  built  up,  how  conditioned 
and  modified,  and  what  has  been  its  retroactive  effect  upon 
the  forces  with  which  it  contended.  This  civilization,  which, 
as  we  think,  commends  itself  to  all  sorts  and  conditions  of 
men  because  of  its  simplicity  and  practicability,  is,  in  fact,  of 
very  complicated  construction.  We  who  are  born  to  it,  who 
have  received  it  as  a  heritage,  fail  to  realize  the  complex  na 
ture  of  our  institutions,  and  the  difficulties  which  one  alien  by 
inheritance  would  experience  in  trying  to  comprehend  them. 

Every  type  of  man  is  in  a  progressive  stage.  Cause  is  con 
tinually  at  work  inspiring  mental  activity  and  results  show 
themselves  in  improved  conditions.  Mental  and  moral  charac 
teristics  are  transmitted  and  there  is  a  steady  advancement  in 
that  particular  direction  whither  natural  tendency,  influenced 


FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS  267 

by  attending  circumstances,  leads.  The  Asiatic  or  African 
has  established  a  mode  of  life  as  fixed  and  permanent  as  that 
which  prevails  in  white  communities.  In  the  course  of  devel 
opment  he  has  proceeded  in  a  direction  divergent  from  the 
one  the  white  man  has  pursued,  and  in  some  respects  on  a 
diametrically  opposite  path.  Particularly  is  this  the  case  as 
regards  mental  processes,  moral  conceptions,  and  religious 
convictions.  Therefore  the  change  which  we  think  necessary 
to  convert  him  into  a  useful  and  self-sustaining  specimen  of 
manhood  involves  not  only  a  different  manner  of  living,  but 
a  reversal  of  thought,  conscience,  belief,  and  inclination.  To 
effect  such  transformation  speedily,  if  at  all,  either  by  decree, 
statute,  persuasion,  or  military  power,  or  by  all  of  these  agents 
combined,  is  an  impossibility  —  not  for  the  reason  that  rep 
resentatives  of  other  races  are  mentally  deficient,  but  because 
they  cannot  comprehend,  or  at  least  appreciate,  that  which  we 
offer. 

I  take  it  that  the  underlying  force  in  our  modern  civiliza 
tion  is  that  which  insures  personal  liberty  as  interpreted  by 
our  best  construction  of  natural  or  positive  law.  To  secure  it, 
several  centuries  of  mental  effort  have  been  expended  to  ascer 
tain  the  absolute  and  relative  rights  of  man,  to  discover  what 
privileges  belong  to  him  as  an  individual,  and  what  duties 
arise  from  the  social  relation.  As  a  result  his  status  as  regards 
his  fellow-men  has  been  defined,  the  elements  of  society  have 
been  analyzed,  and  a  legal  code  has  been  created  by  which 
individual  profit  and  social  well-being  have  been  indissolubly 
linked.  As  a  further  result,  questions  of  social  progress  and 
individual  advancement  in  worldly  interests  have  been  con 
stantly  presented,  confining  investigation  to  intensely  practi 
cal  channels.  It  has  sought  to  unfold  the  laws  of  the  material 
universe.  It  has  endeavored  to  find  out  the  basis  of  things. 
Seeking  ultimate  fact  for  its  postulate  and  for  its  director  the 
infallible  guide  of  experience,  it  has  constructed  its  theology, 
philosophy,  and  civil  institutions.  As  a  consequence,  we  have 


268  FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS 

the  regeneration  of  the  moralities,  eternally  rooted,  as  we  hope, 
in  accepted  social  and  business  creeds  with  appliances  to  com 
pel  their  observance  —  all  existing  and  flourishing  not  only 
in  educated  conscience,  but  in  advantageous  personal,  com 
munal,  and  state  policy. 

In  the  varied  civilizations  of  other  races  some  of  which 
(centuries  older  than  our  own)  have  displayed  wonderful  in 
tellectual  capacity,  with  art  and  architecture  highly  developed, 
with  psychological  inquiry  penetrating  the  mysteries  to  a 
height  and  depth  we  can  neither  measure  nor  fathom,  there 
is  nothing  to  define  or  nurture  liberty  as  distinguished  from 
license,  nothing  to  stimulate  prolonged  honest  individual  la 
bor.  There  is  no  code  of  ethics  to  govern  action  between  man 
and  man,  nothing  more  encouraging  than  is  expressed  in  the 
verities  of  Buddha  which  suppress  the  aims  and  purposes  of 
life  which  our  civilization  fosters.  Would  it  not  appear,  there 
fore,  that  the  radical  change  which  is  deemed  necessary  to 
convert  the  representative  of  another  race  into  a  fairly  good 
member  of  our  modern  society,  requires  that  he  practise  cer 
tain  virtues  of  which  he  knows  nothing  and  to  which  he  at 
taches  no  value  ?  In  his  case  (and  I  speak  of  him  as  an  expo 
nent  of  the  great  mass  of  the  world's  inhabitants  whom  we 
deem  wanting  in  mental  and  moral  expression),  natural  deceit 
must  give  way  to  an  acquired  love  for  truth,  characteristic 
cruelty  to  the  dictates  of  educated  humanity,  the  impulse  to 
retaliate  to  a  controlling  desire  for  justice,  and  habitual  indul 
gence  to  zeal  and  industry  in  creditable  employment. 

The  difficulties  which  beset  attempts  to  impose  upon  other 
races  those  elements  of  our  civilization  which  we  consider 
essential  to  progress  are  so  varied  and  excessive,  it  is  not  sur 
prising  that  the  effort  has  not  been  more  successful.  The 
work  involves  individual  reanimation,  social  advancement, 
political  regeneration,  the  introduction  of  our  modern  busi 
ness  methods  and  commercial  growth,  without  which  a  coun 
try  cannot  hope  to  achieve  even  tolerable  prosperity,  however 


FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS  269 

favored  by  climate,  productiveness,  and  ocean  advantages. 
The  magnitude  of  these  difficulties  may  be  inferred  from  the 
fact  that  in  spite  of  all  past  effort  there  is  not  to-day  a  single 
native  colony  of  all  the  great  number  which  have  been  founded 
beyond  European  boundaries  by  European  nations,  which 
could  sustain  itself  if  European  supervision  were  removed, 
while  every  colony  planted  with  European  subjects  and  prop 
erly  nurtured  in  infancy,  no  matter  in  what  section  of  the 
earth,  has  become  self-sustaining,  thrifty,  and  to  all  intents 
and  purposes  independent. 

In  this  seeming  digression  I  have  not  indulged  in  argu 
ment,  but  have  presented  statements  which  will  not  be  seri 
ously  questioned.  They  sufficiently  suggest  our  theory,  that 
the  racial  characteristics  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  Philippines 
determine  to  what  extent  they  are  capable  of  taking  our 
civilization. 

Who  or  what  are  these  eight  millions  of  inhabitants, 
dwelling  in  many  islands  rich  in  nature's  gifts,  only  slightly 
developed,  and  having  a  total  area  in  territory  of  about  one 
hundred  and  ten  thousand  square  miles?  They  show  diverse 
ethnological  peculiarities,  but  practically  all  are  of  Malayan 
stock.  Separated  by  arms  of  the  sea,  they  exhibit  strong  he 
reditary  dislikes  often  culminating  in  bloody  strife,  and  this 
antagonism  is  frequently  visited  within  the  borders  of  the 
same  island.  For  language  they  employ  more  than  sixty 
different  dialects,  so  pronounced  that  people  of  adjacent 
provinces  cannot  communicate  by  speech.  In  religion  they 
are  Christians,  so  called,  having  the  shell  of  Christianity 
stuffed  full  of  their  heathen  superstitions ;  Mohammedans,  by 
declaration  and  in  the  more  crude  outward  observances  of 
that  creed ;  pagans  of  infinite  variety  from  the  basest  feti- 
chism  to  a  mysticism  of  a  highly  imaginative  order.  They 
have  no  real  cosmopolitan  spirit.  In  domestic  and  social  life 
the  clan  or  family  custom  generally  prevails.  Their  cities, 
even  Manila,  have  been  made  up  of  a  number  of  these  clans, 


270  FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS 

which  located  in  near  proximity  have  extended  to  former  lim 
its  of  separation.  The  residents  of  barrios  or  wards  of  cities, 
sometimes  distant  from  main  centres  five  miles  and  more  with 
intervening  spaces  uninhabited,  are  held  together  by  consan 
guineous  ties  and  affiliate  with  allied  clans  for  protection  and 
governmental  purposes.  They  have  subtle  and  acute  mental 
powers,  and,  lacking  initiative,  inventive  genius,  and  compre 
hension  of  the  practical,  have  the  imitative  faculty  wonder 
fully  strong.  They  are  fairly  industrious  for  people  of  the 
tropics,  and  of  agricultural  proclivities.  Their  personal  at 
tachments  are  circumscribed  by  the  ties  of  domestic  relation 
ship.  To  the  casual  observer  they  are  impassive  in  counte 
nance,  apathetic  in  demeanor,  still  ready  impersonators  of  the 
usual  observances  of  cultivated  society.  By  disposition  they 
are  hospitable,  yet  cunning,  deceitful,  revengeful,  and  fiend 
ishly  cruel  when  opportunity  is  offered  to  avenge  supposed 
inflicted  wrong,  and  they  can  await  opportunity  in  apparent 
tranquillity.  As  for  civil  liberty,  the  essential  principles  of 
representative  or  of  any  other  form  of  government  which  is 
not  entirely  dependent  upon  brute  force,  they  have  no  definite 
conception. 

In  this  estimate  of  character  and  qualities  we  have  ex 
cluded  from  computation  the  few  cultured  natives  who  have 
been  graduated  from  the  advance  educational  institutions  of 
the  Islands  (especially  the  University  of  Manila),  who  pos 
sess  excellent  business  qualifications  and  show  proficiency  in 
science,  law,  and  medicine  —  some  of  whom  have  improved 
their  professional  attainments  by  study  in  the  best  schools  of 
Madrid  and  Paris.  The  majority  of  these  are  of  mixed  blood 
with  European  or  Mongolian  strain  —  a  small  percentage  be 
ing,  to  all  appearances,  of  pure  racial  descent  and  in  no  re 
spect  inferior  to  the  mestizo  in  mental  and  moral  equipment. 
Nor  have  we  taken  account  of  the  densely  ignorant  portion  o£ 
the  population  —  the  tribesmen  of  the  mountains  which  bisect 
every  island  of  importance,  most  of  whom  are  barbarians, 


FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS  271 

though  having  among  them  the  ladrone  element  which  has 
always  robbed  the  permanent  residents  of  the  lowlands.  But 
in  our  estimate  we  have  endeavored  to  portray  the  composite 
Filipino  —  the  type  of  the  great  mass  of  the  inhabitants  of 
the  Philippines. 

When  our  political  relations  with  them  originated,  they  had 
received  the  benefits  of  three  centuries  of  European  colonial 
supervision  which  improved  all  classe's  with  whom  it  came  in 
direct  contact,  acquainting  them  with  European  modes  of 
life  and  occupations  and  arousing  a  well-nigh  universal  desire 
to  follow  them.  Their  moral  deficiencies  we  are  wont  to  as 
cribe  to  long-continued  Spanish  domination,  but  erroneously 
so,  for  when  Spain  found  them  they  were  not  susceptible  of 
degeneration.  The  society  of  the  whites  did  not  make  them 
any  worse  and  did  appeal  to  their  intelligence.  The  religious 
orders,  which  wielded  sufficient  political  power  to  shape  gov 
ernment  policy  and  which  controlled  all  educational  work, 
charge  them  with  base  ingratitude,  since,  as  the  friars  assert 
with  considerable  truth,  they  taught  them  all  they  know. 
They  at  least  gave  them  sufficient  instruction  to  enable  them 
to  realize  that  they  were  the  victims  of  friar  cupidity  and  offi 
cial  injustice.  Spanish  guardianship,  while  it  may  have  re 
tarded  a  development  which  better  example  might  have 
accelerated,  gradually  advanced  them  mentally  and  socially, 
even  to  a  degree  which  some  say  has  fitted  them  to  exercise 
the  duties  of  representative  citizenship. 

Eegarding  their  vigor  and  attainments  we  quote  from  a 
newspaper  article  of  June  8,  1897,  prepared  by  an  educated 
Englishman  who  had  lived  among  them  many  years  and  who 
also  had  a  practical  acquaintance  with  the  inhabitants  of  India, 
the  neighboring  islands  and  indeed  of  the  whole  southern 
Asiatic  coast.  It  will  be  perceived  that  it  bears  date  shortly 
after  our  naval  victory  in  Manila  Bay,  when  Philippine  affairs 
were  becoming  interesting.  The  writer  says  :  "  The  possession 
of  Manila  no  more  means  the  possession  of  the  Philippines 


272  FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS 

than  the  possession  of  New  York  means  the  possession  of 
America ;  and  without  the  good-will  and  assistance  of  the  in 
habitants  I  beg  leave  to  state  that  neither  the  United  States 
nor  any  other  nation  could  ever  hope  to  take  the  Philippines 
except  with  an  army  of  two  hundred  thousand  men  or  more, 
if  even  then,  no  matter  what  theorists  may  say  to  the  con 
trary.  .  .  .  Such  crass  ignorance  of  the  state  of  the  Philip 
pines  and  its  inhabitants  exists  on  every  side  that  it  is  almost 
useless  to  try  to  explain  to  outsiders  that  the  Philippines  are 
as  different  from  British  India,  Ceylon,  Burma,  the  West  In 
dies,  etc.,  as  light  is  from  darkness.  The  people  are  the  most 
enlightened  and  vigorous  branch  of  the  Malay  race  and  have 
been  Christians  for  centuries  —  in  fact  longer  than  the  prin 
ciples  of  the  Reformation  have  been  established  in  Great  Brit 
ain  —  and  are  the  nearest  akin  to  Europeans  of  any  alien 
race." 

It  is  granted  that  the  Filipinos  are  the  most  enlightened 
of  the  Malays  and  have  adopted  European  habits  to  a  greater 
extent  than  any  other  alien  race.  The  reason  is,  doubtless, 
that  they  may  have  been  longer  and  more  completely  under 
European  influences.  Spain,  different  from  other  colonizing 
nations  of  modern  times,  controlled  her  territorial  discoveries 
through  a  board  of  Government  officials,  created  in  1511, 
and  did  not  farm  them  out  to  trading  combinations,  as  did 
Great  Britain  and  the  Netherlands.  The  former  kept  immedi 
ate  control  of  her  colonial  trade,  sent  to  colonial  subjects  her 
citizens,  her  teachers  and  clergy,  who  dwelt  among  them,  while 
the  chartered  trading  companies  of  other  nations  excluded 
from  communication  with  natives  until  a  recent  period  all  ex 
cept  their  own  agents,  whose  business  it  was  to  cheat  them. 
In  every  important  coast  province  of  the  Philippines  there 
were  constructed  quite  early  churches,  convents,  schools,  and 
markets  for  the  exchange  of  products.  The  church  became 
the  centre  around  which  population  assembled  and  from  which 
civilizing  influences  radiated.  Practically  those  islands  have 


FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS  273 

had  one  hundred  and  fifty  years  more  of  European  tutelage 
than  any  other  of  the  Asiatic  or  Pacific  Ocean  colonial 
holdings. 

Some  months  before  this  newspaper  article  appeared,  rep 
resentative  Filipinos  who  had  been  prominent  in  the  island 
revolutionary  movement  of  1897  were  fugitives,  temporarily 
residing  in  Hong  Kong.  Our  controversy  with  Spain  was  ap 
proaching  an  exciting  stage  and  these  Filipinos  believed  it 
would  result  in  war.  They  had  formed  in  Hong  Kong  their 
revolutionary  club,  or  Junta,  and  continued  their  plottings 
against  their  old  enemy.  On  November  3,  1897,  our  Consul- 
General  there  reported  that  he  had  been  visited  by  the  for 
eign  agent  and  high  commissioner  of  the  new  Republic  of  the 
Philippines,  who  was  duly  accredited  by  the  President,  mem 
bers  of  the  Cabinet,  and  General-in-Chief  of  the  same;  that 
he  offered  on  behalf  of  his  Government  an  alliance  offensive 
and  defensive  with  the  United  States  when  the  latter  should 
declare  war  against  Spain;  that  the  Republic  wished  the 
United  States  to  send  to  the  Philippine  coast  rifles,  and  am 
munition  to  be  paid  for  by  it  upon  recognition,  and  it  pledged 
as  security  for  payment  two  provinces  and  the  Custom-House 
at  Manila. 

This  formation  of  a  Philippine  Republic  in  foreign  parts 
by  a  few  exiles  who  took  all  the  offices,  is  an  example  of  Fili 
pino  political  sagacity,  and  the  offer  of  alliance  under  the 
conditions  then  existing  is  a  commentary  on  their  apprecia 
tion  of  international  law.  The  incident  is  introduced  to  illus 
trate,  in  connection  with  later  proceedings  to  which  reference 
will  be  made,  the  crafty  simplicity  of  Filipino  diplomacy  and 
the  lack  of  comprehension  which  characterized  it.  Still,  with 
out  the  aid  of  the  documentary  evidence  which  Aguinaldo's 
captured  war  chest  contained,  we  might  even  now  be  unable 
to  determine  whether  the  insurrecto  leaders  had  then  or  after 
wards  a  predetermined  plan  of  action,  or  willfully  deceived  us 
as  to  their  early  political  intentions. 


274  FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS 

The  foregoing  reported  interview  indicates  that  a  Philip 
pine  Republic  was  then  in  vague  contemplation ;  but  Aguinaldo 
at  the  time  was  fighting  the  Spaniards  in  Central  Luzon,  with 
no  thought,  as  he  declared,  of  creating  an  independent  gov 
ernment,  only  to  compel  certain  political  reforms.  He  had  suc 
ceeded  in  gathering  a  considerable  force  and  had  ingeniously 
imposed  the  belief  on  the  colonial  authorities  that  he  com 
manded  a  formidable  army.  Spain  directed  that  he  and  his 
principal  confederates  be  bought  up  at  a  cost  not  to  exceed 
two  millions  of  dollars.  The  purchase  was  effected  and  what 
is  known  as  the  Treaty  of  Biac-na-bato  resulted.  By  it  Agui 
naldo  and  his  chief  officers,  in  consideration  of  one  million 
two  hundred  thousand  dollars,  agreed  to  counsel  peace,  dis 
band  their  army,  and  surrender  their  arms,  he,  with  a  number 
of  his  lieutenants,  to  leave  the  country,  receive  one  third  of 
the  gross  amount,  the  remaining  sum  to  be  paid  later  when 
certain  promises  should  be  fulfilled.  Spain  shipped  him  with 
some  twenty  of  his  admirers  to  Hong  Kong  during  the  last 
week  of  December,  1897,  and  deposited  the  stipulated  sum 
of  money  to  his  credit  in  a  Hong  Kong  bank,  where  it  soon 
became  a  matter  of  judicial  proceedings  between  him  and 
former  comrades  who  demanded  a  share  of  these  spoils  of 
war. 

The  peace  of  Biac-na-bato  was  of  short  duration.  The  Hong 
Kong  Junta,  now  dominated  by  the  Philippine  warriors, 
charged  Spain  with  breach  of  faith  in  withholding  the  remain 
der  of  the  purchase  money  and  not  inaugurating  the  promised 
political  reforms.  Proof  of  reform  promises  exists  only  in  the 
parole  statements  of  the  purchased  revolutionists.  As  for 
money,  the  Spanish  Government  paid  the  four  hundred  thou 
sand  dollars,  although  Aguinaldo  asserted  that  he  received  but 
half  of  it,  but  certain  of  his  friends  claimed  that  a  noted  Fili 
pino  dextrously  covered  in  the  balance.  It  is  possible,  indeed 
very  probable,  that  neither  party  to  the  treaty  intended  to 
execute  its  covenants.  The  colonial  authorities  had  accom- 


FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS  275 

plished  all  that  they  desired  in  the  disbandment  of  the  revolu 
tionary  army  and  the  withdrawal  of  its  leaders.  They  considered 
themselves  able  to  handle  the  situation,  and  made  no  change 
in  policy,  and  punished  with  more  than  ordinary  severity.  The 
leaders  accepted  the  offer  of  money  and  withdrew  from  the 
Islands  in  order  to  obtain  funds  for  the  purchase  of  arms  and 
a  better  base  for  future  operations.  They  raised  the  cry  of 
fraud  against  Spain  to  excuse  their  plottings,  renewed  before 
they  could  show  that  she  did  not  intend  to  keep  faith ;  and, 
indeed,  their  activity  in  that  direction  had  only  slight  cessation. 
The  Governor-General  of  the  Philippines  proclaimed  the 
new  peace  amid  great  rejoicings  and  festivities,  but  a  destruc 
tive  guerilla  warfare  followed  immediately  upon  the  breaking- 
up  of  the  revolutionary  army  organization.  Said  our  Manila 
Consul  on  February  22  :  "  War  exists,  battles  are  of  almost 
daily  occurrence,  ambulances  bring  in  many  wounded,  and 
hospitals  are  full.  Prisoners  are  brought  here  and  shot  with 
out  trial  and  Manila  is  under  martial  law.'*  The  Hong  Kong 
Junta  was  active,  but  particulars  of  its  proceedings  are  not 
reported.  Our  Consul-General  at  that  city,  in  an  explana 
tory  communication  of  later  date,  asserts  that  Aguinaldo  "  was 
in  and  out  of  his  consulate  for  nearly  a  month,"  which  is  un 
derstood  to  mean  the  month  previous  to  his  journey  to  Saigon 
and  Singapore  on  which  he  departed  during  the  first  half  of 
April.  On  April  24  he  had  a  conference  with  our  Singapore 
Consul-General  and  made  tender  of  assistance  to  the  United 
States.  It  is  well  known  that  the  Singapore  Consul  returned 
him  to  Hong  Kong  for  consultation  with  Admiral  Dewey ; 
that  the  Admiral  had  sailed  for  the  Philippines  before  his 
arrival;  that  he  reached  Manila  Bay  with  seventeen  of  his 
followers,  on  May  19,  and  established  himself  at  Cavite,  where 
on  the  24th  of  that  month  he  issued  certain  proclamations 
assigning  reasons  for  his  return,  intimating  his  purpose  to  de 
clare  a  dictatorship,  and  instructing  natives  in  rules  of  warfare. 
It  is  due  him  to  say  that  in  these  early  proclamations,  as  well 


276  FILIPINO  CHAEACTERISTICS 

as  in  those  of  a  later  issue  and  until  the  Malolos  Government 
was  established,  he  nowhere  makes  a  pretence  that  the  cause 
of  the  Filipinos  is  other  than  that  of  liberty  and  independ 
ence.  In  the  Singapore  conference  he  is  reported  to  have 
stated  that  he  "  hoped  the  United  States  would  assume  pro 
tection  of  the  islands  long  enough  to  allow  the  inhabitants  to 
establish  a  government  of  their  own."  And  not  until  January, 
1899,  after  the  Malolos  Government  had  taken  shape,  had 
voted  him  president  and  subsequently  dictator,  not  until  he 
had  announced  to  the  world  that  the  political  constitution  of 
the  Philippine  Republic  had  been  promulgated  and  awaited 
recognition,  did  he  openly  manifest  a  determination  to  compel 
the  United  States  to  withdraw.  In  his  public,  official  action 
he  appears  to  have  been  consistent.  He  stood  out  as  the  rep 
resentative  of  a  people  engaged  in  a  revolution,  contending 
for  independence;  and  although  he  confined  our  troops  within 
the  limits  of  Manila,  constructing  about  that  city  strong  lines 
of  circumvallation,  he  did  it,  as  he  asserted,  to  be  in  readi 
ness  for  the  return  of  the  Spaniards. 

How,  then,  shall  we  account  for  the  illusions  of  our  civil 
representatives  in  that  region?  Said  one,  officially  reporting 
conditions  early  in  May:  "These  natives  are  eager  to  be  or 
ganized  and  led  by  United  States  officers,  and  members  of 
their  cabinet  visited  me  and  gave  assurance  that  all  would 
swear  allegiance  to  and  cheerfully  follow  our  flag.  .  .  .  Hence 
I  believe  ample  assurances  are  at  hand  that  civil  government 
by  us  will  be  easy  of  organization  and  gratefully  received  by 
the  people."  On  June  16  he  reported:  "I  am  maintaining 
cordial  relations  with  General  Aguinaldo,  having  stipulated 
submissiveness  to  our  forces  when  treating  for  return  here. 
Last  Sunday,  12th,  they  had  a  council  to  form  a  provisional 
government.  ...  A  form  of  government  was  adopted,  but 
General  Aguinaldo  told  me  to-day  that  his  friends  all  hoped 
that  the  Philippines  would  be  held  as  a  colony  of  the  United 
States  of  America."  And  on  August  4  he  wrote :  "  I  have 


FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS  277 

traversed  the  entire  ground  of  government  with  him  in  council 
and  he  has  called  his  officials  from  fifteen  provinces  to  meet 
me  for  their  discussion."  As  late  as  September  5,  after  the 
insurgent  capital  had  been  moved  to  Malolos,  he  cabled  Wash 
ington:  "To-day,  delegation  from  four  thousand  Viscayan 
soldiers,  also  representing  southern  business  interests,  came 
to  me  pledging  loyalty  to  annexation,  several  insurgent  lead 
ers  likewise." 

Another  of  our  representatives  made  report  on  July  18  as 
follows :  "In  reply,  the  State  Department  instructed  me  to 
courteously  decline  to  communicate  with  the  Department  fur 
ther  regarding  the  alleged  mission  ";  meaning  the  occurrence 
of  November  3  of  the  previous  year.  "  I  obeyed  these  instruc 
tions  to  the  letter  until  the  breaking-out  of  the  war  when, 
after  consultation  with  Admiral  Dewey,  I  received  a  delega 
tion  from  the  insurgent  Junta,  and  they  bound  themselves  to 
obey  all  laws  of  civilized  warfare  and  to  place  themselves  ab 
solutely  under  the  orders  of  Admiral  Dewey  if  they  were  per 
mitted  to  return  to  Manila.  ...  I  believe  I  know  the  senti 
ments  of  the  political  leaders  and  of  the  monied  men  among 
the  insurgents,  and  in  spite  of  all  statements  to  the  contrary 
I  know  that  they  are  fighting  for  annexation  to  the  United 
States  first,  and  for  independence  secondly,  if  the  United 
States  desires  to  decline  the  sovereignty  of  the  Islands.  .  .  . 
On  April  27th  in  company  with  [here  naming  the  Manila 
Consul]  we  received  another  delegation  composed  of  Senors 
[here  naming  eight  delegates,  three  of  whom  afterwards  be 
came  the  most  villainous  of  insurgent  officers].  We  agreed  on 
behalf  of  Deway  to  allow  two  of  their  number  to  accompany 
the  fleet  to  Manila,  etc.  ...  It  was  May  16th  before  I  could 
obtain  permission  to  allow  Aguinaldo  to  go.  ...  Immedi 
ately  on  his  arrival  at  Cavite  he  issued  a  proclamation  which 
I  had  outlined  for  him  before  he  left,  forbidding  pillage  and 
making  it  a  criminal  offence  to  maltreat  neutrals.  He,  of 
course,  organized  a  government  of  which  he  was  dictator  — 


278  FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS 

an  absolutely  necessary  step  if  he  hoped  to  maintain  control 
over  the  natives."  On  August  9  our  representative  is  a  little 
shaken  in  his  bestowed  confidence,  for  he  writes  :  "  Aguinaldo 
has  written  me  by  every  opportunity  and  I  believe  that  he  has 
been  frank  with  me  regarding  both  his  actions  and  his  mo 
tives.  I  do  not  doubt  but  that  he  would  like  to  be  President  of 
the  Philippine  Kepublic  and  there  may  be  a  small  coterie  of 
his  native  advisers  who  entertain  a  like  ambition,  but  I  am 
perfectly  certain  that  the  great  majority  of  his  followers  and 
all  the  wealthy  educated  Filipinos  have  but  one  desire  —  to 
become  citizens  of  the  United  States  of  America."  Early  in 
May,  between  the  6th  and  15th  of  that  month,  he  cabled  to 
Washington  in  behalf  of  certain  members  of  the  Hong  Kong 
Junta  (some  of  whom  proved  to  be  among  the  most  implacable 
of  our  enemies)  their  submission  of  allegiance  to  the  United 
States,  stating  that  they  had  "  instructed  their  relatives  in 
Manila  to  render  every  possible  aid  to  our  forces." 

These  recorded  convictions  of  our  civil  officials  in  the  chief 
ports  of  the  China  Sea  could  have  resulted  only  through  the 
practised  duplicity  of  the  principal  Filipino  insurgents  — 
members  of  the  conclave  which  held  their  meetings  in  Hong 
Kong.  In  the  correspondence  to  which  we  have  referred,  not 
a  single  native  is  mentioned  who  manifested  friendly  feeling 
toward  us  during  the  subsequent  insurrection  or  who  gave  us 
aid  in  building  up  an  island  government. 

The  sentiments  expressed  by  this  Junta  on  November  3, 
1897,  and  their  offer  of  alliance  has  been  noticed.  In  a  widely 
circulated  article  published  in  the  "  Singapore  Free  Press"  of 
May  4,  which  recounts  the  particulars  of  Aguinaldo's  visit  to 
that  city,  as  gained  from  a  personal  interview,  his  policy  is 
announced  in  part  as  follows :  "  General  Aguinaldo's  policy 
embraces  the  independence  of  the  Philippines,  whose  internal 
affairs  would  be  controlled  under  European  and  American  ad 
visers.  American  protection  would  be  desirable  temporarily  on 
the  same  basis  as  that  which  might  be  instituted  hereafter  in 


FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS  279 

Cuba."  This  was  and  continued  to  be  substantially  the  policy 
secretly  advocated  by  a  majority  of  the  insurgents,  although  a 
great  many  of  the  ablest  natives,  who  affiliated  with  them  until 
October,  1898,  proposed  the  acceptance  of  United  States  sov 
ereignty  and  deplored  the  signs  of  approaching  conflict.  As  for 
Aguinaldo,  it  was  his  policy  when  he  returned  to  the  Islands, 
but  as  continued  marvellous  success  attended  him,  his  self- 
importance  and  ambitions  correspondingly  increased.  Said 
one  of  our  consular  officers  on  August  9  :  "  Aguinaldo  had  for 
some  weeks  been  getting  what  Admiral  Dewey  calls  a  big 
head  and  writing  me  sulky,  childish  letters."  In  his  own  esti 
mation  he  grew  rapidly  in  greatness.  When  his  Congress  had 
formulated  a  Constitution  he  withheld  his  approval  until  voted 
Dictator.  The  Government  became  an  autocracy,  with  Con 
gress,  the  Judiciary,  and  the  priesthood  the  pliant  tools  of  the 
Autocrat,  and  assassination  became  an  acceptable  remedy  when 
troublesome  individuals  interfered.  In  the  December,  1898, 
rising  of  inhabitants  in  certain  Luzon  cities  against  his  author 
ity,  the  leaders  were  assassinated  and  the  common  people  were 
tranquillized,  as  stated,  by  the  summary  action  of  bodies  of  sol 
diers.  The  insurgent  Secretary  of  War  reported  that  "  he  had 
sent  there  six  companies  of  soldiers  with  explicit  instructions 
to  their  commander  to  make  the  people  return  to  a  peaceful 
life,  using  a  policy  of  attraction"  And  still  Aguinaldo's  am 
bition  for  great  power  and  more  abundant  honors  waxed 
stronger.  His  fertile  imagination  pictured  an  empire  beneath 
his  sway,  and  those  upon  whom  he  relied  for  support  —  the 
officers  of  his  army,  who  clamored  at  Malolos  for  war  and 
overpowered  the  advocates  of  peace  —  indulged  in  inspiring 
reflections  of  personal  aggrandizement.  On  January  13,  three 
weeks  before  he  inaugurated  active  warfare,  they  wired  their 
Honorable  Presidente :  "  We  desire  to  know  results  of  ulti* 
matum  which  you  mentioned  in  your  telegram,  and  we  also 
wish  to  know  what  reward  our  Government  is  arranging  for 
the  forces  that  will  be  able  first  to  enter  Manila."  And  the 


280  FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS 

President  replied,  over  his  own  signature:  "As  to  the  con 
tents  of  your  telegram,  those  who  will  be  the  heroes  will  have 
as  rewards  a  large  quantity  of  money,  extraordinary  rewards, 
promotions,  crosses  of  Biac-na-bato,  Marquis  of  Malta,  Ermite, 
Count  of  Manila,  etc.,  .  .  .  and  more,  if  they  capture  the 
regiments  with  their  generals,  and  if  possible  the  chief  of 
them  all,  who  represents  our  future  enemies  in  Manila.  .  .  . 
The  ultimatum  has  not  been  sent,  but  will  be  within  a  few 
days." 

We  will  now  return  to  the  occurrences  of  a  former  date  in 
order  to  ascertain  the  reason  for  our  failure  to  sooner  compre 
hend  insurgent  intention.  It  will  be  remembered  that  by  official 
correspondence  of  November  3,  1897,  it  appears  that  the  ac 
credited  High  Commissioner  of  the  Republic  of  the  Philip 
pines  proposed  an  alliance  with  the  United  States.  Whoever 
the  parties  styling  themselves  the  chief  officers  of  a  Republic 
might  be,  they  were  not  known  to  the  world  except  as  the  re 
bellious  subjects  of  Spain,  and  instructions  were  issued  to  our 
representative  not  to  hold  intercourse  with  them.  This  the 
members  of  the  Hong  Kong  Junta  doubtless  discovered.  When 
our  war  with  Spain  commenced  they  understood  that  they 
could  be  recognized  only  as  private  individuals,  and  hence  they 
preferred  individual  requests  for  permission  to  return  to  the 
Philippines  and  render  assistance  to  the  United  States  —  pro 
fessing  a  desire  to  have  the  latter  Government  firmly  estab 
lished  there.  Aguinaldo  remained  in  Hong  Kong  some  two 
weeks  after  his  return  from  Singapore  and  before  his  departure 
for  Manila  Bay.  During  that  period  the  Junta  held  an  im 
portant  session.  The  minutes  of  its  proceedings  were  found 
among  the  papers  of  Aguinaldo  captured  in  November,  1899. 
They  indicate  that  the  late  Republic  had  vanished,  as  they  show 
that  he  was  the  choice  of  the  Junta  to  represent  it  in  the  Is 
lands  because  of  the  great  prestige  he  had  already  acquired 
there.  He  was  commissioned  to  take  command  of  such  native 
forces  as  he  could  gather,  obtain  what  aid  he  could  from  the 


FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS  281 

Americans,  work  harmoniously  with  them  until  the  Spaniards 
were  worsted,  and  then,  if  the  former  manifested  an  intention 
of  remaining  permanently,  turn  and  drive  them  out.  The 
speeches  made  on  the  occasion  (the  substance  of  which  are  in 
corporated  in  the  minutes)  illustrate  Filipino  characteristics 
applied  to  diplomacy  even  better  than  the  conclusion  of  the 
Junta.  Aguinaldo,  either  from  lack  of  courage  or  because  of 
honorable  impulse,  hesitated  to  assume  the  task  marked  out  for 
him,  but  yielded  to  the  eloquence  of  the  orators,  who  pleaded 
that  it  was  imperative  in  order  to  secure  their  inalienable  rights 
and  God-given  liberties,  and  therefore  dictated  by  the  noblest 
sentiment  of  humanity.  He  was  a  master  in  dissimulation.  A 
cross  of  the  Chinaman  and  Filipino,  he  had  the  cunning  of 
the  one  and  the  pertinacity  of  the  other.  Illiterate,  as  com 
pared  with  many  of  his  associates,  he  was  their  superior  in 
ability  to  impress  himself  upon  the  people  through  tactful  ap 
peals  to  their  passions  and  superstitions.  Taciturn,  apparently 
retiring  in  disposition,  aping  great  dignity  of  deportment,  look 
ing  to  self-prominence,  without  much  public  display  of  his 
amazing  se]f-conceit,  he  for  a  time  acted  well  the  role  of  lib 
erator. 

No  sooner  had  he  arrived  in  the  Philippines  with  his  seven 
teen  subordinates  and  landed  at  the  captured  Cavite  Arsenal, 
than  the  natives  gathered  to  his  support.  Armed  with  the  rifles 
brought  from  Hong  Kong  and  the  additional  number  turned 
over  from  the  Arsenal,  they  quickly  drove  the  Spaniards  from 
the  western  portion  of  Cavite  Province.  Reports  of  these  vic 
tories  spread  rapidly  throughout  Luzon.  Fierce  rebellion  was 
again  rampant,  and  the  Spanish  troops  having  been  drawn  in 
large  numbers  to  Manila  to  confront  our  threatening  demon 
strations,  it  was  impossible  for  the  colonial  authorities  to  meet 
emergencies.  Aguinaldo,  with  the  subtle,  yet  self-sacrificing 
and  individually  honest  paralytic,  Mabini,  as  his  mentor, 
assumed  the  status  of  an  ally  of  our  Government.  As  early 
as  June  10  he  addressed  the  President  of  the  United  States, 


282  FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS 

greeting  him,  as  he  said,  "with  the  most  tender  effusions  of  my 
soul  and  to  express  to  you  my  deep  and  sincere  gratitude,  in 
the  name  of  the  unfortunate  Philippine  people,  for  efficient 
and  distinguished  protection"  Eight  days  thereafter  he  pro 
claimed  his  dictatorship,  confessing  un worthiness,  but  declaring 
his  inability  to  resist  the  designs  of  Providence.  Within  the 
next  week  he  promulgated  his  decree,  creating  and  establishing 
a  revolutionary  government. 

This  was  quick  work.  It  was  not  attended  with  much  danger, 
as  the  majority  of  the  Spanish  soldiers  were  confined  in  Manila, 
one  half  of  Spain's  native  troops  had  deserted  to  the  insurgents, 
and  our  Navy  was  busy  watching  Spanish  demonstrations. 

On  June  30  the  first  contingent  of  our  expeditionary  force 
arrived,  landed  at  Cavite  Arsenal,  and  friction  ensued.  Soon 
thereafter  Aguinaldo  moved  his  headquarters  to  his  old  home 
at  Bacoor,  distant  a  few  miles,  on  the  shore  of  the  Bay  and 
on  the  road  to  Manila.  The  second  contingent  arrived  and  a 
proper  locality  for  encampment  was  sought.  The  "  big  head  " 
had  wonderfully  developed,  and  on  July  24  Aguinaldo  in 
structed  our  Army  authorities  as  follows  :  "  I  consider  it  my 
duty  to  advise  you  of  the  undesirability  of  disembarking 
American  troops  in  the  places  conquered  by  the  Filipinos 
from  the  Spanish  without  a  previous  notice  to  this  Govern 
ment,  because,  as  no  formal  agreement  yet  exists  between  the 
two  nations,  the  Philippine  people  might  consider  the  occupa 
tion  of  its  territories  by  North  American  troops  a  violation 
of  its  rights.  .  .  .  Because  of  this,  I  take  the  liberty  of  indi 
cating  to  Your  Excellency  the  necessity,  that,  before  disem 
barking,  you  should  communicate  in  writing  to  this  Govern 
ment  the  places  that  are  to  be  occupied  and  also  the  object 
of  the  occupation."  This  pretence  of  advocacy  of  the  people's 
rights  and  wishes  was  the  sham  which  Aguinaldo  continued 
to  employ  throughout  his  career  as  Dictator  and  Commander- 
in-Chief.  The  people  welcomed  the  troops  and  would  have  re 
joiced  to  see  them  overrun  all  Luzon  in  pursuit  of  the  Spanish 


FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS  283 

foe.  They  had  hitherto  fought  for  reforms,  not  for  independ 
ence,  and  the  cry  for  the  latter  had  birth  at  Aguinaldo's  head 
quarters  and,  ignorant  as  the  people  were  of  its  meaning,  had 
an  immediate,  intoxicating  effect.  But  the  self-constituted 
Dictator  and  President  of  the  new  republic  had  now  become 
as  mentally  unbalanced  as  his  duped  subjects.  He  was  intoxi 
cated  by  success,  by  the  greatness  suddenly  thrust  upon  him. 
When  dictating  terms  to  the  United  States  Government  and 
forbidding  it  to  land  its  wearied  troops  except  by  his  consent, 
he  was  preparing  his  eloquent  address  "  To  foreign  Govern 
ments  "  issued  on  August  6,  wherein  he  claimed  to  have  an 
organized  army  of  thirty  thousand  men  and  to  have  established 
representative  government  over  nearly  all  Luzon.  "  Where 
fore,"  -  -  he  announces  and  prays,  —  "  Wherefore  the  under 
signed,  by  virtue  of  the  powers  which  belong  to  him  as  Presi 
dent  of  the  revolutionary  Government  of  the  Philippines  and 
in  the  name  and  representation  of  the  Philippine  people,  asks 
the  support  of  all  the  powers  of  the  civilized  world  and  earn 
estly  entreats  them  to  proceed  to  the  formal  recognition  of 
the  belligerency  of  the  revolution  and  the  independence  of  the 
Philippines,  since  they  are  the  means  designated  by  Provi 
dence  to  maintain  the  equilibrium  between  peoples,  sustaining 
the  weak  and  restraining  the  strong,  to  the  end  that  by  these 
means  shall  shine  forth  and  be  realized  the  most  complete 
justice  in  the  indefinite  progress  of  humanity." 

What  all  that  may  mean  I  leave  to  your  own  interpreta 
tion,  but  it  is  wonderfully  transparent  as  compared  with  Agui 
naldo's  effusions  to  his  dear  people  of  which  he  himself  was 
author  and  scribe. 

We  pass  over  the  occurrences  of  the  ensuing  few  weeks. 
Our  disregard  of  insurgent  demands,  the  events  attending  the 
surrender  of  Manila,  the  entrance  of  Aguinaldo's  troops,  his 
claim  for  his  share  of  the  booty  and  supervision  of  the  affairs 
of  that  city,  the  cause  of  insurgent  withdrawal  from  its  inte 
rior  to  its  outer  lines,  are  matters  of  general  knowledge.  Suf- 


284  FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS 

fice  it  to  say  that  during  the  five  weeks  of  joint  occupation, 
Aguinaldo  and  his  officers  were  busy  in  appropriating  public 
and  private  property,  in  secretly  forcing  contributions  from 
the  citizens  through  arrest  and  punishment,  and  in  initiating 
a  secret  city  government  —  all  this  notwithstanding  they  thor 
oughly  understood  that  we  were  sacredly  obligated  to  Spain 
to  protect  the  lives  and  property  of  the  inhabitants,  and  while 
they  still  professed  for  us  regard,  friendship,  and  gratitude. 
Forced  to  withdraw,  they  retained  in  office  their  civil  officials 
and  to  the  day  of  Aguinaldo's  flight  over  the  mountains  of 
Northern  Luzon  both  an  insurgent  governor  and  I  were  in 
antagonism,  each  conducting  Manila  affairs  to  the  best  of  his 
ability. 

Aguinaldo,  however,  never  entered  Manila  from  the  time 
of  his  deportation  by  Spain  until  he  was  taken  there  as  a  cap 
tive.  He  lacked  the  courage  to  expose  his  person  to  any  pos 
sible  contingency  which  his  artful  brain  might  conceive.  It 
may  be  wrong  to  charge  him  with  the  looting  of  the  city,  but 
he  directed  the  particulars  of  insurgent  enterprise  therein  to 
the  date  of  his  final  discomfiture.  Strongly  escorted  and  mov 
ing  with  ceremonious  pomp,  he  early  in  September  swung 
around  Manila  in  rear  of  his  troops  from  his  headquarters  at 
Bacoor  to  his  capital  of  Malolos,  retaining  in  Manila  for  a 
time  the  ablest  and  most  irreconcilable  insurgents,  to  deceive 
and  excite  the  population  with  infamous  statements  of  our 
intentions.  These  men  requested  interviews,  which  they  ob 
tained.  They  pretended  to  desire  United  States  supremacy, 
wished  to  be  informed  of  the  policy  our  Government  would 
pursue  that  they  might  prepare  the  populace  for  its  accept 
ance,  and  then  caused  villainous  articles  to  be  published  in 
their  improved  newspapers  which  were  circulated  throughout 
Luzon. 

The  same  duplicity  characterized  the  supreme  authorities 
at  Malolos.  To  one  of  our  officers  of  rank,  Aguinaldo,  in  a 
granted  interview  on  October  25,  stated  that  the  people  were 


FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS  285 

divided  into  two  almost  equal  parties  —  the  one  demanding 
independence  and  the  other  advocating  an  American  protec 
torate  ;  that  he  was  waiting  to  ascertain  which  party  was  in  a 
majority  in  order  to  take  his  position.  His  Secretary  of  State 
remarked  that  he  favored  the  protectorate,  as  did  also  his 
chief ;  and  this  was  about  the  date  our  native  supporters  were 
eliminated  from  the  insurgent  Congress  through  the  skilful 
manipulations  of  Mabini.  A  delegation  from  Negros  arrived 
in  Manila  asking  for  a  few  troops  to  assist  the  inhabitants  of 
that  island  to  hold  it  for  the  United  States.  It  was  honest 
and  executed  its  promises.  A  delegation  from  the  neighbor 
ing  island  of  Panay  came.  The  members  were  introduced  by 
an  American  acquaintance  who  vouched  for  their  integrity. 
They  pledged  their  loyalty  to  the  United  States  and  eloquently 
appealed  for  permission  to  accompany  troops  to  Ilo  Ilo,  the 
chief  city  of  that  island,  to  prepare  the  way  for  our  peaceful 
occupation.  They  went  carrying  the  instructions  of  Aguinaldo 
to  his  commander  there  to  resist  the  Americans,  and  the  island 
was  temporarily  lost  to  us. 

During  this  period  of  uncertainty  we  were  greatly  assisted 
by  able  Filipinos  who  confessed  inability  to  determine  the 
nature  of  the  difficulties  in  store  for  us.  We  had  many  Fili 
pino  clerks  and  laborers  in  our  employ,  apparently  contented, 
and  the  inter-island  trade  was  being  industriously  prosecuted 
in  vessels  manned  by  Filipino  sailors.  How  could  one  cast 
the  horoscope  of  events?  We  watched  the  childish  Malolos 
efforts  to  create  constitutional  government.  The  Congress 
framed  a  Constitution,  taking  our  own  as  a  model;  then  bor 
rowed  from  Spanish  sources  the  laws  to  govern  towns  and 
provinces,  — even  to  the  provision  which  permitted  a  military 
officer  to  suppress  civil  rule  at  his  discretion.  We  watched 
the  gradual  evolution  of  Aguinaldo  into  a  demigod  of  the 
ignorant  populace.  He  was  believed  to  be  invulnerable. 
Should  he  die  he  would  rise  on  the  third  day  and  lead  them 
on.  He  had  a  vision  of  the  night,  which  he  duly  made  known 


286  FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS 

where  it  would  do  the  most  good.  He  saw  the  Americans 
driven  into  the  sea  after  four  hours  of  combat ;  and  a  num 
ber  of  his  generals  informed  him  that  his  telegram  announcing 
it  expressed  a  reality  rather  than  a  dream.  He  was  law  and 
gospel,  speaking  through  his  secretary  and  the  excommuni 
cated  priest,  the  bloody  Aglipay,  whom  he  had  appointed 
Bishop  of  the  Islands.  The  people  submitted  and  applauded. 
They  had  a  government  of  their  own  —  the  finished  product 
of  their  highest  political  intelligence. 

We  watched  the  construction  of  strong  intrenchments 
around  Manila's  limits,  the  placing  of  artillery  to  sweep  its 
thoroughfares,  and  the  concentration  about  us  of  the  insurgent 
army,  in  numbers  double  our  own,  but  separated  into  two 
nearly  equal  parts  by  the  Pasig  River,  over  which  no  crossing 
was  available  or  possible  if  we  made  use  of  our  improvised 
gunboats.  In  this  and  other  particulars  the  insurgents  displayed 
as  primitive  a  knowledge  of  the  art  of  war  as  of  civil  govern 
ment.  We  could  not  reach  definite  conclusions  as  to  their 
intentions.  Was  it  all  a  huge  bluff,  or  had  Aguinaldo  reached 
such  a  stage  of  developed  big  head  as  to  believe  that  he  could 
cope  with  the  power  of  the  United  States  ?  We  know  now 
that  he  had  reached  it  and  that  his  rickety  imagination  fore 
saw  an  easy  conquest ;  we  know  that  all  his  officers  were  en 
thusiastic  and  shared  his  belief.  Manila  was  ripe  for  revolt 
and  the  native  Spanish  troops  held  by  us  as  prisoners  under 
the  protocol  with  Spain  had  augmented  his  strength.  "  Tell 
them,"  he  wrote,  "  to  keep  on  good  terms  with  the  Americans 
in  order  to  deceive  them  and  prevent  their  confining  them, 
since  the  hoped-for  moment  has  not  yet  arrived."  His  trusted 
agent  in  Manila  advised  him  often  :  "  Are  you  in  position  to 
take  the  initiative  ?  Do  not  give  the  Americans  time  to  re 
ceive  any  aid."  Again,  on  January  8,  he  advises:  "As  soon 
as  the  Filipino  attack  begins  the  Americans  should  be  driven 
into  the  intramuros  district  and  the  walled  city  set  on  fire," 
—  advice  almost  as  infamous  as  that  which  marks  a  subse- 


FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS  287 

quent  order  of  extermination.  But  the  dream  was  the  thing 
which  raised  the  enthusiasm  of  his  officers  to  the  boiling 
stage,  and  the  promise  of  titles  and  pecuniary  rewards  ap 
pealed  to  their  ambition.  We  know  now  that  Aguinaldo  then 
anticipated  victory,  also  that  a  few  months  later  self-preserva 
tion  was  his  controlling  motive  for  action.  "  For  what  are 
you  fighting?"  I  asked  the  captured  Mabini.  "  To  make  the 
best  terms  possible,"  was  his  candid  reply. 

Apparently,  we  took  no  precautions  to  meet  these  warlike 
preparations,  assuming  an  air  of  indifference ;  but  we  did  fear 
the  destruction  of  the  city  by  its  ignorant  inhabitants,  who 
had  gradually  changed  their  former  friendly  demonstrations 
to  manifestations  of  dislike.  We  learned  also  of  the  formation 
of  hostile  organizations  within  the  city  and  discovered  many 
concealed  arms.  To  meet  the  contingency  the  Provost  Guard 
was  judiciously  placed  and  instructed.  Still,  notwithstanding 
the  exaggerated  opinions  of  their  accomplishments  which  the 
insurgents  manifested,  our  thorough  loss  of  confidence  in  their 
public  statements,  and  their  insulting  charge  of  cowardice  be 
cause  we  had  not  resisted  their  encroachments,  it  was  diffi 
cult  to  conclude  that  they  failed  to  appreciate  their  faulty 
military  dispositions  and  our  tactical  advantages.  On  the  day 
preceding  the  attack  I  wrote  as  follows :  "  I  am  informed  that 
the  chief  men  of  the  insurgent  Government  desire  to  avoid 
any  conflict  at  present;  possibly  for  the  reason  that  they  are 
expecting  to  receive  arms  very  soon ;  possibly  because  they 
fear  that  they  may  not  be  successful;  and  possibly  because 
they  may  have  a  belief  that  they  can  secure  what  they  desire 
without  conflict." 

The  battle  of  Manila  resulted  as  any  competent  judge  of 
proper  military  dispositions,  knowing  conditions,  would  have 
predicted.  It  was  a  rude  awakening  from  the  dream  of  victory 
and  booty  in  which  the  insurgent  soldiers  had  been  indulging, 
and  as  for  the  boastful  officers,  they  must  have  sought  safety 
in  timely  flight,  for  I  am  not  aware  that  a  single  one  of  im- 


288  FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS 

portance  was  either  killed,  wounded,  or  captured  in  the  fear 
ful  punishment  our  troops  inflicted.  Aguinaldo,  as  was  ascer 
tained  later,  had  placed  great  reliance  on  the  assistance  of  his 
organized,  oath-bound  Manila  militia,  which  true  to  its  prom 
ises  did  what  it  could,  but  its  spirit  was  quelled  before  it  could 
sufficiently  assemble  to  take  a  decided  initiative. 

And  now  we  had  scored  not  only  a  victory,  but  an  acknowl 
edgment  from  the  insurgents  that  the  Americans  possessed 
great  valor,  surpassing  possibly  their  own.  They  denied,  how 
ever,  that  they  were  discouraged  ;  they  could  make  up  in  num 
bers  what  they  lacked  in  prowess  and  experience.  They  made 
new  concentrations  to  the  north  and  south  of  us  —  especially 
to  the  north  in  the  direction  of  their  capital,  having  superior 
advantages  because  they  held  the  railway  with  its  entire  roll 
ing  stock.  They  confessed  that  some  of  their  troops  were  dis 
contented  with  the  service  and  they  made  use  of  the  native 
Spanish  soldiers  who  had  joined  them,  "  to  train,"  as  they 
said,  "  the  discontented  in  military  discipline."  I  casually 
asked  Buencamino,  when  he  was  presented  as  a  prisoner, 
"  How  many  men  did  General  Luna  shoot  up  there?  "  and  he 
answered,  "  About  eighty."  By  Aguinaldo's  order  all  the  in 
habitants  residing  between  Calocan  and  Malolos  and  beyond 
were  summoned  to  dig  trenches,  which  were  placed  and  con 
structed  along  all  fairly  good  defensive  positions  throughout 
the  country,  but  our  march  on  the  capital  was  not  thereby 
materially  impeded.  Only  once  did  the  insurgents  make  a 
desperate  stand,  and  then  the  flower  of  their  army,  their  trained 
native  soldiery,  formerly  of  the  Spanish  army,  was  destroyed. 
Tyros  in  even  the  simple  principles  of  waging  war,  without 
the  element  of  practicability  to  devise  any  efficient  methods 
and  depending  upon  treachery,  surprise,  and  the  jungle,  they 
invited  slaughter,  indeed,  compelled  it,  for  no  sooner  did  we 
rest  than  they  recommenced  attack.  What  did  it  matter  to 
the  leaders  so  long  as  in  retreat  they  were  confident  of  per 
sonal  safety  and  the  sacrifice  was  paid  by  the  ignorant  natives 


FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS  289 

who  were  forcibly  driven  into  the  ranks  without  even  the  pre 
liminary  of  conscription?  And  they  published  these  fearful 
reverses  throughout  the  Islands  as  great  victories.  According 
to  their  published  reports  the  number  of  our  casualties  ex 
ceeded  the  number  of  our  men.  The  natives  believed  them.  The 
provincial  president  of  the  far-away  Northern  Luzon  country 
telegraphed  Aguinaldo  on  February  24 :  "  In  the  name  of  the 
provincial  council  over  which  I  preside  and  of  the  entire  prov 
ince  of  Cagayan,  I  have  the  honor  to  congratulate  you  on  the 
brilliant  victories  of  our  new  army,  which  are  unexampled  in 
history."  In  the  fall  of  that  year  this  same  eloquent  local 
president  and  general  conveyed  to  me  the  information  that  if 
I  would  send  troops  to  Northern  Luzon  he  would  surrender 
his  command  with  all  war  material,  stating,  in  substance,  that 
he  did  not  believe  the  whole  insurgent  outfit  could  create  a 
government,  much  less  maintain  one. 

But  we  cannot  indulge  in  details,  nor  are  they  relevant  ex 
cept  to  present  Filipino  characteristics.  Considering  its  more 
important  operations  it  may  be  affirmed  that  no  modern  war 
of  similar  proportions  was  ever  prosecuted  with  less  regard 
for  strategical  principles.  With  our  original  small  army  and 
retaining  Manila  as  a  base,  we  shoved  to  a  point  forty-five 
miles  to  the  northward,  capturing  the  enemy's  capital  at  Malo- 
los,  while  with  a  detached  force,  boldly  moved  on  his  flank, 
we  captured  his  second  capital  of  San  Isidro,  thirty  miles  far 
ther  distant  to  the  east  of  north.  An  object  of  the  second 
movement  was  to  attack  the  enemy's  flank  and  rear  while  we 
engaged  his  front,  but  his  swift  retreat  by  railway  made  it 
impossible  and  the  detached  force  was  withdrawn.  We  re 
tained  all  other  positions  and  secured  our  long  line  of  com 
munication  against  constant  insurgent  efforts  until  we  had 
traded  armies,  receiving  other  regiments  for  the  volunteer 
organizations  sent  home.  At  the  same  time  we  held  and  super 
vised  the  island  of  Negros,  captured  and  held  the  most  impor 
tant  section  of  Panay,  all  of  the  Jolo  Archipelago,  and  to  the 


290  FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS 

south  of  Manila  beat  back  the  forces  which  Lieutenant-Gen 
eral  Trias  concentrated  to  destroy  us  or  oblige  us  to  release 
our  northern  hold. 

An  enterprising,  efficient  enemy  with  half  of  our  numeri 
cal  strength  could  have  broken  our  attenuated  line  and  com 
pelled  us  to  retreat  from  a  good  portion  of  the  Luzon  country 
which  we  occupied.  But  we  had  become  acquainted  with  the 
methods  of  warfare  practised  by  the  insurgents,  and  although 
they  greatly  outnumbered  us  we  remained  confident  and  occa 
sionally  became  aggressive,  especially  when  they  attempted  to 
press  us  in  large  bodies.  Conditions,  however,  required  con 
stant  vigilance  and  a  knowledge  of  the  movements  of  our 
adversaries,  which  were  gained  through  the  reports  of  inhab 
itants  and  native  scouts ;  and  as  we  had  captured  forty  miles 
of  railway  we  readily  reenforced  points  of  threatened  or  actual 
attack. 

By  November  1  of  1899  our  effective  army  had  grown  to 
thirty-five  thousand  men,  of  which  nearly  thirty  thousand 
were  available  for  service  in  Luzon,  and  twenty  thousand 
more  were  expected  to  arrive  during  the  succeeding  two 
months.  We  then  commenced  to  put  in  force  a  plan  of  opera 
tions  for  which  preparations  had  been  made.  Experience 
taught  that  it  was  useless  to  take  possession  of  country  unless 
troops  to  protect  the  inhabitants  could  remain  in  it.  Assured 
of  continued  protection  the  great  majority  of  the  people  ren 
dered  us  willing  assistance,  but  without  such  assurance  they 
remained  for  the  most  part  passive,  fearing  consequences  on 
the  return  of  the  native  soldiers.  Many  who  had  manifested 
a  friendly  interest  were  butchered  after  our  departure,  and  the 
orders  of  at  least  one  insurgent  general  condemned  to  assassi 
nation  all  who  accepted  office  under  our  authority  or  gave  us 
aid.  To  secure  any  permanent  benefits,  therefore,  it  was  not 
only  necessary  to  have  at  hand  an  adequate  military  strength  to 
conduct  a  campaign,  but  also  a  sufficient  number  of  troops  to 
garrison  conquered  country. 


FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS  291 

Our  plan  of  operations,  measured  by  the  rules  of  scientific 
warfare,  was  even  more  faulty  than  the  preceding  one.  It  was 
to  drive  back  and  so  punish  the  army  of  General  Trias  to  the 
south  of  Manila  as  to  keep  it  quiet  for  a  time,  then  place  all 
available  force  at  the  north,  confine  Aguinaldo's  army  in  the 
low  country,  and  there  disperse  or  capture  it.  We  did  it  effec 
tually,  and  the  hardships  endured  by  our  soldiers  during  the 
period  of  six  weeks'  active  movement  have  never  been  appre 
ciated  by  their  countrymen. 

The  short  campaign  through  Southern  Luzon  which  fol 
lowed  was  peculiar  in  conception  and  execution.  The  provinces 
of  Cavite  and  Batangas  in  which  it  was  to  be  conducted  con 
tained  the  homes  of  the  most  prominent  of  the  insurgents,  had 
been  the  hotbed  of  revolt  against  Spain,  and  became  unusually 
hostile  to  United  States  authority.  We  had  only  penetrated 
the  frontier  of  Cavite,  but,  holding  stoutly  the  line  of  the 
Pasig  River  from  Manila  to  the  Laguna-de-Bey,  we  had  pre 
vented  active  cooperation  between  the  insurgent  army  of  the 
south  and  the  one  at  the  north.  The  former  had  made  repeated 
attacks  on  our  southern  line  —  in  fact,  never  permitted  us  to 
remain  quiet,  unless  for  a  short  season  after  experiencing  a 
severe  repulse  when  it  was  obliged  to  suspend  for  repairs. 
These  provinces  had  a  dense  population,  and  we  ascertained 
that  in  so  far  as  a  portion  of  this  army  was  concerned,  quick 
recruitment  from  and  dispersion  among  the  people,  preceding 
and  following  attack,  was  the  policy  practised.  The  fierce  com 
batants  of  to-day  became  the  smiling  amigos  of  to-morrow, 
and  success  required  that  they  be  sharply  pursued  after  defeat 
and  not  be  given  opportunity  to  reach  their  homes,  shed  their 
uniforms,  conceal  their  arms,  and  take  up  the  role  of  the  hum 
ble  husbandman.  A  column  capable  of  rapid  movement  was 
formed  on  the  Pasig  River  near  the  Laguna-de-Bey  some  ten 
miles  from  Manila.  It  passed  swiftly  down  the  shore  of  the 
Laguna,  turned  westward  on  the  main  thoroughfare  to  the 
seacoast,  on  which  the  insurgents  had  established  their  arsenal, 


292  FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS 

storehouses,  and  hospitals,  when  its  cavalry  was  let  loose. 
Within  twenty-four  hours  it  had  captured  the  enemy's  sub 
sistence,  reserve  ammunition,  guns,  money,  property,  and  staff 
officers  in  charge,  and  its  leading  squadron  had  reached  the 
sea.  The  other  troops  of  the  column  followed,  relieved  the 
cavalry  which  concentrated  to  the  westward.  In  the  mean  time 
our  main  forces  lightly  engaged  the  insurgent  army  twenty  miles 
northward,  until  sufficient  time  had  elapsed  for  the  column  to 
take  designated  positions,  when  by  an  irresistible  attack  they 
drove  and  pursued  it  southward  to  the  highway  held  by  the 
troops  of  the  column  which  was  able  to  deal  efficiently  with 
its  disorganized  parts.  Many  small  detachments  escaped,  but 
were  so  relentlessly  pursued  through  the  provinces  of  Batan- 
gas,  Tayobas,  and  the  Laguna  that  they  were  unable  to  effect 
a  union  and  those  not  slain  or  captured  disappeared  amid  the 
great  body  of  the  people. 

By  February  1,  1900,  the  power  of  the  insurgent  Govern 
ment  was  completely  broken,  its  representative  men  fugitives 
or  in  prison,  its  resources  dissipated  and  the  bulk  of  its  war 
material  seized  or  destroyed,  and  it  had  not  won  a  single  vic 
tory,  nor  even  scored  a  success  by  its  constantly  practised 
cunning  to  surprise,  ambush,  or  outwit  our  troops,  either  in 
Luzon  or  the  other  islands  where  they  were  quite  extensively 
employed.  But  the  labors  of  the  army  had  not  ceased.  The 
great  mass  of  the  people  were  eager  for  peace  and  called  for 
protection  from  the  cruelties  of  the  depraved  native  element. 
Fifty  thousand  men  destroyed  organized  rebellion,  but  it  re 
quired  more  than  sixty  thousand  scattered  throughout  the 
Islands  to  restore  order  and  comparative  safety  from  the  chaos 
the  insurgent  Government  had  wrought.  Hostilities  henceforth 
consisted  of  combats  with  guerilla  and  ladrone  bands,  led  for 
the  most  part  for  individual  gain  by  natives  without  reputa 
tion  and  little  former  responsibility.  The  labors  of  this  so- 
called  work  of  pacification  wrere  attended  with  such  measure 
of  success  that  in  June  of  1900,  our  Government,  relying 


FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS  293 

upon  native  intelligence  to  perceive  the  futility  of  further 
resistance,  the  difficulty  of  escaping  merited  punishment  for 
murder  and  robbery,  and  to  appreciate  the  advantages  of  liberal 
treatment,  issued  its  proclamation  of  amnesty.  It  was  too  soon  ; 
neither  the  intelligence  and  practical  sagacity  of  the  native 
nor  his  duplicity  and  natural  tendency  for  sin  were  rightly 
estimated.  The  four  months  during  which  the  amnesty  ran, 
and  while  our  troops  were  inactive,~  witnessed  an  increase  in 
crime  and  renewed  efforts  for  hostile  concentration  which  re 
quired  several  weeks  to  suppress. 

But  we  must  stop  here.  Neither  time  nor  your  patience  will 
permit  mention  of  many  pronounced  manifestations  of  insur 
gent  policy  and  diplomacy,  both  civil  and  military  in  character, 
which  clearly  indicated  an  incapacity  on  the  part  of  the  insur 
gent  leaders  to  create  a  stable  government;  nor  can  I  allude 
to  the  internal  dissensions,  the  utter  lack  of  confidence,  the 
intrigue  for  place  and  prestige,  and  the  cruel  vindictiveness 
which  prevailed  in  insurgent  high  places,  and  which  would 
have  wrecked  any  established  government  except  one  of  pure 
despotism. 

From  experience,  study,  and  much  reflection  upon  the  char 
acteristics  and  capacities  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  Philippines, 
as  displayed  in  social  and  domestic  life,  as  well  as  in  the  do 
main  of  politics  and  field  of  war,  I  have  reached  the  decided 
conviction  that  they  do  not  yet  possess  the  qualities  and  in- 
telligence  to  enable  them,  unaided  and  uncontrolled,  to  properly 
care  for  their  own  interests ;  the  old  racial  features  and  tend 
encies  are  still  too  pronounced  and  require  repression,  while 
direction  from  without,  through  precept  and  example,  are  essen 
tial  to  a  healthy  development.  I  have  faith  that  our  Island 
administration  will  be  the  means  of  so  improving  them  that  in 
the  fulness  of  time  and  at  no  distant  period  they  will  become 
fitted,  under  United  States  protection,  to  control  their  affairs, 
foreign  and  domestic. 

I  anticipate  for  them  not  that  model  of  representative  gov- 


294  FILIPINO  CHARACTERISTICS 

eminent  which  would  realize  our  ideal  of  what  a  representative 
government  should  be,  — one,  for  instance,  like  our  own,  which 
has  been  developed  by  a  slow  process  of  education  and  experi 
ment  from  the  old  Saxon  love  of  individual  liberty  and  is  a 
faithful  representation  of  the  hereditary  sentiments  of  our 
people,  —  but  one  in  the  nature  of  a  graft  on  a  somewhat  dis 
cordant  stem,  or  rather  in  the  nature  of  an  exotic  planted  in 
a  somewhat  uncongenial  soil  which  under  proper  care  and 
supervision  will  root  and  grow  and  soon  secure  sufficient  pro 
portions  for  all  needful  purposes. 


XIV 

THE  VISIT  OF  THE  ALLIES  TO  CHINA  IN 

1900 


BY 


CAPTAIN  HENRY   LEONARD 

UNITED  STATES  MARINE  CORPS 


Read  before  the  Society  December  4,  1900 


THE  VISIT  OF  THE  ALLIES  TO  CHINA  IN  1900 

ON  the  afternoon  of  June  8,  1900,  in  command  of  a  de 
tachment  composed  of  one  second  lieutenant  and  thirty  ma 
rines,  detached  from  the  regiment  at  Cavite,  in  the  Philippines, 
I  left  Manila  Bay  in  the  U.S.S.  Nashville,  and  after  a  pleasant 
run  of  ten  days,  passed  up  through  the  Gulf  of  Pe-chi-li,  and 
arrived  off  the  Taku  Bar.  The  sight  which  presented  itself  to 
view  was  a  magnificent  one.  The  water  off  Taku  being  very 
shallow,  vessels  of  heavy  draught  are  compelled  to  anchor  out 
of  sight  of  land,  and  here,  with  an  air  of  calm,  with  no  ap 
parent  raison  d'etre,  lay  one  of  the  finest  fleets  ever  assembled. 
About  forty  men-of-war,  of  every  conceivable  type  and  de 
scription,  from  the  frowning  and  formidable  Centurion  of  Her 
Majesty  the  late  Queen  Victoria's  Navy,  and  the  stern,  for 
bidding  Rossia,  of  the  Russian  service,  down  to  the  torpedo 
boat  Whistle,  which  glided  in  and  out  among  those  floating 
fortresses,  represented  many  nations  equally  diverse,  and  in 
dicated  to  the  Nashville  complement  for  the  first  time  that 
more  was  at  hand  than  the  protection  of  foreign  residents 
from  the  inroads  of  a  few  Boxers.  Gun  and  bugle  announced 
the  presence  of  admirals  and  other  persons  of  high  degree, 
and  the  bursting  forth  of  heavy  ordnance  in  salute  gave  the 
whole  scene  the  appearance  that  a  great  naval  tragedy  was 
about  to  be  enacted.  The  German  ships  were  all  cleared  for 
action,  and  as  we  hove  to,  a  graceful  German  cruiser  was  cir 
cling  around  a  Chinese  vessel  anchored  near  by,  with  demon 
strations  apparently  quite  the  reverse  of  friendly. 

We  found  the  situation  to  be  briefly  as  follows :  On  June 
15  a  concerted  demand  had  been  made  by  the  admirals  and 
senior  officers  present  (in  which  our  admiral  did  not  join) 
that  the  Taku  forts  be  surrended,  and  that  this  surrender  be 


298      THE   VISIT  OF  THE  ALLIES   TO  CHINA  IN  1900 

made  before  2  o'clock  A.M.,  on  June  16 ;  that,  at  a  little  be 
fore  1  o'clock  A.M.,  on  the  latter  date,  fire  was  opened  by  the 
forts  on  the  smaller  vessels  of  the  nations,  lying  in  the  Pei-ho 
River  abreast  of  them,  and  that,  had  these  vessels  not  shifted 
their  berths  shortly  after  dark,  in  anticipation  of,  and  out  of 
abundant  caution  against,  such  action,  they  would  all  inevi 
tably  have  been  sent  to  the  bottom ;  that  prior  to  the  demand 
on  the  forts,  guards  had  been  sent  to  the  various  legations  in 
Peking,  and  that,  subsequently,  fearing  serious  trouble,  an 
additional  force  of  about  three  thousand  of  the  Allies  had 
started  for  the  same  place,  under  command  of  Vice-Adrniral 
Seymour,  Royal  Navy ;  that  this  expedition,  unable  to  get 
into  Peking,  on  account  of  opposition  by  heavy  forces  of  Chi 
nese,  lay  cut  off  from  help  at  some  point  between  Tien-Tsin 
and  Peking ;  that  the  foreign  concessions  of  Tien-Tsin  were 
besieged  and  in  the  direst  distress,  and  that  all  communica 
tion  with  Peking  was  cut  off ;  that  in  the  fight  that  followed 
the  firing  on  the  ships,  the  Chinese  forts  had  been  and  were 
in  the  possession  of  the  Allies  —  that  was  the  situation. 

On  the  19th,  a  further  force  of  one  hundred  marines  from 
Cavite,  under  command  of  Major  Waller,  having  arrived  off 
Taku,  the  entire  command,  numbering  one  hundred  and  thirty 
all  told,  started  from  the  U.S.  Flagship  Newark  on  board  a 
small  German  passenger  steamer,  which  regularly  plied  be 
tween  Shanghai  and  the  various  Chinese  coast  towns  of  im 
portance,  but  had  now  been  "  commandeered  "  by  the  German 
admiral  and  pressed  into  transport  duty.  This  subject  of 
transportation,  the  actual  getting  of  the  landing  parties  from 
the  various  ships  to  the  point  of  disembarkation,  a  distance 
of  miles,  was  a  vexed  one  which  the  different  admirals  were 
solving,  so  far  as  possible,  in  various  ways.  There  is  not  a 
large  number  of  tugs  and  lighters  in  the  vicinity  of  Taku  at 
any  time,  and  those  that  previously  had  been  there  were  taken 
up-river  by  the  Chinese  when  trouble  began.  As  a  result  of 
this,  long  strings  of  boats,  loaded  to  their  gunwales  with  ma- 


THE   VISIT  OF  THE  ALLIES  TO  CHINA  IN  1900     299 

rines  and  soldiers  and  towed  by  launches,  could  be  seen  shov 
ing  off  from  the  various  ships  in  a  never-ending  procession, 
from  dawn  to  dark  —  during  all  of  this  time  with  a  sea  run 
ning  so  high  that,  under  conditions  admitting  of  delay,  boats 
would  not  have  been  even  lowered.  Antiquated  junks  and 
lighters,  in  such  numbers  as  were  obtainable,  were  doing  vali 
ant  transport  duty,  and  small  passenger  steamers  were  hurry 
ing  to  and  fro  engaged  in  furthering  the  same  cause.  Pursu 
ant  to  arrangements  made  by  Admiral  Kempff,  we  were  taken 
on  board  a  steamer  in  which  German  sailors  were  being  con 
voyed  up-river  to  garrison  some  of  the  captured  forts.  While 
on  this  vessel  I  was  surprised  to  find  that  these  particular 
German  sailors  were  armed  with  a  weapon  of  the  most  anti 
quated  pattern,  —  the  German  Militar-Gewehr  of  the  model 
of  1876,  —  but,  upon  making  inquiries  into  the  subject,  I  was 
informed  by  German  officers  that  a  new  rifle  of  late  design 
would  shortly  be  issued  to  them,  having  long  ere  that  been 
used  by  their  army  troops.  The  precision  of  every  movement 
of  these  ponderous  Teutons  and  their  knowledge  of  infantry 
drill,  together  with  their  erect  military  bearing,  was  as  sur 
prising  as  it  was  pleasant  to  look  upon. 

The  river  trip,  so  far  as  we  went,  was  a  most  picturesque 
one.  Lying  off  the  forts  were  to  be  seen  the  vessels  which 
had  been  engaged  in  their  reduction,  and  though  few  of  them 
were  seriously  damaged,  all  bore  marks  of  having  been  re 
cently  in  action.  As  we  passed  this  flotilla,  three  torpedo 
boats,  formerly  the  property  of  the  Chinese,  which  had  been 
captured  by  the  British  up  the  river  some  distance,  were  be 
ing  taken  out  to  the  fleet.  This  capture  was  most  generously 
shared  by  the  Englishmen  —  the  Germans  and  Russians  each 
getting  one  and  the  captors  keeping  one  for  themselves.  One 
of  the  German  gunboats,  the  Iltis,  had  been  hit  many  times, 
a  shell  carrying  away  her  bridge  and  sending  her  commander, 
Captain  Lands,  to  the  deck  below  with  a  shattered  leg.  This 
gallant  officer,  after  being  thus  grievously  hurt,  struggled  to 


300      THE   VISIT  OF  THE  ALLIES  TO  CHINA  IN  1900 

his  feet,  and,  clinging  to  the  rail,  fought  his  ship  for  over  an 
hour,  until,  exhausted  by  pain  and  loss  of  blood,  he  fainted 
on  the  deck.  The  last  time  I  saw  him  was  on  the  occasion  of 
a  visit  to  the  German  hospital  at  Yokohama,  just  prior  to  my 
departure  from  that  place.  After  suffering  for  three  months 
he  was  still  the  life  of  the  institution,  and  remarked  humor 
ously  to  me  that  he  was  then  engaged  in  trying  to  grow  three 
inches  of  missing  bone  in  his  wounded  leg,  and  that  he  feared 
the  attempt  would  end  in  failure. 

Subsequent  examination  showed  that  shells  from  the  large 
guns  of  the  ships  had  made  but  little  impression  on  the  forts, 
the  walls  of  which,  made  of  clay  mixed  with  rice  straw  and  water 
and  of  great  thickness,  were  pierced,  but  little  damaged.  The 
Pei-ho  is  a  most  tortuous  stream  and  keeping  a  vessel  in  its 
channel  is  a  most  difficult  feat.  On  one  occasion  after  an 
other,  one's  sense  of  distance  and  idea  of  location  were  be 
clouded  by  rinding  the  vessel  doubling  on  her  course  and 
travelling  in  a  diametrically  opposite  direction  from  that 
originally  pursued.  The  banks  on  both  sides  were  dotted  with 
densely  populated  towns,  in  which  the  houses  were  built  so 
closely  together  as  to  barely  admit  of  passage  between  them, 
where  streets  were  unknown,  dogs  omnipresent,  and  filth 
everywhere.  Finally,  after  a  trip  unusual  in  that  it  was  de 
void  of  groundings,  we  arrived  at  Tong-ku,  and  saw  the 
U.S.S.  Monocacy  lying  alongside  the  bank.  The  latter  vessel, 
since  broken  up  for  junk,  was  an  iron,  side-wheel  river  gun 
boat  of  venerable  type,  which  had  been  on  the  Chinese  sta 
tion  from  time  immemorial.  She  had  been  ordered  up  from 
Shanghai  on  the  outbreak  of  the  trouble,  and  was  fired  on 
and  hit  during  the  Taku  fort  engagement,  though  she  took  no 
part  in  the  same,  as,  even  had  her  orders  contemplated  such 
action,  she  was  at  that  time  filled  with  non-combatant  refu 
gees.  This  vessel  and  her  officers  rendered  invaluable  service 
throughout  the  hostilities.  She  was  the  base  on  which  much- 

O 

needed  supplies  were  collected  and  from  which  they  were  sent 


THE  VISIT  OF  THE  ALLIES  TO  CHINA  IN  1900     301 

up  the  river  in  armed  launches  and  tugs  captured  by  her  crew. 
To  her,  after  the  relief  of  the  concessions,  the  wounded  were 
sent,  and  there  cared  for  until  they  could  be  despatched  to 
the  hospital  that  the  English  and  American  surgeons  estab 
lished  at  Yaku ;  in  her  hospitable  ward-room  numberless  ref 
ugees  found  aid  and  comfort,  and  as  the  Government  does 
not  provide  for  such  contingencies,  the  mess-bills  of  her  fa 
vored  officers  waxed  ever  greater. 

In  the  yards  at  Tong-ku,  which  town  is  the  terminus  of  the 
Imperial  Kailway  running  to  Tien-Tsin  and  Peking,  we  found 
several  locomotives  and  many  flatcars,  and  with  these  it  was 
determined  that  a  train  should  be  made  up  which  would  be 
used  as  far  as  the  condition  of  the  road  permitted.  The  train 
having  been  gotten  ready  and  equipped  by  firemen  from  the 
Monocacy,  our  command,  together  with  supplies  and  imple 
ments  with  which  to  repair  breaks  in  the  road,  was  embarked, 
and  we  started  on  our  journey  of  thirty  miles  to  the  relief  of 
Tien-Tsin.  After  having  gone  a  short  distance  we  overtook  a 
battalion  of  four  hundred  Eussians,  and,  our  two  commands 
joining  forces,  we  proceeded  to  Cheng-liang-Cheng,  a  small 
station  at  which  the  Kussians  had  established  a  fortified  camp. 
It  was  ascertained  that  the  troops  here  had  been  without  food 
for  thirty-six  hours,  most  of  which  time  they  had  spent  in  re 
pulsing  repeated  onslaughts  of  Boxers.  Having  relieved  their 
wants,  the  train  pushed  on  until  the  road  could  be  repaired 
no  farther,  when  we  disembarked,  sent  the  train  back,  and 
pushed  ahead  on  foot.  Arriving  at  a  point  about  twelve  miles 
from  Tien-Tsin,  a  council  of  war  was  held,  in  which  it  was 
decided  that  we  would  bivouac  for  the  night  where  we  were 
and  push  ahead  in  the  morning.  In  this  council  Major  Wal 
ler's  opinion  that  the  force,  being  too  small,  should  await  re- 
enforcements,  was  overruled  —  the  wisdom  of  his  proposed 
course  subsequently  demonstrated  itself.  Early  the  following 
morning,  June  21,  the  entire  command,  five  hundred  and 
thirty  strong,  marched  up  the  road,  the  Cossacks,  a  few  of 


302     THE  VISIT  OF  THE  ALLIES  TO  CHINA  IN  1900 

whom  were  with  the  Russians,  doing  the  scouting,  and  at 
about  7  A.M.,  when  we  had  arrived  abreast  of  the  great  East 
Arsenal,  fire  was  opened  011  us  by  a  force  of  about  seven  thou 
sand  Chinese,  intrenched.  The  shooting  of  the  latter  was  re 
markably  accurate,  and  had  we  not  been  covered  in  one  direc 
tion  by  the  railway  embankment,  the  losses  would  have  been 
immense.  A  brisk  engagement  ensued,  in  which  the  Boxer 
contingent  of  the  enemy's  force  endeavored  to  advance  upon 
us  over  an  open  field.  In  the  face  of  a  careful  fire  on  our  part, 
they  continued  to  come  on,  losing  many  men,  but  waving  their 
swords  and  banners  frantically ;  finally,  when  they  had  gotten 
to  within  about  five  hundred  yards,  our  fire  became  so  fierce 
and  the  demonstrations  of  the  falsity  of  their  theory  of  immu 
nity  so  plentiful,  that  they  turned  about  and  ran  —  leaving 
behind  their  wounded,  who  continued  to  rise  and  wave  their 
swords,  only  to  fall  again.  An  action  between  seven  thousand 
men  and  five  hundred  and  thirty  could  not  continue  long  and 
could,  apparently,  have  but  one  termination.  Having  held  our 
ground  as  long  as  possible,  and  the  Russians  having  commenced 
to  retreat,  we  fell  back,  carrying  our  wounded  on  our  backs. 
The  enemy  pursued  in  force  —  infantry  in  the  rear  and  cav 
alry  on  the  flank  —  and  there  followed,  for  four  hours,  a  re 
treating  fight,  in  which  a  force  that  had  been  reduced  to  less 
than  five  hundred,  embarrassed  by  their  wounded,  held  at  bay 
fifteen  times  their  number,  and  finally  beat  them  off,  when 
hope  seemed  preposterous.  At  2  P.M.  the  little  band  arrived, 
without  further  molestation,  at  the  Russian  camp  previously 
referred  to,  having  marched  thirty  miles,  eating  nothing, 
fought  for  five  hours,  and  saved  its  wounded  from  the  enemy 
who  is  not  merciful  enough  to  take  no  prisoners,  but  saves 
them  for  amusement's  sake.  On  this  retreat,  men,  with  the 
bones  of  their  thighs  broken,  were  carried  in  the  arms  and  on 
the  backs  of  their  comrades  for  a  distance  of  many  miles, 
when  every  movement  caused  the  jagged  edges  of  shattered 
bones  to  rub  together  and  made  the  faces  of  the  sufferers  gray 


THE  VISIT  OF  THE  ALLIES  TO  CHINA  IN  1900     303 

with  pain ;  yet  neither  word  nor  deed  betrayed  their  agony, 
and  the  only  request  made  by  any  one  was  to  the  effect  that, 
if  abandoned  they  must  be,  they  be  allowed  to  keep  their 
rifles. 

That  evening  our  force  was  augmented  greatly  by  the 
arrival  of  English,  German,  Italian,  Japanese,  and  more  Rus 
sian  troops,  and  with  a  command  amounting  to  about  two 
thousand  men,  we,  on  the  following  morning,  again  started 
for  the  foreign  concessions.  Throughout  our  advance  the 
booming  of  heavy  ordnance  being  used  against  the  foreign 
ers  could  be  plainly  heard,  and  the  fear  that  the  latter  would 
be  unable  to  withstand  such  furious  cannonading,  with  its 
inevitable  accompaniments,  spurred  on  the  lagging  steps  of 
men  who  were  hungry,  footsore,  and  weary,  and  made  even 
the  blinding  alkali  dust,  which  the  heavy  wind  hurled  in  a 
steady  storm  against  the  small  command  and  which  cracked 
the  membranes  of  lips  and  noses  until  the  not  over-plentiful 
ditch  water  became  palatable  drink,  powerless  to  materially 
impede  the  advance. 

On  June  23,  by  a  succession  of  assaults,  the  Chinese  troops 
were  driven  from  one  line  of  intrenchments  to  another,  until 
the  inner  cordon  which  surrounded  the  beleaguered  city  was 
pierced,  and  the  foreign  troops  entered,  ragged  and  dirty,  the 
marines,  as  Major  Waller  in  his  report  aptly  puts  it,  "  like 
Falstaff's  army  in  appearance,  but  with  brave  hearts  and 
bright  weapons."  The  scene  which  presented  itself  to  view 
baffles  description :  the  town  had  been  bombarded  and  sub 
jected  to  heavy  infantry  fire  for  more  than  a  week;  the 
houses  were  riddled  with  bullets  and  shells;  roofs  were 
pierced,  walls  tottering,  and  no  place  safe  except  a  cellar ;  the 
streets  were  furrowed  by  shells,  and  Gordon  Hall,  the  Muni 
cipal  Building  of  the  British  Concession,  was  filled  with 
women  and  children,  whose  homes  had  been  ruined  or  de 
stroyed.  Trade  had  ceased  —  men  had  given  up  their  usual 
avocations  for  the  all-important  one  of  fighting  the  common 


304     THE   VISIT  OF  THE  ALLIES   TO  CHINA  IN  1900 

enemy.  The  river  was  filled  with  the  bodies  of  Chinese,  and 
the  pontoon  bridge,  which  had  been  immediately  thrown  over 
it,  had  to  be  opened  frequently  to  prevent  a  jam  of  these 
human  logs.  Even  Gordon  Hall,  though  less  vulnerable  by 
reason  of  its  immense  stone  walls,  had  been  pierced  time  and 
again,  and  persons  having  the  temerity  to  sleep  in  the  upper 
stories  of  an  ordinary  house  enjoyed  a  large  number  of 
chances  of  their  rest  becoming  an  eternal  one.  To  such  ex 
tremities  had  the  little  band  of  brave  women  and  fearless 
men  been  reduced  that  it  had  been  tacitly  agreed  that  not 
many  more  hours  could  elapse  ere  the  former,  with  the  chil 
dren,  must  die  at  the  hands  of  their  own  fathers,  brothers,  or 
husbands,  to  insure  their  escaping  a  worse  fate,  while  the  lat 
ter  would  join  them,  after  having  made  the  last  stand  as  ex 
pensive  as  possible  for  their  hated  besiegers.  Small  wonder 
that  these  people  hailed  the  arrival  of  the  relieving  force 
with  an  enthusiasm  scarcely  describable  and  were  generously 
willing  to  keep  our  men  in  one  continuous  state  of  hilarity 
and  bliss,  by  means  of  gratuitous  issues  of  Mumm's  Extra 
Dry. 

The  situation  was  but  little  relieved  of  its  gravity,  however. 
Before  I  go  further,  it  may  be  well  to  explain  that  the  foreign 
settlements,  as  then  constituted,  were  made  up  of  three  con 
cessions,  lying  on  the  Pei-ho  River,  of  which  the  German  is 
the  most  remote  from,  the  English  next,  and  the  French 
nearest  to,  the  native  or  walled  city  of  Tien-Tsin,  which  latter 
is  a  mile  or  so  from  them.  The  native  city  is  rectangular  in 
shape,  and  is  surrounded  by  a  wall  built  with  embrasures  for 
artillery  and  pierced  for  small-arms  fire.  South  of  both  the 
Walled  City  and  the  foreign  concessions,  and  about  one  mile 
distant  from  the  former,  is  the  big  mud  wall  of  Tien-Tsin  - 
a  wall  about  twelve  feet  high  and  in  places  nearly  as  thick. 
On  each  side  of  this  wall  is  a  canal,  and  the  ground  lying  be 
tween  the  wall  and  the  native  city  is  intersected  by  burial 
mounds  and  irrigation  ditches. 


THE   VISIT  OF  THE  ALLIES  TO  CHINA  IN  1900     305 

Now  to  proceed  with  the  situation.  The  work  before  us 
was  briefly  this :  The  Walled  City  must  be  stormed ;  the  ar 
senals  around  Tien-Tsin,  of  which  the  East  Arsenal  was  the 
most  important,  taken,  and  Seymour's  column,  from  which 
nothing  had  been  heard,  relieved,  if  it  was  not  already  de 
stroyed.  To  attempt  the  relief  of  Peking  with  the  force  then 
at  hand  would  have  been  but  to  invite  disaster,  not  only  to  our 
command,  but  to  everything  we  left  in  our  rear.  After  we 
had  been  in  Tien-Tsin  a  day,  word  was  brought  in  by  a  Cos 
sack  courier  that  Admiral  Seymour's  command  lay  besieged 
in  the  Si-ku  Arsenal,  distant  about  eight  miles  from  Tien- 
Tsin,  which  he  had  stormed  and  taken  from  the  Chinese 
troops.  On  the  morning  of  the  25th,  the  advance  was  com 
menced  to  the  relief  of  the  English  admiral,  and  after  com 
paratively  little  opposition,  beyond  considerable  shelling  from 
works  we  were  compelled  to  pass  en  route,  we  beat  back  the 
besieging  force  and  relieved  the  garrison  of  about  twenty-five 
hundred  men.  Admiral  Seymour's  forces  were,  like  ours, 
composed  of  representatives  of  all  nations.  We  found  that  he 
had  arrived  at  a  point  very  near  to  Peking,  after  having  had 
several  severe  encounters  with  Boxer  hordes,  but  without  mo 
lestation  from  the  Imperial  troops,  until  the  day  the  Taku 
forts  were  taken,  when  he  encountered  a  large  force  of  the 
latter,  who,  attacking  him,  he  was  obliged  to  fall  back  before 
them.  He  retired  in  an  orderly  manner  before  the  many 
times  superior  force  of  excellently  armed  Chinese,  being  al 
most  constantly  in  action  from  that  time  until  his  arrival  at 
the  Si-ku  Arsenal.  The  latter  was  rushed  and  taken,  and  in 
it  large  stores  of  ordnance,  arms,  and  ammunition  were  found, 
together  with  a  place  where  his  two  hundred  wounded  could 
receive  some  medical  attention.  Here  he  was  laid  siege  to  by 
the  Chinese  troops,  and  by  turning  his  captured  guns  against 
them,  he  was  enabled  to  hold  them  at  bay  until  our  arrival. 

Shortly  after  we  had  come,  the  Chinese  attacked  the  joint 
forces,  and  it  was  not  until  we  had  advanced  upon  and  driven 


306     THE   VISIT  OF  THE  ALLIES   TO  CHINA  IN  1900 

them  for  a  considerable  distance  that  we  could  get  a  respite 
from  their  fire.  Having  driven  them  several  miles  back,  we 
were  at  liberty  to  return  to  the  arsenal,  and  after  having 
thrown  out  outposts,  to  spend  the  time  which  must  elapse  ere 
we  could  improvise  a  sufficient  number  of  stretchers  to  remove 
two  hundred  wounded  men  a  distance  of  eight  miles  to  the 
foreign  concessions,  in  investigating  the  captured  stronghold. 
This  arsenal  was  built  by  Major  Von  Hannicken,  formerly  of 
the  German  Army,  who  had  for  a  long  time  been  engaged  in 
constructing  works  of  that  character  for  the  Chinese  and  in 
training  their  troops.  He,  with  his  family,  together  with  a 
Colonel  of  the  Russian  service  and  a  former  Belgian  officer, 
who  had  been  similarly  employed,  were  among  those  relieved 
by  us  at  Tien-Tsin  —  the  irony  of  fate  (foreign  officers  train 
ing  Chinese  troops). 

The  arsenal  is  constructed  in  a  sharp  bend  of  the  Pei-ho 
River,  on  the  near  bank  of  which  were  strong  intrenchments. 
Here  the  Allies  had  mounted  many  Krupp,  as  well  as  machine 
guns,  taken  from  the  quantities  of  those  found  in  the  place. 
In  the  storehouses  were  found  arms  of  every  sort  and  descrip 
tion,  from  the  latest  model  Mannlicher  rifles  and  carbines, 
Mausers,  Winchester,  and  Lee  straight-pulls  down  to  Rem 
ingtons  of  the  vintage  of  1860,  and  Gingalls,  the  famous  two- 
men  guns.  The  latter,  it  may  be  interesting  to  state,  are  guns 
of  large  calibre,  —  more  than  one  inch,  —  and  of  considerable 
weight,  which  are  fired  by  two  men,  one  of  them  holding  the 
weapon  over  his  shoulder  and  the  other  sighting  and  discharg 
ing  it ;  they  make  fearful  wounds,  but  are,  as  may  be  easily 
imagined,  rather  clumsy  weapons  for  modern  warfare.  In 
addition  to  small  arms,  many  Krupp  and  rapid-fire  guns  of 
different  kinds  were  stored  in  the  arsenal,  together  with  an 
immense  supply  of  ammunition  for  them  all,  and  such  quan 
tities  of  complete  cavalry  accoutrements  as  would  be  sufficient 
to  equip  a  number  of  regiments.  The  marines  and  sailors  from 
the  U.S.S.  Monocacy,  having  exhausted  their  supply  of  am- 


THE   VISIT  OF  THE  ALLIES  TO  CHINA  IN  1900     307 

munition  for  the  Lee  rifles  with  which  they  were  armed,  dis 
carded  the  latter  in  favor  of  captured  Mannlichers,  and  found 
the  change  a  most  excellent  and  beneficial  one. 

On  the  night  of  June  25,  having  filled  our  canteens  from  a 
little  cove  in  which  fourteen  putrid  Chinese  soldiers  were 
carelessly  floating,  and  having  made  a  detail  of  sixteen  hun 
dred  men  to  carry  the  wounded,  the  column  prepared  to  return 
to  Tien-Tsin.  Before  doing  so  trains  were  laid  to  the  magazine 
and  arm  and  ammunition  houses,  whose  precious  contents  there 
were  no  means  at  hand  of  removing,  and  after  the  forces  were 
well  clear  of  the  vicinity,  the  buildings  were  fired,  and  one  of 
the  finest  military  storehouses,  which  China  had  been  indus 
triously  equipping  since  the  disastrous  Japanese  unpleasant 
ness  of  '95,  went  up  ignominiously  in  smoke.  Having  returned 
to  the  concessions,  Admiral  Seymour,  being  the  senior  officer 
present,  assumed  direction  of  affairs.  By  an  agreement  of  the 
representatives  of  the  Powers,  Captain  Edward  Bayly,  Royal 
Navy,  was  made  provost  marshal,  and  First  Lieutenant  Henry 
Leonard, United  States  Marine  Corps,  deputy  provost  marshal, 
with  the  understanding  that  this  should  not  interfere  with  the 
military  duties  of  this  latter  officer. 

On  June  27,  a  force  composed  of  eighteen  hundred  men, 
the  major  part  of  whom  were  Russians,  with  detachments  from 
the  American,  English,  German  and  Japanese  forces,  took  the 
famous  East  Arsenal,  garrisoned  by  seven  thousand  Chinese 
troops,  and  which  had  proven  the  stumbling-block  in  our  way 
on  our  first  advance  of  June  21.  Here  enormous  supplies  were 
found,  and  the  Russians  decided  to  garrison  and  hold  the  place, 
their  forces  having  been  greatly  augmented,  and  General  Stoessel 
having  taken  command.  A  graphic  though  flowery  account  of 
the  engagement  is  contained  in  the  general  order  subsequently 
issued  by  the  Russian  General,  and  which  I  will  quote :  — 

By  the  aid  of  God,  and  the  bravery  of  my  troops  and  those 
of  other  nations,  viz :  German,  English,  American,  and  Jap- 


308      THE  VISIT  OF  THE  ALLIES  TO  CHINA   IN  1900 

anese,  we  yesterday  succeeded  in  taking  by  storm  a  strong 
hold  of  Tien-Tsin  known  by  the  name  of  the  East  Arsenal. 
Neither  the  open  plain,  covered  by  frightful,  hostile  fire,  nor 
the  ditches  filled  with  water  and  soft  mud,  nor  the  steep  walls, 
were  able  to  stop  the  advance  of  the  brave  storming  party, 
which  only  would  be  ordered  to  cease  the  pursuit  of  their  task 
when  the  enemy  fled  in  all  directions.  Hurrah  !  To  you,  brave 
comrades,  there  is  nothing  impossible.  The  Lord,  our  Pro 
tector,  will  show  us  the  way  to  other  victories  and  glory.  On 
my  part,  as  chief  of  the  expedition,  I  wish  to  express  to  you 
my  heartfelt  thanks  and  my  congratulations  on  the  wreath  of 
laurel  with  which  you  have  decked  your  glorious  colors  anew. 

STOESSEL,  Major-General. 

From  this  time  until  the  llth  of  July  followed  guard  duty 
of  the  most  arduous  nature,  broken  by  frequent  reconnais 
sances  in  force  and  expeditions  with  different  objects  in  view. 
The  Race  Course,  a  Chinese  stronghold,  was  taken,  and  the 
West  Arsenal  captured  by  storm,  the  American  marines  and 
Japanese  being  first  within  its  walls.  Here  further  quantities 
of  guns  and  stores  were  found,  and  with  this  capture,  the  last 
of  the  several  works  before  the  foreign  troops  which  was  fea 
sible  with  the  force  at  hand,  was  accomplished. 

There  remained  now  the  taking  of  the  Walled  City,  and 
the  relief  of  Peking.  While  awaiting  re  enforcements  many 
difficult  problems  had  to  be  worked  out.  The  concessions  were 
being  constantly  fired  upon,  and  the  rain  of  shot  and  shell 
knew  no  cessation  day  or  night.  The  troops  were  quartered 
in  immense  "  go-downs  "  or  storehouses  ;  men  were  being  killed 
in  them  every  day  ;  one  shell  burst  among  the  British  marines, 
killing  four  and  wounding  ten ;  incendiarism  was  rife ;  a  large 
sugar  warehouse  was  fired  near  our  quarters,  the  China 
Merchants'  Steam  Navigation  Company's  building,  the  fire 
threatening  to  spread  indefinitely  and  was  only  extinguished 
after  untiring  efforts  on  the  part  of  the  English,  Japanese, 


THE  VISIT  OF  THE  ALLIES  TO  CHINA  IN  1900     309 

and  ourselves.  The  German  concession  was  having  one  con 
flagration  after  another ;  ever-busy  spies  among  the  apparently 
friendly  Chinese  had  to  be  sought  out  and  dealt  with  ;  the 
efforts  of  the  never-tiring  "  sniper,"  as  the  Chinese  sharp 
shooter  was  denominated,  had  to  be  circumvented  and  repaid 
in  kind.  To  preserve  the  sanitary  conditions  of  the  town  (a 
most  difficult  problem  under  peace  conditions)  became  well- 
nigh  impossible.  Dogs,  which  are  the  only  things  more  plen 
tiful  than  natives  in  China,  were  becoming  rabid  from  their 
feasts  on  human  flesh,  and  no  sight  was  more  common  than 
the  spectacle  of  representatives  of  this  type  of  degenerate, 
shaggy  cur  tearing  dead  men  limb  from  limb.  All  these  prob 
lems  had  to  be  met  and  dealt  with,  and  much  of  the  work 
belonged  to  the  provost  marshals ;  how  well  it  was  done  re 
sults  indicate  best. 

During  this  entire  period,  from  June  21  until  July  11,  the 
United  States  forces  in  China  consisted  of  one  hundred  and 
thirty  marines.  They  had  taken  part  in  every  engagement, 
expedition,  or  reconnaissance,  had  marched  ninety-seven  miles 
in  the  first  five  days,  had  lived  on  one  meal  a  day  for  six  days, 
and  yet  were  ever  cheerful  and  willing.  The  high  opinion 
which  foreign  officers  entertained  of  them  was  never  more 
forcibly  testified  to  than  in  the  letter  of  subsequent  date  of 
General  Dor  ward,  who  finally  commanded  the  British  forces. 
He  wrote :  "I  desire  to  express  the  high  appreciation  of  the 
British  forces  of  the  honor  done  them  in  serving  alongside 
their  comrades  of  the  American  forces  during  the  long  and  hard 
fighting  of  the  13th  instant,  and  the  subsequent  capture  of 
Tien-Tsin  City,  and  of  my  appreciation  of  the  high  honor  ac 
corded  to  me  by  having  them  under  my  command.  The  Ameri 
can  troops  formed  part  of  the  front  line  of  the  British  attack, 
and  so  had  more  than  their  share  of  the  fighting  that  took  place. 
The  ready  and  willing  spirit  of  the  officers  and  men  will  al 
ways  make  their  command  easy  and  pleasant,  and  when  one 
adds  to  that  the  steady  gallantry  and  power  of  holding  on  to 


310     THE  VISIT  OF  THE  ALLIES  TO  CHINA  IN  1900 

exposed  positions,  which  they  displayed  on  the  13th  instant, 
the  result  is  soldiers  of  the  highest  class." 

On  July  11  the  Ninth  United  States  Infantry  and  the  re 
mainder  of  the  First  Regiment  of  Marines  arrived,  and  I 
resumed  the  duty  I  had  been  performing  in  the  Philippines, 
that  of  regimental  adjutant  of  the  latter  command.  On  the 
12th  a  council  of  war  was  held,  in  which  it  was  decided  that 
the  Walled  City  must  be  taken,  even  though  the  number  of 
troops  at  hand,  it  was  generally  agreed,  was  insufficient.  On 
the  morning  of  the  13th  our  command  marched  out  of  its  bar 
racks  at  3  A.M.,  and,  passing  through  the  Taku  Gate,  formed 
with  the  English  and  Japanese  in  two  columns.  These  col 
umns  then  marched  on  a  line  parallel  to  the  great  mud  wall, 
which,  as  I  have  once  before  said,  was  about  one  mile  south 
of  the  Walled  City  and  a  parallel  to  it.  The  orders  contem 
plated  a  meeting  of  the  commanders  at  a  point  near  the  South 
Arsenal,  where  detailed  instructions  for  the  joint  attack  would 
be  given.  The  assault  from  the  south  was  to  be  made  by  a 
combined  force  of  Americans,  English,  Germans,  French,  and 
Japanese,  while  the  Russians,  having  a  number  of  troops 
equal  to  those  of  the  other  Allies  together,  were  to  attack  and 
carry  the  Tree  Forts  and  enter  the  city  from  the  north  side. 
The  Allies,  approaching  from  the  south,  came  under  fire  at 
long  range,  and  the  troops  were  hurried  into  action  without 
the  previously  mentioned  meeting  ever  being  held.  The  line 
formed  up  back  of  the  mud  wall,  the  artillery  opening  fire  on 
the  enemy,  who  were  keeping  up  a  rattling  fusillade.  The 
guns  of  the  various  commands  were  posted  in  the  West  Ar 
senal  and  at  points  along  the  wall  adjacent  thereto,  their 
immediate  duty  being  to  silence  the  4.7-  and  6-inch  guns  of 
the  Chinese,  which  were  making  the  place  almost  unbearably 
warm,  and  to  batter  in  the  South  Gate  of  the  Walled  City. 
A  battery  of  12-pounders  and  4-inch  guns  from  the  British 
ship  Terrible  had  been  previously  mounted  on  the  mud  wall. 
These  guns  were  the  same  ones  that  had  acted  so  splendidly 


THE  VISIT  OF  THE  ALLIES  TO  CHINA  IN  1900     311 

in  the  relief  of  Ladysmith  and  bore  on  their  carriages  the  sig 
nificant  inscription  "  From  Ladysmith  to  Peking";  their  lyd 
dite  shells  did  fine  execution  in  this  action. 

The  artillery  duel  having  been  carried  on  for  some  time, 
the  order  came  from  General  Dorward  for  the  marines  to 
cross  the  mud  wall  and  advance  on  the  city,  having  as  their 
special  objective  a  battery  of  4.7-inch  guns,  with  which  the 
enemy  were  making  matters  more"  than  disagreeable.  The 
plain  lying  between  the  mud  wall  and  the  wall  of  the  city 
was  intersected  with  burial  mounds  and  small  irrigation 
ditches.  With  the  exception  of  this  insignificant  protection 
there  was  no  cover  to  be  had,  and  the  only  method  of  cross 
ing  this  zone,  which  was  constantly  swept  and  ploughed  by 
a  storm  of  bullets  and  shells,  was  by  advancing  by  rushes  of 
fifty  or  seventy-five  yards,  and  then  lying  down  to  recover 
breath  and  open  fire.  We  advanced  thus  to  a  line  of  trenches 
about  eight  hundred  yards  from  the  enemy,  when  word  came 
to  hold  what  we  had,  the  rest  of  the  line  not  having  succeeded 
in  pushing  ahead  so  far.  This  was  much  more  easily  said  than 
done,  as,  in  addition  to  the  heavy  fire  which  was  being  poured 
upon  us,  the  Chinese  troops  endeavored  to  flank  us  twice,  ad 
vancing  on  the  run  and  almost  succeeding  in  gaining  our  rear 
on  one  occasion  —  these  instances  effectually  demonstrating 
the  falsity  of  the  doctrine  that  Chinese  will  never  charge. 
Had  these  flanking  movements  not  been  successfully  resisted, 
the  whole  line,  taken  in  flank  and  rear,  and  outnumbered  by 
the  troops  with  whom  they  were  engaged  by  probably  ten  to 
one,  must  inevitably  have  been  cut  to  pieces. 

At  about  5.45  A.M.  one  of  the  lyddite  shells  from  the  Brit 
ish  battery  struck  and  exploded  the  Chinese  magazine  in  the 
city,  the  column  of  smoke  and  men  going  up  a  thousand  or 
more  feet  into  the  air,  and  the  shock  being  plainly  felt  a  mile 
and  a  half  away.  In  the  mean  time  the  British,  Japanese, 
French,  and  German  troops  and  the  Ninth  United  States  In 
fantry,  on  our  right,  had  advanced  as  far  as  practicable,  and 


312     THE  VISIT  OF  THE  ALLIES  TO  CHINA  IN  1900 

almost  the  entire  line  being  fronted  by  swamps,  the  only  solid 
ground  running  to  the  front  being  a  narrow  road  way,  it  was  im 
possible  to  continue  without  first  silencing,  to  some  extent,  the 
fire  of  the  Chinese.  The  Ninth  United  States  Infantry  held 
the  right  flank  of  the  line  ;  hence  both  flanks  were  confided  to 
the  care  of  American  troops.  In  its  position  on  the  right  the 
Ninth  was  being  terribly  cut  up,  and  word  was  sent  back  to 
General  Dorward  requesting  reinforcements.  In  response  to 
this  the  artillery  battery  of  the  Marine  Regiment,  having  ex 
hausted  its  ammunition  in  its  well-directed  efforts  against  the 
town,  was  sent  forward  as  infantry,  to  support  the  Ninth. 
Throughout  that  long  day  the  conflict  went  on.  There  were 
about  six  thousand  five  hundred  of  the  Allies,  and,  as  Colonel 
Meade  in  his  report  aptly  puts  it,  "  the  Chinese  had  sixty  guns 
and  their  forces  were  variously  estimated,  —  nothing  being 
correct,  —  but  there  was  a  large  army  of  Imperial  troops  and 
Boxers." 

At  2  o'clock  on  the  next  morning,  the  South  Gate  of 
the  city  was  blown  in  and  the  troops  entered  the  town,  the 
enemy  having  evacuated  and  moved  toward  the  west,  under 
cover  of  darkness.  The  city  was  filled  with  dead  and  dying 
Chinese  and  the  bodies  of  animals.  The  Russians  entered 
from  the  north,  and  Tien-Tsin  was  the  property  of  the 
Allies. 

In  order  to  come  to  some  conception  of  what  had  been  ac 
complished  by  the  Allied  forces,  it  will  only  be  necessary  for 
me  to  describe  the  fortifications  and  approaches  of  the  city. 
The  latter  is  surrounded  by  a  wall,  built  to  a  height  which 
makes  scaling  impossible,  and  composed  of  a  facing  of  three 
feet  of  masonry  backed  by  about  thirty  feet  of  solid  earth  — 
a  fortification  proof  against  artillery  fire  at  all  ranges.  This 
facing  extends  above  the  earth  backing  a  distance  of  about 
six  feet,  and  is  pierced  with  loop-holes  and  embrasures.  The 
south  entrance  is  through  a  double  gate,  and  troops  having 
penetrated  the  outer  entrance  would  be  subject  to  a  murder- 


THE   VISIT  OF  THE  ALLIES  TO  CHINA  IN  1900     313 

ous  fire  from  above  until  the  inner  gate  should  also  be  breached. 
The  position  of  the  city  from  a  strategic  standpoint  is  an  ex 
cellent  one.  In  front  of  the  south  wall  is  an  unfordable  moat, 
and  fronting  that  are  marshes  which  have  various  depths  at 
different  points.  As  has  been  said,  the  only  entirely  solid 
ground  over  which  the  wall  can  be  approached  is  a  roadway 
running  from  the  West  Arsenal  to  the  South  Gate.  The  de 
fences  were  planned  by  "  Chinese J'  Gordon, — Gordon  of 
Khartoum,  —  and  their  excellence  would  enable  a  small  force 
to  hold  out  against  an  army  corps  if  proper  dispositions  were 
made. 

A  temporary  government  was  immediately  established  for 
the  native  city,  having  as  its  head  a  board  of  officers,  on  which 
the  various  Powers  were  represented.  Major  Luke,  of  the 
British  marines,  was  made  Chief  of  Police,  and  the  Allies 
sent  details  for  police  duty. 

The  following  proclamation  was  then  issued  by  Major- 
General  Stoessel,  the  Russian  commander-in -chief,  and  ap 
proved  by  the  senior  officers  representing  the  Powers :  — 

To  the  inhabitants  of  the  City  of  Tien-Tsin :  — 

In  bombarding  the  City  of  Tien-Tsin,  the  Allied  forces  only 
replied  to  the  attack  made  by  the  rebels  on  the  foreign  settle 
ments. 

At  present,  as  your  authorities,  forgetting  their  duties,  have 
deserted  their  posts,  the  Allied  forces  consider  it  their  duty  to 
establish  in  the  city  a  temporary  administration,  which  you 
all  have  to  obey.  This  administration  will  protect  every  one 
wishing  to  deal  in  a  friendly  manner  with  foreigners,  but  will 
punish  without  mercy  every  one  who  causes  trouble. 

Let  the  bad  people  tremble,  but  the  good  people  should 
feel  assured  and  quietly  return  to  their  houses  and  begin  their 
usual  work.  Thus  peace  will  be  restored. 

Respect  this. 
TIBN-TSIN,  the  16th  of  July,  1900. 


314     THE   VISIT  OF  THE  ALLIES   TO  CHINA   IN  1900 

Having  received  what  came  very  near  being  my  quietus  in 
the  attack  on  the  Walled  City,  I  lay  in  a  field-hospital  in  Tien- 
Tsin,  hovering  between  life  and  death,  while  the  march  on 
Peking  was  being  executed.  Men  who  were  in  the  advance 
tell  me  that  there  was  little  fighting  of  any  importance  after 
Tien-Tsin  fell.  The  heat,  however,  throughout  the  entire 
campaign  was  intense,  and  the  forces,  having  frequently  but 
little  food,  suffering  from  thirst  and  great  heat,  and  con 
stantly  on  the  march,  endured  on  the  Peking  trip,  as  before, 
hardships  difficult  to  describe.  Of  the  relief  of  Peking  and 
the  situation  there,  I  know  no  more  from  actual  experience 
than  does  my  audience. 

Now  a  word  or  two  as  to  transportation,  subsistence,  etc. 
After  having  abandoned  our  train,  on  the  first  day  of  our 
advance,  we  took  all  the  ammunition  and  food  we  could  carry 
in  belts  and  haversacks  and  cut  loose  from  our  base.  In  the 
various  villages  through  which  we  passed  on  our  way  up,  we 
corralled  every  available  pony  and  donkey  and  pressed  him 
into  service  for  pack  purposes.  Having  command  of  the  scouts 
for  the  forces,  I  saw  to  it  that  the  American  contingent  enjoyed 
as  large  a  proportion  of  these  captures  as  possible.  Probably 
such  a  pack-train  has  seldom  been  seen :  antiquated,  solid- 
wheeled  Chinese  carts,  many  of  them  canopied,  and  all  of 
them  clumsy  and  heavy,  drawn  by  shaggy  Chinese  ponies, 
were  mixed  indiscriminately  with  braying  donkeys  and  yell 
ing  teamsters,  the  latter  swearing  in  many  tongues  at  their 
obstinate  charges,  yet  all  with  but  one  end  in  view  —  to  get 
to  Tien-Tsin  in  time.  The  country  in  that  vicinity  being  re 
markably  barren  and  sterile,  the  only  ration  obtainable  was  the 
not  over-abundant  supply  of  hard-tack  and  canned  "  Willie  " 
(as  the  irreverent  marine  is  wont  to  dub  the  canned  cornbeef 
with  which  a  wise  and  beneficent  Government  provides  him). 
After  Tien-Tsin  had  been  taken  and  sufficient  time  had  elapsed 
for  equipment  to  be  brought  from  the  Philippines,  our  army 
mules  attracted  universal  attention  and  admiration. 


THE  VISIT  OF  THE  ALLIES  TO  CHINA  IN  1900     315 

The  opportunities  for  comparison  of  the  troops  of  the  dif 
ferent  nations,  together  with  their  arms  and  equipment,  which 
were  offered  in  the  Chinese  campaign,  have  never  been  equalled 
before.  The  British  establishment  was  well  and  variously  rep 
resented.  The  British  marine,  who  has  ever  been  the  admira 
tion  of  his  nation,  was  to  me  the  perfect  type  of  a  splendid 
soldier.  The  Wai-hei-wai  regiment  is  composed  of  Chinese 
enlisted  in  the  English  possessions  in  China.  Uniformed  in 
tight-fitting  khaki  suits  and  wearing  all  the  other  elements  of 
European  dress,  the  only  outward  indications  that  they  are 
Mongols  are  almond  eyes  and  "pigtails."  These  men  fought 
well  and  with  bravery  and  coolness  in  every  action  in  which 
I  served  with  them,  and  their  officers  told  me  that  they  had 
done  equally  well  when  engaged  in  suppressing  riots,  in  which 
their  opponents  were  their  own  brothers  and  fathers. 

The  Indian  troops  were  even  more  picturesque  and  inter 
esting,  many  of  them  immense  men,  and  all  of  them  with  the 
faces  of  philosophers.  Their  quietness  of  demeanor,  splendid 
discipline,  love  of  and  respect  for  their  English  officers,  in 
addition  to  their  excellent  fighting  qualities,  make  them  ideal 
soldiers.  An  officer  attached  to  the  Sikh  regiment  remarked 
to  me  that  the  Chinese  trouble  had  been  the  most  beneficial 
of  things  for  these  troops,  for,  as  he  suggested,  these  men, 
who  had  previous  to  this  been  without  honor  in  their  own 
land,  owing  to  the  fact  that  they  had  been  peace  soldiers, 
would  now  hold  positions  of  proud  preeminence  on  their  re 
turn  to  their  native  villages  on  furlough  or  at  the  expiration 
of  their  enlistments.  The  expression  of  keenly  felt  disappoint 
ment  which  appeared  on  their  faces  whenever  any  expedition 
went  out,  of  which  they  were  not  to  constitute  a  part,  testified 
most  forcibly  to  the  fact  that  they  appreciated  their  opportu 
nities  and  did  not  care  to  have  any  of  them  escape  unused. 
The  special  commissary  stores  carried  by  these  troops  and  the 
numerous  little  copper  utensils  with  which  they  are  equipped 
indicate  how  well  England  has  learned  the  lesson  of  respect 


316      THE   VISIT  OF  THE  ALLIES  TO  CHINA   IN  1900 

for  race  prejudice.  The  English  troops  in  general  were  so  ex 
cellent,  and  our  relations  with  each  other  so  cordial,  that  it 
was  a  pleasure  to  serve  with  them. 

The  Japanese  I  should  unhesitatingly  number  among  the 
best  troops  in  the  world.  Active,  untiring  little  fellows,  highly 
trained  and  possessing  matchless  discipline,  they  have  all  the 
elements  necessary  to  perfect  fighting  men.  During  the  storm 
ing  of  the  Walled  City,  the  Japanese  went  into  action  in 
heavy  marching  order,  and  throughout  that  long,  hot  day  not 
an  ounce  of  equipment  was  abandoned ;  and  not  only  did  they 
come  through  with  knapsacks  complete,  but  appeared  on  the 
streets  of  the  Walled  City,  on  the  morning  following  its  fall, 
wearing  white  gloves.  Their  rifle,  of  Japanese  workmanship 
and  design,  is  a  combination  of  the  features  of  several  modern 
weapons.  Field  artillery  of  great  mobility  and  effectiveness  is 
another  of  their  possessions,  and  the  marksmanship  of  their 
cannoneers  was  demonstrated  on  many  occasions. 

The  Russians,  as  troops,  inspire  respect  by  theii  stolid  in 
difference  to  death  and  their  almost  servile  obedience  ;  but 
one  gains  the  impression  that  the  common  soldier  is  better 
trained,  in  proportion,  than  his  officers.  As  to  his  other  traits 
it  would  not  be  the  part  of  policy  to  comment. 

With  regard  to  the  German,  I  should  say  he  is  too  mechan 
ically  taught ;  and  concerning  the  French  and  Italians,  as  I 
cannot  compliment,  I  do  not  care  to  criticise. 

With  reference  to  the  question  of  uniform  and  rifle  —  the 
khaki  and  the  Krag-Jorgensen  have,  in  many  respects,  no  su 
periors,  but  the  blue  shirt  should  go.  As  an  outer  garment 
it  makes  a  target  of  greater  conspicuousness  than  the  much- 
ridiculed  crimson  coat  of  the  Briton  ;  the  German  gray  would 
make  a  welcome  substitute.  The  emphasis  which  should  be 
placed  on  the  necessity  for  the  adoption  of  a  suitable  intrench 
ing  tool  for  our  troops  cannot  be  overestimated. 

Now  a  word  or  two  for  the  other  man  —  the  man  we  have 
been  fighting.  In  this  war,  many  theories  with  regard  to  the 


THE  VISIT  OF  THE  ALLIES  TO  CHINA  IN  1900     317 

despised  Chinaman  have  been  exploded.  The  idea  that  he 
cannot  or  will  not  fight  is  the  most  prominent  of  them,  and 
the  impression  that  he  will  not  charge,  another — he  has  done 
both  of  these  things.  China  has  for  the  last  five  years  been 
going  through  considerable  of  a  military  renaissance.  The 
Japanese  War  taught  her  that,  though  she  might  despise  and 
hate  the  white  man,  with  his  ridiculously  young  institutions 
and  religion,  she  could  not  afford  to  spurn  his  military  sagacity 
and  destructive  inventions.  So  foreign  officers  are  sought  after 
and  highly  paid,  foreign  engineers  build  her  forts  and  arsenals, 
foreign  concerns  make  and  sell  her  arms,  and  settling  down 
to  real  business,  though  on  a  proportionately  small  scale  com 
pared  to  her  resources,  she  decides  to  profit  by  these  things. 
The  improvement  that  has  been  made  is  amply  demonstrated 
by  the  fact  that  these  men  who,  a  few  years  ago,  fought  with 
spears,  bows  and  arrows,  and  tom-toms,  fired  modern  rifles 
and  great  guns  with  an  accuracy  of  marksmanship  which  more 
than  surprised  every  officer  engaged  against  them,  including 
their  former  instructors.  In  every  case  of  the  panic-stricken 
rout  of  the  Chinese  in  the  late  trouble,  the  inspiring  cause  of 
it  was  the  anxiety  of  their  officers  to  save  their  own  precious 
skins,  which  caused  them  to  depart  precipitately  when  the 
Allies  came  at  them  with  a  charge  and  a  yell ;  the  best  of 
troops  have  been  known  to  break,  when  deprived  of  their 
leaders.  Apropos  of  Chinese  it  may  not  be  uninteresting  to 
state  that,  when  the  military  college  at  Tien-Tsin  was  attacked 
by  the  foreigners  on  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  the  cadets, 
though  outnumbered  and  cornered,  fought  until  the  last,  be 
ing  killed  under  beds,  in  which  positions  they  refused  to  sur 
render  and  were  taking  final  shots  at  the  enemy. 

What  a  man  will  do  as  a  soldier  who  looks  forward  to 
death  as  a  consummation  greatly  to  be  desired,  whose  con 
dition  is  at  present  as  bad  as  it  can  possibly  be,  and  who 
hopes  for,  and  is  taught  to  expect,  the  best  in  a  subsequent 
world,  —  who  can  live  on  a  handful  of  rice,  drink  dirty  ditch 


318      THE   VISIT  OF  THE  ALLIES  TO  CHINA  IN  1900 

water  without  any  evil  effects,  sleep  in  the  mud  and  stand  the 
greatest  of  fatigue,  —  what  this  man  will  do,  when  excellently 
armed  and  trained  and  well  led  by  competent  officers,  is  a 
question  pregnant  with  possibilities.  What  a  hundred  million 
of  them  will  do,  under  like  conditions,  is  a  matter  which  it  is 
not  pleasant  to  contemplate. 


XV 


THE  NECESSITY   OF  A   BROADER  SYSTEM 

OF  MILITARY  INSTRUCTION  IN 

THIS   COUNTRY,  AND   OUR 

MILITARY  POLICY 

BY 

MAJOR-GENERAL   LEONARD   WOOD 

CHIEF  OF  STAFF,  U.S.A. 


Read  before  the  Society  January  7, 1913 


THE  NECESSITY  OF  A  BROADER   SYSTEM 

OF  MILITARY  INSTRUCTION  IN 

THIS   COUNTRY,  AND   OUR 

MILITARY  POLICY 

I  APPRECIATE  very  much  the  honor  done  me  in  inviting  me 
to  address  you  on  the  military  policy  of  the  United  States.  I 
am  particularly  anxious  to  present  to  the  people  of  our  country, 
in  a  broad  and  general  way,  our  present  condition  of  unpre- 
paredness  and  lack  of  any  systematic,  well-ordered  scheme  for 
the  development  of  our  military  resources  on  lines  and  through 
methods  which  would  make  them  immediately  available  in  case 
of  war. 

A  serious  attempt  is  being  made  to  secure  a  proper  redistri 
bution  of  troops — a  redistribution  which  will  be  both  strate 
gically  and  economically  advantageous.  At  present  our  troops 
are  scattered  over  the  country,  many  of  them  at  stations  which 
now  have  no  military  utility  —  stations  which  were  built  long 
years  ago  to  guard  the  settlers  against  Indians  who  are  now 
dead  or  scattered  ;  so  that  there  is  no  military  reason  for  the 
continuance  of  troops  at  these  points.  Many  of  them  are  re 
mote  from  the  centres  of  population  and  supply,  the  country 
roundabout  them  furnishes  little  in  the  way  of  supplies  and  few 
recruits,  and  their  location  is  such  that  in  case  of  manoauvres 
or  a  concentration  on  either  frontier  they  have  to  be  moved 
long  distances.  The  forces  which  have  worked  for  their  con 
tinuance  have  been  purely  local  interests,  both  of  communities 
and  individuals ;  these  have  been  strong  enough  to  continue  in 
many  instances  a  most  undesirable,  expensive,  and,  from  a  mili 
tary  standpoint,  unsound,  disposition  of  troops. 

The  present  policy  is  to  concentrate  the  troops  of  the  mobile 
army  (infantry,  cavalry,  and  field  artillery)  in  three  areas : 


322     MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES 

on  the  Pacific  Coast,  near  Puget  Sound,  San  Francisco,  and 
Los  Angeles ;  on  the  Atlantic  Coast,  in  the  Buffalo- Albany 
region,  in  the  Atlanta-Chattanooga  area,  and  in  the  vicinity  of 
San  Antonio ;  and  two  or  three  main  groups  in  the  Mississippi 
Valley ;  also  an  east-west  line  of  stations  through  the  Central 
"West,  including  Forts  Riley,  Leavenworth,  and  Benjamin 
Harrison. 

The  reservations  which  will  be  abandoned  can  be  sold  ulti 
mately  to  good  advantage,  and  it  is  hoped  that  the  funds  ob 
tained  from  such  sales  will  be  deposited  and  held  subject  to 
appropriation  by  Congress  for  the  re  establishment  of  the  army 
at  the  new  stations.  It  is  not  intended  to  concentrate  all  the 
troops  of  an  area  at  the  same  post  or  station,  but  within  these 
areas  to  have  them  so  located  that  they  can  be  concentrated 
for  manoeuvres  without  undue  loss  of  time  or  undue  expense. 

The  policy  is  a  sound  one ;  it  means  economy  and  a  strate 
gically  sound  disposition  of  the  army.  It  is  bound  to  go  through, 
although  there  will  be  strong  opposition  from  communities  and 
individuals  adversely  affected.  These  dispositions,  of  course,  do 
not  include  the  seacoast  artillery,  which  necessarily  is  stationed 
at  the  various  seacoast  defences  along  the  Atlantic,  Gulf,  and 
Pacific  coasts. 

The  general  plan  above  outlined  will  result  not  only  in  econ 
omy  of  supply  and  maintenance,  but  will  permit  of  concen 
tration  of  the  tactical  units  —  brigades  and  divisions  —  for  the 
instruction  and  manoeuvres,  without  involving  an  expense 
which  is  under  present  conditions  prohibitive,  and  will  make 
it  possible  for  our  officers  of  high  rank  to  handle  commands 
such  as  they  would  be  called  upon  to  command  in  war,  and 
give  these  officers  very  necessary  training.  It  will  permit  the 
different  elements  of  the  regular  army  —  infantry,  cavalry,  and 
field  artillery  —  to  operate  together  and  get  that  kind  of  prac 
tice  which  will  build  up  team  play ;  enable  them  each  to  play 
their  proper  part  in  conjoined  operations.  This  is  just  as  impor 
tant  for  the  army  as  it  is  to  get  the  different  portions  of  a  foot- 


MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES     323 

ball  team  to  working  smoothly  together.  We  can  do  much  work 
apart,  but  to  weld  the  team  into  an  effective  whole,  line  and 
backs  must  work  together.  So  it  is  with  the  different  armies ; 
they  must  work  together  in  peace  to  be  a  smooth  working 
whole  in  war.  To  wait  until  war  comes  to  do  this  is  to  have 
learned  nothing  from  experience,  and  to  court  disaster. 

We  have  spent  great  sums  of  money  upon  our  army.  We 
have  spent,  are  spending,  and  will  have  to  spend  for  a  long 
time  enormous  sums  for  pensions.  We  are  not  receiving  an 
adequate  return  for  the  money  spent  on  our  army ;  too  few 
men  are  included  in  our  scheme  of  instruction,  and  men  are 
retained  in  service  much  longer  than  is  necessary  to  instruct 
them  properly  in  their  duties  as  soldiers.  I  do  not  refer  to 
non-commissioned  officers,  or  to  the  commissioned  personnel 
of  the  army,  who  are  really  the  teaching  force,  but  to  those 
private  soldiers  who  come  into  the  army  and  remain  thirty 
years,  serving,  many  of  them,  for  retirement,  others  for  a  long 
period  of  years,  and  through  lack  of  a  reserve  system  are  lost 
to  the  service. 

What  we  are  especially  anxious  to  establish  is  a  system 
under  which  we  can  pass  through  the  regular  army  as  many 
men  as  possible  consistent  with  their  thorough  preparation  to 
discharge  efficiently  their  duties  as  soldiers  in  case  the  country 
should  require  their  services,  and  to  hold  them  in  an  organized 
reserve  for  a  number  of  years. 

It  is  most  important  that  men,  after  their  period  of  active 
service,  should  be  held  in  a  reserve,  so  organized  as  to  make 
them  immediately  available  in  case  of  war.  For  a  considerable 
time  the  War  Department  has  been  attempting  to  secure  the 
enactment  of  legislation  looking  to  the  establishment  of  a  re 
serve,  and  the  matter  has  received  much  attention  on  the  part 
of  various  members  of  Congress,  and  legislation  secured  which, 
while  far  from  perfect,  makes  the  beginning  of  a  reserve  pos 
sible,  though  its  many  objectionable  features  will,  I  fear,  make 
recruiting  much  more  difficult.  A  bill  has  recently  been  intro- 


324     MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

duced  in  Congress  by  Mr.  Tilson,  of  Connecticut,  which  is  per 
haps  the  best  presentation  of  the  subject  that  has  been  made 
to  Congress  in  the  form  of  a  proposed  legislative  enactment. 

The  reserve  should  be  sufficiently  large  to  fill  the  regular 
army  to  the  maximum  authorized  strength  and  to  provide  for 
the  losses  which  would  occur  during  the  first  six  months  of 
war.  This  should  be  the  maximum  expected  of  a  reserve.  It 
would  be  far  wiser  to  have  the  reserve  of  such  strength  that  it 
would  be  sufficient,  not  only  to  fill  up  the  regular  army  and 
provide  for  the  losses  of  the  first  six  months,  —  which  amount 
to  about  thirty  per  cent,  as  a  rule,  from  all  causes,  —  but  also 
to  provide  officers  and  men  for  new  organizations. 

The  same  general  reserve  principle  as  that  proposed  for  the 
regular  army  should  be  applied  to  the  militia,  in  order  that 
it  may  have  enough  reservists  to  bring  it  to  full  statutory 
strength  and  provide  for  losses  during  the  period  above  re 
ferred  to.  The  War  Department  has  expended,  and  is  expend 
ing,  a  great  deal  of  effort  in  making  the  militia  thoroughly 
efficient.  Especial  care  is  exercised  in  the  selection  of  officers 
who  are  assigned  to  duty  with  the  militia,  and  no  effort  spared 
to  build  up  interest  among  the  militia  and  to  raise  its  stand 
ards.  The  response  of  the  greater  portion  of  the  militia  has 
been  very  encouraging,  and  it  is  believed  that  under  the  sys 
tem  now  in  force  the  militia  will,  within  reasonable  time,  be 
come  a  very  efficient  military  force,  ready  to  take  its  place 
immediately  in  the  first  line  and  with  the  regular  army  meet 
the  shock  of  the  first  months  of  war,  during  which  period  the 
volunteers  must  be  raised  and  given  such  hasty  instruction  as 
will  always  be  necessary  until  our  system  of  military  service 
and  obligation  has  been  much  extended.  The  purpose  of  the 
Department  is  to  have  one  officer  of  the  regular  establishment 
with  each  military  regiment  or  equivalent  thereof.  At  present 
the  great  shortage  of  officers  does  not  permit  this  being  done. 
f  I  want  to  invite  your  attention  briefly  to  the  great  and  use 
less  sacrifice  which  lack  of  preparation  has  cost  us  in  previous 


MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES     325 

wars,  and  the  humiliations  which  have  come  upon  us  from  de 
pending  upon  the  sudden  call  to  arms  of  totally  untrained  and 
undisciplined  men.  The  United  States  has  never  engaged  in 
war  with  a  first-class  power  prepared  for  war  in  which  aid  has 
not  been  furnished  us,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  by  another 
power. 

In  the  Revolutionary  War,  as  you  know,  we  received  most 
valuable  aid  from  France  at  a  most  important  and  critical 
period  —  aid,  the  value  of  which  only  those  who  have  studied 
the  Revolutionary  War  from  a  military  standpoint  appreciate. 
The  French  fleet  and  regular  division  were  of  simply  inesti 
mable  assistance,  and  their  part  in  bringing  about  the  surren 
der  of  Cornwallis  at  Yorktown  was  one  the  importance  of 
which  is  difficult  to  overestimate. 

Our  war  with  England  in  1812—14  was  only  a  military  in 
cident  of  the  great  war  which  England  was  waging.  She  had 
nearly  all  her  military  strength  engaged  in  the  great  series  of 
campaigns  which  terminated  in  the  downfall  of  Napoleon,  and 
the  force  sent  to  the  United  States  was  a  small  one.  Her  ag 
gressive  operations  were  few,  and  principally  limited  to  the 
attack  on  Washington,  which  was  wholly  successful,  and  the 
unsuccessful  attack  on  New  Orleans.  On  our  side,  the  con 
duct  of  the  war  was  exceedingly  discreditable  and  frightfully 
costly.  We  suffered  a  long  chain  of  defeats,  and  failed  almost 
entirely  in  our  aggressive  operations.  The  greatest  number  of 
British  regular  troops  in  this  country  at  any  one  time  was  about 
16,800,  while  we  enrolled  for  the  war  527,000  men.  Washing 
ton  was  abandoned  and  our  President  compelled  to  fly  from  our 
Capital  after  a  defence  which  is  one  of  the  most  humiliating 
incidents  in  our  military  history.  Although  our  troops  greatly 
outnumbered  the  attacking  force,  they  made  only  a  show  of 
resistance,  and  abandoned  the  field  and  the  Capital  with  a  loss 
of  eight  killed  and  eleven  wounded.  The  only  resistance 
worthy  of  the  name  was  made  by  a  small  party  of  sailors  from 
some  vessels  of  the  navy ;  and  yet  the  men  who  constituted 


326     MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES 

the  greater  portion  of  the  defence  were  drawn  from  a  section 
which  had  furnished  some  of  the  best  troops  of  the  Conti 
nental  line;  but  they  were  untrained  and  unprepared,  and 
their  conduct  was  such  as  should  have  been  expected.  On  the 
sea  our  navy  did  most  creditable  and  gallant  service.  Its  men 
were  trained  and  well  organized. 

The  war  with  Mexico  was  very  successfully  conducted. 
Mexico  was  a  weak  power,  and  not  in  any  sense  a  first-class 
power  prepared  for  war. 

The  conditions  under  which  the  Civil  War  was  fought  were 
peculiar,  and  would  not  apply  in  a  war  between  our  country 
and  any  of  the  great  powers.  In  the  Civil  War,  both  North 
and  South  started  upon  a  more  or  less  equal  footing,  so  far 
as  their  training  and  lack  of  preparation  were  concerned ;  both 
sides  learned  the  art  of  war  together,  and  in  time  developed 
magnificent  armies  and  splendid  leaders ;  but  it  is  not  diffi 
cult  to  see  what  the  result  would  have  been  had  either  side 
been  well  prepared.  Our  next  enemy  will  be  prepared  to  the 
minute,  and  the  blow  will  fall  before  we  realize  war  is  to  come. 
Our  wealth  and  population  will  not  make  good  our  criminal 
lack  of  preparation. 

It  should  be  remembered  that  undeveloped  military  re 
sources  are  of  no  more  value  in  the  sudden  onset  of  modern 
war  than  an  undeveloped  gold  mine  in  Alaska  in  a  crisis  in 
Wall  Street. 

There  is  one  thing  which  the  Civil  War  gave  us  which  few 
people  appreciate.  It  gave  us,  from  the  2,600,000  men  in  the 
Northern  armies,  and  the  million  or  more  in  the  Southern 
armies,  a  reserve  of  probably  two  millions  of  men  trained  in 
that  best  of  all  schools  —  the  school  of  war.  This  reserve  was 
for  a  number  of  years  available  as  an  effective  force,  although 
not  organized,  it  is  true,  but  the  men  had  had  extensive  mili 
tary  experience,  and  represented  tremendous  military  poten 
tiality,  and  for  perhaps  fifteen  years  after  the  war  would  have 
given  us  splendid  material  with  which  rapidly  to  build  up 


MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES     327 

effective  armies.  But  this  force  has  now  passed  away  as  a 
military  resource,  as  those  who  survive,  both  officers  and  men, 
are  too  old  for  active  military  work ;  and  in  case  of  war  to 
day  we  would  be  required  to  build  up  armies  almost  wholly 
from  untrained  and  uninstructed  men.  We  would  have  as  a 
nucleus  of  such  a  force  only  the  regular  army  and  the  militia, 
the  latter  less  valuable  than  the  former  as  a  leaven  for  the 
mass  of  raw  material,  because  it  would  itself  require  concen 
trated  and  hard  work  to  bring  it  to  a  degree  of  first-class 
efficiency,  and  could  not  safely  absorb  any  large  amount  of 
raw  material  other  than  that  which  came  to  it  from  its  own 
reserve. 

It  will  be  seen  that  we  are  confronted  with  a  very  serious 
difficulty  in  the  way  of  building  up  a  reserve  of  trained  en 
listed  men.  At  present  we  have  no  available  reserve  of  trained 
men  except,  possibly,  such  a  one  as  could  be  made  up  of  men 
who  have  passed  through  the  regular  army,  marine  corps  and 
militia,  and  are  still  of  an  age  which  renders  efficient  service 
possible.  These  men  are  under  no  obligation  to  come  to  the 
colors,  other  than  the  influence  of  patriotism ;  they  are  not 
organized,  and  we  do  not  know  where  they  are  ;  and  the  idle, 
foolish  talk  of  the  " Peace-at-any-price,"  "No-more-war"  peo 
ple  is  doing  a  great  deal,  not  only  to  destroy  all  sense  of  obli 
gation  on  the  part  of  this  class  of  trained  men  to  hold  them 
selves  in  readiness  to  return  to  the  colors,  but  tends  to  dull 
the  natural  instincts  of  others  to  fit  themselves  for  service. 
These  blind  leaders  of  the  blind  are  doing  this  through  reiter 
ated  and  empty  assertions  that  there  are  to  be  no  more  wars, 
and  statements  depreciative  of  patriotic  ideals,  depreciative 
not  only  of  sane  preparation,  but  belittling  willingness  to  make 
the  supreme  sacrifice  when  the  needs  of  the  country  demand 
it.  They  are  refusing  to  put  the  lifeboats  on  the  ship,  and  as 
serting  that  storms  are  to  come  no  more. 

The  reservists,  if  they  are  to  be  immediately  available, 
should  be  listed ;  their  whereabouts  and  all  the  details  about 


328     MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES 

them  known  —  their  qualifications,  sizes  for  uniforms,  shoes, 
etc.  These  data  should  be  carried  in  the  companies  to  which 
they  are  assigned,  and  the  reservists  in  turn  should  know  ex 
actly  to  what  organizations  they  are  to  report.  These  are  the 
simple  general  basic  principles  which  should  govern  in  any 
well-ordered  reserve.  The  reservist's  card  of  assignment  should 
carry  with  it  an  order  for  transportation  on  any  railroad  line 
to  his  designed  point  of  rendezvous  in  case  of  a  call  to  arms. 

Serious  as  the  question  of  men  is,  the  question  of  officers 
is  still  more  serious.  We  have  a  very  small  force  of  trained 
officers  in  this  country,  and  we  have  not  taken  any  systematic 
or  well-ordered  steps  to  secure  one  in  time  of  war.  We  should 
require,  for  a  mobilization  of  600,000  men,  including  regu 
lars  and  militia,  which  would  be  our  minimum  mobilization  in 
time  of  war,  at  least  16,000  new  officers.  Six  hundred  thou 
sand  men  does  not  seem  a  large  number  when  it  is  remem 
bered  that  in  the  Civil  War,  on  the  Northern  side,  we  enrolled 
something  over  2,600,000  men,  and  on  the  Southern  side, 
probably  over  1,000,000.  Considering  our  long  coast-line  and 
many  important  cities  to  whose  defences  a  number  of  troops 
must  be  assigned,  the  estimate  of  600,000  men  is  an  extremely 
conservative  one  ;  probably  we  should  have  to  exceed  it  greatly 
in  the  first  months  of  war.  So  that  the  question  of  officers  to 
handle,  with  any  degree  of  efficiency,  this  enormous  amount 
of  new  material,  is  one  of  the  most  serious  problems  which 
confront  us.  The  question  is,  Where  are  we  going  to  get 
them  ?  The  quick  onset  of  modern  war  does  not  give  time  for 
preparation  after  its  declaration.  Modern  nations  are  pre 
pared  to  act  quickly ;  wars  are  quickly  undertaken  and  rather 
quickly  over,  and  woe  to  the  country  which  is  not  prepared. 
No  time  will  be  given  us  to  train  our  officers ;  we  must  find 
some  method  of  developing  them  in  time  of  peace.  We  have 
the  regular  army  from  which  a  limited  number  of  officers 
could  be  taken,  presumably  for  assignment  to  higher  com 
mands  ;  the  militia,  which  would  furnish  a  certain  number  of 


MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES     329 

officers  for  the  volunteers ;  and  the  graduates  of  some  of  our 
best  military  schools,  who  will  undoubtedly  go  largely  into 
the  volunteers :  but  after  exhausting  these,  we  should  prob 
ably  require  at  least  sixteen  thousand  officers.  These  must  be 
developed  from  absolutely  untrained  material.  It  does  not  re 
quire  argument  to  show  the  folly  of  permitting  a  situation  of 
this  kind  to  continue.  We  must  make  some  adequate  prepara 
tion  for  training  to  a  reasonable  extent  a  body  of  reserve  offi 
cers.  The  question  comes  up  as  to  how  we  can  best  do  it.  I 
believe  the  following  plan  is  a  practicable  one. 

We  have  at  military  schools  throughout  the  country  officers 
of  the  regular  army,  active  and  retired,  on  duty  as  instructors 
in  the  military  art.  The  number  of  pupils  at  these  schools  is 
something  over  twenty-five  thousand.  If  we  could  take  from 
the  four  or  five  thousand  students  who  graduate  at  these  col 
leges  each  year,  say,  eight  hundred  young  men  who  are  rec 
ommended  by  the  military  instructors  as  being  of  the  right 
type,  commission  them  for  one  year  in  the  regular  army  as 
provisional  second  lieutenants,  junior  in  rank  to  all  second 
lieutenants  in  the  regular  establishment,  give  them  full  pay 
and  allowances  of  second  lieutenants,  but  not  require  them  to 
purchase  all  the  uniforms,  and  at  the  end  of  a  year  discharge 
such  as  qualify  with  certificates  of  fitness  for  the  position  of 
an  officer  of  volunteer  infantry,  cavalry,  field  or  coast  artil 
lery,  we  should  accomplish  a  great  deal  toward  building  up 
this  reserve  corps  of  officers,  and  we  should  adopt  an  economi 
cal  and  effective  method  of  securing  them,  for  nothing  can  be 
so  frightfully  and  woefully  expensive  as  to  develop  them  at 
the  cost  of  the  lives  of  thousands  of  our  men,  lives  thrown 
away  due  to  lack  of  preparation. 

Moreover,  the  young  men  serving  for  a  year  with  the  reg 
ular  army  would  in  a  measure  serve  to  offset  the  absenteeism 
of  officers  incident  to  duty  with  the  militia,  schools  and  col 
leges,  recruiting  service,  etc.  Again,  it  would  give  us  an  op 
portunity  to  select  from  these  young  men  those  who  should  go 


330     MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

up  for  the  regular  examination  for  appointment  to  the  army 
from  civil  life.  I  believe  the  plan  would  be  an  attractive  one 
to  a  great  many  youngsters  in  these  schools,  who  have  a  desire 
to  fit  themselves  for  possible  military  service.  They  would  be 
able  to  leave  the  service  with  a  considerable  amount  of  money 
in  pocket,  and  the  year  in  the  regular  establishment  would 
be  of  all-around  benefit  to  them.  They  would  be  sought  for 
by  the  mrlitia,  and  as  our  reserve  is  built  up  would  be  avail 
able  for  assignment  as  officers  of  the  reserve  force. 

This  plan  certainly  has  sufficient  merit  to  warrant  its  being 
given  a  trial,  and  I  believe  it  is  one  which,  if  tried,  will,  with 
such  modifications  as  experience  may  indicate,  provide  a  re 
serve  of  fairly  well-instructed  officers,  certainly  far  better  in 
structed  than  under  any  conceivable  method  which  could  result 
from  instruction  given  in  the  short  period  which  intervenes 
between  the  declaration  of  war  and  actual  fighting. 

As  to  the  cost  of  a  reserve :  We  can  maintain  ten  men  in 
the  reserve  for  what  we  can  maintain  one  on  the  active  list. 
The  reservist,  after  furnishing  his  period  of  service  with  the 
colors,  or  active  service,  could  pass  to  the  status  of  a  man  on  fur 
lough,  and  receive  a  small  monthly  pay,  say,  $2.50,  and  should 
be  given  to  understand  that  he  will  not  be  called  to  the  colors  — 
that  is,  to  active  service  —  during  his  reserve  period,  except 
in  case  of  war  and  for  instruction ;  for  this  latter  purpose,  for 
not  to  exceed  ten  days  every  other  year.  When  mobilized  or 
called  to  the  colors  for  instruction,  he  should  receive  full  pay 
and  allowances,  transportation,  etc.  Under  this  system  the 
reservist  would  be  able  to  make  his  arrangements  to  enter 
into  business,  follow  his  trade,  contract  for  services,  etc.,  with 
an  assurance  that  nothing  but  war  and  the  far  separated  pe 
riods  of  instruction  would  interfere  with  his  business  pursuits 
or  obligations. 

We  trust  that  with  some  modifications  of  the  reserve  law 
recently  enacted  we  shall  be  able  to  build  up  a  really  efficient 
reserve,  and  that  the  militia,  through  the  necessary  legal  en- 


MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES     331 

actments  in  the  various  States,  will  be  able  to  do  likewise, 
and  will  follow  along  the  general  lines  indicated  by  the  army. 
The  system  of  enlistment  upon  which  we  have  proceeded  until 
very  recently  has  been  short-sighted  and  extravagant,  and  one 
which  is  of  little  value  in  preparing  the  country  for  war  with 
a  first-class  power. 

Under  our  old  system  we  rather  encouraged  the  men  to 
stay  on  as  long  as  possible  with  a  view  to  retirement  at  the 
end  of  thirty  years.  This  long  service,  in  the  purely  police 
work  which  the  army  was  doing  in  connection  with  Indian 
wars,  had  certain  advantages.  It  kept  in  the  service  a  cer 
tain  number  of  men  who  had  become  habituated  to  conditions 
on  the  frontier  and  the  method  of  Indian  warfare,  etc. ;  but 
even  for  that  work  the  advantages  were  few  and  the  disad 
vantages  many. 

One  of  the  most  demoralizing  effects  of  this  long  service 
was  upon  the  officers  themselves.  The  company  was  filled  up 
with  old  soldiers ;  the  men  had  been  through  several  instruc 
tion  periods ;  the  necessity  for  training  in  night  operations, 
practice  marches,  instruction  in  field  fortifications,  etc.,  be 
came  less  and  less  apparent,  and  were  more  and  more  neg 
lected.  Officers  became  more  or  less  indifferent.  It  was  a 
good  deal  as  though  a  man  were  teaching  school,  having  the 
same  pupils  all  the  time,  with  a  very  limited  course  to  give 
them,  and  going  over  it  year  after  year  until  both  students 
and  instructor  become  indifferent  and  inert.  It  was  destruc 
tive  of  initiative  and  progress. 

Again,  looking  at  the  long  service  from  the  standpoint  of 
cost,  it  will  be  seen  that  it  is  a  most  unwise  and  extravagant 
system.  The  soldier's  pay  increases  progressively  for  the  first 
eighteen  years  of  service,  and  then  runs  on  flat  up  to  the  date 
of  discharge.  We  take  our  men  anywhere  from  twenty-one 
to  thirty-five  years  of  age,  and  get  most  of  them  in  the  early 
twenties.  Their  physical  condition  is  probably  at  its  best  for 
the  first  fifteen  years ;  from  that  time  on  they  are  physically 


332     MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

less  fit  for  field  service,  and  therefore  less  valuable  as  sol 
diers,  and  yet  they  are  receiving  the  maximum  of  pay  and  are 
approaching  a  time  at  which  they  will  be  retired.  It  is  gen 
erally  the  practice  to  retire  old  soldiers  on  thirty  years'  service 
as  non-commissioned  officers,  many  of  them  as  first  sergeants, 
with  the  retired  pay  of  $67.50  per  month.  In  other  words, 
we  keep  a  man  for  thirty  years;  we  give  him  ten  times  the 
period  of  service  which  is  necessary  for  his  thorough  train 
ing;  the  last  half  of  his  thirty  years  being  at  the  maximum 
of  pay,  while  he  is  physically  on  the  decline ;  and  we  then  re 
tire  him  with  retired  pay  running  in  round  numbers  from 
130  to  $67.50  per  month  —  we  retire  him  on  a  pay,  which 
he  draws  until  he  dies,  equivalent  to  the  pay  of  from  two  to 
four  and  a  half  active  soldiers  during  their  first  enlistment, 
during  their  period  of  greatest  physical  efficiency.  The  sys 
tem  does  not  give  us  a  single  reservist,  and  is  a  most  extrava 
gant  one  in  every  way.  It  is  unsound  from  the  standpoint  of 
military  efficiency,  and  it  is  undesirable  in  that  it  creates  a 
class  of  long-service  soldiers,  not  belonging  to  the  teaching 
group  above  referred  to,  namely,  officers  and  non-commis 
sioned  officers ;  and  it  is  deadening  to  both  officers  and  men. 

Under  the  new  system  which  it  is  hoped  it  will  be  possible 
to  put  in  force,  the  army  will  become  a  training  school,  in 
which  the  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  occupy  the 
places  of  instructors,  and  as  many  men  will  be  put  through  it 
and  passed  into  a  reserve  as  is  consistent  with  thorough  train 
ing.  We  want  to  train  as  many  men  as  possible  in  the  short 
est  time  consistent  with  thorough  instruction,  and  then  return 
them  to  their  industrial  careers,  to  which  we  believe  they  will 
return  better  for  the  training  they  have  received.  The  period 
of  reserve  service  which  should  follow  the  active  service  should 
be  sufficiently  long  to  guarantee  a  reserve  of  at  least  three 
times  the  strength  of  the  active  establishment. 

Just  how  long  it  takes  to  train  a  man  thoroughly  is  a  ques 
tion  ;  but,  personally,  I  believe  we  can  train  a  man  thoroughly 


MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES     333 

in  two  years.  I  am  willing,  however,  to  accept  the  three-year 
period,  with  a  proviso  that  at  the  end  of  two  years  men  who 
have  demonstrated  their  fitness  can  be  transferred  to  the  re 
serve.  Generally  speaking,  men  who  object  to  the  reserve 
idea  are  those  who  expect  to  depend  wholly  upon  volunteers 
in  case  of  war.  They  tell  you  that  it  takes  three  years  of  hard 
work  to  make  a  soldier,  and  in  the  same  breath  speak  con 
fidently  of  developing  volunteers  iir  case  of  sudden  war.  In 
view  of  the  suddenness  of  modern  wars,  those  statements  are 
so  inconsistent  as  to  deserve  little  attention. 

I  believe  the  new  policy  will  be  carried  out,  and  that  we 
shall  be  able  to  build  up  a  reserve  system;  and  I  hope  we 
shall  be  able  to  revivify  in  the  youth  of  this  country  a  sense 
of  their  responsibility  to  the  country  in  the  time  of  war,  and 
that  they  will  see  that  it  is  up  to  them  to  support  measures 
looking  to  the  provision  of  an  adequate  system  of  training,  in 
order  that  if  we  are  so  unfortunate  as  to  become  involved  in 
war  they  may  be  ready  to  play  their  part  efficiently. 

We  do  not  now  see  any  war  in  front  of  us :  but  three 
months  from  now  we  may  be  confronted  by  a  great  crisis;  no 
one  can  tell.  We  have  recently  mobilized  a  large  portion  of 
our  regular  establishment;  and  elsewhere  grave  questions  con 
front  us  which  may  at  any  time  involve  us  in  a  struggle  with 
some  great  power  well  prepared  for  war.  The  statement  that 
there  will  be  no  more  wars  is  an  idle,  foolish  statement ;  it  is 
to  assume,  without  any  reason  for  the  assumption,  that  the 
conditions  that  produce  wars  no  longer  exist.  So  far  as  we 
know  anything  of  history  we  find  it  full  of  the  stories  of  war, 
and  it  is  difficult  to  understand  how  any  straight-thinking 
man  can  for  a  moment  assume  that  wars  will  not  continue  to 
occur.  As  for  our  wars,  all  of  us  who  have  read,  even  super- 
ficialty,  the  history  of  the  country,  know  that  they  have,  from 
an  administrative  standpoint,  been  badly  conducted,  and  that 
they  have  been  wasteful  in  the  way  of  money  and  unneces 
sarily  extravagant  in  human  life,  through  lack  of  any  welt 


334     MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES 

ordered  system  looking  either  to  proper  administrative  han 
dling  of  the  war  or  the  preparation  of  trained  officers  and  men. 
We  have  stumbled  into  military  complications  without  any 
reasonably  adequate  preparation  in  time  of  peace,  and  as  a 
result  we  have  paid  enormously,  both  in  men  and  treasure. 
Are  we  always  to  do  this  ?  Fortunately,  hitherto  we  have  not 
met,  unaided,  a  great  nation  prepared  for  war ;  that  experi 
ence  is  surely  before  us,  sooner  or  later.  As  yet  we  have  done 
little  in  the  way  of  intelligent  preparation. 

It  seems  to  me  that  there  is  a  very  sharp  distinction  between 
advocating  militarism  and  preaching  military  preparedness, 
and  that  we  show  lack  of  intelligence  and  prudence  in  disre 
garding  entirely  the  lessons  of  the  past  and  in  failing  to  take 
notice  of  the  object-lessons  given  us  by  the  preparedness  of 
foreign  countries,  countries  with  which  our  great  commercial 
development  and  other  serious  questions  are  liable  to  involve 
us  in  difficulties,  difficulties  which,  much  as  we  may  want  to 
adjust  them  by  arbitration,  will  result  in  war,  and  be  settled 
only  by  a  resort  to  arms,  for  there  are  many  questions  which 
cannot  be  arbitrated.  We  cannot  well  arbitrate  questions  in 
volving  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  for  instance,  or  questions  involv 
ing  rights  of  certain  aliens  to  citizenship  in  this  country.  In 
brief,  many  of  the  most  vital  questions  which  confront  this 
country  are  outside  of  the  field  of  arbitration.  And  again, 
those  who  preach  arbitration  of  everything,  even  questions  of 
national  honor,  are  forgetful  of  the  fact  that  peace,  under  cer 
tain  conditions,  is  more  dreadful  than  war,  because  it  indicates 
an  absence  of  many  of  the  best  qualities  which  go  to  make  a 
people,  and  that  their  place  has  been  taken  by  those  ignoble 
qualities  which  mark  the  decadence  of  a  people  and  have  the 
stamp  of  moral  degeneracy.  They  also  fail  to  recognize  the 
fact  that  human  nature  has  not  undergone  a  radical  change, 
and  that  war  cannot  be  done  away  with  until  great  and  power 
ful  peoples,  recognizing  a  necessity  vital  to  their  race  or  in 
terest  and  realizing  that  they  have  the  power  to  acquire  what 


MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES     335 

they  need  through,  force  of  arms,  are  willing  to  subordinate 
everything  to  the  decision  of  others.  This  means  a  radical  re 
construction  of  human  character,  and  the  removal  of  the  forces 
which  result  in  the  survival  of  the  fittest ;  and  they  who  are 
preaching  to  the  youth  of  this  country  the  policy  of  "  Do  not 
fight,  no  matter  what  happens ;  arbitrate  everything,  even  na 
tional  honor  ;  raise  no  questions  as  to  citizenship,  even  though 
it  involve  the  injection  among  the  people  of  this  country  of 
material  impossible  of  assimilation,"  are  injecting  into  the 
patriotic  spirit  of  the  youth  of  this  country  a  kind  of  moral 
syphilis,  which  will  be  as  destructive  to  the  patriotic  spirit  of 
our  youth  as  is  syphilis  itself  to  their  bodies  and  their  phys 
ical  health. 

It  is  well  to  remember  that  history  and  human  experience 
do  not  warrant  the  assumption  that  peace  breeds  better  men. 
No  one  can  claim  with  justice  that  Italy,  from  1720  to  the 
Napoleonic  wars,  presented  a  condition  which  from  a  moral 
standpoint  was  preferable  to  those  of  less  peaceful  times.  As 
a  matter  of  fact  men  degenerated.  The  present  tendency 
among  certain  well-meaning  but  unguided  people  to  ask  some 
one  else  to  settle  our  difficulties  means,  if  accepted  by  our 
people,  national  degeneration.  Lack  of  conviction  and  of  a 
willingness  to  die  for  what  we  believe  to  be  the  right,  is  deca 
dence,  nothing  more,  no  less. 

It  has  been  well  said  that  a  virtuous  community  which  neg 
lects  its  political  duties  may  fall  before  a  less  moral  nation 
which  discharges  those  duties.  Cromwell  realized  this,  and 
expressed  it.  He  knew  that  justice  and  spiritual  aspirations 
would  have  been  of  little  avail  without  discipline  and  train 
ing. 

Armies  are  not  necessarily  for  conquest;  in  fact,  under 
present  conditions  they  are  seldom  so  used.  They  are  main 
tained  more  for  protection,  and  the  reason  for  their  being  is 
based  largely  upon  apprehension,  or  a  desire  to  hold  what  a 
nation  considers  vital  to  its  interests.  They  are  to  nations 


336     MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES 

what  safe  deposits  and  police  are  to  the  citizen  —  something 
to  safeguard  things  which  there  is  reason  to  believe  other 
people  would  take  if  they  were  not  adequately  protected. 

Then  again,  there  is  another  effect  of  military  service  which 
our  people  often  overlook,  and  that  is  the  benefit  to  the  na 
tion  from  the  physical  upbuilding  and  the  mental  discipline 
which  results  from  military  training.  The  military  countries 
of  Europe  have  a  criminal  rate  far  lower  than  our  own,  and 
we  must  admit  one  of  two  things :  either  that  they  are  inher 
ently  a  more  law-abiding  and  morally  better  people,  or  that 
they  have  had  something  in  the  way  of  training  which  has 
made  them  more  respectful  of  authority,  of  law,  and  more  ob 
servant  of  the  rights  of  others.  We  cannot  admit  that  they 
are  inherently  a  better  people,  and  I  think  it  is  only  fair  to 
conclude  that  the  effect  of  their  military  training  has  been, 
not  only  to  build  up  the  physical  well-being  of  the  men,  but 
to  increase  their  respect  for  law  and  order  and  their  observ 
ance  of  the  rights  of  others.  Those  who  are  best  qualified  to 
speak  on  the  subject  say  that  the  gain  in  efficiency  resulting 
from  military  training,  in  France  and  Germany,  for  instance, 
has  been  from  fifteen  to  thirty  per  cent.  The  man  who  has 
passed  through  his  military  service  has  not  only  been  improved 
physically,  learned  to  respect  law  and  order,  and  become  dis 
ciplined  in  mind  and  body,  but  is  in  every  way  a  more  useful 
and  valuable  man,  whether  it  be  as  a  laborer,  or  as  an  em 
ployee  in  a  business  house,  or  in  any  other  position  of  trust 
and  responsibility ;  he  is  a  more  dependable  and  better-trained 
working  machine  than  a  man  who  has  not  had  this  training. 
The  time  lost  is  far  more  than  offset  by  the  gain  in  efficiency. 

Moreover,  there  is  another  thing  which  is  of  vital  impor 
tance  in  any  country  :  I  refer  to  the  effect  of  universal  service 
which,  broadly  speaking,  all  share  alike.  It  makes  tremend 
ously  for  the  building-up  of  a  firm  national  spirit  and  the 
binding  together  of  all  classes  of  society  in  one  common  pur 
pose,  namely,  the  defence  of  the  country,  and  the  creation  of 


MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES     337 

a  spirit  of  sacrifice  and  willingness  to  prepare  one's  self  so  to 
be  ready  that  each  one  may  be  prepared  to  discharge  efficiently 
his  particular  duty  in  war.  This  influence  is  tremendous  and 
far-reaching  in  making  a  nation. 

Again,  the  men  learn  how  to  take  care  of  themselves,  not 
only  in  matters  of  personal  sanitation,  but  under  conditions 
of  outdoor  life.  There  is  all  the  difference  between  a  man, 
when  he  comes  to  the  colors  and  when  he  leaves  after  two 
years,  that  there  is  between  an  undeveloped,  untrained  horse 
and  the  well-developed  hunter.  No  one  who  has  seen  the  re 
cruits  coming  to  the  colors  and  the  two  years'  service  men 
leaving  can  doubt  the  physical  benefits  which  these  men  have 
received.  It  is  the  general  experience  of  all  observers  that 
they  have  been  greatly  improved  in  efficiency.  They  are  the 
better  men  for  the  work  and  struggle  of  life.  The  discipline 
and  habits  of  promptness  and  exactness  which  they  have  ac 
quired  in  the  service  make  them  desired  in  preference  to  men 
who  have  not  had  this  training.  They  learn  to  do  things  when 
and  as  told. 

The  economic  gain  to  the  countries  having  military  service 
has  been  very  great ;  and  coincident  with  general  military 
service  has  been  a  rapid  advance  in  wealth  and  education,  and 
great  improvement  in  the  conditions  of  public  order ;  since  its 
establishment,  the  great  countries  of  Europe  have  had  more 
of  peace  than  ever  before. 

Beneficial  as  general  military  training  would  be  to  our  youth, 
such  a  proposition  would  not  at  present  receive  any  large 
measure  of  support;  but  I  believe  that  as  time  goes  on  it  will 
be  more  and  more  thought  of,  and  that  we  shall  eventually 
come  to  it,  or  something  very  close  to  it. 

Probably  the  Swiss  system  more  nearly  represents  one 
which  would  be  workable  in  this  country  than  any  other. 
There  practically  every  able-bodied  man  has  to  prepare  him 
self  to  discharge  the  duties  of  a  soldier,  and  yet  the  training 
is  so  arranged  and  divided  up  into  short  and  condensed  pe- 


338     MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

riods  of  instruction  that  very  few  men  are  under  arms  for  any 
length  of  time.  This  country,  with  a  small  population,  has  a 
military  system  under  which  it  can  turn  out  on  two  or  three 
days'  notice  230,000  men,  and  has  back  of  these  some  300,000 
well-trained  men  as  a  reserve,  and  it  accomplishes  all  this  for 
less  than  six  million  dollars  a  year. 

No  people  in  the  world  are  more  law-abiding  and  self- 
respecting  than  the  Swiss.  Their  criminal  rate  is  far  lower 
than  ours.  The  sense  of  individual  responsibility  among  these 
people  is  so  thoroughly  developed  that  practically  all  the  men 
on  the  active  list  have  their  military  arms  and  equipments  in 
their  houses,  well  taken  care  of,  and  always  ready  for  use.  In 
other  words,  every  man,  during  the  period  of  his  military  life, 
realizes  his  responsibility  to  the  country,  and  stands  prepared 
and  ready  to  discharge  it.  He  would  be  discredited  and  with 
out  honor  among  his  people  if  he  failed  to  perform  this  most 
sacred  duty  of  the  citizen. 

What  intelligent  person  would  claim  that  a  system  of  mili 
tary  instruction  which  would  prepare  the  young  men  of  this 
country  to  discharge  efficiently  their  duty  as  soldiers  in  war, 
develop  a  sense  of  individual  responsibility  to  be  ready,  and 
give  them  a  period  of  helpful  discipline  and  healthy  life, 
would  not  be  of  the  greatest  benefit  ?  Our  young  men  have 
not  received  any  serious  impression  in  the  schools  and  colleges 
of  their  duty  to  the  country  in  war ;  at  least,  it  has  not  been 
impressed  upon  them  that  a  part,  and  a  very  vital  part,  of  the 
citizen's  duty  to  the  State,  is  to  fit  himself  to  discharge  a  duty 
which  is  little  thought  of  in  this  country,  namely,  the  duty 
of  a  soldier  when  his  country  needs  him.  They  have  heard 
too  much  of  the  arbitration  quackery  of  the  day,  and  been 
taught  that  it  will  replace  the  resort  to  arms  when  vital  issues 
arise.  (I  use  the  word  "  quackery "  deliberately,  because 
while  we  want  arbitration  this  talk  of  arbitration  of  every 
thing  savors  of  the  patent  remedy  which  is  advertised  to  cure 
all  diseases.)  No  statement  is  more  completely  indicative  of 


MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE   UNITED  STATES     339 

a  failure  to  appreciate  the  teachings  of  history  and  few  are 
more  untrue,  more  dangerous,  or  more  destructive  of  those 
qualities  of  firmness  and  spirit  of  sacrifice  when  duty  calls, 
which  a  people  must  guard  and  cherish  if  they  are  to  live  and 
progress. 

There  is  a  great  deal  of  idle  talk,  by  people  who  have  not 
looked  beneath  the  surface,  which  would  lead  one  to  suppose 
that  armies  and  navies  are  anxious  for  war,  and  are  often  the 
creators  of  war.  Nothing  is  farther  from  the  truth.  The  causes 
of  war  are  almost  always  traceable  to  those  great  vital  issues 
which  surround  the  life  and  welfare  of  the  people  ;  the  people 
themselves,  acting  under  the  impulse  of  popular  feeling,  make 
war;  governments  only  declare  it.  To  say  that  armies  and 
navies  desire  and  encourage  war  simply  because  they  are  trained 
for  it  is  about  as  sound  as  to  say  that  the  life-saving  service  on 
the  New  England  coast  is  thirsting  for  an  opportunity  to  put 
their  boats  out  in  a  winter  gale  simply  because  they  have  been 
taught  to  do  it  in  case  they  have  to  do  so  as  a  life-saving 
measure. 

Despite  all  we  may  do  and  say,  wars  will  come  in  the  future 
as  in  the  past,  and  our  duty  is  to  make  reasonable  preparation. 
We  have  not  done  so  yet.  No  greater  service  can  be  done  the 
people  of  this  country  than  by  impressing  upon  them  these 
facts  :  To  wait  until  war  is  upon  us  is  to  invite  grave  disaster  ; 
to  fail  to  establish  a  definite  military  policy  and  to  depend  in 
the  future  as  in  the  past  upon  the  most  expensive,  vicious,  and 
demoralizing  of  all  systems,  —  the  bounty  system,  —  is  to  an 
nounce  that  we  have  learned  nothing  from  the  lessons  of  our  past 
wars  and  their  needless  expenditure  of  life  and  money.  We  have 
no  right  to  send  our  young  men  into  war  without  previous  train 
ing,  and  under  officers  who  are  ignorant  of  their  most  elementary 
duties ;  it  is  criminally  wrong.  It  is  well  to  remember,  as  I  have 
stated  before,  that  we  have  not  had  any  experience  in  war  with  a 
first-class  power  prepared  for  war  in  which  we  have  not  been 
aided,  directly  or  indirectly.  We  have  never  been  engaged  in 


340     MILITARY  POLICY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

war  under  modern  conditions  with  any  great  nation  prepared  as 
all  of  them  now  are  for  immediate  action.  Any  one  who  looks 
back  to  the  panicky  conditions  on  our  Eastern  seacoast  when  it 
was  reported  that  an  insignificant  Spanish  fleet  was  bound  in 
this  direction  can  realize  what  the  state  of  public  mind  would 
be  in  case  we  were  confronted  with  a  war  with  a  great  power, 
full  of  energy  and  ready  to  the  moment. 

Please  do  not  think  I  am  preaching  militarism,  for  I  am 
not.  We  do  not  want  a  large  standing  army  in  this  country. 
We  do  want  a  system  which  will  give  us  the  largest  possible 
number  of  instructed  men  —  men  who  have  had  sufficient  mili 
tary  training  to  fit  them  to  discharge  their  duties  as  soldiers 
in  war,  and  have  returned  to  their  industrial  careers  ready  to 
respond  when  needed. 


XVI 
THE  NAVAL  WAR  COLLEGE 

BY 

CAPTAIN  F.  E.  CHADWICK,  U.S.N. 


Read  before  the  Society  March  4,  1902 


THE  NAVAL  WAR  COLLEGE 

I  THINK  I  may  start  the  subject  of  the  Naval  War  College 
by  saying  that  war  is  a  pure  matter  of  business ;  an  enter 
prise  like  any  other,  it  is  a  mere  question  of  degree  of  impor 
tance.  As  to  this  degree,  it  must  be  granted,  of  course,  that 
the  business  of  war  stands  in  the  front  rank,  as  the  conse 
quences  of  its  outcome  are  of  supreme  importance  to  the 
State. 

Say  what  we  may,  feel  as  we  may  regarding  war,  its  in 
iquity,  its  cruelty,  its  injustice,  we  have  to  face  the  fact  that  it 
is  with  us,  for  this  generation  at  least  and  probably  for  many 
more.  No  man  can  now  foresee  the  time  when  nations  will 
cease  to  wage  war.  It  certainly  will  not  come  until  there  is 
such  a  feeling  of  universal  brotherhood  that  the  custom-house 
and  national  boundaries  shall  disappear ;  until  it  shall  make 
no  difference  to  any  man  as  to  the  race  which  looks  after  the 
moral  and  social  well-being  of  any  particular  part  of  the  earth, 
and  that  we  shall  be  as  content  to  live  under  the  administra 
tion  of  the  Chinaman  as  under  that  of  our  own  blood.  This  is 
the  stern  logic  of  such  a  discussion.  We  have  only  to  put  the 
question  to  ourselves  as  to  whether  we  shall  sit  quietly  and 
let  certain  races  expand  and  occupy  lands  at  will ;  whether 
we  should  be  content  to  see  Russia  overwhelm  and  occupy  all 
Asia,  Constantinople,  and  the  near  as  well  as  the  farthest 
East,  and,  if  she  thought  well  of  it,  to  overrun  and  swamp  by 
mere  numbers  the  western  coast  of  America.  Or  should  we 
be  willing  to  see  Germany  do  the  same,  though  so  much  more 
closely  allied  with  us  in  what  we  may  call  race  genius  ?  And 
such  things  are  on  the  cards.  The  final  outcome,  I  believe  the 
final  world  government,  is  going  to  be  in  the  hands  of  the 
race,  all  other  things  being  equal,  which  shows  the  greatest 


344  THE  NAVAL    WAR   COLLEGE 

productiveness,  which  rears  to  manhood  the  greatest  number 
of  men.  I  do  not  think  the  importance  of  this  phase  of  the 
question  can  be  exaggerated.  The  race  that  breeds  the  great 
est  number  of  children  must  in  the  end  overtop  and  overwhelm 
any  race  of  like  mental  quality  whose  productiveness  is  not 
equal  to  that  of  the  former.  This  has  been  one  of  the  great 
elements  of  England's  superiority ;  it  is  to-day  one  of  the 
points  in  Germany's  favor ;  it  is  at  the  root  of  the  decadence 
of  France. 

The  only  thing  which  can  save  the  less  productive  race  in 
the  contest  for  world  supremacy  is  a  greater  mental  and  phys 
ical  ability;  a  greater  capacity  for  government;  a  greater 
command  of  the  elements  of  force.  We  ourselves  are  begin 
ning  to  think  we  have  a  right  to  a  voice  in  the  world's  affairs ; 
we  have  said  so  very  markedly  in  regard  to  one  part  at  least, 
South  America ;  and  we  have  intimated  lately  that  we  have 
considerable  interest  in  the  way  things  are  going  in  China. 
But  apart  from  any  antagonisms  which  may  arise  from  mere 
interference  in  world  matters,  as  a  member  of  the  world's  so 
ciety,  we  are  rapidly  advancing  to  a  time  when  we  are  going 
to  find  in  the  greater  part  of  the  rest  of  the  civilized  world 
an  enmity  with  which  heretofore  we  have  never  counted.  The 
world's  feelings  are  governed  by  its  pockets,  and  we  are  put 
ting  our  hands  very  deeply  into  those  of  Europe,  and  they 
are,  by  the  necessity  of  a  force,  mqjeiire,  going  much  deeper. 
This  force  majeure  is  coal.  Coal  is  the  basis  of  manufacturing 
energy.  The  United  States  by  the  grace  of  nature  has  had  be 
stowed  upon  it  this  power  in  a  greater  degree  than  any  other 
country  in  the  world,  so  far  as  yet  known.  In  cheapness,  in 
wide  distribution,  there  is  no  country  which  can  for  a  moment 
stand  comparison.  Our  product  is  increasing  in  a  rapid  ratio 
and  is  of  practically  unlimited  extent ;  that  of  Europe  is  prac 
tically  at  a  standstill  and  must  soon  decrease,  not  only  from 
the  depth  of  mines  and  difficulty  of  working,  but  from  actual 
working-out  of  deposits.  We  are  thus  destined  to  be  the 


THE  NAVAL   WAR  COLLEGE  345 

manufacturing  centre  of  the  world,  and  we  have  to  seriously 
consider  what  will  be  the  attitude  of  the  nations  which  will  be 
so  vitally  injured  by  this  preeminence. 

If  history  has  taught  any  one  thing,  it  is  that  in  later  ages 
at  least  war  is  the  outcome  of  commercial  rivalry.  We  have 
come  to  recognize  the  fact  that  commerce  is  the  great  war- 
producing  factor ;  that  nations  fight  in  order  that  they  may 
sell,  and  we  are  faced,  as  never  before,  by  this  question  as 
applied  to  ourselves. 

You  may  think,  possibly,  that  there  is  not  much  in  this 
about  Naval  War  College,  but  the  fact  is  that  herein  is  to  be 
found  the  reason  for  its  existence,  which  is  the  study  of  these 
great  conditions  which  we  are  bound  to  face,  and  to  devise,  as 
far  as  may  be  done  by  preparation,  the  way  of  meeting  the 
difficulties  which  may  arise  through  the  antagonisms  which 
are  bound  to  come. 

The  War  College  is  thus  a  place  for  the  study  of  war  con 
ditions  in  all  phases. 

As  suggested  before,  I  think  we  may  grant  that  war  is  the 
largest  and  most  difficult  business  in  which  any  one  can  en 
gage.  It  is  always  the  disruption,  in  some  degree,  and  some 
times  in  their  entirety,  of  all  our  social  forces  and  conditions, 
and  a  clearing  of  the  way  for  their  reconstruction.  It  is  the 
letting  loose  of  the  social  volcano,  and  the  guidance  of  these 
gigantic  forces  is  principally  the  province  of  the  admiral  and 
the  general.  If  study  and  experience  are  necessary  in  bank 
ing,  in  administering  a  governmental  department  or  a  great 
system  of  railways,  it  is  naturally  the  part  of  wisdom  to  sup 
pose  that  they  may  be  good,  in  fact,  necessary,  in  this  busi 
ness  of  war  which  is  so  much  greater  than  any  which  can  fall 
to  our  civilian  brother.  It  would  seem  that  the  statement  is 
axiomatic,  but  the  great  mass  even  of  military  men  are  un 
questionably  loath  to  accept  it  in  practice,  at  least  in  England 
and  the  United  States.  We  have  generally  been  accustomed 
to  go  on  in  the  routine  of  the  service,  doing  what  comes  to 


346  THE  NAVAL   WAR  COLLEGE 

our  hands  to  do,  hoping  that  when  the  time  comes  to  beat  an 
enemy  we  shall  be  ready  and  able  to  do  so  by  the  gift  of  God 
which  comes  to  us  by  steady  advancement  through  the  grades 
of  the  service. 

But  all  experience  is  against  this;  there  have  been  certain 
great  masters  in  our  profession,  some  half-dozen  of  the  fore 
most  rank;  and  though  we  do  not  know  overmuch  of  the 
views  and  habits  of  study  of  most,  we  know  very  thoroughly 
those  of  Napoleon,  the  greatest  of  them  all ;  and  no  one  can 
be  more  emphatic  in  regard  to  the  value  of  the  study  of  the 
work  of  those  who  had  preceded  him ;  and  there  is  no  ques 
tion  that  he  himself  was  a  most  diligent  student,  genius  as  he 
was.  If  such  a  man  thinks  study  necessary,  how  much  more 
needful  is  it  for  those  who  are  not  geniuses,  and  who  must, 
therefore,  depend  upon  the  principles  which  govern  our  busi 
ness.  For  there  are  such  principles.  War  is  not  a  haphazard 
game  any  more  than  the  great  game  of  commerce.  It  requires 
the  study  of  conditions,  of  means,  appliances,  and,  above  all, 
that  study  of  lines  and  bases  of  operations  which  is  known  as 
strategy. 

The  great  eye-opener,  to  the  Anglo-Saxon  part  of  the  world 
at  least,  was  the  Franco-German  campaign  of  1870.  We 
saw  a  great  and  warlike  nation  suddenly  overwhelmed,  and 
with  the  greatest  apparent  ease,  by  one  which  only  a  lifetime 
earlier  had  been  under  the  heel  of  the  former,  and  whose 
own  troops  had  formed  part  of  the  armies  which  had  marched 
to  and  fro  over  Europe  at  the  beck  of  the  French  Emperor. 
There  was  a  cause  for  this ;  it  could  not  be  accident,  and  the 
chief  cause  at  least  was  not  hard  to  find.  It  lay  in  the  studies 
and  work  of  the  German  General  Staff.  This  dates,  on  its 
present  basis,  from  1821.  Its  numbers  have  gradually  in 
creased  until  in  1898  there  were  attached  to  it  two  hundred 
and  twenty-nine,  of  whom  twelve  were  general  officers.  Within 
the  General  Staff  is  what  is  known  as  the  Great  General 
Staff,  of  one  hundred  and  twenty-three  officers,  where  they 


THE  NAVAL   WAR   COLLEGE  347 

are  entrusted,  under  the  immediate  direction  of  the  Chief  of 
Staff  of  the  Army,  with  the  preparation  of  plans  of  large  mil 
itary  operations,  with  the  collection  of  knowledge  of  and 
comparison  of  military  administrations  and  the  study  of  the 
theatre  of  war;  and,  in  addition,  with  the  preparation  of 
maps,  the  promotion  of  military  history,  and  finally,  with  the 
training  of  young  officers. 

Ninety-three  officers  of  the  General  Staff  are  with  the  troops 
to  execute  the  measures  inaugurated  by  the  Great  General 
Staff  while  obeying  at  the  same  time  other  (minor)  orders  of 
the  general  commanding  the  units  of  troops  to  which  they 
are  attached. 

Appointments  to  the  General  Staff  are  through  the  War 
Academy,  where  four  hundred  officers  are  maintained  by  the 
admission  through  competitive  examination  of  from  one  hun 
dred  to  one  hundred  and  fifty  yearly.  These  officers  must 
have  had  at  least  three  years'  service  with  the  troops.  They 
remain  three  years  at  the  War  Academy,  being  assigned 
three  months  in  each  summer  while  there  to  regimental  duty 
with  another  arm  of  the  service  than  their  own.  The  fourth 
summer  is  taken  up  by  a  General  Staff  journey.  On  gradua 
tion  all  return  to  their  regiments  until  the  following  spring, 
when  about  twenty  of  the  total  are  selected  to  take  a  proba 
tionary  turn  with  the  General  Staff  as  full-fledged  members, 
those  unsuitable  being  returned  to  their  regiments.  A  tem 
porary  return  to  regimental  duty  is,  however,  compulsory 
from  time  to  time  for  all  the  General  Staff  officers. 

The  extraordinary  care  and  time  expended  in  the  selection 
of  these  officers  show  the  immense  value  set  upon  staff  work 
by  the  German  authorities.  That  it  has  had  full  fruition  we 
all  now  know  in  the  results  of  the  campaigns  of  1866  and 
1870.  The  downfall  of  two  great  empires  was  the  direct  out 
come  of  the  thorough  staff  work  of  which  at  the  time  Von 
Moltke  was,  and  had  been  from  1857,  the  head.  In  the  face 
of  the  mighty  results  of  the  system  it  is  vain  to  decry  such 


348  THE  NAVAL   WAR  COLLEGE 

studies.  The  other  great  military  powers  of  Europe  had,  of 
course,  some  such  organization,  but  none  had  the  complete 
and  flexible  system  of  Germany.  France  began  fair,  but  in 
1832  the  system  of  return  of  staff  officers  to  the  line  was 
given  up,  and  the  staff  naturally  stiffened  into  the  unwhole 
some  and  un progressive  routine  inseparable  from  the  continued 
occupancy  of  directive  posts.  There  can  be  no  surer  road  to 
inefficiency;  not  that  it  is  downhill,  but  that  it  ceases  to  as 
cend,  and  we  had  the  natural  results  when  the  two  systems 
were  pitted  against  each  other  in  1870. 

We  have  now  fairly  covered  the  field  of  the  German  Great 
General  Staff  by  the  establishment  of  our  General  Board,  the 
Intelligence  Office,  and  the  War  College.  It  has  taken  many 
years  to  effect  this.  The  first  to  come  was  the  Office  of  Naval 
Intelligence,  established  in  1882,  and  the  work  done  in  which 
was  the  basis  on  which  was  built  the  present  navy.  At  this 
date  (1882)  there  was  violent  opposition  with  us  to  building 
ships  of  steel  instead  of  iron  ;  we  had  not  a  single  modern 
piece  of  ordnance ;  we  could  not  make  a  steel  shaft  for  so 
small  a  vessel  even  as  the  Dolphin,  built  in  1884.  Her  shaft 
had  to  be  forged  of  iron.  We  put  into  the  four  ships  of  this 
date  —  which  were  the  first  of  our  new  navy,  the  Chicago, 
Atlanta,  Boston,  and  Dolphin  —  engines  which  were  years 
behind  those  then  being  produced  abroad.  We  had  in  fact  to 
begin  at  the  very  bottom  and  acquire  the  necessary  information. 
We  know  the  outcome.  By  1890  we  were  in  a  position  to 
build  ships  of  any  type  and  manufacture  ordnance  and  armor 
to  meet  any  demand,  and  much  of  this  great  advance  was  due 
to  the  careful,  unremitting,  and  zealous  work  of  the  Office  of 
Naval  Intelligence.  The  Naval  War  College  followed  the  Office 
of  Naval  Intelligence  very  closely,  being  founded  in  1884.  But 
it  was  not  until  1900  that  the  General  Board  came  into  exist 
ence  and  rounded  out  an  organization  very  closely  assimilated  to 
the  German  system.  These  three  organizations  are  thus  closely 
interlaced,  and  as  time  goes  on  they  will  become  more  and  more 


THE  NAVAL   WAR  COLLEGE  349 

so.  The  partial  separation  is  not  at  all  a  disadvantageous  one, 
and,  in  fact,  has  many  advantages.  The  Intelligence  Office  is 
our  collector  of  information,  very  much  of  which  does  not 
apply  to  military  study ;  the  War  College  is  the  collator  of 
such  information  on  military  subjects,  whatever  its  origin, 
which  has  a  bearing  on  questions  of  war.  It  is  in  no  wise  a 
teaching  establishment  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  term.  It 
is  a  place  for  the  study  and  discussion  of  military  problems  ; 
for  the  study  of  war  in  all  its  phases,  historical,  strategical, 
tactical ;  of  the  events  which  lead  up  to  war ;  of  the  interna 
tional  situations  and  of  the  probabilities  or  possibilities  which 
might  arise  therefrom.  Besides  carrying  on  the  study  of  such 
questions  as  continuously  as  its  limited  staff  will  allow,  it  pre 
pares  and  lays  before  the  General  Board  such  studies  as  may 
be  particularly  called  for.  The  aim,  however,  is  to  prepare,  in 
connection  with  the  General  Board,  studies  for  all  eventuali 
ties,  so  that  the  Navy  Department  may  be  able  to  furnish  a 
commander-in-chief  in  war  with  complete  studies  of  the  thea 
tre  of  war ;  with  thought  made  to  hand,  so  to  speak,  and  enable 
him  to  act  unhampered  by  the  necessity  of  forming  a  judg 
ment  offhand  regarding  a  great  variety  of  questions  on  which 
hasty  judgment  cannot  be  safely  made. 

I  should  like  to  quote  here  some  words  of  Admiral  Tay 
lor's,  taken  from  his  "  Memorandum  on  a  General  Staff  for 
the  Navy."  After  speaking  of  the  real  functions  of  the  Gen 
eral  Staff  of  an  army  or  navy,  he  says :  — 

"  The  second  element,  though  rarely  recognized  in  a  formal 
manner,  is  by  far  the  more  important  of  the  two.  It  is  the 
mental  training  of  officers  engaged  in  this  plan-making,  and 
their  consequent  readiness  to  confront  warlike  situations  in 
general.  It  does  not  equal  the  school  of  actual  war,  but  it  is 
only  second  to  it  —  and  there  is  no  third  method.  This  trained 
readiness  of  officers'  minds,  in  the  Franco-Prussian  War  of 
1870,  constituted  the  essential  value  of  the  diligent  staff  work 
done  by  the  Germans  during  fifty  years  of  peace.  What  the 


350  THE  NAVAL    WAR  COLLEGE 

world  at  large  saw  were  the  plans  of  work  perfected  in  mi 
nutiae,  railroad  cars  numbered  for  special  work,  arriving  near 
battlefields  on  schedule  time,  bringing  guns  or  men,  pontoons 
or  hospital  beds.  This  it  was  which,  being  so  admitted,  gave 
to  the  staff  its  reputation  among  non-professional  people,  and 
it  was,  in  fact,  a  most  valuable  aid  in  the  battle  and  campaign ; 
but  far  greater,  as  a  factor  of  efficiency,  was  the  state  of  mind 
of  German  officers  —  from  generals  down  to  majors  —  that 
familiarity  with  war  situations,  acquired  in  the  staff  work  of 
peace,  which  enabled  them  to  confront  all  emergencies  of  the 
campaign  with  ready  energy  and  composure  of  mind." 

While  the  Germans  have  been  foremost  in  general  staff 
work,  the  individual  who  did  most  to  give  it  form  was  the 
Swiss  officer  Jomini,  who  served  first  with  Napoleon  and  later 
with  the  Russian  army.  His  was  the  first  complete  and  me 
thodic  dealing  with  the  subject,  and  his  epoch-making  work 
has  become  a  classic,  which,  though  it  has  had  many  succes 
sors,  still  stands  in  the  front  rank.  He  divides  the  study  of 
war  as  an  art  into  six  distinct  parts :  — 

1.  Statesmanship  in  its  relation  to  war. 

2.  Strategy,  or  the  art  of  properly  directing  masses  upon 
the  theatre  of  war,  either  for  defence  or  invasion. 

3.  Grand  tactics. 

4.  Logistics,  or  the  art  of  moving  armies. 

5.  Engineering  —  the  attack  and  defence  of  fortifications. 

6.  Minor  tactics. 

Though  Jomini  only  touches  upon  maritime  affairs,  "  to  be 
taken,"  he  says,  "  in  connection  with  maxims  of  descents," 
his  treatment  of  his  main  subject  applies  in  principle  to  fleets 
as  well  as  armies.  The  fleet  is  simply  an  army  moving  with 
much  greater  rapidity  than  land  forces.  Its  supply  and  main 
tenance  involve  the  same  considerations,  and  it  is  extraordi 
nary  that  so  great  and  original  a  mind  as  that  of  Jomini  should 
not  have  grasped  the  more  essential  facts  connected  with  com 
mand  of  the  sea.  It  is  the  great  pride  of  the  Naval  War  Col- 


THE  NAVAL   WAR   COLLEGE  351 

lege  that  it  was  the  instrument  of  bringing  before  the  world 
the  views,  now  accepted  by  all,  of  the  overpowering  influence 
of  the  army  of  the  sea  as  compared  with  that  of  the  army  of 
the  land.  It  was  the  fine  mind  of  Mahan  which  accomplished 
this  revolution,  giving  sea  power  its  logical  supremacy  in  the 
minds  of  men  which  we  can  now  all  see  it  has  always  had  in 
actuality.  Had  the  War  College  never  had  any  further  out 
come,  had  it  stopped  with  this  result  alone,  its  establishment 
would  have  been  justified  many  times  over.  Mahan's  work  in 
giving  naval  power  its  just  due  has  had  a  revolutionizing  ef 
fect  in  international  policies.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that 
no  event  in  the  latter  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  did  more 
to  direct  the  world  of  statesmanship  into  new  lines  of  thought 
than  these  great  works  of  an  officer  of  our  navy,  and  I  do  not 
think  that  the  weight  which  the  War  College  had  in  directing 
his  own  thought,  and  in  the  production  of  his  great  works, 
which  were  first  produced  as  lectures  before  the  College,  and  as 
the  natural  outcome  of  his  duties  there,  should  be  lost  sight  of. 

Administrative  reforms  with  us  work  slowly.  The  Naval 
Academy  had  to  be  forced  upon  the  service.  I  myself  was  on 
duty  there  with  an  officer  (and  it  was  only  twenty-six  years 
ago)  who,  when  he  took  up  the  duties  of  superintendent,  was 
an  utter  disbeliever  in  its  utility.  I  had  this  from  his  own 
lips,  when  he  assured  me,  however,  that  he  had  now  seen 
enough  of  it  to  change  his  mind.  We  have  been  more  than 
a  hundred  years  in  bringing  about  the  establishment  in  the 
Navy  Department  of  a  Bureau  of  Personnel,  thus  gathering 
into  one  section  of  the  Department  nearly  all  things  military, 
and  we  have  been  more  than  a  hundred  years  in  establishing 
a  General  Staff  which  I  hope  is  now  accomplished  in  the  tri 
une  organization  of  the  General  Board,  the  War  College,  and 
the  Intelligence  Office. 

Going  back  to  Jomini's  tabulation  of  the  art  of  war  into 
six  parts,  the  first  of  these,  it  will  be  noted,  is  the  great  field  of 
statesmanship,  under  which  he  brings,  among  other  matters, 


352  THE  NAVAL   WAR  COLLEGE 

military  policy  and  military  statistics  and  geography.  Under 
the  first  mentioned  he  embraces  all  the  combinations  of  any 
projected  war,  except  those  relating  to  diplomacy  and  strategy, 
including  the  passions  of  the  nation  to  be  fought,  its  military 
system,  its  immediate  means  and  reserves,  financial  resources, 
character  of  government,  the  characters  and  military  abilities 
of  the  commanders  of  their  armies,  the  influence  of  cabinet 
council  or  councils  of  war  upon  their  operations,  the  system 
of  war  in  favor  with  their  staff,  the  military  geography  and 
statistics  of  the  state  to  be  invaded. 

I  would  beg  to  recall  how  much  we  would  have  given  in 
our  own  little  war  with  Spain  for  thorough  and  accurate  in 
formation  regarding  that  which  I  have  just  quoted.  There  is 
no  need  to  dwell  upon  the  importance  of  such  knowledge  as 
an  element  of  success.  No  man  can  deal  with  war  without 
feeling  that,  after  ships  and  men,  the  one  all-important  thing 
is  information,  and  no  expense,  no  difficulty,  and,  above  all, 
no  preliminary  study  should  be  spared  to  provide  this. 

While  information  is  mainly  the  field  of  the  Office  of  Intel 
ligence,  the  remainder  of  Jomini's  tabulation  is  largely  the 
province  of  the  Naval  War  College,  covering  a  vast  field  of 
study,  to  much  of  which  there  is  definite  solution  in  any  par 
ticular  case. 

An  important  field  of  work  for  the  College  is  always  that  of 
battle  tactics,  to  which  we  cannot  give  too  much  thought  and 
study.  The  development  of  the  musket  and  of  field  artillery, 
the  development  of  heavy  guns  and  of  the  torpedo,  have  caused 
both  armies  and  navies  to  go  about  their  ends  in  a  very  differ 
ent  manner  from  that  of  fifty  and  one  hundred  years  ago.  The 
principles  remain  the  same,  but  the  methods  must  differ,  and 
the  land  and  sea  forces  of  the  whole  world  are  now  studying 
this  vital  question.  That  it  may  take  some  time  to  develop  these 
to  perfection  is  not  improbable,  but  we  may  hope  that  it  will 
not  take  the  centuries  that  were  needed  for  the  development 
of  tactics  under  sail. 


THE  NAVAL   WAR  COLLEGE  353 

It  may  not  be  generally  known  that  for  a  hundred  years 
previous  to  the  appearance  of  Clerk's  work  on  tactics  in  1779, 
all  actions  between  the  French  and  the  English  were  of  a  very 
indecisive  character.  Kodney  made  a  first  application  of  Clerk's 
principles  in  his  action  with  De  Grasse.  Clerk  was  a  civilian. 
The  final  and  successful  tactics  under  sail  were  thus  worked 
out  in  the  solitude  of  a  student's  study,  though  there  were  hun 
dreds  of  officers  at  sea  to  develop  views,  and  scores  of  battle 
ships  with  which  to  test  them.  This  is  an  extraordinary  fact  and 
one  which  should  not  be  lost  sight  of  when  the  value  of  a  place 
of  study  such  as  the  War  College  is  discussed ;  and  I  thus  believe 
it  is  at  the  College  where  the  question  of  tactics  will  finally 
be  solved,  because  it  will  probably  be  there  that  some  active- 
minded  genius  will  have  the  time  and  opportunity  for  thought 
and  study  which  one  so  rarely  gets  at  sea.  England,  at  the 
period  of  the  publication  of  Clerk's  tactics,  had  few  officers 
who  made  an  independent  study  of  either  tactics  or  strategy 
and  to  this  is  clearly  due  a  failure  which  made  certain  the  loss 
to  her  of  the  American  colonies.  Had  Rodney  not  gone  home 
on  leave  just  at  the  time  he  did,  it  is  beyond  question  that  he 
would  have  been  on  our  coast  in  1781  and  that  with  the  opin 
ions  and  views  held  by  him,  De  Grasse  would  have  been  pre 
vented  from  supporting  Washington  and  Rochambeau ;  Corn- 
wallis  would  have  been  relieved,  the  Yorktown  expedition  would 
have  failed,  and  the  consequences  would  probably  have  been 
fatal  to  the  American  cause.  Rodney  left  orders  covering  the 
eventualities,  but  they  were  not  obeyed.  Admiral  Graves,  with 
faint  conception  of  the  enormous  importance  of  his  influence 
upon  the  situation,  failed  after  his  action  with  De  Grasse  to 
enter  the  Chesapeake,  which,  if  he  had  done,  would  have  pre 
vented  De  Grasse  from  reentering  and  would  have  prevented 
the  reception  by  the  allied  forces  of  the  siege  train  sent  with 
the  squadron  of  Barras  from  Newport.  The  British  fleet  would 
have  been  in  the  Chesapeake  instead  of  the  French,  and  the 
siege  of  Yorktown  would  not  have  been.  The  result  was  one 


354  THE  NAVAL    WAR  COLLEGE 

of  the  great  turning-points  in  the  history  of  the  world.  This 
incident  is  mentioned  merely  as  one  of  many  to  illustrate  the 
fact  that  we  cannot  ignore  preliminary  study  of  strategic  ques 
tions  ;  that  there  must  be  a  general  study  of  these  in  order 
that  we  should  not  be  at  the  mercy  of  chance  as  to  whether  the 
commander-in-chief  has  thought  or  not. 

If  we  do  not  have  this  general  study,  the  chances  are  that  he 
will  not  have  thought;  and  even  if  he  be  a  man  such  as  Rod 
ney,  it  is  far  better  that  he  should  have  the  aid  of  many  minds 
instead  of  standing  alone  and  unassisted.  The  united  and 
long-continued  study  and  thought  of  a  large  group  of  men  are 
of  more  value  than  the  offhand  thought  of  any  one  man  of  like 
mental  calibre,  and  it  is  on  this  principle  that  we  have,  in  some 
countries,  at  least,  a  general  staff  and  places  of  study  for  such 
a  staff  akin  in  some  degree  to  that  which  is  the  subject  of  this 
paper. 

To  come  to  the  history  of  the  College. 

On  the  30th  of  May,  1884,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  then 
William  E.  Chandler,  of  New  Hampshire,  constituted  a  Board 
of  Officers,  which  consisted  of  Commodore  Stephen  B.  Luce, 
U.S.N.,  Commander  W.  T.  Sampson,  U.S.N.,  and  Lieuten 
ant-Commander  C.  F.  Goodrich,  U.S.N.,  to  consider  and 
report  upon  the  whole  subject  of  a  post-graduate  course  or 
school  of  application  for  officers  of  the  navy  of  the  United 
States. 

On  the  15th  of  June  following,  this  Board  of  Officers  made 
a  full  report  to  the  Navy  Department.  Among  other  rea 
sons  for  establishing  such  a  school  of  war,  the  following  were 
given :  — 

44  The  bare  statement  that  our  naval  officers  not  only  do  not 
study  war  as  a  science,  but  have  no  adequate  school  of  prac 
tice,  seems  in  these  days  of  broad  and  liberal  culture  so  extra 
ordinary,  that  it  is  alone,  in  the  judgment  of  the  Board,  suffi 
cient  reason  for  the  early  founding  of  the  institution  which  the 
Department  now  has  under  consideration." 


THE  NAVAL   WAR  COLLEGE  355 

The  Board  outlined  a  course  to  last  six  months,  and  recom 
mended  very  strongly  practical  exercises  in  combination  with 
the  North  Atlantic  squadron,  during  the  summer  or  autumn 
months.  In  considering  the  location  of  the  proposed  War 
School,  the  Board  took  into  consideration  the  following  places : 
Washington,  Annapolis,  Newport,  New  York,  and  Boston.  As 
practical  exercises  afloat  were  considered  important  in  con 
nection  with  the  course,  Newport  and  its  adjacent  waters 
and  especially  its  proximity  to  the  sea,  offered  exceptional 
advantages.  The  fact  also  that  the  Navy  Department  was 
already  in  possession  of  ample  grounds  and  the  necessary 
buildings  at  Coasters'  Harbor  Island,  near  Newport,  had 
weight  with  the  Board  in  its  recommendation  of  location  at 
this  point. 

The  principal  building  then  upon  Coasters'  Harbor  Island 
was  that  which  was  formerly  used  as  the  asylum  of  the  city  of 
Newport.  It  was  put  in  good  condition  and  suitably  arranged, 
with  a  library  and  lecture-room,  and  upon  the  4th  of  Septem 
ber,  1885,  a  class  of  officers,  eight  in  number,  reported  for 
duty  and  attendance  upon  the  course.  An  appropriation  of 
eight  thousand  dollars  had  been  previously  made  for  the  main 
tenance  of  the  College,  in  the  act  of  Congress,  approved  March 
3,  1885. 

Lectures  were  delivered  during  the  course  by  Commodore 
Luce,  the  President  of  the  College ;  Rear  Admiral  Ammen, 
Commander  H.  C.  Taylor,  Professor  J.  R.  Soley,  U.S.N., 
General  Gordon,  U.S.V.,  General  Palfrey,  U.S.V.,  and  that 
friend  of  most  excellent  memory  of  so  many  of  us  here,  John 
C.  Ropes. 

Rear  Admiral  Luce,  to  whose  efforts  the  establishment  of 
the  College  was  nearly  wholly  due,  and  who  was  its  energetic 
upholder  through  the  years  necessary  to  convince  the  service 
of  its  need,  was  its  first  President.  He  was  succeeded  by  Cap 
tain  Mahan,  to  whom  was  mainly  due  the  development  of  the 
College  on  its  true  lines,  that  of  a  place  for  the  study  of  the 


356  THE  NAVAL   WAR  COLLEGE 

art  of  war.  The  College  itself  is  a  striking  instance  of  the  fact 
that  one  can  never  wholly  forecast  the  direction  of  the  devel 
opment  of  any  organization,  whether  a  government  or  any 
thing  else.  Thus  the  College  has  dropped  entirely  all  post 
graduate  functions,  such  as  were  first  laid  down  for  it,  and  it 
has  worked  steadily,  by  force  of  circumstances,  by  that  curious 
intangible  subdirection  which  almost  unconsciously  influences 
so  greatly  human  life  and  endeavor,  to  become  what  it  should 
have  been  designed  to  be  from  the  first,  that  is  to  almost  purely 
a  place  for  the  study  of  war  problems.  There  is  a  permanent 
staff  of  officers  who  are  at  work  on  these  at  all  times.  During 
the  four  months  from  June  1  to  October  1,  a  number  of  addi 
tional  officers  are  in  attendance,  usually  from  twenty  to  twenty- 
five,  who  take  up  a  problem  of  the  same  character,  and  to  the 
study  of  which  the  whole  four  months  are  devoted.  These 
officers  are  generally  of  high  rank.  Those  in  attendance  last 
summer  were  (besides  the  staff)  one  rear  admiral,  six  captains, 
six  commanders,  and  five  lieutenant-commanders.  These  officers 
are  divided  into  four  committees  for  this  work.  Each  deals  with 
the  problem  as  a  whole,  but  each  is  also  assigned  certain  de 
tails.  We  find  the  four  months  none  too  long  for  the  subject. 
The  first  hours  of  every  morning,  except  Saturday,  are  given 
up  to  tactical  games  which  are  played  with  miniature  fleets  on 
large  tables  laid  off  in  short  distances  to  facilitate  manoeuvres. 
These  games  are  played  under  elaborate  printed  rules,  and  it 
is  through  these  we  hope  for  the  development  of  the  coming 
tactics.  Many  think  that  with  the  great  speed  and  handiness 
of  modern  ships,  the  admiral  must  lose  control  of  his  squadron 
as  soon  as  the  action  gets  well  under  way,  and  that  the  result 
must  be  a  melee.  But  this  is  not  so ;  if  the  two  squadroas  are 
nearly  equal,  victory  will  always  rest,  barring  pure  accident, 
with  him  who  holds  his  squadron  well  in  hand  and  carries  out 
his  preconceived  tactics.  Saturday  morning  is  always  given 
up  to  a  game  in  strategy,  in  which  one  committee  plays  against 
another.  The  problem  is  laid  down  a  week  in  advance,  so  that 


THE  NAVAL   WAR  COLLEGE  357 

action  can  be  well  considered.  The  two  commanders-in-chief  issue 
their  preparatory  orders  and  plans  of  action  as  in  actual  service. 
They  occupy  separate  apartments  as  do  also  the  officers  in 
command  of  the  scouts,  or  of  divisions  separated  from  the  main 
body  of  the  fleet.  They  are  given  such  information  of  events 
by  the  umpire  as  would  fall  to  them  in  actual  service  and  upon 
this  information  are  issued  the  necessary  orders.  The  umpire, 
assisted  by  several  officers,  pricks  off  upon  a  large  chart  the 
movement  of  every  squadron  or  scout,  so  that  at  the  end  there 
is  a  complete  graphic  illustration  of  the  strategy  involved. 
The  issue  is  usually  made  to  turn  upon  the  junction  or  the 
prevention  of  the  junction  of  an  enemy's  force  or  upon  the 
successful  occupancy  of  an  important  position  before  he  can 
be  brought  to  battle.  These  games  are  a  remarkable  test  of 
ability,  and  they  frequently  excite  the  greatest  interest.  They 
similate  actual  war  to  a  remarkable  degree. 

During  this  period  of  attendance  in  summer  a  number  of 
lectures  are  given  by  men  prominent  in  the  field  of  their  sub 
jects.  While  these  lectures  are  often  not  directly  concerned 
with  the  study  of  war,  they  are  always  on  subjects  with  which 
naval  officers  have  to  deal  and  with  which  they  must  be  con 
versant.  They  cover  such  ground  as  international  relations, 
international  law,  diplomatic  questions,  questions  of  govern 
ment,  and  I  hope  I  may  not  be  trespassing  too  much  on  his 
modesty  when  I  say  that  one  upon  the  last-named  subject, 
which  gave  the  widest  satisfaction  last  summer,  was  by  the 
accomplished  scholar  who  is  chairman  of  your  Executive  Com 
mittee  and  who  has  several  times  honored  the  College  by  giv 
ing  us  some  of  the  results  of  his  thoughtful  work.  During 
these  summer  months  the  subject  of  international  law  assumes, 
and  almost  necessarily,  very  considerable  prominence.  The 
subject  is  dealt  with  by  cases,  the  solutions  of  which  are 
handed  in  by  the  four  committees  into  which  the  officers  are 
divided  for  the  summer  work.  These  solutions  are  then  dis 
cussed  in  committee  of  the  whole  by  the  officer  and  professor 


358  THE  NAVAL   WAR  COLLEGE 

charged  with  the  superintendence  of  the  subject.  Three  peri 
ods  of  a  week  each  are  taken  for  this,  and  the  result  is  a  work 
which,  while  it  represents  mainly  the  thought  and  expression 
of  the  professor,  represents  also  his  thought  as  tinged  by  the 
criticisms  and  views  of  the  officers,  some  of  whom  have  prob 
ably  been  the  leading  actors  in  the  cases  discussed.  The  last 
summer's  work  was  under  the  direction  of  Dr.  John  Bassett 
Moore,  of  Columbia  University,  whose  name  is  too  well  known 
in  the  subject  to  need  encomium  from  myself. 

The  College  thus  tends  steadily  toward  becoming  one  of 
the  foremost  schools  of  international  law  in  the  world.  It  has 
the  special  quality  of  having  as  students  men  who  both  make 
and  interpret  the  law  and  who  thus  come  to  the  subject  with 
an  intensity  of  interest  such  as  the  student  who  deals  with  it 
as  an  abstraction  cannot  have.  It  is  a  very  concrete  matter  to 
the  naval  officer.  It  is  a  subject,  one  may  say,  which  is  daily 
part  of  his  life  when  afloat,  and  one  in  which  he  knows  he 
cannot  afford  to  make  a  mistake. 

But  apart  from  this  summer's  course  which  thus  includes 
some  of  the  addenda,  so  to  speak,  of  the  profession,  the  Col 
lege  as  a  whole  adheres  strictly  to  its  real  work  in  the  study 
of  the  art  of  war  and  its  problems.  In  the  more  practical  part 
of  this  work  it  labors  to  prepare  for  every  eventuality ;  stud 
ies  every  harbor,  every  coast,  the  resources  of  every  country, 
its  conditions,  its  military  power,  the  character  of  its  govern 
ment,  of  its  leading  men,  in  fact  everything  which  can  have  a 
bearing  upon  our  own  action.  This  is,  of  course,  a  large  field 
and  it  is  not  covered  in  a  year  nor  ten  years.  Germany  took 
sixty  years  in  which  to  prepare  the  overthrow  of  France,  and 
I  have  no  possible  doubt  to-day  that  had  we  had  all  the  knowl 
edge  regarding  Spain  which  we  should  have  had,  we  should 
have  finished  the  war  in  two  months  instead  of  three.  Knowl 
edge  is  power  in  war  as  in  everything  else.  What  every  com 
mander  thirsts  for  when  he  begins  operations  is  information. 
He  wants  every  scrap  and  of  every  kind  available. 


THE  NAVAL   WAR  COLLEGE  359 

"War  is  a  great  game,  and  the  man  who  goes  into  it  unpre 
pared  plays  it  blindfold.  No  genius  can  take  the  place  of  com 
plete  preparation.  We  cannot  make  sure  of  having  the  genius, 
but  we  can  always  make  sure  of  the  other  if  we  make  the 
proper  effort,  and  it  is  to  this  end  the  Naval  War  College 
exists. 


XVII 
THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH 


BY 


ANTHONY  J.   ABDY 
COMMANDING  FIFTY-THIRD  BATTERY,  ROYAL  FIELD  ARTILLERY 


Read  before  the  Society  January  7, 1902 


THE   SIEGE  OF   LADYSMITH 

THE  events  that  led  to  the  despatch  of  a  force  of  all  arms 
from  India  to  Natal  in  September,  1899,  are  so  well  known 
that  nothing  need  be  said  about  them. 

A  few  words,  however,  on  the  nature  of  service  of  batteries 
and  their  mobilization  for  active  service  in  India  may  not  be 
out  of  place. 

The  Fifty-third  Battery,  Royal  Field  Artillery,  of  which  it 
is  the  purpose  to  describe  the  movements  and  doings,  in  the 
year  1899  was  serving  at  Deesa,  a  military  station  in  Northern 
Gwzevat ;  there  is  no  other  artillery,  but  a  small  force  of  cav 
alry  and  infantry  is  stationed  there.  Deesa  is  situated  on  a 
branch  of  the  Metre-Gauge  Raj  put  ana-Mai  wa  Railway,  and, 
although  the  soil  of  the  country  is  very  sandy,  it  affords  ex 
cellent  opportunities  for  the  drill  and  instruction  of  a  battery. 
That  these  opportunities  had  not  been  neglected  may  be 
judged  from  the  fact  that  in  1898  the  battery  had  won  the 
Commander-in-Chief 's  Prize  as  the  best  shooting  battery  in 
all  India,  and  in  1899,  when  the  competition  for  prizes  was 
restricted  to  Presidency  commands,  the  battery  had  won  the 
first  prize  for  all  batteries  in  the  Bombay  command.  If  noth 
ing  supervened,  the  battery  was  under  orders  to  embark  for 
England  in  October,  1899,  after  a  tour  of  nearly  fourteen 
years  in  India,  and,  in  consequence,  was  full  of  well-seasoned 
old  non-commissioned  officers  and  men,  every  one  of  whom 
knew  his  duty  and  could  be  trusted  to  do  it.  In  August  an 
order  was  received  to  the  effect  that,  owing  to  the  dark  out 
look  in  South  Africa,  no  reliefs  to  England  from  India  would 
take  place  before  March,  1900. 

On  the  6th  of  September,  after  a  very  satisfactory  inspec 
tion  of  the  battery,  General  Hogg,  commanding  the  Deesa 


364  THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH 

District,  informed  the  officer  commanding,  confidentially,  that, 
if  any  force  were  sent  from  India  to  South  Africa,  the  Fifty- 
third  Battery  would  form  part  of  it ;  and,  on  the  8th  came  a 
telegram  from  Simla  warning  the  battery  to  mobilize  for  serv 
ice  out  of  India. 

As  on  mobilization  for  service  some  of  the  men  and  horses 
and  parts  of  the  equipment  are  found  unfit  to  go,  the  custom 
in  India  is  for  each  battery  about  to  be  mobilized  to  have  told 
off  to  it  another  battery  which  will  supply  all  deficiencies.  In 
the  case  of  the  Fifty-third  the  supplying  battery  was  the 
Thirty-fourth,  stationed  at  Ahmedabad.  It  is  only  a  grateful 
act  of  acknowledgment  here  to  place  on  record  the  loyal  and 
generous  way  in  which  the  Thirty-fourth  supplied  its  more 
fortunate  fellow-battery ;  the  best  of  non-commissioned  officers 
and  men,  the  most  skilful  of  artificers,  the  finest  of  horses 
were  none  too  good  to  be  handed  over  in  place  of  invalids 
and  wastrels ;  later  on  will  be  told  how  nobly  some  of  these 
transferred  men  served  the  Fifty-third. 

As  the  battery  had  expected  to  leave  India  in  any  case, 
perhaps  the  work  of  mobilization  was  somewhat  easier  than 
it  might  otherwise  have  been,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  matters 
were  rather  complicated  by  an  order  that  no  natives  of  any  sort 
were  to  accompany  the  battery.  This  meant  that  all  cooking  was 
to  be  done  by  men  of  the  battery,  that  the  places  of  the  vari 
ous  native  artificers  who  help  the  farrier,  the  wheeler,  and  the 
collar-maker  were  to  be  filled  by  soldiers,  and  that  each  officer 
was  to  provide  himself  with  a  soldier  servant  and  soldier  groom. 
The  establishment  of  horses  on  mobilization  was  increased 
from  one  hundred  and  ten  to  one  hundred  and  forty-three, 
and,  as  Deesa  is  a  very  unhealthy  station  for  Australian 
horses,  it  resulted  that  the  Thirty-fourth  was  called  upon  to 
provide  no  less  than  seventy-two  horses  and  forty  non-com 
missioned  officers  and  men  and  one  lieutenant. 

As  Ahmedabad  is  the  southern  terminus  of  the  narrow- 
gauge  line  and  lies  on  the  way  from  Deesa  to  Bombay,  sane- 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH  365 

tion  was  given  for  the  Fifty- third  to  halt  there  from  the  15th 
to  the  18th  of  September  in  order  to  complete  establishment 
and  hand  over  what  was  left  behind.  The  work  of  entraining 
a  battery  in  the  small  trucks  of  the  narrow-gauge  railway  at 
Deesa  was  very  heavy,  and  the  heat,  over  100°  F.  in  the 
shade,  was  very  trying  to  all  ranks.  On  the  15th  the  battery 
marched  out  of  barracks  at  4.30  P.M.,  and,  though  the  station 
was  two  miles  off  and  badly  provided  with  platforms,  every 
thing  was  safely  installed  in  two  trains  soon  after  8  P.M.  The 
work  of  entraining  in  the  broad-gauge  trucks  at  Ahmedabad 
on  the  18th  was  much  easier. 

Attention  may  here  be  called  to  the  difficulty  of  economi 
cally  carrying  on  railway  trains  the  long  modern  field  guns  ; 
their  muzzle  must  not  project  beyond  the  buffer  stops  of  the 
truck,  and  the  time  taken  is  too  great  to  allow  of  dismounting 
and  remounting  the  gun  on  its  complicated  carriage,  if  the 
gun  is  being  conveyed  by  rail  straight  on  to  the  battlefield,  as 
is  often  the  case. 

The  battery  reached  the  Prince's  Dock,  Bombay,  at  dawn 
on  the  19th  of  September  and  found  the  S.S.  Booldana  still 
in  the  hands  of  painters  and  fitters,  but,  by  the  time  every 
thing  was  detrained  and  ready  to  embark,  the  ship  was  ready. 
The  work  in  the  muggy  heat  of  Bombay  was  even  more  try 
ing  than  at  Deesa  or  Ahmedabad,  but  the  hydraulic  cranes 
and  crews  of  skilled  stevedores  were  of  great  assistance.  Here, 
as  on  each  other  occasion,  the  subaltern  officers  did  all  the 
really  difficult  jobs,  such  as  getting  a  vicious  or  wayward 
horse  into  the  slings  and,  when  every  one  was  employed  on 
his  allotted  task,  the  officer  commanding  seemed  to  be  the 
only  person  with  time  to  look  about  him.  In  the  course  of 
embarkation  the  ship  was  inspected  by  General  Sir  R.  Low, 
commanding  the  Bombay  Army,  who  expressed  himself  pleased 
with  all  he  saw.  At  8.30  P.M.  the  tide  served,  and  the  ship 
left  dock,  cheered  on  her  voyage  by  a  crowd  of  Europeans 
collected  at  the  dock  head. 


366  THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH 

There  were  no  other  troops  on  the  Booldana  besides  the 
Fifty-third,  but  a  captain  of  the  Royal  Artillery  Medical  Corps 
and  a  lieutenant  of  the  Artillery  Veterinary  Department  were 
attached  for  medical  and  veterinary  charge,  respectively,  on 
the  voyage.  All  spare  room  in  the  ship's  hold  was  filled  with 
stores  for  men  and  horses.  The  whole  force  sailing  from  India 
took  with  it  complete  stores  of  food,  fodder  and  forage  for 
three  months ;  it  was  these  stores  that  later  on  rendered  the 
prolonged  retention  of  Lady  smith  possible. 

On  the  morning  of  the  5th  of  October  the  ship  reached 
Durban  and  by  noon  she  was  moored  alongside  the  wharf. 
The  battery  disembarked  at  once  and  entrained  in  three  trains. 
The  weather  was  not  ominous  of  good,  as  it  was  one  succes 
sion  of  squalls  of  wind  and  torrents  of  rain.  The  men  and 
horses  were  in  open  trucks,  and,  as  the  line  in  parts  reached 
a  height  of  more  than  three  thousand  feet  above  the  sea,  the 
cold  was  very  trying. 

The  entraining  at  Durban  was  worse  than  either  time  in 
India,  as  the  trucks  were  iron  and  their  floors  were  covered 
with  sand  and  coal  dust  in  order  to  prevent  the  horses  from 
slipping  ;  this  was  only  partially  successful,  and  the  battery  lost 
one  or  two  horses  in  the  night's  journey  to  Ladysmith.  Excel 
lent  as  the  Natal  State  Railway  is  in  every  other  respect,  it  is 
not  well  designed  for  the  carriage  of  troops,  so  far  as  regards 
their  comfort.  The  three  troop  trains  had  started  at  an  hour's 
interval  between  each  and  reached  Mooi  River  Station  at  7, 
8,  and  9  A.M.  respectively ;  here  a  breakfast  of  tea  and  bread 
and  cheese  was  provided  for  every  man,  and  the  trains  then 
went  on  through  to  Ladysmith,  the  last  arriving  at  2  P.M. 
The  baggage  was  quickly  all  packed  on  transport  wagons  and 
carted  off  to  the  Tin-Camp,  some  two  miles  from  the  station, 
and  by  7  P.M.  the  whole  battery  was  established  in  the  lines 
lately  vacated  by  one  of  the  three  batteries  serving  in  Natal 
which  had  gone  up  to  Dundee  with  Sir  Penn  Symons's  force. 
The  Twenty-first  and  Forty-second  Batteries,  which  had  come 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH  367 

from  India,  were  found  in  the  lines  and  the  Brigade  Division 
was  now  complete  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  J.  A.  Coxhead, 
who  had  Captain  A.  L.  Walker  as  his  adjutant.  The  next 
few  days  were  spent  in  shaking  down,  drawing  regimental 
transport,  and  trying  to  get  horses  fit  again  after  the  voyage. 
On  the  7th  of  October  a  fourth  subaltern  joined  the  battery, 
having  been  transferred  to  it  from  the  Garrison  Artillery  at 
Mauritius. 

Although  on  the  9th  the  Forty-second  was  warned  to  be 
ready  to  move  out  with  a  flying  column,  it  was  not  until  the 
12th  of  October  that  the  two  Republics  of  South  Africa  de 
clared  war  on  England. 

On  the  13th  the  Brigade  Division  paraded  at  2  A.M.  and 
marched  through  Ladysmith  to  join  a  force  of  all  arms  on  the 
road  to  Van  Reenen's  Pass.  It  was  a  weird  experience  march 
ing  silently  through  the  dark  streets  of  Ladysmith,  passing 
all  the  time  a  column  of  mounted  troops,  Natal  Mounted 
Volunteers,  who  were  moving  by  another  route  to  the  rendez 
vous.  At  daybreak  the  whole  force  moved  toward  the  west 
until  about  10  A.M.  when  it  halted  under  a  rocky  kopje,  which 
five  months  later  became  most  intimately  known  as  Camp  Ar 
cadia.  It  was  in  the  "  prepare  for  action  "  on  this  occasion 
that  a  gunner  asked  his  section  officer  if  he  was  to  load  with 
live  shell.  The  Free  State,  or  Commando,  which  had  been  ex 
pected  was  not  found ;  so,  after  watering  and  feeding  horses 
and  issuing  rations  to  the  men,  the  force  returned  to  Lady- 
smith,  meeting  on  the  way  back  the  Manchester  Regiment 
which  had  marched  out  straight  from  the  train  to  the  would-be 
battlefield.  This  was  one  of  the  last  days  of  the  cold  weather, 
and,  as  there  had  been  a  recent  fall  of  snow  on  the  Drakens- 
berg,  the  views  of  that  range  from  sunrise  until  nearly  mid 
day  were  lovely.  The  ground  manoeuvred  over  was  full  of 
artillery  positions,  and  perhaps  it  was  for  this  reason  that  the 
Free  State  column  never  appeared. 

The  air  was  full  of  rumors  connected  with  the  war,  but, 


368  THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH 

whether  Natal  was  particularly  badly  situated  for  the  obtain 
ing  of  news  or  whether  news  was  withheld,  the  fact  remains 
that  in  Ladysmith,  except  those  who  received  information 
from  the  Staff,  no  one  could  say  anything  about  the  Boers  or 
their  movements,  and  the  idea  that  they  might  take  matters 
into  their  own  hands  and  invade  the  Colony,  although  the 
Indian  troops  had  arrived,  was  never  mooted. 

However,  this  idea  must  have  been  strongly  impressed  on 
some  of  the  inhabitants  of  Pietermaritzburg,  for  it  was  in  an 
swer  to  a  request  from  the  Capitol  that  a  flying  column,  con 
sisting  of  the  Nineteenth  Hussars,  Fifty-third  Battery,  Impe 
rial  Light  Horse,  the  Liverpool  Regiment  with  its  Mounted 
Infantry,  field  hospitals,  and  a  supply  column  was  despatched 
from  Ladysmith  at  3  A.M.  on  the  18th  of  October.  The  march 
of  this  column  was  of  peculiar  interest  in  that  its  route  lay 
through  Colenso,  over  the  Bulwer  Road  Bridge  and  by  the 
Blaaukrau's  River  Bridge  to  Estcourt,  crossing  much  of  the 
ground  about  to  become  famous  in  connection  with  Buller's 
operations  a  couple  of  months  later. 

On  the  night  of  the  1 8th  the  column  bivouacked  at  Colenso ; 
at  2  A.M.  on  the  19th  it  marched  halfway  back  to  Ladysmith 
and  lay  in  the  folds  of  the  high  ground  above  Onderbrook 
waiting  for  a  Free  State  column,  which  was  reported  to  be 
moving  on  Ladysmith  and  whose  flank  would  be  exposed  to 
attack.  Very  pleasant  it  was  lying  in  the  grass  or  sitting 
about  on  old  anthills  trying  to  discern  the  Boers,  and  at  last  it 
seemed  as  if  hopes  were  about  to  be  realized,  for  from  among 
some  trees  in  the  proper  direction  duly  heralded  by  a  cloud 
of  dust  a  column  moved  steadily  into  the  open  ground  ;  every 
glass  was  fixed  on  it  and,  after  careful  spying,  the  column 
proved  to  be  one  of  cattle  only.  Lying  here  the  Staff  were 
amused  by  the  cheery  tales  of  Colonel  Scott  Chisholm,  who, 
two  days  later,  met  his  fate  gallantly  leading  his  Imperial 
Light  Horse  at  Elandslaagte.  The  flying  column  returned  to 
Colenso  that  night  and  bivouacked  in  heavy  rain.  The  next 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH  369 

day  the  march  was  to  Estcourt  without  the  Imperial  Light 
Horse,  which  returned  to  Ladysmith.  The  two  marches 
through  the  Onderbrook  Pass  to  Colenso  enabled  those  who 
took  part  in  it  to  recognize  later  on  the  almost  insuperable 
difficulties  this  route  presented  to  Buller,  and  that,  if  he  was 
to  relieve  Ladysmith,  he  was  not  likely  to  come  this  way.  The 
next  day,  the  21st  of  October,  the  Liverpool  Kegiment  alone 
continued  the  march.  The  rest  of  the  column  stood  fast  until 
5  P.M.,  when  orders  came  to  move  back  to  Colenso  by  night 
march.  At  4  P.M.  a  heavy  thunderstorm  had  burst  and  the 
slipperiness  of  the  steep  hills  out  of  Estcourt  was  most  trying 
to  the  artillery  horses.  Altogether  the  march  of  twenty-two 
miles  through  the  dark  and  wet  was  very  trying  and  tiring, 
and  it  was  welcome  news  to  all  to  hear  at  8  A.M.  on  the  22d 
that  the  column  was  to  return  by  train  from  Colenso  to  Lady- 
smith.  Elandslaagte  had  been  fought,  the  Dundee  column  was 
just  starting  on  its  withdrawal  to  Ladysmith,  and  the  need  of 
all  available  troops  in  Ladysmith  had  been  recognized.  Once 
more  the  Fifty -third  was  entrained ;  this  time  under  greater 
difficulties  than  ever  and  it  was  astonishing  to  see  loaded 
wagons  lifted  bodily  into  trucks  by  men  standing  around  and 
men  handling  them. 

On  reaching  camp  at  Ladysmith  every  one  of  the  other  bat 
teries  was  full  of  tales  of  Elandslaagte,  and  very  bitter  were 
the  feelings  of  all  connected  with  the  Fifty-third  at  having 
missed  so  successful  a  battle,  the  more  so  as  the  battery  had 
been  specially  selected  to  go  on  the  flying  column. 

On  Monday,  the  23d  of  October,  the  battery  shifted  to  a 
camping-ground  near  the  Iron  Bridge  alongside  the  other  bat 
teries  of  the  Brigade  Division,  and  from  this  ground  the  guns 
and  horses  never  moved  until  the  15th  of  March,  1900. 

On  the  24th  the  Twenty-third  paraded  at  4  A.M.  and 
marched  with  a  strong  column  of  all  arms  up  the  road  to 
Newcastle.  At  about  8.30  A.M.,  while  still  in  column  on  the 
road,  Boers  were  seen  on  some  heights  to  the  left  (west)  of 


370  THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH 

the  road,  and  the  range-takers  were  told  to  take  range.  While 
this  was  being  done,  a  gun  was  seen  to  fire  on  the  top  of  the 
hill  and  a  shell  dropped  near  the  head  of  the  column.  The 
Forty-second  and  Fifty-third  Batteries  immediately  wheeled 
to  the  left,  formed  line  (the  Forty-second  on  the  right)  to 
ward  the  west,  and  advanced  at  a  trot  to  a  level  crossing  over 
the  railway  line  some  six  hundred  yards  from  the  road.  The 
two  batteries  formed  column  inward  to  cross  this,  and,  as  they 
did  so,  the  gun  on  the  hill  opened  rapid  fire  on  the  crossing, 
of  which  those  serving  the  gun  had  evidently  previously  found 
the  range.  This  unexpected  fire,  opening  on  the  battery  in  the 
first  moments  of  its  ever  coming  into  action  against  an  enemy, 
might  have  proved  somewhat  disconcerting,  but  all  ranks  con 
tinued  their  duties  quite  calmly  and  the  batteries  re-formed 
line  again  on  emerging  from  the  crossing,  the  only  casualties 
being  one  officer  of  the  Forty-second  and  two  of  the  Fifty- 
third,  all  slightly  grazed  by  shell  splinters.1 

About  five  hundred  yards  beyond  the  crossing  the  batteries 
came  into  action  against  the  gun,  but,  owing  to  an  intervening 
ridge,  the  Forty-second  could  not  bring  any  fire  to  bear.  The 
first  gun  of  the  Fifty-third  was  fired  with  an  elevation  of  four 
thousand  yards  and  was  not  seen  to  burst,  so  the  next  round 
was  fired  at  three  thousand  six  hundred  yards,  and,  by  what 
can  be  little  short  of  a  miracle,  hit  the  gun,  causing  it  to  cease 
fire  and  be  withdrawn.  Were  all  the  conditions  connected 
with  this  shot  to  be  calculated  out,  the  resulting  odds  against 
its  hitting  the  gun  must  be  millions  to  one,  but  staff  officers, 
newspaper  correspondents,  and  officers  of  other  arms  on  the 
field  all  declared  that  the  shell  burst  at,  or  on,  the  gun.  The 
battery  fired  a  few  more  rounds  and  prepared  to  move  to  an 
other  position,  farther  to  the  west  again.  The  new  position 
introduced  the  battery  to  the  novelty  of  coming  into  action 
on  a  kopje,  and  a  very  typical  one  it  was.  —  a  ridge,  running 
more  or  less  north  and  south,  rising  abruptly  out  of  the  plain 

1  One  of  these  was  Major  Abdy,  I  think.   (A.  P.  R.) 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH  371 

on  which  the  battery  had  been  in  action,  to  a  height  of  some 
two  hundred  feet,  covered  on  its  sides  with  rocks  and  boul 
ders.  The  Forty-second  was  the  first  to  surmount  it  and  es 
sayed  to  come  into  action  under  cover  against  the  enemy's 
position  on  the  ridge,  which  was  now  very  distinct.  There 
was  no  room  on  the  left  flank  of  the  Forty-second  for  the 
Fifty-third  to  come  into  action,  but,  after  a  little  reconnais 
sance,  an  excellent  position  was  found  some  five  hundred  or 
six  hundred  yards  farther  to  the  left,  and  immediately  oppo 
site  to  it  was  a  rocky  knoll,  less  than  fifteen  hundred  yards 
distant,  from  which  the  enemy  opened  a  sharp  musketry  fire. 
The  battery  was  led  on  to  the  officer  commanding  by  the 
senior  subaltern,  Lieutenant  A.  M.  Perreau,  who  fell  from 
his  horse  shot  through  the  left  shin  bone  just  as  he  was  about 
to  dismount  for  action ;  unable  to  stand  he  lay  on  the  ground 
and  continued  to  direct  the  fire  of  his  section  until  removed 
on  a  stretcher.  Here  the  battery  remained  for  about  three 
and  a  half  hours,  the  rate  of  its  fire  varying  as  the  enemy's 
rifle  fire  increased  or  decreased ;  whenever  the  battery's  fire 
was  directed  on  to  the  kopje  in  front  for  any  considerable  pe 
riod,  the  rifle  fire  died  away  and  ceased,  only  to  recommence 
after  the  battery  had  ceased  firing  for  some  time. 

More  than  once  a  gun  was  dragged  forward  by  the  Boers 
close  to  the  same  point  on  the  high  ridge  where  it  had  first 
appeared,  but  each  time  one  or  two  rounds  from  the  Fifty- 
third  caused  it  to  disappear  again.  On  this  same  high  ridge 
also  and  farther  to  the  south  large  parties  of  Boers  were  re 
ported  to  be  collecting,  and  toward  them  the  fire  of  one  sec 
tion  of  the  Fifty-third  was  directed ;  the  bursting  shell  after 
a  little  set  light  to  the  grass,  which  blazed  up  all  over  the  hill 
top.  At  about  3.30  P.M.  the  Boer  fire  had  grown  very  slack 
and  nearly  died  away,  so  the  Forty-second  and  Fifty-third 
were  ordered  to  wifhdraw  across  the  railway  and  cover  the 
withdrawal  of  the  in,  y.  This  they  did,  firing  a  few  rounds 
against  the  crests  of  N.  ttigh  ridges. 


L 


372  THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH 

While  the  Fifty-third  were  in  action  in  their  main  position, 
the  Forty-second  had  passed  across  their  rear  and  taken  up 
a  position  lower  down  the  kopje  about  another  half-mile  to  the 
left,  and  No.  10  Mountain  Battery  had  come  up  and  into 
action  about  two  hundred  yards  to  the  left  also  of  the  Fifty- 
third;  that  is,  between  the  Fifty-third  and  Forty-second.  As 
soon  as  the  infantry  appeared  on  the  plain,  the  batteries  were 
ordered  to  take  up  positions  on  each  side  of  the  road  to  Lady- 
smith,  and  from  them  they  moved  back  to  camp  without  com 
ing  into  action  again.  Of  the  cavalry  nothing  has  yet  been  said, 
as  nothing  had  been  seen  of  them  all  day.  The  infantry  had 
not  been  called  upon  to  press  home  an  attack,  but,  unfortu 
nately,  the  Gloucesters  had  got  too  far  forward  and  lay  for 
several  hours  under  the  fire  of  the  Fifty-third,  about  halfway 
between  the  battery  and  the  enemy  on  the  kopje,  —  unfortu 
nately,  for,  though  their  losses  were  small,  they  included  the 
commanding  officer,  Colonel  Wilford,  who  was  shot  dead.  On 
the  way  home  the  cavalry  could  be  seen  at  work  farther  to 
the  north,  covering  the  withdrawal.  About  5.30  P.M.  a  heavy 
rainstorm  burst,  but  did  not  quench  the  spirits  of  the  battery, 
which  were  cheered  up  by  Sir  G.  White's  information  that  he 
had  achieved  his  object.  It  was  long  afterwards  learned  that 
this  object  was  the  prevention  of  the  Free  State  army  from 
joining  the  Transvaal  armies  to  harass  the  march  of  General 
Yule's  force  from  Dundee.  The  number  of  rounds  fired  by 
the  Fifty-third  this  day  was  three  hundred  and  fifty-four. 

The  next  day,  the  25th,  a  small  column  of  small  arms,  which 
the  Twenty-first  battery  joined,  moved  out  under  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Coxhead  to  escort  the  Dundee  column.  It  went  out 
in  heavy  rain,  which  lasted  persistently  until  the  following 
morning.  The  story  went  that  some  of  the  Dundee  force  ex 
pressed  annoyance  at  the  idea  that  any  one  should  have  been 
sent  to  bring  them  in,  while  the  commanding  officer  of  one 
corps  in  that  force  was  most  indignant  that  Colonel  Coxhead 
had  not  provided  hot  coffee  for  his  men  at  3  A.M.,  quite  over- 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH  373 

looking  the  impossibility  of  keeping  a  fire  burning  in  the  tor 
rents  of  rain  then  falling. 

Whatever  has  been  said  as  to  the  miserable  appearance  of 
the  Dundee  column  was  not  visible  at  11  A.M.  on  the  26th, 
when  the  major  and  captain  of  the  Fifty-third  met  it  some 
two  miles  beyond  Ladysmith  on  the  Helpmakaar  Road.  So 
far  from  the  battery  horses  looking  played  out  and  nearly 
ready  to  drop,  their  fine  condition  excited  the  envy  of  officers 
whose  battery  was  horsed  with  Australians.  On  the  27th  the 
three  batteries  turned  out  with  a  strong  column  of  all  arms 
and  bivouacked  north  of  the  Modder  Spruit,  where  it  crosses 
the  Helpmakaar  Road.  Colonel  Ian  Hamilton  was  in  com 
mand,  and  a  careful  reconnaissance  was  carried  out  before  dark. 
Whatever  operations  had  been  determined  on  by  him  were  frus 
trated  by  an  order  from  Sir  G.  White  for  the  force  to  return 
to  Ladysmith.  This  was  complied  with  at  3  A.M.  on  the  28th. 

The  29th  of  October  was  a  fine  hot  day  and  the  whole  of 
the  forces  in  Ladysmith  moved  out  at  midnight ;  the  artillery 
to  a  rendezvous  north  of  Limit  Hill,  where  all  lay  out  silently 
in  the  warm  fine  night  waiting  to  move  to  position.  This  move 
was  a  difficult  one,  as  the  left  of  the  front  assigned  to  the 
artillery  was  covered  with  enormous  boulders,  which  so  con 
fined  the  space  available  for  the  guns  to  come  into  action  that 
at  first  there  was  room  for  only  two  guns  of  the  Fifty-third, 
which  tried  to  open  fire  against  some  Boer  guns  in  position  to 
the  west  of  the  Newcastle  Road  and  to  the  southwest  of  Pep- 
worth's  Farm.  The  formation  of  the  ground  was  such  as  to 
render  impossible  both  fire  and  observation  of  fire,  so  the 
Twenty-first  and  Fifty-third  were  ordered  to  take  up  fresh 
positions  farther  to  the  north,  still  facing  much  the  same  way, 
but  this  time  against  the  Boer  guns  on  Pepworth  Hill. 

Now  for  the  first  time  was  seen  a  "  Long  Tom  "  or  ninety- 
four  pounder  Creusot  gun,  mounted  on  a  disappearing  carriage 
and  firing  black  (smoke)  powder.  Nowhere  was  there  a  trace 
of  the  expected  Boer  batteries  manoeuvring  to  come  into  action 


374  THE  SIEGE  OF  LADY  SMITH 

in  a  favorable  position,  but,  from  various  points  on  the  hill, 
an  occasional  flash  denoted  that  a  gun  firing  smokeless  powder 
was  mounted  in  a  concealed  emplacement.  Of  Boer  riflemen, 
or  mounted  troops,  there  was  not  a  sign.  The  ranges  to  Pep- 
worth's  Hill  were  just  about  four  thousand  yards,  and  shell 
burst  at  this  and  approximate  elevations  generally  caused  fire 
to  cease,  at  least  temporarily,  from  a  gun  that  could  be  located. 
After  a  bit,  however,  the  Boer  gunners  would  return  to  their 
gun  and  fire  another  round ;  presently,  too,  the  fire  from  the 
guns  first  attacked  became  more  harassing,  especially  as  they 
were  taking  the  batteries  in  flank.  It  was  by  now,  say  8  A.M., 
evident  that  the  Brigade  Division  was  not  firing  at  the  enemy's 
main  position,  or  any  portion  of  it  likely  to  be  the  point  of 
assault,  so  Lieutenant-Colonel  Coxhead  rode  off  with  Major 
Blewitt,  the  commanding  officer  of  the  Twenty-first  Battery, 
to  seek  a  position  whence  the  fire  of  the  batteries  might  be  made 
of  greater  use.  In  their  absence  Sir  G.  White  rode  into  the 
batteries,  and,  not  liking  the  effect  the  flank  fire  was  having  on 
the  batteries,  ordered  the  commanding  officer  1  of  the  Fifty- 
third  to  retire  the  Twenty-first  and  Fifty-third  and  to  take  up 
a  new  position  where  he  could  find  useful  work  for  them. 
Thereupon  this  officer  retired  these  batteries  some  three  quar 
ters  of  a  mile  towards  Lombard's  Kop,  and  then  wheeled  them 
to  the  left,  advanced  the  Fifty-third  and  brought  it  into  action 
toward  the  east  against  Boer  guns  hidden  in  thick  scrub.  Just 
after  the  batteries  had  wheeled  to  the  left,  Major  Blewitt  came 
up,  resumed  command  of  the  Twenty-first,  and  took  it  off 
among  the  folds  of  Lombard's  Kop  in  response  to  an  urgent 
request  for  artillery  sent  by  the  officer  commanding  the  cavalry 
there.  The  Twenty-first  disappeared  up  what  looked  to  be  a 
nearly  impossible  passage  and  was  soon  heard  in  action,  but 
could  not  be  seen  again.  Some  day  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  a 
full  account  of  what  the  Twenty-first  did  and  saw  may  be 
published  ;  it  will  be  of  remarkable  interest. 

1  Major  Abdy. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH  375 

The  Fifty-third  remained  in  position  for  two  or  more  hours 
firing  at  different  rates  at  guns  in  the  scrub,  or  rather  at 
what  were  believed  to  be  guns,  as  both  gun  and  flash  were 
quite  invisible.  Presently,  however,  it  could  be  seen  that  a 
battery  in  front  was  gradually  drawing  a  heavy  fire  upon  it 
self  from  many  Boer  guns,  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Coxhead, 
coming  to  the  Fifty-third,  gave  leave  to  its  commanding  officer 
(Major  Abdy)  to  take  his  battery  to~  the  assistance  of  the  one 
in  front.  This  necessitated  an  advance  of  about  one  and  a  half 
miles  over  a  plain  with  one  donga  crossing  it,  which  was  passed 
without  mishap,  and  the  Fifty-third  came  into  action  on  the 
right  of  the  Thirteenth  Battery  commanded  by  Major  J.  W. 
G.  Dawkins.  The  Boer  artillery  fire  was  certainly  trying,  as 
it  came  simultaneously  from  the  front  and  two  flanks.  Major- 
General  Hunter,  the  Chief-of-Staff,  with  his  aide-de-camp,  was 
on  foot  in  this  battery,  and,  after  the  Fifty-third  had  ranged 
itself  on  a  Boer  gun  to  the  east  at  over  2350  yards  range, 
gave  an  order  that  the  batteries  were  to  withdraw  alternately 
toward  Ladysmith  and  cover  the  infantry,  who  were  retiring 
through  the  batteries.  As  it  had  come  there  the  first,  the  Thir 
teenth  was  the  first  to  retire  and  it  took  up  a  covering  posi 
tion  some  eight  hundred  yards  to  the  south.  Being  left  alone, 
the  enemy's  fire  must  have  been  concentrated  on  the  Fifty-third, 
as  two  or  three  shells  burst  among  the  limbers  and  their  teams. 
The  wheels  of  one  gun  limber  were  completely  ruined  and  it 
was  necessary  to  leave  this  gun  on  the  position  ;  the  five  other 
guns  moved  off  at  a  walk  to  take  up  a  position  again  beyond 
the  Thirteenth,  and,  as  soon  as  morale  would  permit,  broke 
into  a  steady  trot.  In  recrossing  the  donga  good  fortune  de 
serted  the  battery,  as  one  of  the  remaining  five  guns  turned 
over.  Notwithstanding  the  heavy  shell-fire  which  followed  the 
battery  all  the  way,  Lieutenant  J.  F.  Higgins,  with  only  its 
own  detachment,  succeeded  in  righting  the  gun  and  brought 
it  up  into  line  very  shortly  after  the  battery  had  once  more 
come  into  action.  Then,  too,  was  shown  one  of  those  fine 


376  THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH 

pieces  of  work  that  prove  the  value  of  sound  drill  and  train 
ing.  On  seeing  the  gun  limber  disabled,  Battery  Sergeant- 
Major  Vevers  at  once  sent  to  the  rear  for  a  wagon  limber. 
This  took  some  time  to  come  up,  and,  indeed,  the  battery 
must  have  been  nearly  into  its  new  position,  when  Captain 
Thwaites,  with  Corporal  Saunders,  three  team-drivers,  and 
two  gunners  seated  on  the  limber,  rode  out  under  the  shell- 
fire,  hooked  onto  the  lonely  gun,  and  brought  it  back  to  the 
battery.  The  infantry  were  by  this  time  nearly  all  in  safety, 
so  the  two  batteries  continued  the  movement  of  alternate  re 
tirement  until  they  could  themselves  get  under  cover  to  refit 
and  horse  themselves.  The  losses  of  the  Fifty-third  were  lighter 
than  might  have  been  feared ;  they  were  five  men  wounded, 
twenty-one  horses  killed  and  wounded,  one  wagon  and  one 
limber  with  all  their  kits  and  stores  left  on  the  field.  At  about 
3  P.M.  the  march  homeward  commenced,  and  by  5  P.M.  the 
battery  was  back  again  in  camp,  having  fired  two  hundred 
and  thirty-nine  rounds. 

Such  is  an  account  of  "  Lombard's  Kop,"  "  Farquhar's 
Farm,"  "  Black  Monday,"  as  called  by  the  British,  "  Modder 
Spruit,"  as  called  by  the  Boer,  —  an  account  of  things  seen 
and  done  by  the  Fifty-third  Battery.  Of  what  happened  in  the 
neighborhood  at  the  fateful  "  Nicholson's  Nek  "  nothing  can 
be  said  here,  as  nothing  came  within  the  knowledge  of  any  one 
connected  with  the  battery.  It  was  not  until  the  next  day 
that  rumors  of  that  sad  disaster  were  circulated,  and  rumors 
they  have  remained  to  this  day. 

A  few  points  connected  with  artillery  fire  may  be  noted 
here :  — 

"  In  -  withdrawing  Grimwood's  three  advanced  battalions 
from  the  ridge  that  they  had  held  for  hours,  they  crossed  the 
open  in  some  disorder  and  lost  heavily  and  would  have  done 
so  more  had  not  the  Fifty-third  Field  Battery  dashed  forward, 
firing  shrapnel  at  short  ranges  in  order  to  cover  the  retreat 
of  the  infantry.  Amid  the  bursting  of  the  huge  ninety-four- 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH  377 

pounder  shells,  and  the  snapping  of  the  vicious  little  auto 
matic  one-pounders,  with  a  cross-fire  of  the  rifles  as  well,  Ab- 
dy's  gallant  battery  swung  round  its  muzzles  and  hit  back  right 
and  left,  flashing  and  blazing  amid  its  litter  of  dead  men  and 
horses.  So  severe  was  the  fire  that  the  guns  were  obscured  by 
the  dust  knocked  up  by  the  little  shells  of  the  automatic 
gun.  .  .  .  Then,  when  its  work  was  done  and  the  retiring  in 
fantry  had  struggled  over  the  ridge,  the  covering  guns 
whirled  and  bounded  after  them.  So  many  horses  had  fallen 
that  two  pieces  were  left  until  the  teams  could  be  brought 
back  for  them,  which  was  successfully  done.  .  .  .  The  action 
of  this  battery  was  one  of  the  few  gleams  of  light  in  a  not 
too  brilliant  day's  work."  l 

It  was  on  this  day  that  acquaintance  was  first  made  with 
the  largest  and  smallest  of  the  Boer  weapons,  namely,  a  "  Long 
Tom"  and  a  "Pom-Pom."  The  former,  as  remarked  previ 
ously,  was  a  Creusot  uinety-four-pounder  mounted  on  Pepworth 
Hill,  and,  for  the  most  part,  directing  its  fire  toward  the 
town  of  Ladysmith.  Even  at  that  early  stage  of  proceedings 
the  emplacement  in  which  it  was  mounted  resembled  a  small 
castle.  The  Pom-Pom,  or  one  and  one-fourth  pounder  Vickers- 
Maxim  quick-firing  gun,  was  probably  mounted  somewhere 
near  the  north  end  of  Pepworth  Hill,  and  its  fire  was  turned 
on  various  objects  moving  on  the  plateau  over  which  the 
Fifty-third  manoeuvred.  There  is  no  record  of  any  damage 
being  done  by  it  on  this  day,  and  it  may  safely  be  said  that, 
throughout  the  ensuing  bombardment,  the  garrison  of  Lady- 
smith  never  came  to  regard  the  fire  of  this  weapon  with  the 
same  dread  that  was  noticeable  among  all  ranks  of  Buller's 
relieving  army.  What  the  effect  of  the  fire  of  the  British  bat 
teries  on  this  day  was  will  probably  never  be  known,  but  it 
must  certainly  have  been  strongly  deterrent,  for  the  Boers 
made  no  attempt  to  follow  up  the  withdrawing  infantry,  and 

1  "Lombard's  Kop,"  from  A.  Conan  Doyle's  History  of  the  Great  Boer  War, 
p.  99. 


378  THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH 

could  be  seen  walking  aimlessly  about  on  the  summit  of 
Long  Hill.  It  would  seem  as  if  the  Boers  quite  failed  to  real 
ize  the  advantage  they  had  gained  by  their  victory  at  Nichol 
son's  Nek,  which  carried  with  it  the  retirement  of  the  infan 
try  from  a  critical  point  of  the  main  field  of  battle  to  guard 
the  unprotected  and  now  exposed  town  of  Ladysmith. 

On  the  morning  of  the  31st  all  the  officers  of  the  Brigade 
Division  of  the  Light  Battery  attended  the  funeral  of  Lieu 
tenant  Macdougall,  of  the  Forty-second  Battery,  killed  by  a 
shell  wound  from  the  flanking  fire  to  which  his  battery  was 
exposed  when  in  action  against  Pep  worth  Hill. 

The  1st  of  November  was  a  very  hot  day  on  which  no  move 
ment  took  place,  while  on  the  2d  trains  and  mails  ceased  to 
come  and  the  Boers  began  a  slight  bombardment  chiefly  from 
Pepworth  and  Isamblwhaua,  commonly  called  Bulwana,  Hills  ; 
on  the  2d  the  Twenty-first  and  Fifty-third  moved  out  from 
camp  across  the  Klip  River  by  the  Iron  Bridge  and  then  to  the 
southeast  through  the  mimosa  scrub,  in  order  to  try  and  si 
lence  the  Boer  guns  on  Bulwana.  No  one  could  locate  them, 
so  the  batteries  returned  to  camp. 

This  going  out  from  and  returning  to  camp  by  the  Iron 
Bridge  was  no  joy,  for  directly  a  battery  got  on  the  road  at 
the  foot  of  the  bridge,  it  became  visible  to  the  Boer  gunners 
on  Bulwana,  who  were  able  to  see  the  battery  move  for  more 
than  a  mile  up  the  open  road  to  Range  Post,  if  it  took  that 
direction ;  while,  when  moving  to  the  southeast,  it  was  only 
out  of  sight  from  Bulwana  for  two  or  three  minutes  shortly 
after  crossing  the  bridge. 

On  the  2d  of  November  it  was  generally  recognized  that 
Ladysmith  was  cut  off  from  the  outer  world,  and  officers  dis 
cussing  the  situation  agreed  that  it  must  be  at  least  ten  days 
before  the  advance  of  Clery  from  Durban  would  enable  the 
garrison  once  more  to  move  with  freedom.  The  troops  from 
India  had  heard  so  little  news  since  they  sailed,  that  few  of 
them  were  in  a  position  to  gauge  the  situation,  nor  could  they 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH  379 

tell  but  that  it  might  be  due  to  some  unknown  error  of  their 
own  that  they  were  thus  placed  in  restraint.  The  feeling  of 
being  in  such  a  position  through  the  strategy  of  a  so-called 
pastoral  people  was  peculiarly  irksome.  After  the  first  month 
of  investment,  as  news  of  British  non-successes  in  South  Africa 
and  the  unexpected  strength  of  the  Boers  filtered  through, 
this  feeling  died  away  and  was  replaced  by  a  feeling  that,  in 
retaining  as  many  of  the  enemy  as  possible  around  Lady- 
smith,  the  garrison  was  rendering  the  most  valuable  assistance 
possible  towards  the  salvation  of  South  Africa. 

At  daybreak  of  the  3d  the  three  batteries  had  roused  and 
harnessed  up,  but  were  not  wanted  then.  At  about  6.30  A.M. 
the  Twenty-first  Battery,  with  the  Cavalry  Brigade,  the  Natal 
Carabiniers,  Border  Rifles,  and  Imperial  Light  Horse,  moved 
out  over  Range  Post  to  reconnoitre  to  the  west  towards  Lan 
cer's  Hill ;  the  Twenty-first  took  up  a  position  and  opened  fire 
against  an  enemy  on  the  hill,  while  the  cavalry  tried  to  move 
around  its  south  flank  and  the  Colonial  troops  operated  against 
the  enemy  on  End  Hill.  The  troops  this  day  were  under  the 
command  of  Major-General  Brocklehurst,  who  had  arrived  in 
Ladysmith  by  one  of  the  last  trains  running.  The  fight  never 
developed  into  anything  on  a  large  scale,  but  more  of  the 
enemy  were  found  to  the  south  and  southwest  than  had  been 
expected,  so  orders  were  sent  to  camp  for  the  Forty-second 
and  Fifty-third  to  come  out.  They  started  about  12.30  P.M. 
and,  on  getting  outside  Range  Post,  divided,  the  Fifty-third 
going  to  join  the  Twenty-first  in  action,  while  the  Forty-sec 
ond  moved  with  the  Eighteenth  Hussars  to  Rifleman's  Ridge, 
where  they  remained  observing  the  enemy  without  being  or 
dered  into  action.  The  Fifty-third  fired  but  few  rounds  while 
in  action  with  the  Twenty-first,  and  was  finally  ordered  to 
cooperate  with  that  battery  in  an  alternate  retirement  in  action 
towards  Ladysmith,  covering  the  withdrawal  of  the  cavalry. 
In  the  course  of  this  movement,  while  crossing  the  plain  below 
Sign-Post  Ridge,  the  troops  drew  upon  themselves  the  fire  of 


380  THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH 

a  Boer  long-ranging  field  gun  mounted  somewhere  in  the  di 
rection  of  Telegraph  Hill ;  several  rounds  fell  or  burst  near 
the  battery,  but  no  damage  was  done.  There  was  another 
curious  shot  fired  by  the  Fifty-third  in  this  retirement.  A 
Boer  gun,  or  what  looked  like  a  gun,  was  driven  up  into  the 
space  between  the  end  of  Rifleman's  Ridge  and  Lancer's  Hill. 
Lieutenant  Higgins  laid  the  gun  with  an  ordered  elevation 
of  four  thousand  yards ;  the  shell  appeared  to  burst  right  on 
the  object,  and  mounted  men  ran  or  galloped  away  from  it.  After 
crossing  Range-Post  Ridge  the  batteries  came  under  fire  of 
the  Bulwana  guns  again,  and,  to  avoid  the  danger  of  a  block 
in  crossing  the  Iron  Bridge,  they  went  to  a  drift  some  half- 
mile  lower  down  the  river.  This  had  to  be  approached  across 
an  open  piece  of  ground,  over  which  each  gun  hurried  singly. 
The  driving  down  the  right  and  up  the  left  bank  was  very 
difficult,  as  the  roadway  on  each  side  was  most  elementary ; 
guns  stuck  in  the  river-bed  and  on  the  roadway,  but  were 
quickly  extricated  by  gunners  with  drag-ropes.  This  passage 
showed  how  difficult  the  drift  would  be  if  the  river  were  at  all 
high,  and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  batteries  never  used  it  again. 

On  the  4th  there  was  no  fighting,  but  all  civilians  who  could 
be  persuaded  were  removed  to  Intombi  Camp,  a  spot  some 
four  miles  from  Ladysmith,  halfway  between  Bulwana  and 
Caesar's  Camp,  and  close  to  the  railway ;  thither  also  on  the 
5th  of  November  the  chief  hospitals  were  moved  and  estab 
lished  to  the  north  of  the  line,  the  civil  camp  being  to  the 
south. 

On  the  5th  the  commanding  officer  of  the  Fifty-third  took 
a  party  of  ten  gunners  from  each  of  the  three  batteries  and 
made  the  beginning  of  a  roadway  to  enable  artillery  to  be 
taken  up  the  west  end  of  Caesar's  Camp ;  another,  a  zigzag 
road,  had  been  laid  out  by  Captain  Walker,  Adjutant  Royal 
Artillery,  leading  up  a  re  entering  angle  on  the  northeast  side 
of  Caesar's  Camp,  and  this  became  the  main  road  on  to  the 
top  of  that  hill. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH  381 

It  was  up  this  latter  road  that  the  Forty-second  Battery 
took  their  guns  on  the  night  of  the  7th  of  November,  and  es 
tablished  themselves  in  gun  emplacements  admirably  designed 
by  Major  Goulburn,  who  commanded  the  Forty-second.  With 
the  exception  of  five  days  in  December,  the  Forty-second  re 
mained  always  on  Caesar's  Camp ;  during  the  rest  of  the 
Ladysmith  operations,  the  Twenty-first  and  Fifty-third  Bat 
teries  lay  side  by  side  ready  to  move  where  wanted,  taking 
their  shares  of  various  tasks  alternately. 

The  Forty-second  was  considerably  broken  up,  as  they  had 
only  their  guns  on  the  top  of  Caesar's  Camp ;  to  man  them 
they  had  their  gunners  under  the  major  and  three  subalterns, 
while  the  drivers  under  the  captain  remained  in  their  old 
camp  beside  the  Twenty-first.  The  Caesar's  Camp  party  were 
established  in  a  charming  little  plateau  amongst  mimosa  bushes 
halfway  up  the  northeast  face  of  the  hill,  some  quarter-mile 
from  the  camp  of  the  Manchester  Regiment,  which  was  pitched 
at  the  top  of  Captain  Walker  Road. 

The  Twenty-first  and  Fifty-third  were  hooked  in  every 
morning,  ready  to  move  off,  at  daybreak,  then  about  4.15 
A.M. ;  and  very  trying  work  this  was,  especially  for  the  drivers 
who  had  to  harness  up  in  the  dark.  It  was  wonderful,  when 
daylight  came  and  the  battery  could  be  inspected,  to  see  how 
few  mistakes  the  men  ever  made.  The  men  stood  by  their 
horses  and  guns  in  their  respective  gun-parks,  while  the  offi 
cers  collected  and  waited  for  orders  on  the  main  road  of  the 
town  which  ran  past  two  of  the  gun-parks. 

Two  of  the  officers  were  always  down  by  the  river-bank, 
some  half-mile  from  camp,  on  the  lookout  for  an  attack  on 
the  Helpmakaar  Post.  Had  such  an  attack  come,  the  batteries 
had  orders  to  move  to  this  part  of  the  river-bank  and  there 
come  into  action  against  the  flank  of  the  attack.  This  spot, 
which  the  Royal  Artillery  named  Blewitt's  Post,  and  which 
was  close  above  the  drift  from  the  town  on  to  the  "flats,"  was 
a  very  good  point  from  which  to  observe  the  commencement 


382  THE  SIEGE  OF  LADY  SMITH 

of  the  Boer  artillery  fire  each  morning.  As  the  mists  rose  and 
the  light  increased,  there  would  be  a  duel  of  snipers  on  each 
side,  and,  as  this  duel  began  at  much  the  same  time  and  in 
much  the  same  places  nearly  every  day,  it  must  be  supposed 
that  a  mutual  interchange  of  shots  between  the  same  men 
took  place  daily  throughout  the  investment.  As  it  got  fairly 
light,  a  pom-pom  somewhere  on  Bulwana  always  fired  at  the 
cavalry  vedettes  coming  in  along  under  the  Helpmakaar  Eidge, 
and,  though  this  happened  daily,  no  casualty  was  ever  heard 
of  as  the  result  of  this  fire.  Next,  the  big  "  Long  Tom  "  on 
Pep  worth  would  open  fire  on  the  town,  and  then  a  field  gun 
on  Bulwana  would  fire  round  after  round  at  the  balloon,  which 
generally  made  its  first  ascent  about  the  hour  of  sunrise.  On 
the  8th  of  November  "  Long  Tom "  on  Bulwana  first  fired, 
and  it  was  always  a  matter  of  interest  to  see  him  begin  work 
for  the  day.  Occasionally  it  was  rather  startling,  while  watch 
ing  the  fire  of  the  various  Boer  guns,  to  find  a  shell  from  one 
of  them  burst  close  to  Blewitt's  Post,  having  been  fired  at 
one  of  the  many  herds  of  cattle  driven  out  each  morning  over 
the  drift  to  feed  on  the  flats.  A  herd  of  cattle  always  pos 
sessed  an  irresistible  attraction  to  the  Boer  gunners,  and  the 
firing  at  herds  was  so  persistent  that  it  would  almost  seem  as 
if  by  this  means  unskilled  layers  were  being  trained  in  the  art 
of  firing  on  moving  objects. 

As  attacks  were  only  expected  early  in  the  morning,  there 
was  no  need  for  both  batteries  to  remain  hooked  in  all  day, 
so  the  horses  of  the  battery  not  on  duty  generally  filed  on  to 
their  lines  about  6.30  A.M.,  and  the  morning  passed  in  the 
usual  routine  of  stables  and  orderly  room ;  the  horses  remained 
harnessed  up  until  5  P.M.,  so  their  grooming  before  that  hour 
could  not  be  very  thorough.  All  through  the  first  part  of  the 
investment,  in  fact  up  to  Christmas,  the  horses  were  well  fed, 
largely  from  supplies  of  hay  and  corn  brought  from  India ; 
they  were  exercised  up  and  down  the  main  roads  of  the  town, 
shaded  by  trees  from  the  Boers'  sight. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH  383 

November  9  was  a  notable  day;  first,  because  on  it  the 
Boers  commenced  attacks  on  Caesar's  Camp,  Observation  Hill, 
and  Helpmakaar  Post,  but  pressed  none  of  them  home,  ex 
cept,  perhaps,  that  on  Caesar's  Camp,  where  they  were  re 
pulsed.  These  attacks  were  well  backed  up  by  their  guns, 
which  were  estimated  to  have  fired  between  eight  hundred 
and  nine  hundred  rounds  this  day.  They  failed  to  draw  the 
naval  guns  until  noon,  when  a  royal  salute  of  twenty-one 
shotted  guns  was  fired  from  the  naval  batteries  in  honor  of 
the  birthday  of  His  Royal  Highness,  the  Prince  of  Wales.  If 
the  failure  of  the  attacks  and  the  firing  of  a  shotted  salute 
were  not  sufficient,  the  fact  that,  for  the  first  time,  helio- 
graphic  messages  were  sent  through  to  a  hill  south  of  Colenso 
should  have  sufficed  to  make  the  day  notable.  Among  the  first 
messages  were  birthday  congratulations  to  His  Royal  High 
ness  from  the  Natal  Field  Force. 

From  the  10th  to  the  13th  the  weather  was  misty,  rainy, 
and  cool,  and  the  bombardment  only  slight.  The  14th  was 
the  first  day  of  a  most  unpleasant  duty,  which,  from  the  21st 
to  the  28th,  was  taken  on  alternate  days  by  the  Twenty-first 
and  the  Fifty-third  Batteries;  it  was  as  follows:  At  3.15  A.M. 
the  battery  marched  off  up  to  the  old  "  Tin  Camp,"  and  two 
sections  —  four  guns  —  were  posted  ready  to  open  fire  at  day 
break  from  a  position  in  the  open  close  under  "  Ration  Post "; 
the  other  section,  of  two  guns  under  Lieutenant  Higgins,  was 
placed  near  the  Klip  River  Camp  Bridge,  ready  to  open  fire 
on  an  enemy  showing  on  Star  Hill.  The  guns  at  Ration  Post 
were  directed  against  a  Boer  field  gun,  probably  a  twelve- 
pounder,  in  a  strong  emplacement  on  Thornhill's  Kopje  dis 
tant  about  thirty-two  hundred  and  fifty  yards  and  a  howitzer 
in  an  emplacement  on  Surprise  Hill  distant  forty-three  hun 
dred  yards.  The  Fifty-third  was  sent  to  these  positions  to 
allow  the  Sixty-seventh,  which  had  hitherto  occupied  them, 
to  move  out  with  the  Twenty-first  Battery  and  the  cavalry 
against  a  Boer  gun  and  convoy.  As  soon  as  the  batteries 


384  THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH 

appeared  over  Range  Post,  the  Boer  guns  on  Telegraph  Hill, 
three  in  number,  opened  fire  on  them,  and,  in  order  to  check 
this  fire,  one  section  of  the  Fifty-third  was  moved  some 
half-mile  nearer  to  ThornhiU's  Kopje  and  brought  into  action 
to  the  left  against  Telegraph  Hill.  This  advance  was  covered 
by  the  remaining  section  which  fired  salvos  against  the  gun 
on  ThornhiU's  Kopje.  Telegraph  Hill  was  distant  about  four 
thousand  yards,  and,  though  the  fire  of  the  section  against  it 
was  good,  its  value  was  the  greater  in  that  it  diverted  the  at 
tention  of  the  Boer  guns  from  the  force  moving  out  by  Range 
Post.  As  soon  as  this  force  withdrew,  the  Boer  guns  ceased 
firing,  and  the  advanced  section  of  the  Fifty-third  rejoined  the 
other  section  in  the  same  manner  as  it  had  come. 

When  not  engaging  the  enemy,  the  guns  were  left  loaded, 
standing  out  in  the  open,  the  officers,  non-commissioned  offi 
cers,  and  men  being  withdrawn  on  to  the  kopje  of  Ration  Post, 
where  they  remained  all  day.  This  kopje  faced  east  and  was 
exposed  to  the  heat  of  the  sun's  rays  through  the  greater  part 
of  the  day,  and,  by  dinner-time,  the  rocks  became  nearly  hot 
enough  to  fry  meat.  It  was  necessary  to  stay  on  this  face  of 
the  kopje,  as  every  other  side  was  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the 
Boer  guns  mentioned  above,  as  well  as  a  very  annoying  one 
fired  from  near  where  the  Blauubank  Road  crossed  Rifleman's 
Ridge.  A  small  Boer  gun  was  constantly  fired  at  the  earth 
works  on  King's  Post,  or  at  mules  grazing  between  that  and 
Ration  Post,  or  even  at  single  men  passing  from  the  Tin  Camp 
to  behind  King's  Post ;  this  gun  was  either  a  three-pounder 
or  a  pom-pom.  After  the  two  sections  were  reunited,  the  trum 
peter  had  tied  his  own,  the  major's,  and  the  captain's  horses  to 
a  wheelbarrow  at  the  foot  of  Ration  Post.  A  shell  from  the 
Blauubank  gun  hit  and  burst  on  the  barrow  and  scattered  the 
horses,  which  galloped  off  back  towards  camp.  When  caught, 
both  the  officers'  horses  were  found  to  be  wounded,  but  both 
recovered  within  a  week ;  the  only  serious  damage  done  was 
to  the  wheelbarrow,  much  to  the  annoyance  of  the  Sixtieth 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH  385 

Rifles,  to  whom  it  belonged.  This  is  a  good  illustration  of  the 
small  and  very  local  effect  of  a  percussion-fused  long-ranged 
shell. 

The  battery  was  ordered  to  return  to  camp  as  soon  as  it 
was  dusk,  which  was  not  until  after  7  P.M.  Rain  had  begun 
at  5  P.M.,  and  had  made  every  one  wet,  but  had  never  ren 
dered  it  dark  enough  to  anticipate  the  hour  of  dusk,  so  the 
battery  returned  in  the  dark  to  the~  camp  it  had  left  in  the 
dark. 

This  night  at  12.30  A.M.  the  Boers  for  the  first  time  opened 
fire  from  their  guns  at  night,  and  judging  by  the  sound,  they 
fired  one  round  from  each  gun  in  turn ;  partly,  perhaps,  on 
account  of  this  and  partly  because  heavy  rain  began  at  9  A.M., 
there  was  no  further  bombardment  on  the  15th. 

The  16th,  17th,  and  18th  produced  what  may  be  called  an 
average  bombardment.  This  consisted  of  the  early  morning 
firing  previously  described,  which  usually  ceased  about  6  or 
6.30  A.M.,  probably  for  breakfast.  Another  period,  or  series, 
was  from  9.30  to  10.30  A.M.  Sometimes  there  was  another 
soon  after  noon,  after  which  there  was  always  a  lull  as  for 
dinner  and  siesta,  and  then  the  evening  series,  which  was  often 
the  heaviest,  began  about  5  P.M.  and  lasted  occasionally  until 
dark.  The  firing  from  their  heavy  guns  was  usually  opened 
either  on  Caesar's  Camp  or  on  the  Carnp  of  the  Gordon  High 
landers  near  the  iron  bridge  over  the  Klip.  After  three  or 
four  rounds  at  them  it  was  turned  for  the  same  number  on  to 
the  neighborhood  of  the  Royal  Artillery  Camp ;  thence  to  the 
camp  of  the  Imperial  Light  Horse,  and  so  on  to  the  Poort 
Road  and  the  general's  house,  to  the  Ordnance  Parks,  the 
railway  station,  and  Helpmakaar  Post.  Very  often,  however, 
before  these  had  all  been  visited  in  their  turn,  the  naval  guns 
would  open  on  them,  the  Boers  would  at  once  reply,  and  a 
duel  would  ensue,  lasting  until  one  or  the  other  had  fired  the 
number  of  rounds  allotted  to  that  series,  when  the  other  would 
also  "cease  fire."  Siege  artillerymen  will  at  once  recognize 


386  THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH 

that  the  Boers  worked  by  no  scientific  system ;  their  use  of 
heavy  guns  was  only  in  the  form  of  a  casual  bombardment, 
and  the  chief  result  was  an  enormous  waste  of  ammunition. 

Although  the  Boers  observed  the  daylight  of  Sunday  as  a 
peace  or  holiday,  it  did  not  prevent  them  from  bombarding  at 
12.30  A.M.  on  the  19th  of  November.  On  the  afternoon  of  this 
day  a  team  of  press  correspondents  came  and  played  a  cricket 
match  against  the  officers  of  the  Royal  Artillery  Camp.  The 
only  ball  that  could  be  found  was  made  of  rubber  compo 
sition,  which  slowly  chipped  away,  but  which  lasted  long 
enough  to  allow  of  one  complete  innings  for  each  side  ;  the 
Press  made  21,  the  Royal  Artillery  Camp,  58.  Poor  Steevens,1 
of  the  "  Daily  Mail,"  and  Mitchell,  assistant  correspondent  of 
the  "  Standard,"  who  both  fell  victims  to  enteric,  took  part  in 
this  match. 

On  the  20th  the  bombardment  became  heavier  and  was 
again  repeated  at  night  about  11.30  P.M.,  and,  on  this  night, 
the  Boers  used  a  searchlight  from  the  north.  On  the  21st, 
23d,  25th,  and  28th,  the  Twenty-first  Battery  went  off  to 
Ration  Post  at  3.15  A.M.,  returning  to  camp  about  8  P.M.  The 
Fifty-third  took  this  unpleasant  duty  on  the  22d,  24th,  and 
27th.  The  only  day  on  which  either  of  the  batteries  fired  any 
rounds  was  the  24th,  when  the  Fifty-third  fired  ten  rounds  at 
the  Boer  gun  on  Thornhill's  Kopje.  This  gun  was  firing  at  the 
mounted  infantry,  who  had  gone  out  to  try  and  round  up  a 
herd  of  commissariat  oxen  which  had  grazed  off  too  near  to 
the  Boer  lines.  The  gun  returned  the  fire  and  dropped  several 
shells  just  over  the  battery  without  touching  anything.  The 
following  official  statement  for  the  24th  of  November  may  be 
of  interest :  — 


( 

Killed  to  date     .     .     . 
Wounded  

Officers 
24 
83 

Men            Horses  and  mules 
171                   276 
799                   100 

Missing       
Died  of  wounds  . 
Died  of  disease  .     .     . 

47 
6 

1,153 
34 

9 

1  Author  of  With  Kitchener  to  Khartum. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH  387 

Ammunition  expended  to  date 

4.7  inch  naval  guns 239  rounds 

12-pounder  naval  guns 272 

6.3  inch  howitzer 12 

15-pounder  B.  L.  guns      .     . 5,870 

9-pounder  muzzle-loading  magazine  rifle  guns    .  529 

.303  inch  rifle 594,127 

.303  inch  carbine 73,945 

pistol 241 

There  were  requiring  to  be  rationed  on  this  day  some  thir 
teen  thousand  military  and  four  thousand  civilians,  and  there 
remained  supplies  for  another  eighty  days. 

While  employed  on  Ration  Post,  it  was  easy  to  observe  the 
Boers  building  an  emplacement  for  a  large  gun  on  End  Hill 
to  the  west  of  Wagon  Hill,  and,  on  the  27th,  a  gun  firing 
black  powder,  probably  a  Creusot  ninety-four-pounder,  opened 
fire  in  the  forenoon  against  the  northwest  corner  of  Caesar's 
Camp,  where  a  naval  volunteers'  nine-pounder  gun  was  mounted. 
The  first  three  rounds  were  all  unpleasantly  near  this  gun,  and 
every  one  was  watching  where  the  fourth  shell  would  pitch, 
when  there  was  a  crash  some  six  hundred  yards  short  of  Ration 
Post.  The  shell  had  pitched  close  to  the  reservoir  where  a  bat 
talion  of  the  Sixtieth  Rifles  was  lying  under  shelter,  and  where 
the  horses  and  limbers  of  the  Fifty-third  were  resting,  as  it 
was  thought,  safely  under  cover.  The  explosive  in  this  shell 
was  very  powerful,  as  splinters  of  shell  or  rock  fell  thickly  on 
Ration  Post.  Four  more  rounds  did  this  gun  fire  close  to  the 
same  spot,  and  the  Rifles  wisely  adjourned  to  seek  better  cover 
under  the  river-bank.  Again,  once  more  nothing  was  touched. 

From  this  day  forward  the  morning  routine  for  some  weeks 
was  for  batteries  to  exercise  from  4  A.M.  to  5  A.M.,  at  which 
hour  both  were  hooked  in  ready  to  move  off.  There  was  no 
more  duty  at  Ration  Post. 

On  the  30th  of  November  another  large  gun  opened  fire 
from  Gun  Hill,  a  hill  which  may  be  described  as  an  under- 
feature  of  Lombard's  Kop.  This  soon  proved  itself  to  be  one 
of  the  most  annoying  guns  throughout  the  investment.  And 
now  the  bombardment  came  heavier,  so  much  so  that  on  the 


388  THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH 

2d  of  December  it  was  found  necessary  to  shift  the  tents  of 
the  men  of  the  Fifty-third  to  a  spot  in  the  peach  orchard  of  a 
house  close  to  the  ground  their  camp  had  hitherto  occupied, 
and  it  now  became  necessary  to  issue  orders  that,  directly  a 
"  Long  Tom  "  began  to  fire,  every  man  was  to  retire  to  the 
shelter  trenches  dug  under  the  left  bank  of  the  Klip  River. 
Each  battery  had  its  own  trenches,  and  there  is  no  record  of 
a  shell  ever  touching  one  of  them.  Those  of  the  Royal  Artil 
lery  were  poor  places  compared  to  the  caves  dug  by  the  Gor 
dons,  or  to  the  elaborate  mines  excavated  by  the  skilled  miners 
of  the  Imperial  Light  Horse  a  little  higher  up  on  the  opposite 
bank  of  the  river ;  but,  as  just  mentioned,  they  sufficed. 

It  should  not  be  overlooked  that,  on  the  29th  of  November, 
both  batteries  were  warned  to  go  out  with  a  large  force  that 
night  to  seize  Rifleman's  Ridge.  Had  this  been  done,  the  idea 
was  that  the  ridge  was  to  be  held  as  an  advanced  post  by  the 
Rifle  Brigade.  Whether  it  was  ever  seriously  intended  to  at 
tempt  this  operation  will  probably  never  be  divulged,  but  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that,  quite  early  in  the  day,  the  Boers  had  full 
and  accurate  information  of  what  was  proposed,  for,  instead 
of  its  usual  deserted  appearance  shortly  before  sunset,  the  ridge 
was  observed  to  be  occupied  in  force.  The  result  of  this  was 
that,  about  10.30  P.M.,  the  orders  were  countermanded.  The 
Boers  had  an  excellent  system  of  espionage  and  of  commu 
nication  from  inside  to  the  investing  lines  of  Ladysmith,  and 
an  order  had  only  to  be  written  out  for  them  to  know  it,  very 
often  sooner  than  some  of  the  forces  of  the  defence. 

Early  in  December  flying  columns  were  detailed  to  be  ready 
to  move  out ;  presumably  to  cooperate  with  Buller.  On  the 
nights  of  the  2d  and  6th  of  December  the  column  assembled 
at  a  rendezvous  at  9  P.M.,  and  was  not  dismissed  until  the  sup 
ply  wagons  had  been  duly  marshalled  and  moved  off  along  an 
indicated  road  in  the  town. 

On  the  night  of  the  7th-8th  of  December  a  party  of  one 
hundred  each  of  the  Natal  Carbineers  and  Imperial  Light 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH  389 

Horse,  with  Captain  Fowke  and  Lieutenant  Turner,  both 
Royal  Engineers,  all  under  Major-General  Sir  A.  Hunter, 
made  a  most  successful  sortie  against  Gun  Hill,  destroying  a 
"  Long  Tom  "  and  howitzer,  and  bringing  back  a  Maxim  gun. 
The  whole  affair  was  carried  out  as  a  surprise,  and  orders  con 
nected  with  it  were  only  issued  by  word  of  mouth. 

On  the  morning  of  the  8th  the  cavalry  brigade  under  Gen 
eral  Brocklehurst  moved  out  towards  Limit  Hill  and  along  the 
Newcastle  Road  to  find  out  the  strength  of  the  Boers  in  that 
direction.  The  Fifty-third  was  ordered  soon  after  4  A.M.  to 
move  to  a  rendezvous  on  the  Newcastle  Road  just  above  the 
town  and  wait  there  for  further  orders.  The  rendezvous  spot 
brought  the  head  of  the  battery  to  a  halt  where  the  road  winds 
over  the  hill  and  was  fully  exposed  to  the  view  of  the  Boers  on 
Bulwana.  Nothing  would  be  visible  until  the  sun  rose  behind 
Bulwana,  but,  directly  the  first  rays  appeared,  it  was  evident 
that  the  unwonted  presence  of  troops  must  draw  down  a  heavy 
artillery  fire.  Surely  enough,  within  a  minute  of  the  sun  show 
ing  over  the  crest  of  the  hill,  the  first  round  was  fired  from 
Bulwana.  Never  was  an  order  more  welcome  than  that  given 
to  the  commanding  officer  of  the  Fifty-third  to  move  from  the 
rendezvous  and  advance  to  a  place  under  cover  of  Observation 
Hill.  By  6.30  A.M.  Sir  G.  White  had  learned  all  that  his  cav 
alry  could  tell  him,  so  the  battery  was  sent  home  at  once. 

On  the  night  of  the  lOth-llth  of  December  another  sur 
prise  visit  was  paid  to  the  Boers.  This  time  the  hill  visited 
was  that  appropriately  named  Surprise  Hill.  The  officer  com 
manding  the  troops  was  Lieutenant-Colonel  C.  Metcalfe,  K.B. 
Lieutenant  Digby-Jones  went  as  Royal  Engineer  officer  to 
carry  out  the  explosion  part  of  the  operations.  The  howitzer  was 
successfully  destroyed^  but  not  without  a  heavy  casualty  list. 

The  flying  column  paraded  at  9.30  P.M.  on  the  12th  and  at 
9  P.M.  on  the  13th,  and  these  parades  were  utilized  to  give 
the  infantry  regiments  composing  the  column  a  short  night 
route  march  around  the  various  streets  of  the  town. 


390  THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH 

In  the  evening  of  the  llth  Major  Goulburn  had  taken  four 
of  his  guns  of  the  Forty-second  Battery  from  Caesar's  Camp 
to  relieve  Major  Wing's  Sixty-ninth  Battery,  in  position  on 
Observation  Hill,  in  order  that  the  Sixty-ninth  might  accom 
pany  the  flying  column.  At  night  on  the  16th  Major  Goul 
burn  returned  to  Cesar's  Camp,  and  Major  Wing  to  Obser 
vation  Hill.  The  flying  column  was  no  longer  wanted ;  Buller 
had  made  his  attempt  at  Colenso  and  failed. 

The  news  of  this  failure  became  generally  known  on  Sun 
day  the  17th,  and,  in  a  measure,  the  disappointment  was  not 
so  great  as  might  have  been  the  case.  This  was  due  to  the 
fact  that  Buller 's  guns  had  been  fired  on  the  13th  and  again 
very  heavily  on  the  15th,  and,  as  no  good  effect  had  resulted, 
there  was  a  general  feeling  that  all  was  not  going  favorably 
with  the  relieving  column. 

Saturday,  the  16th,  had  been  Diugaau's  Day,  and  the  Boers 
had  celebrated  this  important  holiday  with  a  heavy  bombard 
ment  from  4.30  A.M.  to  6.30  A.M.  Unfortunately  Driver  Mid- 
wood,  of  the  Fifty-third,  was  one  of  the  few  men  hit;  a  shell 
from  the  Bulwana  "  Long  Tom  "  grazed  his  back  as  he  was 
riding  his  horse  at  battery  exercise  in  the  main  street  of  the 
town.  The  shell  burst  in  the  road  a  yard  or  two  beyond  him 
and  hurt  no  one  else.  Mid  wood  was  taken  off  his  horse  and 
carried  to  the  field  hospital  in  the  Poort  Road,  but  died  in 
twenty  minutes.  His  was  one  of  the  very  few  known  cases  of 
a  man  being  touched  by  a  shell  in  its  flight,  and  what  made 
it  the  more  sad  was  the  fact  that  he  was  one  of  the  wagon 
limber  drivers  who  rode  out  with  Captain  Thwaites  and  re 
covered  the  gun  on  the  battlefield  of  Lombard's  Kop.  A  few 
weeks  later,  too,  Corporal  Saunders,  who  was  the  non-commis 
sioned  officer  of  this  party,  died  of  sickness  at  Intombi  Camp ; 
he  was  a  great  loss  to  the  battery. 

On  the  18th  of  December  began  the  first  of  a  series  of  dis 
astrous  shell  bursts.  On  this  day  a  ninety-four-pounder  shell 
fell  in  the  lines  of  the  Natal  Carbineers,  striking  and  bursting 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH  391 

on  a  horse.  The  pieces  of  shell  killed  three  men,  severely 
wounded  two  men  and  several  horses  in  the  neighborhood, 
while  other  pieces  flying  forward  to  the  Royal  Engineers'  lines 
killed  a  sapper,  and  alongside  in  the  lines  of  the  Twenty-first 
Battery  wounded  Captain  Campbell's  charger  so  badly  that  it 
had  to  be  destroyed.  The  same  evening  another  shell  wounded 
a  man  in  the  Twenty-first  Battery.  On  the  20th  a  shell  struck 
and  burst  on  a  sunburnt  brick  wall  in  the  Fifty-third  Bat 
tery's  lines  and  killed  five  mules  picketed  behind  it;  inspec 
tion  of  their  carcasses  showed  that  they  were  more  damaged 
by  the  blast  of  the  explosion  than  by  the  splinters  of  shell. 
In  each  of  these  cases  it  is  noteworthy  that  the  damage  seemed 
due  to  the  fact  that  the  shell  burst  on  some  object  above  the 
level  of  the  ground,  and  it  was  very  rare  that  a  shell  which 
fell  in  the  open  soil  did  any  harm.  On  the  22d  another  of 
Bulwana's  u  Long  Tom's  "  shells  burst  with  disastrous  effect 
in  the  camp  of  what  was  left  of  the  Gloucester  Eegiment. 

On  the  21st  this  gun  had  fired  at  Sir  George  White's  house 
in  the  Poort  Road.  The  first  round  pitched  in  the  road  some 
two  hundred  yards  short  of  the  house,  the  next  about  one  hun 
dred  short,  the  next  only  fifty,  and  the  fourth  struck  the  house, 
pitching  in  the  room  occupied  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Sir  H. 
Rawlinson,  assistant  adjutant-general,  who,  luckily,  was  out 
of  it  at  the  time.  Sir  George  was  in  the  house  lying  sick  with 
fever,  and  it  was  with  great  difficulty  that  the  Staff  persuaded 
him  to  move  into  Mr.  Christopher's  house  on  the  ridge  less 
than  a  quarter  of  a  mile  off. 

The  greater  portion  of  the  Headquarters  Staff  moved  to 
another  house,  which  was  conspicuously  labelled  Headquarters 
Staff,  and  which  was  well  under  cover  of  the  ridge.  Perhaps 
the  Boers'  information  as  to  Sir  George's  new  residence  was 
faulty,  but  no  further  attempt  was  made  to  shell  it.  Although 
the  flying  column  was  no  longer  warned  to  be  in  readiness, 
the  Twenty-first  and  Fifty-third  Batteries  tried  to  keep  their 
horses  fit  for  any  movement,  and,  to  this  end,  each  battery 


392  THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH 

went  for  a  route  march  from  3  A.M.  to  4  A.M.  on  alternate 
mornings  ;  the  Fifty-third  usually  went  out  over  the  iron 
bridge  up  to  the  foot  of  Range  Post  and  back,  making  a  little 
tour  of  some  of  the  streets  of  the  town.  In  this  way  horses 
got  both  up  and  down  hill  work. 

Christmas  Day,  by  the  thoughtful  care  of  Colonel  Ward, 
assistant  adjutant-general,  was  kept  as  a  feast  day  by  all  the 
garrison,  every  man  getting  enough  flour,  currants,  etc.,  to 
make  an  excellent  plum  pudding  and  a  ration  of  rum  with 
which  to  wash  it  down.  Notwithstanding  a  bombardment 
morning  and  evening  officers  went  around  and  visited  their 
friends.  The  heat  at  this  time  was  very  great.  The  maximum 
registered  in  the  shade  on  the  26th  of  December  was  107°  F., 
and  thunderstorms  burst  or  were  visible  in  the  neighborhood 
daily.  On  the  26th  the  bombardment  was  heavier  than  usual. 
As  the  batteries  now  had  got  into  a  regular  routine  of  exer 
cise  and  harness  before  dawn,  stables  and  orderly  room  about 
9  A.M.,  feed  and  water  at  the  usual  hours,  it  became  easy  for 
officers  of  the  batteries  to  go  out  of  camp  and  see  other  parts 
of  the  works  and  their  friends  occupying  them.  It  was  a  great 
treat  to  go  to  the  Intelligence  Division  or  Headquarters  and 
hear  the  news  heliographed  in  or  see  papers  recently  brought 
in  by  runners. 

Interest  in  the  relief  was  revived  on  the  26th  by  the  sound 
of  guns  to  the  southwest. 

On  the  last  day  of  1899  Captain  Slayter,  Royal  Artillery 
Medical  Corps,  who  had  been  in  medical  charge  of  the  bat 
teries  from  the  arrival  in  Natal,  was  removed  to  Intombi  Camp 
sick  with  enteric.  His  was  a  remarkable  case,  as  it  was  his 
third  attack  of  enteric.  Thenceforward  the  batteries  were  in 
medical  charge  of  subordinates  of  the  Indian  Medical  Staff. 

The  year  1900  was  welcomed  by  the  firing  of  another  salute 
directly  after  midnight  from  the  guns  mounted  on  the  works. 
The  Boers  did  not  reply  except,  perhaps,  by  making  the  bom 
bardment  heavier  than  usual  on  the  1st  of  January. 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH  393 

At  6  A.M.  on  the  2d  of  January,  as  Second  Lieutenant  O.  S. 
Cameron,  of  the  Fifty-third,  was  riding  out  of  camp  to  take 
up  his  lookout  duty  on  Blewitt's  Post,  a  shell  from  Bulwana 
"  Long  Tom  "  pitched  about  two  yards  over  him,  causing  him  to 
be  thrown  violently  from  his  horse  and  sustain  a  concussion  of 
the  brain.  He  was  taken  off  to  the  hospital  and  soon  got  better. 

In  the  early  morning  of  the  6th  o£  January  there  was  con 
siderable  noise  of  rifle  fire,  and  at  about  3  A.M.  a  sound  as  of 
a  bullet  striking  the  corrugated  iron  stable  in  the  Royal  Artil 
lery  Officers'  Camp  was  heard.  Rifle  fire  continued  all  the 
time  the  batteries  were  harnessing  up,  but  nothing  happened 
until  5.15  A.M.,  when  it  was  quite  light.  At  this  hour  one 
staff  officer  came  and  took  away  with  him  the  Twenty-first 
Battery  over  Range  Post,  and  another  took  the  commanding 
officer  of  the  Fifty-third  to  reconnoitre  the  ground  by  Blewitt's 
Post  and  see  what  sort  of  a  position  was  available  for  the 
battery  there.  This  staff  officer  was  Captain  "Wales,  of  the 
Natal  Volunteers,  on  the  staff  of  Colonel  Royston,  command 
ant  of  Natal  Volunteers,  who  had  charge  of  the  "  flats  "  sec 
tion  of  the  defences.  Captain  Wales,  having  seen  the  position, 
rode  off  across  the  drift  to  report  to  Colonel  Royston,  and 
from  him  sent  another  staff  officer,  Captain  Tatham,  also  of 
the  Natal  Carbineers,  to  join  the  Fifty-third  in  its  gun-park. 

Captain  Tatham  soon  arrived  and  reported  that  the  Boers 
were  lodged  on  the  southeast  point  of  Caesar's  Camp,  having 
eluded  the  pickets  and  patrols  in  the  dark,  and  were  in  such 
force  that  the  troops  on  the  top  of  the  hill  could  not  dislodge 
them.  The  battery  was  to  move  out  over  the  Klip  River  to  do 
this.  Accordingly,  just  before  5.30  A.M.  the  Fifty-third  started 
in  column  of  route  round  by  the  road  over  the  iron  bridge  and 
along  parallel  to  the  crest  of  Caesar's  Camp.  The  command 
ing  officer  halted  the  battery  in  the  mimosa  scrub  about  three 
thousand  yards  from  the  point  to  be  attacked,  rode  forward 
and  selected  a  position  some  seven  hundred  yards  nearer  to 
the  point,  and  quickly  brought  the  battery  into  action. 


394  THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH 

The  laying,  as  usual,  was  admirable,  and,  in  a  very  few 
minutes,  shells  were  bursting  with  lovely  accuracy  all  down 
the  edge  line  of  the  hill  end.  Up  to  the  time  of  coming  into 
action  the  Boers  on  Bulwana  and  Lombard's  Kop,  for  some 
unaccountable  reason,  had  not  fired  a  round  at  the  battery ; 
they  soon  made  up  for  this  by  a  rapid  and  concentrated  fire 
of  all  the  guns  they  could  bring  to  bear.  Shells  fell  fast  all 
around  the  battery,  and  the  outline  of  one  gun  carriage  was 
marked  by  the  craters  of  five  burst  shells,  —  thus. 
Once  more  the  ground  was  soft,  and  to  this  was  due  .  A\ 
the  singularly  few  casualties  in  the  battery.  All  the  .  »  * 
men  working  at  the  guns  in  the  Fifty-third  always 
did  so  as  far  as  possible  kneeling  down,  and,  when  not  em 
ployed,  sat  down.  Sergeant  Boseley,  of  No.  2  gun,  was  sitting 
in  his  place  as  No.  1  of  the  detachment,  resting  his  left  elbow 
on  his  left  knee,  when  a  splinter  of  shell  struck  knee  and  elbow 
simultaneously,  causing  fearful  wounds.  He  retained  conscious 
ness  and  said,  "  Roll  me  out  of  the  way,  boys,  and  get  on  with 
the  gun,"  and  a  minute  or  two  later,  when  being  carried  off 
to  the  rear  on  a  stretcher,  called  out,  "Buck  up,  No.  2."  It  is 
satisfactory  to  know  that  his  wounds  were  so  admirably  dressed 
on  the  field  by  Assistant-Surgeon  Kelly,  Indian  Medical  Ser 
vice,  in  charge  of  the  Fifty-third,  that  the  operation  of  am 
putating  both  leg  and  arm  was  successfully  performed  that 
same  evening  in  the  hospital,  and  that,  on  the  twenty-ninth 
day  after  the  operation,  Boseley,  perfectly  convalescent,  was 
being  driven  about  Laclysmith  in  a  Cape  cart  for  a  Sunday  out 
ing  and  change  of  air.  It  is  worth  remembering  that  he  was  one 
of  the  transfers  from  the  Thirty-fourth  Battery.  Another  piece 
of  the  same  shell  struck  Gunner  Pollard,  of  No.  1  gun,  on  the 
right  leg ;  he,  poor  fellow,  was  not  so  fortunate  as  Boseley,  and 
in  October,  1900,  had  to  go  into  the  hospital  for  a  tenth  opera 
tion  on  the  stump  of  his  leg. 

Sergeant  Boseley 's  place  as  No.  1  was  taken  by  Bombardier 
Cooke,  who,  in  his  turn,  was  wounded  in  the  right  leg  by  one 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH  395 

of  the  next  shells.  He,  that  week,  was  Battery  Orderly,  and, 
as  he  lay  on  the  ground  waiting  to  be  removed,  told  those 
around  him  where  his  book  of  duty  rosters  would  be  found  in 
camp  and  whose  turn  it  was  for  various  duties.  Happily,  his 
was  a  satisfactory  case  and  he  rejoined  the  battery  shortly 
after  the  relief  to  find  himself  a  corporal  and  noted  for  early 
promotion.  There  were  many  narrow  escapes  from  shells,  but 
there  was  no  other  serious  wound  that  day  in  the  Fifty-third, 
and,  for  some  time,  the  Boer  shells  dropped  persistently  in 
one  spot  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  yards  in  front  of  the 
battery. 

After  the  battery  had  been  firing  for  an  hour  or  so  the 
Gordon  Highlanders  and  other  British  troops  could  be  seen 
getting  near  to  the  point  being  shelled  by  the  battery,  and,  so 
well  were  the  guns  laid  and  so  accurately  were  the  fuses  set, 
that  it  was  not  until  these  troops  were  within,  what  was  called, 
twenty  yards  of  the  Boers  that  Colonel  Royston  sent  the  orders 
to  cease  fire.  As  soon  as  the  battery  ceased  firing  the  Boer 
guns  turned  their  attention  elsewhere.  The  battery's  guns 
were  left  standing  in  the  open  ready  to  commence  firing  again 
whenever  required,  while  the  officers  and  men  took  shelter 
under  the  steep  bank  of  a  donga,  or  dry  bed  of  a  stream, 
which  debouched  on  to  the  plain  a  few  yards  above  the  guns. 
Here  the  rest  of  the  day  was  spent  inactive,  eating  breakfast 
and  dinner,  listening  to  the  sounds  of  fighting  going  on  in 
other  directions,  talking  to  the  escort  of  Natal  Volunteers,  or 
hearing  from  time  to  time  reports  of  how  the  fight  was  going 
elsewhere.  As  the  day  wore  on,  one  of  the  usual  thunder 
storms  began  to  threaten  and  worked  its  way  all  around  Lady- 
smith  from  west  to  northeast ;  suddenly,  about  4.30  P.M.,  it 
rushed  up  from  the  direction  of  Lombard's  Kop  and  burst 
like  a  water-spout  over  the  battlefield.  As  the  storm  increased, 
so  the  sound  of  rifle  fire  on  Caesar's  Camp  and  Wagon  Hill 
sounded  louder  and  closer,  and  the  Staff  on  Wagon  Hill  felt 
so  sure  that  the  attack  was  being  pushed  home  by  the  Boers 


393  THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH 

tliat  they  drew  their  revolvers.  Above  the  roar  of  thunder  and 
constant  roll  of  rifle  fire,  the  guns  of  the  Forty-second  Bat 
tery  on  the  top  of  Caesar's  Camp  continued  to  fire  at  regular 
intervals,  marking  the  time,  as  it  were,  of  a  horrible  music. 
It  was  about  this  time  that  the  Devons  made  their  historic 
charge  and  swept  the  Boers  from  Wagon  Hill. 

The  change  of  the  scene  around  the  Fifty-third  was  so  rapid 
as  to  be  hardly  credible ;  in  one  quarter  of  an  hour  from  the 
burst  of  the  storm  the  donga,  which  had  sheltered  the  men  all 
day,  was  full,  and  five  minutes  later  the  water  was  overflow 
ing  its  eight-feet  high  banks.  As  the  stream  fast  threatened 
to  cut  off  the  guns  from  the  limbers,  the  commanding  officer 
of  the  Fifty-third  gave  the  order  to  limber  up  and  return  to 
camp,  and  it  was  with  difficulty  that  this  was  reached,  as  every 
donga,  which  had  been  dry  in  the  morning,  was  now  a  raging 
torrent.  One  of  these  was  pronounced  by  some  of  the  Colo 
nials  to  be  impossible  to  cross,  but  the  battery  drove  through 
gun  by  gun,  and,  although  one  of  the  horses  fell,  washed  off 
his  legs  by  the  current,  all  eventually  got  across  with  only  the 
loss  of  a  few  helmets.  The  driving  of  the  teams  on  this  occa 
sion  was  much  admired  by  the  Colonials.  Besides  the  com 
manding  officer,  Lieutenants  Stobart  and  Higgiiis  alone  were 
with  the  battery  this  day,  as  Captain  Thwaites  was  sick  with 
fever  and  Cameron  disabled,  as  previously  described.  Late 
into  the  evening  the  roar  of  rifle  fire  continued,  but  never  so 
loud  or  so  threatening  as  during  the  height  of  the  storm,  and, 
although  the  battery  unhooked  and  turned  in  for  the  night,  it 
was  in  the  expectation  of  a  renewal  of  the  fight  at  dawn  next 
morning. 

Dreadful  were  the  stories  that  the  morning  brought.  The 
most  distressing  to  officers  of  the  batteries  was  the  news  of 
the  death  of  their  Koyal  Engineers  neighbors,  Digby-Jones 
and  Dennis,  while  all  hoped  that  the  wound  to  Colonel  Dick 
Cunningham,  of  the  Gordons,  might  not  prove  fatal.  He  had 
been  struck  within  a  quarter  of  a  mile  of  camp  by  a  stray 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH  397 

bullet,  which  dropped  over  the  hill  of  Maiden  Post,  fired  in 
the  attack  on  Wagon  Hill.  He  was  only  recently  convales 
cent  from  a  wound  received  at  Elandslaagte,  and,  unhappily, 
succumbed  to  the  fresh  wound  on  the  8th. 

Sad  as  were  the  tales  of  losses  incurred  by  all  the  troops 
engaged  on  Caesar's  Camp  and  Wagon  Hill,  there  was  some 
comfort  in  the  thought  that  they  were  not  in  vain,  for  every 
report  gave  the  losses  of  the  Boers  as  the  heaviest  of  the  cam 
paign  so  far.  Throughout  the  next  week  each  report  increased 
the  numbers  of  their  losses  instead  of,  as  after  previous  fights, 
decreasing  them. 

Again,  it  is  well  to  remark  that  this  account  of  the  6th  of 
January  is  only  of  the  part  taken  on  that  day  by  the  Fifty- 
third  Battery.  The  Twenty-first  Battery,  in  action  against 
the  end  of  Wagon  Hill  and  the  Boers  on  Middle  Hill,  had  a 
very  similar  experience  to  that  of  the  Fifty-third,  losing  two 
men  wounded  and  fourteen  horses,  all  from  shell  fire;  they 
were  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  Blauubank,  Rifleman's  Ridge, 
and  Telegraph  Hill  guns.  On  the  8th  of  January  the  bom 
bardment  was  heavier  than  had  been  the  case  for  some  time 
previously,  and  it  seemed  as  if  the  fire  from  Bulwana  was 
more  particularly  directed  at  the  Royal  Artillery  Camp,  espe 
cially  that  part  of  it  occupied  by  the  officers'  tents.  One 
shell  pitched  exactly  on  the  spot  where  Second  Lieutenant 
Cameron's  tent  had  stood  up  to  the  date  of  his  going  to  the 
hospital.  At  7  P.M.  on  the  8th  a  thanksgiving  service  for  de 
livery  from  the  assault  of  the  6th  was  conducted  by  Arch 
deacon  Barker  in  the  English  Church.  All  who  could  attend 
and  the  members  of  the  Staff  assembled  in  the  chancel  for  the 
singing  of  the  "  Te  Deum  "  at  the  close  of  the  service.  The 
bombardment  for  the  next  five  days  was  very  slight,  and,  on 
the  13th,  though  Bulwana  "Long  Tom"  fired  six  rounds, 
only  four  of  them  fell  in  the  Royal  Artillery,  or  adjoining 
Royal  Engineer,  camps. 

On  the  15th  of  January,  not  only  the  garrison  of  Lady- 


398  THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH 

smith,  but  the  whole  literary  world,  sustained  a  loss  in  the 
death  of  that  brilliant  writer,  G.  W.  Steevens,  of  the  "  Daily 
Mail."  His  death  was  a  cruel  surprise,  as,  to  within  two  days 
of  the  end,  he  had  made  good  progress  toward  convalescence. 

By  this  time  it  had  become  evident  that  the  tents  in  the 
Royal  Artillery  officers'  lines  were  objects  selected  for  the 
aim  of  the  Boer  gunners  on  Bulwana,  so,  at  dawn  on  the  16th, 
the  officers'  tents  of  the  Twenty-first,  Fifty-third,  and  Brigade 
Division  Staff  were  shifted  to  neighboring  sites  on  the  river- 
bank  where  they  were  not  visible  to  the  Boers. 

From  the  llth  to  the  16th  the  gunners  of  the  two  batteries 
were  employed  at  night  in  making  new  emplacements  for 
guns  on  Junction  Hill  at  the  other  end  of  the  town.  These 
were  designed  for  occupation  only  in  case  of  an  attack  on  Ob 
servation  Hill.  On  the  16th,  also,  Colonel  Coxhead,  with  the 
commanding  officer  of  the  Fifty-third,  selected  sites  for  guns 
on  Poundburg  Hill,  which  would  form  a  second  line  of  de 
fence  in  event  of  the  outer  line  —  Caesar's  Camp  and  Wagon 
Hill  —  falling.  Happily  neither  was  ever  required  to  be 
occupied. 

On  the  17th  the  guns  of  the  relieving  force  were  for  the 
first  time  heard  firing  from  the  direction  of  Potgieter's  Drift, 
—  that  is,  to  the  left  of  Colenso,  —  and  this  day  the  flying 
column  was  once  more  warned  to  be  ready  to  go  out.  Every 
day,  until  the  25th,  heavy  firing  was  heard  from  the  direction 
of  Potgieter's  and  Acton  Homes,  and  from  certain  points  on 
Caesar's  Camp  and  Observation  Hill  shells  could  be  seen 
bursting  on  Spion  Kop  and  its  neighboring  hills.  Still  the 
flying  column  was  not  ordered  to  move,  and,  on  the  26th, 
when  the  firing  in  the  distance  had  ceased  and  no  news  was 
promulgated,  uneasy  feelings  as  to  the  doings  of  the  relieving 
force  once  more  arose.  Colonel  Frank  Rhodes  was  one  of  the 
very  few,  if  not  the  only  one,  to  gauge  the  situation  aright. 
He  said,  judging  from  what  he  had  heard  and  seen  from  Ob 
servation  Hill,  "  I  believe  we  have  seized  Spion  Kop  and  lost 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LADTSMITH  399 

it  again."  On  the  27th  of  January  the  news  of  what  had 
occurred  became  known. 

It  probably  was  fortunate  that  the  flying  column  was  not 
called  upon  at  this  time  to  take  the  field,  for  both  horses  and 
men  were  by  now  beginning  to  feel  the  want  of  proper  food, 
proper  rest,  and  proper  exercise ;  sickness  was  rife,  many  who 
ought  to  be  in  the  hospital  were  living  in  camp,  as  the  hos 
pitals  were  full,  and,  without  doubt,  if  the  flying  column  had 
tried  to  march  ten  miles  and  fight  a  battle  at  the  end  of  that 
journey,  it  must  have  failed. 

On  the  28th  of  January  Cameron,  who  had  rejoined  the 
battery  011  the  13th,  more  or  less  recovered  from  his  concus 
sion,  had  another  bad  accident:  his  horse  trod  on  a  stone  and 
came  down  on  top  of  him,  crushing  and  bruising  him  so 
severely  that  he  was  moved  to  Intombi  Camp  for  treatment, 
and,  after  the  relief,  was  invalided  home  to  England. 

The  bombardment  never  again  became  anything  more  than 
slight,  and  it  would  seem  as  if  most  of  the  Boer  forces  were 
withdrawn  from  around  Lady  smith  to  operate  against  the  re 
lieving  forces.  Those,  too,  who  were  left  were  probably  an 
inferior  stamp  of  soldier,  for,  on  more  than  one  occasion  at 
night,  they  began  to  fire  on  a  false  alarm,  and  must  have  fired 
away  hundreds  of  rounds  quite  harmlessly.  It  is  worthy  of 
note  that  this  fire  was  not  replied  to,  nor  did  the  British  once, 
during  the  whole  investment,  open  fire  by  night  on  a  false 
alarm.  This  is  in  rather  marked  contrast  to  what  has  occurred 
in  most  modern  campaigns.  On  the  1st  of  February  food  for 
the  horses  and  oxen  had  become  so  scarce  that  orders  were 
issued  for  all  horses,  beyond  one  hundred  in  the  case  of  each 
battery  of  artillery  and  seventy-five  in  the  case  of  each  cav 
alry  regiment,  to  be  turned  out  to  find  what  grazing  they 
could  on  the  flats  and  over  Range  Post.  In  this  way  the 
Fifty-third  turned  out  thirty-one  horses.  These,  with  those  of 
the  other  two  batteries  and  ammunition  column,  were  driven 
out  of  camp  each  morning  by  a  party  of  mounted  drivers 


400  THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH 

under  an  officer.  A  small  picket  of  drivers  was  supposed  to 
watch  them  during  the  day  and  at  night  those  that  could  be 
rounded  up  were  driven  into  a  laager  formed  by  the  ammuni 
tion  column  wagons.  Many  grazed  away,  got  lost  in  the  scrub, 
or  fell  into  muddy  dongas  and  were  too  weak  to  scramble  out 
again,  so  that,  in  a  very  few  days,  the  herd  to  be  driven  out 
was  but  a  small  one,  and,  after  the  3d  of  February,  the  sur 
vivors  were  required  for  slaughter,  a  certain  number  each 
day,  to  make  "chevril,"  or  issue  as  a  meat  ration.  The  allow 
ance  of  corn  for  each  horse  retained  was  two  pounds  a  day, 
sometimes  oats,  sometimes  ground  mealies,  and  sometimes 
whole  mealies.  The  allowance  of  grass  was  nominally  sixteen 
pounds  for  each  horse  a  day,  but  this  was  brought  in  wet,  cut 
by  a  corps  of  Indian  coolies,  Zulus,  and  Cape  boys.  It  had  to 
be  dried  for  a  day  and,  when  given  to  the  horses,  can  rarely 
have  amounted  to  ten  pounds  apiece.  There  had  been  no 
"horse-sickness"  hitherto,  but,  about  the  middle  of  January, 
all  the  horses  were  suffering  from  some  form  of  diarrhoea, 
which  was  accompanied  by  a  persistent  cough. 

On  the  7th  of  February,  Captain  Thwaites  was  ordered  to 
Rifle  Post  to  take  charge  of  four  fifteen-pounders  in  emplace 
ments  there.  While  on  this  duty  he  contracted  dysentery, 
with  which  he  was  invalided  home  soon  after  the  relief. 

On  the  8th  of  February  firing  was  once  more  heard  from 
the  direction  of  Colenso,  and  this  was  repeated  nearly  every 
day  until  the  18th,  when  the  sound  came  as  if  from  the  east 
of  Colenso,  and  thence  it  continued  to  come  for  the  next  nine 
days. 

On  the  23d  of  February  the  commanding  officer  of  the 
Fifty-third  was  ordered  to  ride  out  and  reconnoitre  for  a  posi 
tion  beyond  the  southeast  point  of  Cesar's  Camp,  whence  a 
battery  might  fire  on  a  dam  the  Boers  could  be  seen  build 
ing  across  the  Klip  River  some  mile  or  more  below  Intombi 
Camp. 

A  most  careful  reconnoissance  of  the  ground  failed  to  dis- 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH  401 

cover  any  point  from  which  a  fifteen-pounder  could  possibly 
reach  the  dam;  but  a  place  was  found  on  the  east  end  of 
Caesar's  Camp  plateau  where  a  naval  long-range  twelve- 
pounder  gun  was  mounted  and  from  which  it  could  reach  the 
dam.  Although  it  transpired  later  that  this  dam  had  been 
part  of  the  scheme  for  reducing  Ladysmith,  which  had  been 
determined  on  by  the  Boers  at  a  very  early  date  in  the  invest 
ment,  work  on  it  had  not  been  prosecuted  with  any  vigor  un 
til  about  this  time.  Doubtless  the  Boers  began  to  find  the  left 
flank  of  their  Colenso  lines  seriously  threatened  by  Buller's 
operations  against  Hlaugwaue,  and  to  see  that,  if  the  river 
were  to  rise  suddenly,  their  retreat  by  way  of  Bulwana  and 
the  Modder  Spruit  was  liable  to  be  closed.  They,  therefore, 
determined  to  push  on  the  construction  of  the  dam  as  fast  as 
possible,  more  with  a  view  of  enabling  them  to  control  the 
flow  of  the  Klip  and  keep  a  drift  open  than  with  a  hope  of 
flooding  out  first  the  helpless  Intombi  Camp  and  afterwards 
Ladysmith. 

So  successfully  did  the  relief  force  seem  to  be  advancing 
that  on  the  22d  of  February  a  full  bread  ration  of  biscuit  was 
issued,  and,  on  the  28th,  the  good  news  of  the  capture  of 
Kronje  and  Buller's  victory  at  Pieter's  Hill  were  published. 

It  was  soon  evident  that  the  truth  of  both  these  disasters 
was  realized  by  the  Boers,  for,  on  the  afternoon  of  the  28th, 
a  gyn  or  derrick  was  erected  above  "  Long  Tom  "  of  Bulwana, 
and,  notwithstanding  the  fire  of  the  naval  guns  directed  against 
it,  the  Boers  worked  away  at  the  operation  of  dismounting  for 
some  time. 

As  evening  closed  in,  shouting  and  cheering  from  the  di 
rection  of  Blewitt's  Post  marked  the  arrival  of  Lord  Dun- 
donald  and  some  mounted  volunteers.  Hopes  had  been  too 
often  raised  only  to  be  miserably  shattered  for  any  great  en 
thusiasm  to  be  shown  by  the  relieved  garrison.  No  doubt,  if 
relief  had  come  two  months  sooner,  the  excitement  would  have 
been  far  greater. 


402  THE  SIEGE   OF  LADYSMITH 

On  the  morning  of  the  1st  of  March  a  small  force  of  all 
arms  was  despatched  under  Colonel  W.  Knox,  C.B.,  up  the 
Newcastle  Road  to  try  and  cut  off  some  of  the  flying  Boers. 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Pickwood  went  out  in  command  of  the 
Royal  Artillery,  which  consisted  of  the  Fifty-third  and  Sixty- 
seventh  Batteries,  formed  into  a  brigade  division,  and  two 
guns  of  No.  10  Mountain  Battery.  The  brigade  division  was 
directly  under  the  command  of  the  commanding  officer  (Major 
Abdy)  of  the  Fifty-third.  The  batteries  came  into  action 
against  Boer  riflemen  on  Long  and  Pep  worth  Hills,  and  drove 
them  from  those  positions.  As  the  Staff  rode  forward  to  re 
connoitre  over  the  Modder  Spruit  Boer  railway  station,  a 
train  slowly  moved  some  quarter  of  a  mile  out  from  the  sta 
tion  and  pulled  up,  when,  immediately,  the  bridge  over  the 
spruit  was  blown  up  behind  it.  Again  the  train  moved  for 
ward  and  a  culvert  went  up  behind  it,  and  this  manoeuvre  was 
repeated  twice  more. 

It  was  not  long  before  Colonel  Knox  found  both  men  and 
horses  knocking  up,  and  felt  himself  obliged  to  send  word  to 
Sir  G.  White  to  say  his  troops  could  do  no  more.  At  about 
1.30  P.M.,  shortly  before  the  retirement  began,  Colonel  Pick- 
wood  was  shot  through  the  right  thigh  by  a  bullet  from  Pep- 
worth  Hill.  There  were  few  other  casualties  tbis  day,  but 
several  horses  in  the  cavalry  and  two  or  three  in  the  artillery 
succumbed  to  weakness. 

To  enable  the  Fifty-third  to  turn  out,  it  was  lent  eighteen 
pairs  of  horses  by  each  of  the  Thirteenth  and  the  Sixty-ninth, 
and  twelve  pairs  by  the  Twenty-first  Battery  while  Captain 
Bright,  of  the  Royal  Artillery  Staff,  took  the  place  of  the 
commanding  officer  of  the  Fifty-third  in  command  of  that  bat 
tery  for  the  day,  and  a  subaltern  from  the  Thirteenth  came  for 
the  day  also.  On  return  to  Ladysmith  visitors  from  Pieter's 
Hill  Camp  were  found,  and  the  investment,  or  siege,  as  it  has 
been  called,  of  Ladysmith  was  at  an  end. 

Many  matters  of  interest  have  been  omitted,  or  overlooked, 


THE  SIEGE  OF  LADYSMITH  403 

in  this  slight  sketch,  but  there  is  one  subject  that  should  be 
noted  and  testified  to  by  every  writer;  it  is  the  magnificent 
patience  and  soldierlike  bearing  of  the  rank  and  file  through 
out  those  trying  weeks.  For  officers  there  were  during  more 
than  4half  the  time  many  of  the  comforts  and  small  luxuries 
of  a  mess;  for  an  officer,  too,  who  knew  where  to  go  there 
were  several  excellent  libraries;  and- officers  who  fell  sick  and 
did  not  want  to  go  to  Intombi  were  taken  into  civilians'  houses, 
where  at  least  they  had  a  roof  over  their  heads  and  a  floor  be 
neath  them.  For  the  rank  and  file  there  were  none  of  these, 
and  camp  life  was  worse  for  the  men  of  the  Indian  force  than 
for  others,  as,  up  to  the  date  of  sailing  from  India,  they  had 
everything  in  the  way  of  washing,  cooking,  and  cleaning  their 
lines  done  for  them  by  natives.  In  Lady  smith,  moreover,  they 
had  no  syces  to  help  in  the  care  of  the  horses.  Men,  so  weak 
from  sickness  that  they  ought  to  be  in  bed  and  cared  for  by 
nurses,  would  crawl  down  to  the  horse  lines  and  feebly  try  to 
groom  a  horse.  Much  has  been  written  of  the  splendid  bearing 
of  the  British  soldier  on  the  field  of  battle;  those  who  saw 
him  in  the  festering  camps  of  Ladysmith  can  state  how  nobly 
he  bore  himself  there. 


XVIII 

A  JUDICIAL  VERSUS  A  MILITARY  SETTLE 
MENT  OF  SOME  INTERNATIONAL  DISPUTES 

BY 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  WILLIAM  CROZIER,  U.S.A. 


•  Read  before  the  Society  February  10,  1911p 


A  JUDICIAL  VERSUS  A  MILITARY  SETTLE 
MENT  OF  SOME  INTERNATIONAL  DISPUTES 

I  FEEL  a  good  deal  of  trepidationjn  appearing  before  this 
Society  without  more  preparation  than  I  have  had  the  time  to 
make.  The  Society  has  a  right  to  expect  that  the  addresses 
which  take  up  its  time  shall  have  been  preceded  by  a  good 
deal  of  research,  and  shall  form  a  contribution  of  evidence 
tending  to  bring  out  or  to  clear  up  interesting  facts  in  regard 
to  a  species  of  history  whose  accuracy,  even  in  regard  to  im 
portant  points,  is  often  difficult  to  establish.  But  the  conduct 
of  a  busy  administrative  government  office  does  not  give  oppor 
tunity  for  research,  which,  being  of  absorbing  interest,  is  also 
absorbing  of  time ;  and  I  can  therefore  only,  using  some  well- 
known  facts  of  history,  put  before  you  certain  reflections  upon 
a  subject  which  has  in  recent  years  occupied  a  good  deal  of  the 
attention  of  a  considerable  number  of  statesmen,  public  edu 
cators,  and  other  thinkers  who  may  fairly  be  said  to  be  con 
ducting  or  guiding  the  affairs  of  this  world  in  which  we  live. 

In  speaking  about  a  judicial  settlement  of  international 
disputes  I  wish  to  emphasize  the  difference  between  that  kind 
of  settlement  and  a  settlement  by  diplomacy,  or  by  any  sort 
of  adjustment  in  which  the  parties  make  mutual  concessions. 
You  are  well  aware  of  the  existence  in  this  country  of  a  prom 
inent  association  whose  name  is  the  "  Society  for  the  Judicial 
Settlement  of  International  Disputes."  The  kind  of  settle 
ment  advocated  by  that  Society  is  a  settlement  by  a  court 
similar  to  the  courts  established  within  nations,  before  which 
a  cause  may  be  tried,  and  from  which  the  party  rightfully  ap 
preciating  that  it  has  the  law  and  precedent  on  its  side  can 
confidently  expect  judgment  in  its  favor ;  however  radical 
such  judgment  may  be,  and  however  completely  it  may  deprive 


408     SETTLEMENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  DISPUTES 

the  other  party  of  any  shred  of  comfort  from  the  result.  The 
character  of  such  an  international  court  has  been  often  de 
scribed  by  prominent  members  of  the  Society.  At  the  meet 
ing  of  the  Society  in  Washington,  on  December  15,  1910,  Mr. 
Elihu  Root  made  the  following  statement  in  regard  to  it :  — 

"  Now  it  has  seemed  to  me  very  clear  that  in  view  of  these 
practical  difficulties  standing  in  the  way  of  our  present  sys 
tem  of  arbitration,  the  next  step  by  which  the  system  of  peace 
able  settlement  of  international  disputes  can  be  advanced,  the 
pathway  along  which  it  can  be  pressed  forward  to  universal 
acceptance  and  use,  is  to  substitute  for  the  kind  of  arbitration 
we  have  now,  in  which  the  arbitrators  proceed  according  to 
their  ideas  of  diplomatic  obligation,  real  courts  where  judges, 
acting  under  the  sanctity  of  the  judicial  oath,  pass  upon  the 
rights  of  countries,  as  judges  pass  upon  the  rights  of  individ 
uals,  in  accordance  with  the  facts  as  found  and  the  law  as 
established." 

In  an  address  before  the  Society  in  Cincinnati,  on  Novem 
ber  7,  1911,  President  Taft,  in  speaking  of  the  treaties  of 
arbitration  which  he  had  negotiated  with  Great  Britain  and 
France,  said :  — 

"  Personally,  I  would  have  made  the  treaty  —  if  I  had  had 
the  making  of  it  and  the  ratification,  too  —  I  would  have 
made  the  treaty  so  that  the  board  of  arbitration  should  have 
had  the  jurisdiction  to  decide,  upon  the  application  of  either 
party,  whether  the  question  arising  came  within  the  treaty.  I 
would  leave  the  question  to  a  court  of  superior  jurisdiction. 
But  evidently  we  have  not  yet  quite  got  to  that  stage,  though 
this  is  a  step  in  that  direction.  I  believe  the  arbitral  court  to 
be  the  solution  of  the  difficulty ;  and  when  I  say  '  arbitral 
court,'  I  mean  a  court  whose  jurisdiction  and  power  are  estab 
lished  by  joint  agreement  of  all  nations,  a  court  into  which 
one  nation  may  summon  another  for  a  hearing  upon  a  com 
plaint  and  for  a  judgment,  and  may  rely  upon  the  judgment 
being  carried  out  through  the  public  opinion  of  the  nations, 


SETTLEMENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  DISPUTES     409 

or  by  an  auxiliary  force,  if  necessary.  When  we  have  such  an 
arbitral  court,  then  disarmament  will  follow." 

The  article  of  the  treaties  which  caused  most  discussion, 
and  the  one  whose  material  amendment  by  the  Senate  after- 
wards  caused  the  treaties  to  be  dropped,  provided  an  agree 
ment  that  there  should  be  submitted  to  judicial  settlement 
all  questions  which  should  be  justiciable  in  their  nature,  and 
these  were  immediately  denned  in  the  article  to  be  such  ques 
tions  as  would  be  susceptible  of  decision  by  the  application  of 
the  principles  of  law  arid  equity.  This  would,  of  course,  mean 
nothing  but  the  principles  of  law  or  equity  as  they  were 
understood  at  the  time,  resulting  from  previous  practice.  It 
was  well  recognized  by  Mr.  Taft  that  such  settlement  would 
result  at  times  in  the  complete  defeat  of  one  of  the  contesting 
parties.  He  said:  — 

"  Arbitration  cannot  result  in  victory  for  both  parties. 
Somebody  has  got  to  be  beaten.  We  cannot  play  '  Heads  I 
win,  tails  you  lose.'  We  have  got  to  have  the  people  accept 
the  fact  that  sometimes  we  may  be  beaten.  We  ought  not  to 
arrange  something  with  a  string  to  it  so  that  when  we  think 
we  are  going  to  lose  we  can  back  out  of  arbitration,  and  open 
up  the  possibility  of  war.  We  ought  to  put  ourselves  in  such 
a  situation  that  sometimes  it  will  hurt  us ;  we  ought  to  sub 
scribe  to  and  carry  out  the  treaty  and  stand  to  its  terms.  If 
we  do  not,  then  we  are  not  making  any  progress.  Therefore, 
while  I  appreciate  the  sensitiveness  of  the  Senate  with  respect 
to  this,  and  while  I  regard  that  feeling  with  respectful  con 
sideration,  nevertheless,  I  think  it  is  mistaken.  I  believe  that 
we  can  well  afford  to  go  ahead  and  occasionally  lose  an  arbitra 
tion  in  the  general  cause  of  the  peace  of  the  world." 

I  have  thus  dwelt  upon  the  character  of  the  judicial  settle 
ment  which  many  well-disposed  and  intelligent  people  urge  us 
to  bind  ourselves  to,  in  order  that  we  may  submit  it  to  the  only 
kind  of  test  which  is  worth  anything,  in  the  absence  of  prac 
tical  trial ;  that  is,  the  test  of  its  application  to  incidents  which 


410     SETTLEMENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  DISPUTES 

have  arisen  in  the  world's  history,  and  the  estimation  of  its 
probable  effect.  We  can  examine  the  causes  of  some  of  the  wars 
which  have  occurred,  and  form  an  opinion  of  how  these  causes 
would  have  been  settled  if  the  judicial  process  had  been  em 
ployed,  instead  of  the  process  of  war,  and  see  how  we  should 
have  liked  the  result. 

Taking  our  own  nation ;  the  war  which  resulted  in  its  birth 
may  not  with  strict  accuracy  be  called  the  culmination  of  an 
international  dispute,  since  it  was  the  revolt  of  colonies  from 
the  mother  country.  But  it  was  a  war  between  communities  of 
considerable  size,  geographically  separated,  over  distinct  ques 
tions  of  policy,  and  thus  exhibits  quite  enough  for  our  purpose 
of  the  characteristics  of  a  war  between  nations.  We  have  been 
in  the  habit  of  assigning  as  the  most  immediate  cause  of  the 
war  objection  to  taxation  without  representation,  but  the  ob 
jection  to  this  upon  the  part  of  the  colonists  was  only  a  part 
of  their  claim  that  the  American  colonies  constituted  such  dis 
tinct  communities  that  they  were  entitled  to  local  self-govern 
ment  in  their  internal  affairs,  and  even  in  certain  affairs  which 
concerned  their  relations  with  the  outside  world.  The  reason 
ing  of  the  colonists  upon  the  new  state  of  affairs  which  had 
arisen  in  the  progress  of  the  world  led  them  to  a  conclusion 
which  was  at  variance  with  the  principles  which  had  theretofore 
been  considered  as  universally  governing.  It  is  true  that  some 
representation  as  a  condition  precedent  to  taxation  had  been 
enjoyed  by  British  subjects  in  the  home  country,  but  the  ex 
tension  of  the  principle  to  colonial  peoples  was  a  brand-new 
subject,  constituting  a  departure.  Even  as  a  right  of  subjects 
at  home  it  had  been  acquired  by  the  exercise  of  or  show  of 
force,  and  in  being  so  acquired  had  upset  previously  existing 
practice.  As  to  the  right  of  self-government,  this  was  a  more 
radical  departure  from  precedent  than  the  other  claim,  in  that 
it  involved  a  broader  abandonment  of  the  old  rules,  and  in 
cluded  not  only  representation  for  taxation,  but  a  general  free 
dom  from  the  authority  which  had  theretofore  always  been  dis- 


SETTLEMENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  DISPUTES     411 

tinctly  claimed,  although  it  had  been  in  many  respects  leniently 
exercised  with  reference  to  the  American  colonies.  The  claims 
of  the  colonists  were  therefore  revolutionary  in  their  character, 
and  by  this  very  statement  of  their  nature  are  stamped  as 
having  been  such  as  could  not  have  been  allowed  by  a  judicial 
tribunal,  which  has  no  authority  to  make  new  laws,  or  to 
change  laws  which  are  in  force. 

I  am  not  losing  sight  of  the  fact  that  courts  must  often 
make  application  of  laws  to  situations  which  were  not  in  the 
minds  of  the  legislators  at  the  time  the  laws  were  made  ;  but  this 
admitted  duty  of  the  courts  includes  no  authority  to  change  the 
laws  when  there  is  no  doubt  as  to  what  they  are,  and  they  do  not, 
in  the  opinion  of  the  court,  suit  the  situation  which  is  before  it. 

We  are  familiar  with  the  comparatively  recent  instance  in 
which  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  has  declared 
that  the  Sherman  Law  prohibiting  contracts,  combinations,  or 
conspiracies  in  restraint  of  trade  applies  to  certain  acts  of  labor 
organizations  in  the  maintenance  of  the  boycott.  Since  the 
boycott  had  not  at  the  time  of  the  passage  of  the  Sherman  Act 
made  its  appearance  as  the  evil  which  the  courts  have  since 
that  time  frequently  stated  it  to  be,  it  is  altogether  improbable 
that  Congress  had  in  mind  this  kind  of  activity,  by  this  kind 
of  association,  at  the  time  of  the  passage  of  the  Sherman  Act ; 
but  the  court  held  that  the  principles  of  that  act  so  suitably 
fitted  this  new  kind  of  combination  in  restraint  of  trade  as  to 
bring  it  clearly  under  the  prohibition  of  the  law.  The  Ameri 
can  Federation  of  Labor  is  now  endeavoring  to  have  a  new 
law  enacted  which  shall  relieve  labor  organizations  from  the 
operation  of  the  Sherman  Law ;  and  if  it  should  succeed  the 
courts  will,  of  course,  have  to  be  governed  by  the  new  law. 
What  I  wish  to  hold  your  attention  to  is  the  fact  that  the  court 
has  not  made  any  new  law,  and  has  not  reversed  or  rendered 
inoperative  an  old  law ;  but  that  it  has  simply  declared  the 
existing  law  to  be  applicable  to  the  new  condition  which  had 
arisen  since  its  passage. 


412     SETTLEMENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  DISPUTES 

The  colonists  wished  the  old  rules,  not  to  be  applied  to  a 
new  condition,  but  to  be  reversed,  which  would  involve  some 
kind  of  law-making  process,  as  it  is  inconceivable  that  it  could 
have  been  done  by  a  judicial  process.  That  the  previously  ex 
isting  law  was  not  statutory  law  does  not  obscure  our  under 
standing  of  what  it  was.  It  is  often  thus,  with  international 
law,  which  is  none  the  less  clear  because  it  has  not  been  en 
acted  by  a  legislative  body.  If  the  American  colonists  could 
have  won  their  contentions  before  a  judicial  body  such  as  could 
have  been  gathered  together  in  the  world  at  that  time,  it  seems 
clear  that  it  would  have  been  because  of  the  prejudice  aroused 
in  the  civilized  world  against  the  power  and  prestige  of  Great 
Britain,  and  would  have  necessarily  resulted  from  such  an 
abandonment  of  the  judicial  attitude  which  becomes  such  a 
body  as  to  cause  the  latter  to  lose  its  proper  character  as  a 
court. 

The  first  distinctly  foreign  war  in  which  the  new  American 
nation  was  engaged  was  that  of  1812.  In  regard  to  this  war 
the  Honorable  John  W.  Foster,  in  an  address  before  the  So 
ciety  for  the  Judicial  Settlement  of  International  Disputes, 
at  Washington,  on  December  15,  1910,  stated  that  "  the 
single  question  upon  which  war  was  finally  declared  was  that 
of  blockade,  and  immediately  after  the  war  began  the  ques 
tion  was  transferred  to  impressment,  both  of  which  are  pure 
subjects  of  international  law  and  practice." 

As  the  first-mentioned  cause  had  really  ceased  to  exist  at 
the  time  war  was  commenced,  we  may  leave  it  out  of  consid 
eration  and  examine  only  the  question  of  impressment.  I 
quite  agree  that  this  was  a  subject  of  international  law  and 
practice,  and  it  is  pertinent  to  examine  what  the  law  and  the 
practice  were,  and  how  we  should  have  come  out  of  a  judicial 
determination  of  them.  General  Foster  makes  many  quota 
tions  in  support  of  his  view  that  the  subject  of  impressment 
could  have  been  brought  under  the  rules  of  existing  inter 
national  law.  In  quoting  Hall  on  this  subject  he  states  Eng- 


SETTLEMENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  DISPUTES     413 

lish  practice  at  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century  to 
have  been  that  "  if  a  foreign-naturalized  Englishman  was  met 
on  the  high  seas  in  a  foreign  merchant  ship  he  could  be  taken 
out  of  it,  the  territoriality  of  such  ships  not  being  then  recog 
nized."  He  calls  attention  to  the  statement  of  Canning, 
British  Foreign  Secretary,  that  "when  mariners,  subjects  of 
His  Majesty,  are  employed  in  the  private  service  of  foreign 
ers,  .  .  .  those  subjects  may  be  taken  at  sea  out  of  the  service 
of  such  foreign  individuals  and  recalled  to  that  paramount 
duty,  which  they  owe  their  sovereign  and  their  country.  .  .  . 
It  is  needless  to  repeat  that  these  rights  existed  in  their  fullest 
force  for  ages  previous  to  the  establishment  of  the  United 
States  of  America;  and  it  would  be  difficult  to  contend  that 
the  recognition  of  that  independence  can  have  operated  any 
change  in  this  respect."  A  great  deal  of  authority  is  cited  by 
General  Foster  in  support  of  the  doctrine  that  at  that  time 
the  inalienability  of  national  allegiance  was  universally  con 
ceded.  Even  American  authorities,  both  administrative  and 
judicial,  then  held  this  view,  and  Justice  Story,  in  1830,  in 
delivering  an  opinion  of  the  court,  according  to  General  Fos 
ter,  said :  "  The  general  doctrine  is  that  no  persons  can,  by 
any  act  of  their  own,  without  the  consent  of  the  Government, 
put  off  their  allegiance  and  become  aliens." 

The  attitude  toward  change  of  allegiance  which  was  com 
mon  to  the  rest  of  the  world  was  also  largely  held  with  refer 
ence  to  allegiance  to  the  United  States,  as  evidenced  by 
Chancellor  Kent  who,  in  his  Commentaries  on  American  Law, 
in  1826,  wrote:  "A  citizen  cannot  renounce  allegiance  to  the 
United  States  without  the  permission  of  the  Government  be 
declared  by  law." 

The  United  States,  from  the  beginning  of  the  argument  of 
the  question,  denied  the  right  of  visitation  and  search  for  im 
pressment,  and  commenced  almost  immediately  to  give  expres 
sion  to  this  denial.  But  the  British  Government  held  strictly 
to  it  and  when  Madison  was  Secretary  of  State,  gave  the  fol- 


414     SETTLEMENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  DISPUTES 

lowing  instructions  to  the  British  Minister  at  Washington : 
"  The  pretension  advanced  by  Mr.  Madison,  that  the  Amer 
ican  flag  should  protect  every  individual  sailing  under  it  on 
board  merchant  ships,  is  so  extravagant  as  to  require  no  seri 
ous  consideration." 

Admiral  Mahan,  in  his  "  Sea  Power  in  its  Kelations  to  the 
War  of  1812,"  gives  a  most  interesting  discussion  of  the 
claim  of  the  right  of  visitation  and  search  and  impressment 
which  was  the  cause  upon  which  the  War  of  1812  was  actu 
ally  waged.  He  demonstrates  the  practical  impossibility  of 
an  abandonment  of  this  claim  by  Great  Britain  at  the  time 
when  she  was  engaged  in  a  desperate  struggle  for  life  against 
the  power  of  Europe  under  Napoleon,  and  when  she  was  fol 
lowing  the  practice  which  had  theretofore  not  been  questioned. 
He  gives  evidence  to  show  that  British  opinion  found  a  good 
deal  of  support  among  American  public  men,  and  quotes  Rep 
resentative  Gaston,  who,  speaking  of  the  British  practice  as  a 
right,  steadily  defending,  of  course,  the  immunity  of  Amer 
ican  seamen  from  British  impressment,  went  so  far  as  to  say 
that  should  Great  Britain  consent  to  relinquish  the  right  of 
taking  her  own  subjects  it  would  be  no  advantage  to  our  indi 
vidual  seamen,  because  of  the  competition  of  British  seamen 
in  the  American  merchant  service,  which  brought  down  the 
rate  of  wages.  Admiral  Mahan  also  quotes  Gouverneur  Mor 
ris,  who  wrote  :  "  Let  the  right  of  search  and  impressment  be 
acknowledged  as  maxims  of  public  law." 

I  think  enough  has  been  cited  of  the  opinions  of  these  two 
eminent  authorities  to  show  that  Great  Britain  had  a  strong 
case  in  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  impressment  of  British 
seamen,  when  their  presence  on  board  of  American  merchant 
ships  was  disclosed  by  the  visitation  and  search  which  she  had 
concededly  a  right  to  effect  during  war-time,  in  order  to  de 
termine  the  nationality  of  the  vessel  visited  and  the  character 
of  her  cargo.  Admiral  Mahan  reminds  us  that  the  acute 
character  of  the  question  arose  from  the  new  condition  which 


SETTLEMENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  DISPUTES     415 

came  about  in  the  world  when  another  nation  came  into  exist 
ence,  of  people  of  the  same  race  and  speaking  the  same  lan 
guage  as  those  of  the  greatest  existing  maritime  nation,  whose 
interests  were  most  strongly  bound  up  with  the  question  of 
allegiance  of  her  maritime  subjects.  Up  to  that  time  the 
probability  of  making  mistakes  in  the  impressment  of  alleged 
British  subjects  was  negligible.  When  the  new  state  of  affairs 
came  into  existence  the  old  practice  was  found  to  possess  dis 
advantages  theretofore  unsuspected,  but  there  was  no  law- 
making  process  or  authority  by  which  the  practice  could  have 
been  forbidden,  and  the  nation  profiting  by  it  had  as  much 
right,  if  not  a  great  deal  more,  to  adhere  to  it,  as  the  new 
nation,  adversely  affected,  had  to  object  to  it. 

Conceding  General  Foster's  position  that  the  subject  of  im 
pressment  was  not  quite  within  the  scope  of  international  law 
and  practice,  I  cannot  understand  his  argument  otherwise  than 
as  indicating  that  if  the  case  had  been  judicially  settled  in  ac 
cordance  with  international  law  and  practice,  it  must  have 
gone  against  the  United  States.  It  is  true  that  the  war  did 
not  settle  it,  because  we  lost  out  in  the  war,  and  were  in  no 
position  to  claim  our  contention  at  the  treaty  of  peace ;  but 
the  practice  ended  by  reason  of  the  termination  of  the  war 
between  Great  Britain  and  Continental  Europe,  and  the  ques 
tion  ceased,  for  the  time  being,  to  be  an  acute  one.  It,  how 
ever,  merged  into  the  question  of  the  right  of  visitation  and 
search  in  time  of  peace,  by  reason  of  the  efforts  of  Great  Brit 
ain  to  suppress  the  slave  trade,  and  this  right  was  not  for 
mally  given  up  by  Great  Britain  until  as  late  as  1860.  It  was, 
however,  finally  given  up,  and  the  whole  question  was  settled 
in  favor  of  the  American  view.  I  do  not  see  how  it  can  be 
contested  that  the  result  was  brought  about  through  force,  at 
first  unsuccessfully  exerted,  but  even  thus  demonstrated  to  be 
a  process  which  the  United  States  was  willing  to  resort  to. 

I  suppose  the  Mexican  War  is  generally  acknowledged  as 
one  in  which  the  cause  of  the  United  States  is  most  difficult 


416     SETTLEMENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  DISPUTES 

of  defence.  Questions  of  boundary  in  new  countries,  where 
the  geography  was  unknown  at  the  time  when  the  people  of 
the  two  countries  contesting  about  the  boundary  first  com 
menced  to  occupy  the  disputed  region,  are  bound  to  be  at 
tended  with  much  difficulty.  I  do  not  intend  to  detain  you  by 
any  examination  of  the  relative  rights  of  Mexico  and  the 
United  States  to  the  disputed  territory.  General  Foster  holds 
that  the  movement  of  American  troops  into  that  territory, 
while  the  boundary  question  was  still  under  discussion,  was 
an  overt  act  of  aggression  which  naturally  brought  on  the 
war.  It  is  not  altogether  easy  to  admit  this,  since  there  is  lack 
of  apparent  necessity  for  the  attack  on  these  United  States 
troops  in  the  disputed  territory,  and  their  presence  there  need 
not  have  caused  the  termination  of  negotiations.  There  was 
plenty  of  other  territory  into  which  Mexican  troops  might 
have  been  similarly  moved.  The  whole  question  has  received 
too  extended  examination  for  me  to  be  justified  in  going  into 
it  here,  but  it  is  less  difficult  to  notice  the  character  of  the 
results  which  followed  the  military  settlement  which  was 
effected.  Can  anybody  maintain  that  it  is  a  pity  that  Colo 
rado,  Utah,  California,  etc.,  are  not  now  in  the  condition  of 
Chihuahua,  Sonora,  and  Durango?  Selfishly  speaking,  the 
United  States  is,  of  course,  incomparably  the  gainer  in  the 
possession  of  the  rich  country  which  was  acquired  by  the  war 
which,  including  the  purchase  price  of  the  ceded  territory, 
cost  less  than  one  hundred  million  dollars.  The  inhabitants  of 
the  acquired  territory,  both  those  who  were  in  it  at  the  time 
of  the  dispute  and  those  who  have  since  settled  there,  have 
reason  to  thank  Heaven  that  the  change  of  nationality  oc 
curred  ;  while  the  world  at  large,  being  able  to  engage  in  rela 
tions  with  a  part  of  the  United  States  instead  of  being  con 
demned,  with  regard  to  this  acquired  territory,  to  such  as  are 
now  prevailing  between  the  rest  of  the  world  and  Mexico, 
must  necessarily  be  heartily  congratulated.  The  only  unfor 
tunates  would  appear  to  be  those  in  control  of  the  central  gov- 


SETTLEMENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  DISPUTES     417 

ernment  of  Mexico,  and  of  these  persons  the  principal  griev 
ance  would  seem  to  be  that,  having  at  that  time  been  deprived 
of  the  power  of  exploiting  the  inhabitants  of  the  ceded  terri 
tory,  they  now  have,  in  the  restricted  area  in  revolt,  a  less 
dignified  adversary  to  yield  to,  in  case  they  shall  finally  be 
compelled  by  the  northern  revolutionists  to  relinquish  their 
control,  than  they  would  have  had  if  the  ceded  territory  had 
been  left  to  join  the  revolt  against  them. 

I  am  not  contending  for  the  settlement  of  questions  irre 
spective  of  their  real  merits,  and  I  am  quite  willing  to  con 
cede  that  questions  of  boundary  are  such  as  to  almost  uni 
versally  lend  themselves  to  judicial  settlement;  but  I  do 
maintain  that  the  method  of  judicial  settlement  is  at  least 
upon  its  explanation  when  it  can  be  made  to  appear  so  clearly 
that,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Mexican  War,  the  failure  to  resort 
to  it,  and  the  settlement  of  that  question  by  the  process  of 
war,  produced  a  result  which  must  be  universally  regarded  as 
one  which  it  would  be  extremely  unfortunate  to  have  lost. 
The  incident  certainly  raises  a  suspicion  that  the  principles 
which  must  guide  in  judicial  settlement  of  international  dis 
putes  are  subject  to  grave  error,  and  that,  in  the  absence  of 
the  possibility  of  correcting  them  by  other  means,  the  inter 
national  law-making  process  of  war  is  oftentimes  the  very  best 
that  can  be  resorted  to. 

Now,  take  the  familiar  case  of  our  Civil  War,  the  greatest 
in  our  history.  Of  course  this  war  also  was  not  one  between 
nations,  but,  like  the  Revolutionary  War,  was  between  such 
considerable  and  such  distinctly  separated  communities  that 
it  can  be  considered  as  a  war  between  nations  for  the  pur 
poses  of  this  discussion.  Its  inspiring  cause,  the  extension  of 
slavery  into  the  new  territory  of  the  United  States,  and  its 
immediate  cause,  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  secession,  lend 
themselves  easily  to  an  examination  with  reference  to  the  out 
come  of  a  judicial  settlement.  The  first-named  cause  was  sub 
mitted  to  such  a  settlement,  in  the  Dred  Scott  case,  before 


418     SETTLEMENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  DISPUTES 

the  tribunal  which  we  consider  the  best  which  has  ever  been 
created,  namely,  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States.  It 
was  by  that  body  held  that  slaves  were  property  and  as  such 
could  be  carried  into  the  new  territory  of  the  United  States 
to  be  there  entitled  to  its  protection.  This  judicial  settlement 
must  be  accepted  as  according  to  the  law  as  it  then  existed. 
Of  course,  the  whole  world  now  concedes  that  it  was  not  in 
accordance  with  right,  but  that,  as  distinct  from  the  lawful 
aspect  of  the  case,  it  was  not  within  the  province  of  the  court 
to  determine.  Equally  certain  was  it  that  in  the  existing  state 
of  affairs  the  law  could  not  have  been  changed  by  the  usual 
process. 

As  to  the  right  of  secession,  of  course  we  shall  not  attempt 
to  reach  any  conclusion  by  discussion ;  but  I  think  we  will 
have  to  admit  that,  as  a  question  before  a  court,  the  right  was 
certainly  doubtful.  Mr.  Charles  Francis  Adams,  a  distin 
guished  citizen  of  New  England,  thoroughly  identified  with  the 
Northern  cause,  has  more  than  once  stated  that  the  question 
was  not  determined  at  the  time  of  the  formation  of  this  Gov 
ernment,  and  that  the  quality  of  legal  right  could  be  claimed 
by  either  party  to  the  contest.  Another  distinguished  son  of 
New  England,  the  Honorable  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  has  said 
that  at  the  time  of  the  formation  of  the  Government,  and  for 
a  considerable  time  afterwards,  the  right  of  secession  was  not 
only  generally  considered  to  exist,  but  also  to  be  a  right  that 
would,  in  all  probability,  be  exercised.  Under  these  circum 
stances,  how  would  the  different  fundamental  questions  of  the 
dispute  have  lent  themselves  to  judicial  settlement?  If  the 
Supreme  Court  was  right,  the  judicial  settlement  would  prob 
ably  have  been  different  from  that  which  was  brought  about 
by  the  war;  and  if  the  distinguished  gentlemen  whose  views  I 
have  just  cited  were  right,  it  is  at  least  entirely  uncertain  that 
the  judicial  settlement  would  have  determined  the  right  of 
secession  in  the  same  manner  as  did  the  sword.  Those  of  us 
who  are  well  pleased  with  the  result  that  was  attained  as  to 


SETTLEMENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  DISPUTES     419 

secession,  and  those  of  us  who  would  have  been  dissatisfied  with 
the  continuance  of  the  opposite  result  as  to  slavery,  and  I 
think  such  now  include  practically  all  of  the  inhabitants  of 
this  country,  have  reason  to  congratulate  ourselves  that  the 
questions  of  the  Civil  War  received  a  military  instead  of  a 
judicial  settlement. 

Coming  now  to  the  last  war  which  the  country  has  waged, 
it  is  pertinent  to  examine  the  object  which  the  United  States 
had  in  entering  into  it.  This  can  best  be  gathered  from  the  Reso 
lution  of  Congress  giving  the  directions  to  the  President  under 
which  the  war  was  prosecuted.  These  are  found  in  the  Joint 
Resolution  of  Congress  approved  April  20, 18  98,  as  follows:  — 

"  1st.  That  the  people  of  the  Island  of  Cuba  are,  and  of 
right  ought  to  be,  free  and  independent. 

"  2d.  That  it  is  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  demand 
and  the  United  States  does  hereby  demand  that  the  Govern 
ment  of  Spain  at  once  relinquish  its  authority  and  government 
in  the  Island  of  Cuba,  and  withdraw  its  land  and  naval  forces 
from  Cuba  and  Cuban  waters. 

"  3d.  That  the  President  be  and  he  is  hereby  directed  and 
empowered  to  use  the  entire  land  and  naval  forces  of  the  United 
States  and  to  call  into  the  actual  service  of  the  United  States 
the  Militia  of  the  several  States  to  such  extent  as  may  be 
necessary  to  put  this  resolution  into  effect. 

"  4th.  That  the  United  States  hereby  disclaims  any  dispo 
sition  or  intention  to  exercise  sovereignty,  jurisdiction,  or  con 
trol  over  the  Island  except  for  the  pacification  thereof,  and 
asserts  its  determination  when  that  is  accomplished  to  leave  the 
government  and  control  of  the  Island  to  its  people." 

The  object  of  the  war  is  thus  seen  to  have  been  the  termi 
nation  of  the  sovereignty  of  Spain  in  Cuba,  for  reasons  which 
are  set  forth  in  the  preamble  to  the  Resolution  as  "  abhorrent 
conditions  which  have  existed  for  more  than  three  years  in  the 
Island  of  Cuba,  so  near  our  own  borders,"  which  are  said  to 
"  have  shocked  the  moral  sense  of  the  people  of  the  United 


420     SETTLEMENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  DISPUTES 

States,  to  have  been  a  disgrace  to  civilization,"  etc.  Undoubt 
edly,  the  United  States,  in  a  judicial  proceeding,  might  have 
obtained  a  judgment  to  the  effect  that  the  conditions  in  Cuba 
were  abhorrent,  and  that  Spain  was  responsible  for  them 
and  should  terminate  them ;  but  abundant  representation  had 
already  been  made  to  that  effect,  and  this  country  was  con 
vinced  that,  after  long  trial,  Spain  was  powerless  to  remedy 
them.  There  is  a  good  deal  of  contention  that  when  national 
sentiment,  roused  by  the  disaster  to  the  Maine,  was  supposed 
to  have  urged  this  country  into  a  hasty  war,  the  condition  of 
the  negotiations  was  such  that  with  a  little  more  time  the  dif 
ferences  between  this  country  and  Spain  might  have  been  dip 
lomatically  settled.  I  have  no  doubt  that  Spain  would  have 
expressed  a  willingness  to  concede  the  necessity  for  reform  in 
Cuba,  and  probably  would  have  been  willing  to  grant  some 
kind  of  a  measure  of  autonomy  to  that  island ;  but  I  very  seri 
ously  doubt  if  she  knew  how,  or  had  any  persons  capable  of 
effecting  any  real  self-government  in  that  island,  and  conse 
quently  any  permanent  remedy  for  the  evils  which  existed  there. 
The  deliberate  conclusion  of  this  country  was  that  her  sover 
eignty  there  must  be  terminated,  and  it  is  apparent  that  our 
demand  could  not  have  been  granted  by  any  judicial  tribunal. 
The  sovereignty  of  Spain  in  Cuba  was  as  firmly  established  as 
anything  in  international  law,  and  without  a  change  in  such 
law  it  could  be  terminated  only  by  some  such  revolutionary 
process  as  that  of  war. 

I  am  far  from  believing  that  efforts  looking  towards  a 
peaceful  settlement  of  disputes  between  nations  should  cease, 
or  even  should  diminish  their  activity.  I  think  there  are 
classes  of  cases  which  lend  themselves  unmistakably  to  this 
kind  of  settlement;  but  there  are  other  cases  which  distinctly 
do  not,  for  the  reason  that  the  law  and  the  precedent  and  the 
established  order,  being  human-made,  are  subject  to  error,  and 
in  the  course  of  the  progress  of  the  world  are  therefore  likely 
at  a  given  moment  not  to  accord  with  the  conditions  as  they 


SETTLEMENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  DISPUTES     421 

exist.  In  such  cases  there  arises  a  demand  for  a  change,  and 
if  the  change  is  resisted  by  a  nation  whose  interests  are  bound 
up  in  the  wrong  order,  the  change  must  be  brought  about  by 
the  process  of  war.  The  judicial  process,  being  held  bound  to 
the  very  principles  which  are  claimed  to  have  been  outgrown, 
and  holding  the  world  looking  backward  instead  of  forward, 
cannot  effect  the  revolution  which  is,  demanded,  and  which 
must  be  brought  about  by  some  kind  of  a  law-making  process, 
laying  down  new  principles.  I  have  no  fear  that,  at  the  time 
of  being  confronted  with  such  a  situation  as  we  have  fre 
quently  met  in  the  past,  the  people  of  this  country  will  submit 
to  judicial  arbitration  questions  concerning  which  the  exist 
ing  principles  are  such  that  arbitration  would  unrightfully  go 
against  us.  But  I  would  like  to  call  attention  to  the  fact  that, 
since  a  judicial  process  cannot  constitute  a  universally  safe 
reliance  upon  which  to  lean  in  our  conscientious  efforts  to  pro 
mote  the  progress  of  the  world,  we  should  not  neglect  reason 
able  preparation  for  resort  to  the  warlike  process  which  we 
shall  certainly  have  to  resort  to  under  such  circumstances,  and 
which  has  served  so  frequently  in  the  past  to  establish  principles 
which,  without  it,  would  not  have  been  born  into  the  world  for 
an  indefinite  time  after  the  period  when  they  really  did  com 
mence  to  exercise  their  beneficent  influence.  A  case  by  judi 
cial  process  must  be  settled  according  to  the  principles  which 
govern  the  court ;  if  these  are  not  such  as  we  can  adhere  to 
we  can  have  no  chance  of  gaining  our  contention,  unless  the 
principles  are  changed.  This  change  of  principle  has  been  the 
cause  of  those  wars  which  have  produced  the  greatest  effect  in 
the  improvement  of  the  world. 

Processes  have  been  suggested  which  are  based  upon  the  as 
sumption  that  wars  often  result  from  precipitate  action,  with 
out  time  for  sober  second  thought  or  even  for  careful  inves 
tigation  of  the  circumstances  embodied  in  the  cause  of  the 
dispute.  Such  proceedings,  and  the  agreements  which  lead  to 
them,  can  do  no  harm,  and  should  probably  be  encouraged; 


422     SETTLEMENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  DISPUTES 

but  I  think  it  is  easy  to  place  more  reliance  upon  them  than 
the  facts  of  history  justify.  When  at  the  First  International 
Peace  Conference  at  The  Hague,  in  1899,  it  became  apparent 
that  the  nations  engaged  in  the  conference  were  not  going  to 
bind  themselves  by  a  hard-and-fast  agreement  to  submit  con 
tentions  to  arbitration,  various  forms  of  moral  pressure,  looking 
to  the  use  of  arbitral  methods,  were  resorted  to  and  embodied 
in  the  convention  for  the  peaceful  settlement  of  international 
disputes  which  was  adopted  by  that  Conference.  The  most 
prominent  of  these  was  Article  XXVII,  which  states:  "The 
signatory  Powers  consider  it  their  duty  in  case  a  serious  dis 
pute  threatens  to  break  out  between  two  or  more  of  them,  to 
remind  these  latter  that  the  permanent  Court  of  arbitration 
is  open  to  them.  ..." 

How  woefully  this  article  failed  of  its  object  is  appreciated 
by  reference  to  the  fact  that  since  the  adoption  of  the  con 
vention  three  wars  have  occurred,  namely,  the  South-African 
War,  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  and  the  Balkan  War;  and 
with  regard  to  not  one  of  them  did  the  signatory  Powers  of 
the  Convention  think  it  worth  while  to  remind  the  parties  in 
dispute  that  the  court  of  arbitration  was  open  to  them.  It  is 
perfectly  evident  that  an  appeal  to  the  court  would  never  have 
served  the  purpose  of  the  disputants  in  any  case,  and  there 
fore  the  duty  imposed  by  the  article  was  completely  and  sensi 
bly  neglected.  There  may  be  in  the  future,  as  there  have  been 
in  the  past,  wars  which  result  from  temporary  irritation,  from 
hasty  action,  which  the  various  processes  of  delay  which  form 
the  subject  of  present  negotiations  between  nations  may  be  of 
service  in  softening ;  but  wars  for  great  principles  are  not 
of  this  class,  and  for  doing  away  with  them  I  cannot  see  that 
any  suggestion  which  is  now  before  the  world  offers  reasonable 
guarantee. 


XIX 

THE  GEOMETRICAL  FACTOR  IN  NAPOLEON'S 
GENERALSHIP 

BY 

PROFESSOR  R.  M.  JOHNSTON 


Read  before  the  Society  February  4>  1918 


THE  GEOMETKICAL  FACTOR  IN  NAPOLEON'S 
GENERALSHIP 

"  To  be  a  good  general,"  said  Napoleon  at  St.  Helena,  "  a 
man  must  know  mathematics ;  it  is  of  daily  help  in  straighten 
ing  one's  ideas.  Perhaps  I  owe  my  success  to  my  mathematical 
conceptions ;  a  general  must  never  imagine  things,  that  is  the 
most  fatal  of  all.  I  can  distinguish  what  is  essential  in  a  ques 
tion  from  every  angle.  The  great  art  in  battle  is  to  change 
the  line  of  operations  during  the  course  of  the  engagement ; 
that  is  an  idea  of  my  own  and  quite  new." 

It  is  at  least  curious  that  among  the  numerous  historians 
and  military  theorists  who  have  written  about  Napoleon,  none 
has  thought.it  worth  while  to  discuss  what  the  greatest  of 
soldiers  deliberately  stated  was  his  one  individual  addition  to 
the  science  of  war.  Jomini,  von  Clausewitz,  Thiers,  and  the 
more  modern  writers,  disagreeing  in  most  things,  agree  in 
passing  over  Napoleon's  statement  in  solemn  silence.  They 
fail  to  understand  him,  just  as  several  generations  failed  to 
understand  the  equally  subtle,  elusive  thing  that  Nelson  did 
at  Trafalgar,  and  so,  with  all  historical  gravity  and  decorum, 
they  passed  the  fact  over  as  of  no  historical  importance.  It  is 
another  proof  of  how  difficult  a  subject  is  military  history 
and  of  how  badly  historians  may  fail  when  they  get  on  this 
ground. 

The  explanation  of  this  dictum  of  Napoleon  is  in  reality 
quite  simple,  but  the  illustrations  of  it  few ;  it  will  be  better, 
therefore,  to  attach  the  theory  of  changing  the  line  of  opera 
tions  during  the  course  of  an  engagement,  to  a  subject  a  little 
wider  of  which  it  will  appear  as  merely  one  aspect.  That  sub 
ject  is  the  geometrical  factor  in  Napoleon's  generalship. 

It  must  at  once  be  said  that  in  all  generalship  there  is 


426  THE  GEOMETRICAL  FACTOR 

essentially  a  mathematical  and  geometrical  aspect.  In  every 
branch  of  war,  calculation  is  necessary.  The  formation  of  in 
fantry,  the  trace  of  a  fortification,  the  problems  of  transpor 
tation  and  supply,  the  velocity  and  curves  of  missiles,  all  these 
are  scientific  problems  in  the  routine  of  the  soldier's  work.  It 
is  clear,  therefore,  that  taking  any  great  general  of  whom  we 
have  a  fairly  adequate  record,  —  the  case  will  fit  Napoleon, 
or  Frederick,  or  Lee,  —  there  can  be  no  great  difficulty  in  ac 
cumulating  more  or  less  instances  to  prove  that  he  was  a  man 
of  mathematical  or  geometrical  attainment.  But  that  really  is 
not  the  point;  it  is  rather  this,  that  among  great -exponents 
of  the  military  art  we  always  find  in  Napoleon  a  geometrical 
predisposition,  when  in  others,  like  Frederick  or  Lee,  it  is 
something  else. 

Frederick,  it  would  seem,  was  always  the  drillmaster,  his 
mind  set  on  evolving  some  unexpected  enfilade  by  a  right 
wheel  or  companies  left  and  thereby  dislocating  the  European 
equilibrium !  Lee,  with  troops  that  manosuvred  none  too  well, 
and  a  personal  inclination  to  disregard  what  sort  of  figure  his 
line  of  communications  might  describe  on  the  map,  was  always 
the  psychologist,  playing  skilfully  and  boldly  on  the  charac 
ters  and  attainments  of  his  opponents,  his  old  companions  of 
West  Point  and  of  the  United  States  Army.  Napoleon  was 
what  he  had  become  as  a  schoolboy  and  as  a  young  man,  the 
accomplished  mathematician  and  geometrist. 

The  evidence  is  ample  as  to  his  youthful  proficiency  in  this 
matter.  And  his  career  appears  to  bear  the  interpretation  that 
largely  owing  to  this  mental  habit,  he  achieved  much  success  in 
his  early  years,  but  failed  to  learn  anything  in  his  later  ones. 
For  mathematical  proficiency  exacts  its  price :  it  develops  the 
logical  faculty,  but  it  tends  to  crystallize  ideas  and  to  render 
them  rigid.  Now,  it  is  part  of  the  argument  that  Napoleon  in 
his  later  days  showed  rigidity.  In  1796  he  was  already  the 
full-fledged  geometrician  general,  correct  in  his  solutions  and 
with  triumph  opening  before  him;  in  1815  he  was  still  apply- 


IN  NAPOLEON'S  GENERALSHIP  427 

ing  the  same  solutions  to  his  problems,  but  disaster  was  staring 
him  in  the  face.  The  principles  of  geometry  had  not  changed, 
nor  had  the  man ;  it  was  only  that  his  opponents  had  been  in 
vestigating  his  system  of  geometry.  He  really  admits  all  this 
himself  when  he  says  :  "  Fighting  sixty  battles  taught  me 
nothing  I  did  not  know  at  the  first  one." 

Here,  perhaps,  objections  may  be  advanced.  It  may  be 
said  that  great  changes  are  observable  in  the  methods  of  war 
followed  by  Napoleon  at  different  epochs  of  his  career.  This 
is  true,  and  yet  it  is  more  apparent  than  real  so  far  as  his 
fundamental  processes  of  thought  are  concerned,  for  those 
changes  were  mostly  due  to  facts  external  to  himself.  After 
1805,  his  armies  grow  in  size ;  after  1807,  they  deteriorate  in 
quality ;  but  the  larger  and  inferior  bodies,  in  whatever  way 
utilized,  present  themselves  for  handling  as  a  problem  in  bal 
listics.  "  The  impact  of  an  army,"  says  the  Emperor,  "  like 
the  total  of  mechanical  coefficients,  is  equal  to  the  mass  multi 
plied  by  the  velocity." 

Before  coming  now  to  some  examples  that  illustrate  how 
peculiarly  Napoleon's  mind  worked  along  the  line  already  in 
dicated,  a  minor  point  must  be  disposed  of.  It  might  be  argued 
that  as  a  tactician,  in  the  sense  of  minor  tactics,  he  displays 
the  same  bias,  but  this  is  hardly  justifiable.  The  material  for 
the  study  of  Napoleon  as  a  tactician  is  singularly  slight.  So 
far  as  it  goes  it  would  seem  to  show  that  in  his  early  years  he 
was  a  follower  of  Guibert,  perhaps  the  only  one  among  the 
French  theorists  of  the  period  in  the  strict  sense.  Some  pre 
ferred  the  column,  others  the  line ;  some  made  use  either  of 
the  column  or  of  the  line  as  circumstances  seemed  to  demand. 
But  Napoleon,  whenever  he  appears  to  be  responsible  for  the 
tactical  formations  of  his  subordinates,  uses  line  and  column 
together,  in  the  "  ordre  mixte  "  of  Guibert,  deploying,  let  us 
say,  one  battalion  of  a  demi-brigade  and  forming  the  other 
two  on  either  flank  in  columns.  The  standard  formation  of 
Guibert's  battalion  column  was  by  divisions  and  taking  it  at 


428 


THE  GEOMETRICAL  FACTOR 


company  distances,  it  must  be  admitted  that  diagrammatically 
the  result  had  quite  an  engaging  appearance  for  a  geome 
trician. 


A  DEMI-BRIGADE  OF  THREE  BATTALIONS  IN  "  ORDRE  MIXTE  " 

It  is  quite  possible  that  Napoleon's  evident  liking  for  this 
formation  was  connected  with  his  bias  for  the  geometrical,  but 
that  is  quite  as  much  as  can  be  safely  said. 

Taking  up  the  problem  of  the  change  in  the  line  of  opera 
tions  during  the  course  of  an  engagement,  it  must  first  be 
pointed  out  that  to  Napoleon  an  army  ranged  in  battle  is 
never  represented  by  a  line,  but  by  a  "  T."  The  battle  front 
and  the  line  of  communications  together  make  the  organic 
whole,  and  the  general's  art  largely  consists  in  guarding  his 
line  while  seeking  to  reach  his  opponent's.  It  need  hardly  be 

said  that  the  line  of  communica 
tions  produced  forward  towards 
the  objective  point  becomes  the 
line  of  operations. 

„.--  At  Castiglione,  in  1797,  we 
have  the  first  instance  of  the 
change  in  line  of  operations  dur 
ing  the  course  of  the  engage 
ment.  Napoleon  awaits  the  Aus- 
trians  in  the  position  marked 
by  the  full  lines,  with  a  line  of 
communications  running  towards  Brescia-Milan.  To  the  south 
of  him  lies  Serrurier's  division  driven  back  from  Mantua,  and 
with  a  parallel  line  of  communications  through  Cremona- 


X 


CASTIGLIONE 


IN  NAPOLEON'S  GENERALSHIP 


429 


AUSTERLITZ 


Milan.     Napoleon  brings  up  Serrurier  for  the  battle,  and 
crushes  the  Austrian  left  and  centre,  his  second  disposition, 
with  changed  line  of  operations,  be 
ing  indicated  by  the  dotted  lines. 

The  Austrians,  misled  by  Napo 
leon's  first  position,  deployed  in  such 
a  way  as  to  give  him  every  advantage. 

Austerlitz  is  another  example  of 
the  same  thing.  There  Napoleon,  fac 
ing  about  east,  had  an  ostensible  line 
of  communications  running  almost 
south  to  Vienna,  making  his  right 

wing  to  all  appearances  extremely  vulnerable.  But  within  a 
few  days  of  the  battle,  unknown  to  the  Allies,  he  had  estab 
lished  an  alternative  line  of  communications  running  due 
west.  Again  the  full  lines  represent  the  apparent,  and  the 
dotted  lines  the  real  tactical  and  strategical  situation  of  the 
army ;  they  explain  why  Napoleon  could  afford  to  let  the  Al 
lies  press  in  on  his  left  while  he  bulged  out  through  the  centre. 
He  did  what  they  never  suspected,  changed  his  line  of  opera 
tions  during  the  course  of  the  battle. 

At  Bautzen,  in  1813,  something  very  similar  happened. 
Napoleon's  line  of  operations  appeared  to  be  from  west  to 


X     / 


BAUTZEN 


430 


THE  GEOMETRICAL  FACTOR 


east,  say  Dresden-Glogau.  The  Allies  met  him  and  held  him 
back  for  a  while  at  Bautzen  until  Ney,  coining  in  from  the 
northwest  with  a  line  of  operations  running  back  to  Torgau- 
Leipzig,  outflanked  them. 

Best  known  of  all  Napoleon's  geometrical  operations  is  the 
strategic  march  leading  to  Jena  and  the  occupation  of  Berlin 
in  1806. 

He  describes  it  to  Marshal  Soult  as  the  march  of  a  bat 
talion  square  of  two  hundred  thousand  men,  in  such  close 

supporting  distance  as  to  be 
free  to  move  with  the  utmost 
rapidity  towards  any  strategic 
objective  and  irrespective  of 
the  enemy's  army.  Should  any 
point  of  the  square  during  this 
operation  come  into  contact 
with  the  enemy,  the  remain 
ing  parts  would  immediately 
begin  to  manoeuvre  about  that 
point.  It  was  this  scheme  that 
sent  the  French  army  to  Jena, 
while  its  right  under  Davout 
went  circling  around  to  Auer- 
stadt. 

Quite  another  standpoint 
from  which  the  geometrical  working  of  Napoleon's  mind 
may  be  observed  is  afforded  by  the  Eckmiihl  Campaign  in 
1809.  That  campaign  was  notable  in  many  ways,  but  the 
only  point  it  is  desired  to  make  here  is  the  mathematical 
rigidity  with  which  Napoleon  made  the  whole  operation 
depend  on  a  line  of  communication  that  ran  from  Strass- 
burg  about  east  to  the  river  Lech,  a  south-bank  affluent 
of  the  Danube,  and  on  a  strong  defensive  front  along  the 
Lech.  The  outbreak  of  war  had  found  Napoleon  for  once 
unprepared,  badly  unprepared.  He  was  hesitating  between 


BATTALION  SQUARE  MANffiUVRING 

ABOUT  A  POINT,  IN  FORMAL 

DESIGN 


IN  NAPOLEON'S  GENERALSHIP  431 

two  plans :  the  first  was  to  concentrate  as  near  Vienna  as  he 
could,  and  this  meant  about  Ratisbon  ;  the  second  was,  should 
the  Austrians  anticipate  him,  to  concentrate  farther  back  on 
the  line  of  the  Lech.  Massena  with  one  large  corps  was  hur 
riedly  concentrating  on  the  Lech;  Davout  with  another  was 


diagonally  crossing  Germany  from  Hamburg  towards  Ratis 
bon.  As  he  began  his  long  march,  Davout,  of  course,  drew 
his  supplies  from  Hamburg.  Then,  as  he  reached  central 
Germany,  he  turned  to  France  and  began  to  draw  them  from 
various  points  on  the  Rhine.  But,  as  the  despatches  show, 
Napoleon  was  watching  this  process  closely.  He  presently 
narrowed  Davout  down  to  Mainz,  and  the  instant  he  was 
fairly  in  Upper  Bavaria,  he  cut  him  off  from  Mainz  and  in 
sisted  that  the  line  of  communications  must  be  a  branch  of 
the  line  which  already  connected  Massena's  wing  with  Strass- 
burg.  Elaborate  instructions  were  then  issued  for  closing 
every  bridge  across  the  Rhine  save  that  near  Strassburg,  and 
at  that  one  a  whole  system  of  army  and  police  control  was  put 
into  operation.  In  other  words,  the  T  —  Strassburg-Lech  — 
became  the  sole  foundation  of  the  French  armies  in  Germany. 
But  partly  owing  to  Napoleon's  initial  error  as  to  when  war 
was  likely  to  break  out,  partly  owing  to  Berthier's  bungling 
before  Napoleon  could  reach  the  front,  Davout,  instead  of  be 
ing  brought  back  safely  to  the  line  of  the  Lech  where  Mas 
sena's  troops  were  fast  accumulating,  was  allowed  to  reach 
Ratisbon  at  the  very  moment  that  the  Austrians  crossed  the 


432  THE  GEOMETRICAL  FACTOR 

frontier.  A  few  days  later  Napoleon  arrived  in  the  valley  of 
the  Danube  post-haste  to  find  a  desperate  situation.  The 
Archduke  Charles  with  overwhelming  numbers  was  almost 
between  the  two  French  wings  and  apparently  had  the  French 
army  at  his  mercy.  To  extricate  it,  gain  the  offensive,  and 
wrest  success  out  of  the  very  hands  of  Fate,  Napoleon  clung 
resolutely  to  that  geometrical  design  he  had  already  traced 
on  the  map  of  southern  Germany.  The  front  on  the  Lech 
must  be  held  firm  till  a  fair  chance  for  snatching  the  offen 
sive  should  come,  while  Davout,  however  great  the  risk,  must 
march  along  the  south  bank  of  the  Danube,  between  the  river 
and  the  Archduke,  to  effect  his  junction  with  the  main  army. 
To  march  along  the  north  bank  looked  much  safer,  but  it 
would  have  destroyed  the  fundamental  unity  that  Napoleon's 
mind  absolutely  demanded.  The  event  justified  him.  Davout 
fought  his  way  through  with  the  barest  possible  margin  at 
Thann.  Napoleon  guessed  the  Archduke's  moves  correctly, 
seized  the  very  instant  when  he  could  throw  Massena  forward, 
and  succeeded  in  reaching  Eckmiihl  with  a  united  army  "on  a 
single  line  of  operations  and  striking  at  the  communications 
of  his  opponent. 

But  all  this  logic  and  courage  left  no  room  for  psychologi 
cal  deductions  and  intuitions.  Napoleon  took  almost  no  heed 
of  his  opponent's  mentality.  The  map  and  the  compasses  filled 


Cologne 


French  frontier 


his  mind.  In  1815  he  formulated  precisely  the  same  scheme 
to  defeat  the  English  and  Prussians  as  he  had  in  1796  to  de 
feat  the  Sardinians  and  Austrians.  The  armies  facing  him  had 


IN  NAPOLEON'S  GENERALSHIP  433 

divergent  lines  of  communications  that  came  together  at  the 
French  frontier. 

If  only  he  could  strike  hard  and  suddenly  at  the  apex  of  the 
angle  and  start  both,  or  only  one  retreating,  then  the  retreat 
must  be  divergent  and  separate  the  Allies,  leaving  him  inte 
rior  lines,  whence  he  could  destroy  them  in  detail.  But,  had 
he  stopped  to  think  of  it,  one  of  those  opponents,  Bliicher,  at 
the  crisis  of  the  campaign  of  1813,  had  achieved  his  end  by 
cutting  loose  from  his  line  of  communications ;  he  had  repeated 
this  in  1814;  in  both  cases  with  results  disastrous  to  the 
French.  But  to  a  geometrician  men  count  for  little  and  angles 
for  much ;  and  as  Napoleon  could  not  see  Bliicher  on  his  map 
of  Belgium,  but  only  a  great  angle  of  which  the  apex  lay  at 
Charleroi,  one  of  its  sides  led  away  through  Namur  to  Cologne 
and  the  Rhine,  while  the  other  appeared  to  lose  itself  in  the 
Scheldt  at  Antwerp.  But  midway  to  Antwerp  lay  Water 
loo,  and  there  Bliicher,  refusing  to  act  geometrically,  turned 
up  on  the  fatal  18th  of  June. 

Napoleon  tells  us  that  it  was  said  of  him  at  school :  "  That 
boy  is  no  good  except  at  geometry."  Shall  we  say  that  those 
words  were  pregnant  with  his  fate  ?  That  would  not  be  just. 
The  master  quality  of  his  mind,  though  it  brought  him  to  ruin 
at  the  end,  is  not  to  be  rated  lightly.  Even  in  Bergson's  sys 
tem  of  philosophy,  which  places  intellectualism  lower  than  it 
has  been  estimated  since  the  Greeks,  the  geometrical  sense  is 
held  to  be  the  cardinal  and  distinctive  quality  of  the  human 
mind.  In  few  men  has  it  been  so  developed  as  in  Napoleon, 
in  few  has  it  produced  so  powerful  or  so  great  results. 


XX 

AMERICAN  TACTICS  IN  THE  PRESENT  WAR 

BY 
THOMAS  G.  FROTHINGHAM 


Read  before  the  Society  February  5,  1918 


8  3  2 

^   8  2  5 

t  "8 

=  c«  >> 

I  |  | 

S     o  3>  03 


2    o 

to      to 

K    S 


3  s 

o 


g  a 


2 

I  1  * '^  -^ 

a  I  '-o  «j  | 

S  _,  02  CO  ^ 


1    1 

02         ® 


t>    ^        ^ 


111    I 

Jj      02    OJ        .S 

H      02    CO         Q, 


AMERICAN  TACTICS  IN  THE  PRESENT  WAR 

ALTHOUGH  it  is  known  in  a  general  way  that  American 
tactics  are  being  used  in  the  present  Great  War,  few  realize 
that  this  war  is  dominated  by  tactics  and  weapons  which  had 
their  origin  in  America.  On  land  the  European  formal  battles 
and  formal  fortresses  have  been  superseded  by  armies  manoeu 
vring  and  intrenching,  as  developed  in  our  American  wars.  On 
the  sea,  American  ideas  have  been  even  more  universally 
adopted.  It  may  be  truthfully  said  that,  in  their  effects  on 
tactics  and  weapons  of  warfare,  our  three  wars,  the  American 
Revolution,  the  War  of  1812,  and  the  Civil  War,  are  beyond 
comparison. 

Our  War  for  Independence,  the  American  Revolution,  was 
one  of  the  most  extraordinary  in  history,  when  one  considers 
the  great  results  achieved  almost  without  resources.  Unusual 
conditions  on  land  and  sea  existed  at  the  beginning  of  this 
struggle,  which  was  destined  to  differ  in  tactics  from  any  pre 
vious  war,  and  for  such  a  war  on  land  and  sea  the  Colonists 
were  well  prepared.  This  is  very  little  understood,  even  by 
those  who  have  some  historical  knowledge  ;  but  a  careful  study 
of  the  history  of  the  Revolution  shows  that,  although  the 
Colonists  were  poor  in  resources  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war, 
the  American  soldiers  and  sailors  had  already  been  schooled 
in  the  qualities  that  gave  them  victory. 

On  land,  the  idea  that  "  embattled  farmers  "  sprang  forth 
fully  armed  is  wrong  from  every  historical  point  of  view.  The 
so-called  "  French  wars  "  had  given  our  people  the  right  prep 
aration  for  the  Revolution.  Scattered  through  all  the  Colonies 
were  officers  and  men  who  had  served  in  the  French  and 
Indian  War.  Consequently,  from  Washington  down,  through 
the  personnel  of  our  Continental  Army,  were  men  who  had 


438     AMERICAN  TACTICS  IN  THE  PRESENT  WAR 

learned  the  lesson  of  tactics  adapted  to  this  continent.  They 
had  also  learned,  many  of  them  from  bitter  experience,  that 
such  tactics  were  very  effective  against  the  Regular  Army. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  conduct  of  the  War  of  the  Revolu 
tion  by  the  Royal  Army  shows  plainly  enough  that  they  had 
not  learned  their  lesson.  The  contrast  between  the  failure  of 
the  Regulars  under  Braddock  and  the  effective  work  of  the 
Provincials  at  Lake  George  was  forgotten.  The  final  victory 
of  Wolfe  at  Quebec,  where  Montcalm  reverted  to  European 
tactics  and  gave  battle  on  the  Plains  of  Abraham,  summed 
up  the  French  and  Indian  War  in  the  mind  of  the  British 
Army  —  a  triumph  for  the  Regulars  ! 

As  a  result  of  this,  it  was  not  the  professional  Regular  sol 
dier  who  was  prepared  for  the  Revolutionary  War.  It  was  the 
Colonist  who  was  prepared.  In  the  end  this  outweighed  all 
the  resources  that  could  be  brought  against  the  revolt. 

On  land,  the  Revolutionary  War  was  really  decided  the 
day  the  first  shot  was  fired,  when  an  action  was  fought  that 
was  prophetic  of  great  changes  of  tactics.  The  Lexington  and 
Concord  fight  showed  the  helplessness  of  the  old  formal  school 
against  a  line  of  battle  in  extended  order,  taking  advantage 
of  every  natural  shelter,  never  giving  a  set  battle,  but  attack 
ing,  here,  there,  and  everywhere.  A  column  of  Regulars,  sup 
posed  to  be  strong  enough  to  march  anywhere  in  the  Colony, 
barely  escaped  under  the  cover  of  reinforcements.  From  that 
day  the  Regular  Army  never  dared  to  venture  into  the  coun 
try  unless  in  overwhelming  force.  Even  at  that,  the  war  was 
a  repetition  of  the  same  thing.  Saratoga  was  Lexington  on  a 
larger  scale. 

But  the  best  example  of  such  tactics  was  the  campaign  of 
Greene  in  the  Carolinas,  which  finally  drove  Cornwallis  into 
Virginia  and  eventually  into  Yorktown.  Greene  made  the 
country  what  Cornwallis  called  a  "  hornet's  nest."  Sometimes 
Greene's  army  was  united,  at  other  times  it  would  be  divided 
into  partisan  bands,  but  always  attacking  and  harassing  the 


AMERICAN  TACTICS  IN  THE  PRESENT   WAR     439 

Regulars,  yet  not  giving  Cornwallis  the  chance  to  force  the 
Americans  into  a  set  battle.  Worried  and  menaced  every 
where,  Cornwallis  did  not  know  which  way  to  turn. 

In  desperation  he  detached  Tarleton  against  Greene's  lieu 
tenant,  Morgan,  who  led  Tarleton  into  a  trap  and  destroyed 
his  force.  Stung  to  anger  by  this  disaster,  Cornwallis  moved 
against  Greene,  who  drew  him  several  hundred  miles  from  his 
base,  and  so  weakened  his  army  that  he  gave  up  his  campaign, 
and  moved  into  Virginia. 

The  American  tactics  of  avoiding  formal  battles,  keeping 
their  weaker  army  in  the  field,  and  constantly  wearing  down 
the  enemy,  won  the  campaign.  The  European  tactics  of  try 
ing  to  force  a  set  battle,  and  retiring  with  a  weaker  army  into 
a  fortress,  resulted  in  the  capture  of  Cornwallis  at  Yorktown. 

Within  two  months  after  Lexington,  another  epoch-making 
action  was  fought  —  the  Battle  of  Bunker  Hill,  June  17,1775. 

A  weak  earthwork  had  been  thrown  up  in  the  night,  by  the 
Provincials,  threatening  the  Royal  troops  in  Boston.  The 
few  hundred  men  who  defended  it  might  have  been  easily  cut 
off,  but  a  greatly  superior  force  of  the  best  troops  in  the  Brit 
ish  Army  attempted  to  storm  this  position,  and  succeeded  in 
taking  it  only  after  the  ammunition  of  the  defenders  was  ex 
hausted.  The  British  losses  were  nearly  equal  to  the  numbers 
of  the  Americans.  The  reason  is  plain.  It  was  an  intrench- 
ment  defended  by  weapons  of  precision. 

At  that  time  drilled  troops  of  all  nations  "  presented  "  their 
pieces  and  fired.  Their  muskets  were  not  even  sighted.  The 
Provincials,  who  defended  the  intrenchment,  were  all  skilled 
marksmen.  Every  man  aimed  at  an  individual  enemy.  Such 
a  deadly  fire  had  never  been  experienced  in  European  warfare. 

The  resultant  awful  loss  made  such  a  deep  impression  on 
the  Regular  Army  that  intrenchments  defended  by  Americans 
were  ever  after  objects  of  great  respect.  Washington's  army 
at  Valley  Forge  marked  the  lowest  ebb  of  our  military 
strength.  That  army  would  have  been  an  easy  prey,  if  the 


440     AMERICAN  TACTICS  IN  THE  PRESENT   WAR 

Eoyal  Army  had  ventured  an  attack  —  but  the  menace  of 
intrenchments  defended  by  weapons  of  precision  was  too  great. 
This  respect  of  the  Regular  Army  for  Americans  in  intrench 
ments  was  of  great  tactical  value  to  us  throughout  the  war. 

On  the  sea  the  Colonists  had  another  element  of  prepared 
ness  which  is  not  generally  appreciated.  Nowhere  in  the 
world  were  there  hardier  and  more  intelligent  seamen.  Their 
ships  had  been  on  every  ocean,  and  American  designers  were 
already  noted  for  the  speed  of  their  ships.  American  sailors 
all  over  the  world  had  gained  the  experience  that  was  destined 
to  make  them  so  resourceful  against  their  enemies.  Many  of 
them  had  seen  fighting  in  every  kind  of  naval  warfare.  They 
were  thus  especially  well  equipped  for  war  against  a  superior 
naval  power,  in  which  ingenuity  and  daring  were  necessary 
qualities.  The  same  irregular,  harassing  tactics,  which  were 
successful  on  land,  were  adopted  by  the  Americans  on  the  sea. 

With  the  poor  resources  at  their  command,  the  Colonists 
could  not  hope  for  a  strong  navy,  and  the  number  of  ships 
commissioned  in  the  United  States  Navy  was  small.  The  Brit 
ish  control  of  the  sea  was  absolute,  and  the  seas  about  Great 
Britain  were  patrolled  by  her  great  fleet ;  but,  with  the  enter 
prising  American  seaman,  it  was  no  question  of  being  daunted 
by  this  superior  force,  or  of  playing  the  game  of  the  enemy. 

American  naval  vessels  boldly  sailed  into  these  well-guarded 
seas,  and  actually  harried  the  British  coasts.  These  raids, 
culminating  in  the  exploits  of  Paul  Jones  and  the  fight  off 
Flamborough  Head,  had  a  serious  effect  on  the  British  pub 
lic.  The  amount  of  actual  damage  was  small,  but  the  fact 
that  landings  had  been  made  on  their  coasts  upset  for  the  first 
time  the  idea  of  complete  control  of  the  seas. 

Our  Navy  also  did  damage  to  British  commerce,  and  here 
another  class  of  American  ships  was  of  great  tactical  value. 
As  there  were  so  few  naval  ships  to  give  service  to  our  sea 
men,  private  enterprise  began  to  fit  out  ships.  Soon  a  swarm 
of  privateers  was  scattered  over  the  seas  preying  on  the  Brit- 


AMERICAN  TACTICS  IN  THE  PRESENT   WAR     441 

ish  merchant  marine,  and  for  the  first  time  commerce-destroy 
ing  became  a  determining  factor  in  war. 

Privateering  before  this  had  been  carried  011  in  the  wars 
between  the  British  and  the  French;  but  it  had  been  a  mat 
ter  of  give  and  take,  with  profit  to  many  merchants  of  each 
nation.  It  is  doubtful  if  it  ever  affected  the  result  either  way. 
But  in  the  Revolutionary  War  it  was  another  thing.  British 
commerce  was  devastated  with  no  chance  of  equal  damage  to 
the  Americans. 

English  insurance  rates  were  raised,  and  merchants  were 
even  deterred  from  shipping  goods  at  any  rate  of  insurance. 
The  American  privateers  captured  or  destroyed  about  six 
hundred  ships  of  the  value  of  eighteen  million  dollars  —  very 
great  losses  for  those  days. 

"  In  all  the  memorials  presented  to  Parliament  the  ar 
gument  used  to  bring  about  peace  was  the  unprecedented 
destruction  of  English  commerce,"  l  and  many  authorities 
believe  this  argument  of  commerce-destroying  by  the  United 
States  Navy  and  American  privateers  did  more  to  gain  inde 
pendence  than  any  other  factor  in  the  war. 

Probably,  however,  the  most  extraordinary  event  in  the 
Revolution,  in  relation  to  the  present  war,  was  the  first  use 
of  the  torpedo  and  the  submarine.  Various  forms  of  mines  had 
been  tried  before  with  indifferent  success,  but  nothing  ap 
proaching  the  torpedo  as  used  in  the  present  war. 

In  1775  David  Bushnell,  of  Connecticut,  who  graduated 
from  Yale  that  year,  built  the  "  diving  boat "  known  as  the 
"American  Turtle."  Its  design  was  astonishingly  modern  in 
many  ways.  It  was  made  of  iron  plates,  propelled  by  a  screw, 
and  guided  by  a  compass  made  visible  by  phosphorus.  The 
torpedo  was  carried  outside,  to  be  attached  to  the  enemy  ship, 
and  then  cast  loose.  The  action  of  casting  off  started  a  clock 
work,  which  gave  the  submarine  time  to  get  away  to  a  safe 
distance. 

1  Maclay. 


442     AMERICAN  TACTICS  IN  THE  PRESENT  WAR 

This  submarine  and  torpedo  were  first  tried  against  the 
Eagle,  a  sixty-four-gun  ship,  lying  off  New  York.  The  oper 
ator  in  the  submarine  found  difficulty  in  attaching  the  tor 
pedo,  which  contained  one  hundred  pounds  of  powder,  and 
the  explosion  was  not  near  enough  to  the  Eagle  to  cause  any 
damage.  It  was  again  tried  against  the  Cerberus  at  New 
London.  The  submarine  missed  the  large  ship,  but  blew  up 
a  schooner  that  lay  near  her,  with  several  of  her  people  killed. 
It  was  Bushnell  who  in  1778  set  afloat  torpedoes  against  the 
British  shipping  in  the  Delaware  River  near  Philadelphia. 
They  were  in  kegs  and  did  little  damage,  but  inspired  the 
amusing  poem,  "  The  Battle  of  the  Kegs,"  written  at  the 
time. 

These  attempts  with  the  submarine  and  the  torpedo,  al 
though  they  did  very  little  actual  harm,  caused  so  much  alarm 
and  kept  the  enemy  ships  away  from  narrow  waters  to  such 
an  extent  that  it  is  perfectly  fair  to  say  that  the  submarine 
and  the  torpedo  had  a  tactical  value  in  the  Revolution. 

Consequently  it  may  be  said  that  in  this  war  were  found 
the  germs  of  some  of  the  most  important  tactics  and  weapons 
of  the  present  war. 
On  land  :  — 

The  mobile  army  in  the  field,  and  the  end  of  formal 

battles. 
The  tactical  use  of  intrenchments  defended  by  weapons 

of  precision. 
On  the  sea :  — 

The  tactical  use  of  the  submarine. 
The  tactical  use  of  the  torpedo. 
Commerce-destroying  as  a  factor  in  war. 
Raids  upon  an  enemy's  coast  by  a  weaker  navy. 
The  War  of  1812  found  the  Americans  totally  unprepared 
on  land.    The  generation  of  the  American  Revolution   had 
passed  away,  and  there  was  no  element  in  the  population  with 
any  experience  in  war,  except  a  few  Indian  fighters  in  the 


AMERICAN  TACTICS  IN  THE  PRESENT  WAR     443 

western  part  of  the  United  States.  The  wretched  showing  of 
the  Americans  on  land  was  a  natural  result.  The  often  cited 
Battle  of  New  Orleans  was  only  the  mistake  of  Bunker  Hill 
repeated  by  an  over-confident  British  general,  who  attempted 
the  tactics  of  the  Peninsula  War  against  intrenchments  de 
fended  by  expert  marksmen. 

On  the  sea,  things  were  very  different.  Our  seamen  had 
become  even  more  expert  in  the  interval  between  the  two 
wars ;  our  ships  had  maintained  their  superiority  in  speed, 
and  our  privateers  repeated  the  damage  of  the  Revolution, 
but  on  a  larger  scale.  The  American  privateers  captured  or 
destroyed  in  this  war  no  less  than  thirteen  hundred  ships  of 
the  value  of  thirty-nine  million  dollars.  Such  losses  were  un 
precedented,  and  this  destruction  of  commerce  again  won  us 
an  advantageous  peace. 

The  following  from  the  London  "  Times  "  is  enough  to  show 
the  effect  of  these  losses  on  the  public  mind:  "Lloyd's  list 
contains  notices  of  upward  of  five  hundred  British  vessels  cap 
tured  in  seven  months  by  the  Americans.  Five  hundred  mer 
chantmen  and  three  frigates  !  Can  these  statements  be  true  ? 
And  can  the  English  people  hear  them  unmoved?  "  The  refer 
ence  to  the  loss  of  "  three  frigates  "  is  a  comment  on  another 
offensive  developed  by  the  Americans  on  the  sea,  which  was 
the  beginning  of  great  changes  in  naval  tactics. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  War  of  1812  the  United  States 
Navy  had  only  the  following  ships  in  commission :  — 

President,  frigate 44  guns 

Constitution,  frigate 44  " 

United  States,  frigate 44  " 

Constellation,  frigate 36  " 

Chesapeake,  frigate 36  " 

Congress,  frigate 36  " 

Essex,  frigate 32  " 

Adams,  corvette 28  " 

John  Adams,  corvette 28  " 

Wasp,  sloop 18  " 

Hornet,  sloop 18  " 

Argus,  brig 16  " 

CV  1_     •     °  1«         « 

feiren,  brig ID 


444     AMERICAN  TACTICS  IN  THE  PRESENT  WAR 

Enterprise,  schooner 12  guns 

Nautilus,  schooner 12     " 

Vixen,  schooner 10     " 

Viper,  schooner 10     " 

It  was  not  thought  possible  that  such  a  weak  fleet  would 
make  any  showing  against  the  powerful  British  Navy,  but  in 
this  small  navy  were  concentrated  skilled  officers  and  men, 
making  up  a  personnel  probably  never  before  equalled.  As 
was  natural  in  such  a  picked  body  of  men,  excellent  methods 
of  seamanship  and  gunnery  had  been  developed,  superior  to 
those  used  by  the  officers  and  crews  of  the  men-of-war  of  the 
time.  The  United  States  Navy  had  also  gained  experience  of 
warfare  in  the  Tripoli  tan  War,  etc.,  and  it  was  far  ahead  of 
its  time  in  construction  and  armament. 

Our  naval  constructors,  with  an  intuition  almost  prophetic, 
had  built  a  class  of  frigates,  of  which  the  Constitution  is  best 
known,  and  placed  long  twenty-four-pounders  on  them.  Such  an 
armament  was  ridiculed  abroad,  and  it  was  predicted  that 
such  ships  would  be  useless  —  but,  in  the  War  of  1812,  these 
frigates  became  the  wonder  of  the  world. 

The  British  frigates  were  simply  overwhelmed,  and  the 
individual  superiority  of  this  class  of  frigates  was  never  over 
come  in  the  war.  Another  extract  from  the  "  Times  "  shows 
again  the  state  of  the  public  mind :  "  The  fact  seems  to  be 
established  that  the  Americans  have  some  superior  mode  of 
firing."  The  "fact"  that  the  " Times "  could  not  understand 
was  the  great  advance  in  naval  construction  shown  by  these 
frigates  of  the  United  States  Navy.  This  advanced  design 
by  American  naval  constructors  was  the  birth  of  the  "all- 
big-gun-ship  "  idea,  which  was  destined  to  dominate  naval  con 
struction;  and  the  Constitution  may  fairly  be  called  the  ances 
tor  of  the  modern  dreadnought. 

In  the  War  of  1812  the  American  inventions  of  the  torpedo 
and  the  submarine  were  of  tactical  value,  although  not  in 
actual  use.  Robert  Fulton  had  attempted  to  develop  the  Bush- 
nell  inventions,  for  the  French  and  for  the  English ;  but  he 


AMERICAN  TACTICS  IN  THE  PRESENT  WAR     445 

had  returned  to  America  discouraged.  There  was  some  aid 
voted  for  his  machines,  but  nothing  was  ever  done  with  them 
in  actual  warfare.  However,  as  in  the  Revolution,  the  idea 
that  the  Americans  possessed  such  dangerous  weapons  proved 
a  good  defence  for  portions  of  our  coast  in  this  war. 

But  it  was  in  the  Civil  War  that  these  germs  of  American 
tactics  attained  a  development  that  revolutionized  warfare. 
To  understand  the  Civil  War  it  should  be  kept  in  mind  that, 
from  the  first  outbreak  of  secession,  a  military  situation  ex 
isted  that  made  the  grand  tactics  of  the  Civil  War  sound. 
This  was  not  from  any  definite  plans  of  any  generals ;  but  the 
efforts  to  keep  the  Border  States  in  the  Union,  to  save  West 
Virginia,  Missouri,  and  the  Unionists  of  Tennessee,  with  the 
necessity  of  getting  control  of  the  Mississippi  River,  and  the 
blockade  of  the  Southern  coast,  all  meant  the  beginning  of 
the  envelopment  that  in  the  end  strangled  the  Confederacy. 
Consequently  the  problem  was  for  the  North  to  constrict,  for 
the  South  to  break  the  circle ;  and  the  resulting  tactics  had 
the  right  basis,  in  spite  of  mistakes  by  commanders  on  both 
sides. 

The  early  battles  of  the  Civil  War  followed,  in  general, 
European  tactics.  It  was  natural,  however,  where  armies  of 
such  great  intelligence  in  both  officers  and  men  were  contend 
ing,  with  no  traditions  to  hamper  them  and  a  sound  basis  of 
strategy  for  both  sides,  that  new  tactics  should  be  developed. 
The  outstanding  feature  of  the  campaigns  of  the  Civil  War 
was  the  tactical  use  of  what  are  known  as  "  hasty  intrench- 
ments."  These  intrenching  tactics  were  a  new  factor  in  war 
fare.  "  The  art  of  constructing  and  using  hasty  intrenchments 
on  the  field  of  battle  is  a  contribution  from  America  to  the 
war  knowledge  of  the  world."  1 

Intrenchments  are  as  old  as  fighting,  and  were  constantly 

used  in  European  warfare,  notably  in  Marlborough's  wars. 

Such  trenches  were,  however,  formally  planned  and  laid  out 

1  Colonel  Arthur  L.  Wagner,  U.S.A.,  Papers  of  Mass.  Mil.  Hist.  Soc.,  vol.  13. 


446     AMERICAN  TACTICS  IN  THE  PRESENT  WAR 

by  engineers.  Whenever  an  army  "  came  out  of  its  trenches," 
or  was  "  driven  out  of  its  trenches,"  the  trenches  ceased  to  be 
a  factor.  The  idea  that  an  army  might  move,  and  literally 
take  its  trenches  with  it,  was  the  product  of  the  Civil  War. 

Like  the  men  of  the  Lexington  fight,  the  intelligent  Amer 
ican  soldiers  of  both  armies  began  to  take  advantage  of  all 
natural  shelters.  The  next  step,  at  the  battle  of  Games'  Mill, 
was  using  rails,  logs,  trees,  etc.  Then  followed  the  use  of  the 
spade  to  help  out  such  improvised  shelters,  until,  later  in 
the  war,  armies  manoeuvred,  digging  themselves  in,  and  thus 
strengthening  their  positions  as  a  matter  of  course. 

All  of  this  was  a  gradual  development  of  American  inge 
nuity,  not  the  inspiration  of  any  tactician. 

Sherman's  wonderful  campaign  against  Atlanta  is  the  great 
example  of  hasty  intrenchnients  reaching  definite  strategic 
value.  Sherman  intrenched  and  threw  out  turning  forces 
around  his  enemy's  flank.  As  a  result  of  these  tactics,  re 
peated  again  and  again,  the  Confederates  were  compelled  to 
abandon  positions  that  would  have  caused  prohibitive  losses 
to  direct  assaults,  and  finally  they  were  forced  to  evacuate 
Atlanta. 

In  Grant's  last  campaigns  against  Lee,  from  the  Wilder 
ness  to  Petersburg,  the  use  of  hasty  intrenchments  was  per 
fected.  In  May,  1864,  Grant  moved  against  Lee,  who  in 
trenched  against  him  with  a  greatly  inferior  army  in  the 
Wilderness.  The  campaign  that  followed  was  a  series  of  at 
tacks,  and  moves  to  turn  Lee's  right  by  Grant.  Lee,  beating 
off  direct  attacks  on  his  trenches,  moved  to  the  right  when 
ever  Grant  attempted  to  outflank  him,  and  kept  his  army 
steadily  between  the  Federals  and  Kichmond.  Each  army  in 
trenched  as  it  moved,  Grant  attacking  from  his  trenches  when 
ever  he  thought  there  might  be  an  opening,  Lee  defending  by 
counter-attacks.  The  armies,  thus  facing  one  another,  swung 
to  Cold  Harbor  —  and  then  came  the  final  deadlock  and  long 
struggle  at  Petersburg. 


AMERICAN  TACTICS  IN  THE  PRESENT   WAR     447 

These  were  not  battles  in  the  European  sense  of  the  word. 
The  Wilderness,  Spottsylvania,  North  Anna,  and  Cold  Har 
bor  were  all  a  series  of  attacks  and  counter-attacks  of  armies 
intrenching  against  one  another  in  each  manoeuvre.  Peters 
burg  was  the  same  with  the  armies  brought  to  a  standstill, 
trench  against  trench. 

Formal  fortresses,  in  the  European  meaning  of  the  word, 
were  not  used  in  the  Civil  War.  The  superiority  of  earth 
works  and  intrenchments  was  too  evident.  These  Civil  War 
tactics  have  dominated  the  present  war,  and,  if  we  can  believe 
the  lessons  of  the  war,  the  day  of  formal  battles  and  formal 
fortresses  has  passed. 

It  seems  strange  at  first  glance  that  Europe  did  not  realize 
the  value  of  the  tactics  thus  developed  in  the  Civil  War.  But 
the  prestige  of  Napoleon  remained  too  overpowering  for 
Europe  even  to  consider  innovations  from  America.  The  great 
Emperor  fought  against  general  staffs  and  generals  imbued 
with  the  book-lore  of  war.  He  was  infinitely  better  at  their 
own  game.  Much  of  his  superiority  lay  in  his  knowledge  of 
what  his  enemy  would  do  under  conditions  governed  by  exist 
ing  tactics.  At  Austerlitz  the  Emperor's  order  told  his  army 
just  what  the  plan  of  the  enemy  would  be.  Why  should  he 
have  changed  the  game  ?  Yet  who  knows  what  he  might  have 
done,  had  new  tactics  been  necessary  ? 

Consequently  European  tactics  remained  unchanged.  Only 
five  years  after  the  Civil  War  came  the  Franco-Prussian  War. 
In  spite  of  an  inefficient  staff  and  bad  generalship,  the  French 
Army  fought  hard  and  maintained  its  organization.  After  gal 
lant  efforts  in  the  field  to  repel  the  systematically  planned 
German  onslaughts,  it  was  drawn  into  fortresses  where  capture 
was  only  a  matter  of  days. 

It  is  no  exaggeration  to  say  that  Woerth  and  Gravelotte 
might  have  been  another  story,  if  American  intrenching  tactics 
had  been  followed.  To  quote  again  from  Colonel  Wagner :  "  The 
defence  of  the  village  of  Froeschweiler  by  a  French  brigade 


448     AMERICAN  TACTICS  IN  THE  PRESENT  WAR 

against  the  frontal  attacks  of  a  German  army  corps  showed 
what  MacMahon  might  have  done  had  his  whole  position  been 
intrenched  .  .  .  the  sun  might  have  set  upon  a  field  of  French 
victory  [Gravelotte]  had  Bazaine  taken  heed  of  the  lesson  so 
plainly  taught  in  the  American  War." 

Lee  was  dead  —  but  if  Sherman  or  Grant  could  have  com 
manded  the  French  Army,  kept  it  in  the  field,  and  used  the 
intrenching  tactics  of  the  Civil  War,  would  the  Von  Moltke 
campaign  have  gone  through  like  clockwork  ?  The  present  war, 
using  the  tactics  of  Sherman,  Grant,  and  Lee,  is  the  answer  to 
this  question. 

Such  tactics  were  first  used  to  some  extent  in  Europe  by 
Skobeloff  and  Osman  Pasha  in  the  Russo-Turkish  War,  and 
increasingly  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War  and  the  wars  in  the 
Balkans.  In  the  present  war  these  American  tactics  have  been 
so  universally  accepted,  that  we  are  forced  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  old  systems  have  been  discarded.  There  seems  to  be 
no  future  possibility  of  the  formal  battle  of  European  tactics. 
The  formal  fortress  has  been  proved  not  only  useless,  but  a 
death  trap  ;  and  the  use  of  "  hasty  intrenchments  "  has  become 
the  basis  of  the  tactics  of  to-day.  Many  forms  of  such  in 
trenchments  have  been  devised  —  but  the  factors  in  the  war 
are  mobile  armies,  manoeuvring  and  taking  shelter  —  attack 
ing,  defending,  and  counter-attacking  from  "  hasty  intrench 
ments." 

On  the  sea  the  Civil  War  also  brought  about  great  changes 
in  tactics.  Before  this  war,  in  the  same  spirit  of  progress  that 
had  placed  the  heavy  guns  on  the  Constitution,  the  United 
States  Navy  had  built  steam  frigates  which  had  the  most  pow 
erful  armaments  of  their  class.  The  U.S.S.  Niagara  carried 
twelve  eleven-inch  guns.  This  American  idea  of  mounting 
heavier  guns  on  warships,  instead  of  adhering  to  the  policy  of 
increasing  the  number  of  guns,  led  naturally  to  the  use  of 
heavy  guns  on  armored  ships  by  both  sides  in  the  Civil  War. 

The  attack  in  Hampton  Roads  on  the  Union  fleet  by  the 


5  2 


o    « 

•<      5 


AMERICAN  TACTICS  IN  THE  PRESENT  WAR     449 

Merriraac,  converted  into  the  casemate  ironclad  Virginia  by 
the  Confederates,  showed  decisively  the  helplessness  of  wooden 
ships  against  armored  ships.  The  fight  that  followed  the  next 
day  between  the  Virginia  and  the  first  turret  ship,  the  Mon 
itor,  was  the  first  challenge  to  big  guns  in  casemates  by  big 
guns  in  turrets.  The  construction  of  the  epoch-making  Mon 
itor  had  been  hurried,1  and  she  was  defective  in  many  ways. 
Consequently,  although  the  Monitor  saved  the  Union  fleet,  the 
question  of  superiority  between  the  two  types  remained  unde 
cided  in  many  minds. 

The  less  known  fight  in  Warsaw  Sound  in  1863  established 
the  superiority  of  a  few  big  guns  in  turrets  over  a  greater  num 
ber  in  casemates.  The  Atlanta,  a  Confederate  casemate  iron 
clad  of  the  type  of  the  Virginia,  came  out  to  destroy  two 
monitors,  with  two  excursion  steamers  to  watch  the  destruc 
tion.  The  monitor  Weehawken  fired  just  five  shots —  and  the 
contest  was  ended  for  all  time  in  favor  of  big  guns  in  turrets. 
The  all-big-gun  ship  commands  the  sea  in  this  war  —  and  the 
big  guns  in  turrets  have  never  been  supplanted. 

In  the  Monitor  type  from  one  to  two  turrets  was  but  a  step, 
and  many  such  monitors  were  built.  Then  came  the  Roanoke 
(1863),  another  stage  in  the  development  of  the  monitor.  The 
Roanoke  was  a  "  sea-going  turret  vessel "  with  three  turrets, 
all  aliened  over  the  keel.  Here  were  the  essentials  of  the  dread- 

O 

nought  of  to-day,2  and  this  American  design  of  big  guns 
mounted  in  turrets,  aligned  over  the  keel,  has  prevailed  over 
all  other  types  of  armored  warships. 

Foreign  navies  have  been  reluctant  to  accept  this  design. 
They  have  built  all  kinds  of  armored  ships,  and  on  their  turret 
vessels  have  used  various  arrangements  of  the  turrets.  English 
and  German  dreadnoughts,  the  most  recent  development  of 

1  Launched  January  30,  1862,  100  days  after  keel  was  laid.  Commissioned 
February  25,  1862 ;  fought  battle  March  9,  1862. 

2  "  For  one  nowadays  to  see  a  drawing1  of  the  battery  plan  of  the  U.S.S.  Ro 
anoke  is  to  be  reminded  that  there  is  nothing  new  under  the  sun."  (Lieutenant- 
Commander  W.  P.  Cronan,  U.S.N.,  U.S.  Naval  Institute  Proceedings.) 


450     AMERICAN  TACTICS  IN  THE  PRESENT  WAR 

battleships,  have  other  dispositions  of  the  turrets  :  but,  in  the 
latest  classes  of  dreadnoughts,  all  foreign  naval  constructors 
have  conformed  to  the  American  design  of  turrets  aligned  over 
the  keel,  from  which  we  have  never  swerved  in  mounting  our 
heavy  guns.  The  turret  and  deck-plan  diagrams  show  this 
American  development  of  the  modern  dreadnought,  which 
makes  the  design  of  U.S.S.  Michigan  one  of  the  great  steps 
in  naval  construction. 

From  the  Constitution,  to  the  Niagara,  to  the  Monitor,  to 
the  Roanoke,  to  the  Michigan,  to  the  Pennsylvania,  are  but 
steps  in  the  American  idea  of  the  all-big-gun  ship. 

In  the  Civil  War  there  was  also  a  great  development  of  the 
torpedo  and  of  the  submarine.  The  use  of  the  torpedoes  by 
the  Confederates  was  of  real  tactical  value  to  them.  Their 
torpedoes  were  placed,  as  are  mines  in  the  present  war,  to 
protect  narrow  waters  and  harbors.  Covered  by  artillery  fire, 
these  mine-fields  undoubtedly  proved  a  good  defence  in  many 
cases  against  the  superior  naval  power  of  the  North.  Many 
Federal  warships  were  destroyed  by  them,  among  these  the 
monitors  Tecumseh  and  Petapsco.  In  fact  they  were  a  fore 
cast  of  the  great  mine-fields  which  now  defend  the  German 
bases  against  the  stronger  British  fleet. 

There  was  also  developed  a  tactical  use  of  the  torpedo  as  a 
weapon  of  offence,  the  Confederate  ram  Albemarle  being  the 
most  important  warship  so  destroyed.  The  Albemarle  was 
torpedoed  in  Cushing's  daring  night  attack.  As  is  well  known, 
with  a  volunteer  crew,  he  attacked  in  a  launch,  with  his  tor 
pedo  rigged  on  a  spar  and  exploded  by  pulling  a  lanyard. 

The  Confederates  also  made  great  strides  in  the  development 
of  the  submarine.  Under-sea  boats  approaching  the  modern 
type  were  used,  especially  at  Charleston.  One  design  had  an 
engine,  and  ran  along  awash  with  the  surface  of  the  sea,  carry 
ing  its  torpedo  thrust  out  from  the  bow  on  a  spar.  This  was 
called  a  "  David,"  but  the  best-known  Confederate  submarine 
was  the  boat  built  at  Mobile  by  Horace  L.  Huntley,  after 


AMERICAN  TACTICS  IN  THE  PRESENT  WAR      451 

whom  the  craft  was  named.  It  was  designated  as  a  "sub 
marine  torpedo-boat "  by  General  Beauregard  in  an  order  at 
Charleston  ;  *•  and  this  general's  description  of  the  H.  L.  Hunt- 


U.S.S.  MONITOR  (1862) 


TWO  TURRET  MONITOR  (1863) 


U.S.S.  MICHIGAN  (1906) 

DIAGRAMS  SHOWING  AMERICAN  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  DESIGN 
FOR  BIG  GUNS  IN  TURRETS  ALLIGNED  OVER  THE  KEEL 

ley  shows  that  it  deserved  the  title,  even  in  the  modern  sense 
of  the  words  :  — 

"  It  was  shaped  like  a  fish,  made  of  galvanized  iron,  was 
twenty  feet  long,  and  at  the  middle  three  and  a  half  feet  wide 
and  five  feet  deep.  From  its  shape  it  came  to  be  known  as 
the  '  fish  torpedo-boat.'  Propelled  by  a  screw  worked  from  the 
inside  by  seven  or  eight  men,  it  was  so  contrived  that  it  could 
be  submerged  and  worked  under  water  for  several  hours,  and 
to  this  end  was  provided  with  a  fin  on  each  side,  worked  also 
from  the  interior.  By  depressing  the  points  of  these  fins  the 
boat,  when  in  motion,  was  made  to  descend  and  by  elevating 
them  it  was  made  to  rise.  Light  was  afforded  through  the 
means  of  bull's  eyes  placed  in  the  manholes."  2 

1  Special  Order  No.  271,  Dec.  14,  1863. 

2  Southern  Historical  Society  Papers,  April,  1878. 


452      AMERICAN  TACTICS  IN  THE  PRESENT  WAR 

This  submarine  was  very  dangerous  for  its  crews.  On  a 
tablet  of  the  monument  at  Charleston  the  inscription  begins : 
"  Of  more  than  thirty  men  drowned  in  this  desperate  service 


DREADNOUGHT  (BRITISH  1906) 

First  British  design.  Note  that  at  many  angles  the  turrets  interfere  with 
one  another,  and  that  one  turret  cannot  be  used  in  a  broadside.  Four  British 
First  Line  Dreadnoughts  have  this  arrangement  of  turrets. 


HELGOLAND  (GERMAN  1908) 

First  German  design.  It  is  evident  that  there  is  still  more  interference  of 
the  turrets,  and  only  eight  turrets  can  be  used  in  a  broadside.  Eight  German 
First  Line  Dreadnoughts  have  this  arrangement  of  turrets. 


NEPTUNE  (BRITISH  1908) 

Echelon  arrangement  of  turrets.  Although  all  turrets  can  be  used  on  a 
broadside,  at  many  angles  there  is  still  interference  of  the  turrets.  Three 
British  and  four  German  Dreadnoughts  and  many  British  and  German  battle- 
cruisers  have  this  arrangement. 


U.S.S.  MICHIGAN  (1906) 

American  design  of  turrets  alligned  over  the  keel.  This  ship  was  designed 
before  the  nameship  Dreadnought,  though  the  latter  was  completed  first. 
This  design  of  the  Michigan  has  prevailed  over  all  others. 

DIAGRAMS   OF   DECK   PLANS  SHOWING  ARRANGE 
MENTS  OF  TURRETS  IN  MODERN  FIRST  LINE 
DREADNOUGHTS 


AMERICAN  TACTICS  IN  THE  PRESENT  WAR      453 

the  names  of  but  sixteen  are  known  " ;  and  the  first  name  on 
the  list  is  that  of  the  inventor,  Horace  L.  Htmtley,  who  lost 
his  life  in  his  submarine.  Yet  successive  crews  volunteered 
for  "this  desperate  service,"  and  February  17,  1864,  the 
Huntley  sank  U.S.S.  Housatonic  off  Charleston,  going  to 
the  bottom  with  its  victim.  Years  afterward  the  submarine 
was  found  in  the  same  place,  and  raised  with  the  bodies  of  its 
captain  and  all  its  crew.  The  boat  which  made  the  attack  on 
U.S.S.  New  Ironsides  was  of  the  "  David  "  type. 

These  Confederate  developments  of  the  original  American 
idea  of  the  submarine  undoubtedly  paved  the  way  for  Holland, 
Lake,  and  others,  and  led  to  the  recent  high  efficiency  of  the 
U-boat,  which  has  become  so  important  a  factor  in  the  grand 
tactics  of  the  present  war. 

As  a  dangerous  commerce-destroyer  nothing  approaching 
the  U-boats  has  ever  been  seen.  The  other  commerce-destroy 
ers,  the  light  German  cruisers,  which  early  in  the  war  made 
such  destructive  raids  on  British  shipping,  closely  followed  the 
tactics  originated  by  the  Confederate  Navy  in  the  Civil  War. 
This  was  the  first  navy  to  make  commerce-destroying  a  factor 
in  war  after  the  abolition  of  privateering. 

In  spite  of  the  prohibition  against  privateers  in  the  De 
claration  of  Paris,1  the  Confederate  Government  at  the  out 
break  of  the  Civil  War  hoped  to  create  a  fleet  of  privateers. 
This  proved  impossible.  The  South  did  not  have  the  ships, 
and  privateering  was  never  of  much  importance  in  the  war. 
The  South  then  tried  new  tactics,  and  the  Confederate  Navy 
commissioned  regular  warships  whose  mission  was  commerce- 
destroying. 

These  cruisers,  Sumter,  Alabama,  Florida,  Georgia,  etc., 
almost  drove  the  United  States  flag  from  the  seas.  With  the 
command  of  the  sea  hopelessly  against  them,  their  raids  were 
carried  on  with  the  greatest  ingenuity  and  daring,  and  it  was 
very  difficult  to  catch  them. 

1  "  Privateering  is  and  remains  abolished."  (Declaration  of  Paris,  1856.) 


454     AMERICAN  TACTICS  IN  THE  PRESENT  WAR 

In  the  present  war  the  German  cruisers  imitated  the  tactics 
of  these  Confederate  commerce-destroyers,  and  did  a  great 
amount  of  damage,  with  the  same  control  of  the  sea  against 
them.  The  Alabama  and  the  Emden  will  always  be  associated 
in  their  kinship  of  successful  audacity. 

For  the  Federals  on  the  sea  the  hardest  task  was  the  block 
ade  of  the  Confederate  coast.  Blockades  had  been  used  before 
in  warfare,  and  the  status  of  a  blockade  was  well  defined.1 
But  what  the  United  States  Navy  accomplished  was  no  "  cabi 
net  blockade,"  but  an  effective  blockade  such  as  had  never 
been  seen. 

Here  was  one  of  the  longest  coast-lines  in  the  world,  where 
harbors  and  inlets  gave  every  advantage  to  the  blockade-run 
ner.  The  United  States  Navy  had  not  ships  enough  to  carry 
out  the  task,  but,  with  characteristic  energy  all  kinds  of  craft 
were  utilized.  The  steamer  Circassian,  one  of  the  most  valu 
able  prizes  of  the  war,  was  actually  captured  by  a  Fulton 
ferry-boat.  At  first  the  blockade  was  de  facto,  as  different 
portions  of  the  coast  were  policed  and  notified  of  the  block 
ade,  but  in  an  astonishingly  short  time  the  long  coast-line  was 
effectively  hemmed  in.  "As  to  the  legal  efficiency  of  the 
blockade  after  the  first  six  months  there  can  be  no  question."  2 

This  was  only  the  beginning  of  the  undertaking.  Great 
profits  offered  inducements  to  blockade-runners.  After  the 
blockade  became  stringent  and  ships  were  being  constantly 
seized  on  the  high  seas,  attempts  were  made  to  evade  cap 
ture  by  clearing  for  one  of  the  available  neutral  ports,  touch 
ing  there,  and  then  trying  to  run  into  a  Confederate  port. 

Bermuda,  Nassau,  Havana,  and  Matamoras  were  these 
ports,  of  which  Nassau  was  much  the  most  active.  The  idea 
was  that  the  claim  of  neutral  destination  would  protect  the 
ship  for  most  of  its  voyage,  and  it  would  be  in  danger  only  in 
the  short  run  between  the  neutral  port  and  the  Southern  port. 

1  "  A  blockade  to  be  legal  must  be  effective."  (Declaration  of  Paris,  1856.) 

2  Professor  J.  R.  Soley,  U.S.N. 


AMERICAN  TACTICS  IN  THE  PRESENT  WAR     455 

This  practice  proved  easy  to  stop,  as  the  character  of  cargo 
and  evidence  of  final  destination  brought  condemnation  in  the 
courts.  This  evidence  was  most  difficult  in  the  case  of  Mat- 
amoras,  the  only  town  of  importance  on  the  Confederate  south 
ern  border,  but  so  general  became  the  forfeiture  of  ships  and 
cargoes  that  some  other  evasion  was  necessary. 

The  next  scheme  tried  was  clearance  for  the  neutral  ports, 
and  then  trans-shipment  at  the  neutral  port.  The  return 
cargoes  were  to  be  handled  in  the  same  way.  "  But  here  again 
the  courts  stepped  in,  and  held  that  though  a  trans-shipment 
was  made,  even  after  landing  the  cargo  and  going  through  a 
form  of  sale,  the  two  voyages  were  parts  of  one  and  the  same 
transaction,  and  the  cargo  from  the  outset  was  liable  to  con 
demnation,  if  the  original  intention  had  been  to  forward  the 
goods  to  a  blockaded  port.  Nor  did  the  decision  stop  here.  As 
all  property,  both  ship  and  cargo,  is  confiscated  upon  proof 
of  breach  of  blockade,  it  was  held  that  ships  carrying  on  this 
traffic  to  neutral  ports  were  confiscable,  provided  the  ultimate 
destination  of  the  cargo  to  a  blockaded  port  was  known  to  the 
owner.  In  the  words  of  the  Chief  Justice  of  the  Supreme 
Court,  'The  ships  are  planks  of  the  same  bridge.'  "*• 

The  last  resort  of  the  blockade-runners  was  most  ingenious, 
to  break  the  voyage  by  shipping  to  a  Federal  port,  then  to  a 
neutral  port,  then  to  the  Confederate  port.  Goods  were 
shipped  to  New  York  by  regular  steamship  lines,  thence  to 
Nassau,  to  be  sent  to  the  South.  This  was  ended,  when  it  was 
observed  that  trade  with  Nassau  and  Bermuda  was  abnormal, 
by  orders  issued  to  the  collectors  of  customs  to  refuse  clear 
ance  to  vessels  whose  cargoes  were  in  danger  of  falling  into 
the  hands  of  the  enemy,  and  to  require  owners  to  give  ample 
security  where  there  was  ground  for  apprehension  that  cargoes 
were  destined  for  the  enemy's  use. 

These  orders  were  general  and  named  no  particular  ports. 
Yet  the  "  merchants  of  Nassau  "  complained  of  this  "  unjust 

1  Soley. 


456     AMERICAN  TACTICS  IN  THE  PRESENT  WAR 

discrimination  "  and  persuaded  Earl  Russell  to  take  up  the 
subject  diplomatically.  The  correspondence  that  followed 
showed  so  plainly  that  "  the  trade  of  the  Bahamas "  was 
blockade-running,  that  the  British  Government  "  derived  lit 
tle  satisfaction,"  and  the  traffic  was  ended. 

Thus  were  overcome  difficulties,  physical  and  legal,  that 
seemed  insuperable.  The  amount  of  harm  done  to  the  South 
by  these  perfected  blockading  tactics  cannot  be  estimated. 

This  well-established  case  of  successful  legal  blockading 
tactics  was  at  the  command  of  the  British  Government  at  the 
outbreak  of  this  war.  Enforcement  of  a  legal  blockade  against 
the  Teutonic  Allies  would  have  been  very  difficult,  but,  if 
the  British  had  proclaimed  such  a  blockade  at  the  outset, 
they  could  have  attempted  to  build  up  their  case  on  the  case 
already  established.  Such  a  policy  at  the  start  might  not  have 
caused  undue  friction  among  the  neutral  nations. 

Instead  of  this,  Great  Britain  attempted  to  keep  goods 
from  the  Teutonic  Allies  by  using  her  command  of  the  sea, 
and  by  proclaiming  an  increasing  list  of  contrabands,  and 
"war  areas"  in  the  North  Sea.  It  is  now  recognized  that  this 
method  was  a  mistake,  especially  the  "  war  area  "  policy,  which 
gave  Germany  the  chance  to  play  the  same  game,  and  Great 
Britain  is  now  imitating  our  Civil  War  blockade. 

The  American  invention  and  development  of  the  airplane 
is  so  recent  that  there  is  no  need  to  describe  it. 

It  is  impressive  to  sum  up  these  American  contributions  to 
the  tactics  of  the  present  war. 

On  land :  — 

The  mobile  army  kept  in  the  field,  and  the  end  of  for 
mal  battles. 
The  superiority  of  intrenchments,  and  the  end  of  formal 

fortresses. 
The  development  of  "  hasty  intrenchments,"  and  of  armies 

manoeuvring  and  intrenching. 
The  development  of  the  airplane. 


AMERICAN  TACTICS  IN  THE  PRESENT   WAR     457 

On  the  sea:  — 

The  development  of  the  "  all-big-gun  ship." 

The  tactical  superiority  of  the  armored  ship. 

The  tactical  superiority  of  guns  mounted  in  turrets  — 
and  of  turrets  aligned  over  the  keel. 

The  tactical  use  of  the  torpedo. 

The  tactical  use  of  the  submarine. 

Kaids  on  an  enemy's  coast  by  a  weaker  fleet. 

The  development  of  a  legal  blockade  of  along  coast-line. 

Commerce-destroying  as  a  factor  in  war. 

The  development  of  the  hydroplane. 

The  facts  and  results  given  in  this  paper  are  not  exag 
gerated.  In  truth  they  are  understated.  No  attempt  has 
been  made  to  give  a  list  of  American  inventions  that  have 
been  used  in  warfare  — the  purpose  has  been  only  to  show  to 
what  extent  America  has  influenced  the  grand  tactics  of  the 
war.  This  should  not  make  us  self-satisfied  with  our  past  — 
on  the  contrary,  it  ought  to  be  a  stimulus  in  our  present 
great  task. 


INDEX 


INDEX 


Abbott,  E.  A.,  240. 

Abdy,  Major  Anthony  J.,  commanding 
Fifty-third  Battery,  Royal  Field  Artillery, 
361,  370,  373,  374,  375,  377,  389,  393,  396, 
398,  400,  402. 

Acton  Homes,  398. 

Adams,  Charles  Francis,  418. 

Adams,  corvette,  443. 

A  Defence  of  Wirz,  162. 

Aglipay,  P.,  whom  Aguinaldo  appointed 
Bishop  of  the  Philippine  Islands,  286. 

Aguinaldo,  Gen.  Emilio,  238,  239,  241,  247, 
253,  254,  257;  reply -as  to  what  relation 
the  Filipinos  expected  to  hold  to  the 
United  States,  258  et  seq. ;  his  letter,  259, 
260;  his  treaty,  274  et  seq.;  arrival  at  Ca- 
vite,  277;  his  policy  and  ambition,  278, 
279 ;  rewards,  280 ;  papers  captured  in  No 
vember,  1899,  280,  281  et  seq.;  instructs 
our  army  authorities,  282;  address  "To 
Foreign  Governments"  issued  August  6, 
283;  occupation  of  Manila  and  flight,  284 
et  seq.;  interview  on  October  25,  285;  his 
advice  on  January  8,  286;  his  order,  288; 
his  congratulations  on  February  24,  289. 

Ahmedabad,  364,  365. 

Aiken,  Mr.,  92. 

Alabama,  453. 

Alabama  River,  175. 

Alabama,  State  of,  67,  158,  175. 

Albemarle,  450. 

Alexander,  Gen.  A.  P.,  232. 

Alexander,  Charles  T.,  surgeon,  152. 

Allies,  298,  306,  310,  312,  313,  317,  429,  430, 
433. 

Alton,  111.,  154. 

American  Army,  238,  245,  247,  252. 

American  colonies,  353,  410,  411. 

American  contributions  to  the  tactics  of  the 
present  war  with  Germany,  456,  457. 

American  Federation  of  Labor,  411. 

American  forces,  309. 

American  Historical  Association,  215. 

American  inventions,  456. 

American  Marines,  308. 

American  Navy,  238. 

American  privateers,  441,  442. 

American  protectorate,  285. 

American  Revolution,  437  et  seq.,  442. 

American  tactics  in  the  present  war,  435, 
437,  439,  445,  448. 

American  troops  in  China,  307,  309,  312. 

American  troops  in  the  occupation  of  Ma 
nila,  241,  248,  282. 

American  Turtle,  diving  boat,  441. 

Americans  in  intrenchments,  439,  440. 


Ames,  Gen.  Adelbert,  123. 

Ammen,  Rear  Admiral,  355. 

Amory,  Major  Charles  B.,  158. 

Anderson,  Gen.  Richard  H.,  225. 

Anderson,  Brig.-Gen.,  first  expedition  to 
the  Philippines  under,  235,  241. 

Andersonville  and  Other  War  Prisons,  161. 

Andre,  Mr.,  Belgian  Consul,  238,  243,  247, 
248. 

Annals  of  the  War,  161. 

Annapolis,  355. 

Antietam,  1,  5,  7,  11,  14,  15,  27. 

Antietam  Campaign,  5,  7,  17. 

Antietam  Creek,  1,  2,  9,  10,  14,  15,  17. 

Antwerp,  432,  433. 

Appomattox,  232. 

Appomattox  Court  House,  231. 

Appomattox  River,  87,  99,  107,  109,  122. 

Appomattox  Valley,  109,  113. 

Archbishop  of  Manila.    See  Nozaleda,  P. 

Archduke  Charles,  432. 

Archer,  James  J.,  218. 

A  Rebel  War  Clerk's  Diary,  96,  97,  140,  217, 
228. 

Argus,  brig,  443. 

Armory  of  the  First  Corps  of  Cadets,  162. 

Army  and  Navy  Journal,  excerpt  from,  189. 

Army  of  the  Cumberland,  67,  69,  81. 

Army  of  the  James,  88,  99,  105,  108,  122, 
123,  125. 

Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  7,  41,  45,  124, 
142,  188,  197,  220,  221,  227,  232. 

Army  of  the  Potomac,  1,  7-9,  37,  41,  45,  48, 
59,  67,  71,  80,  88,  98,  107,  122,  123,  144, 
182. 

Articles  of  War,  22d  and  23d,  230;  23d,  231. 

Artillery,  at  Antietam,  12;  at  Gettysburg, 
24,  32,  37;  reserve,  8,  26,  27;  in  the  Mine 
Run  Campaign,  49,  51,  52,  62;  Petersburg 
and  Ft.  Harrison,  93,  96,  97,  108,  110,  112; 
Battery  No.  5,  108;  Battery  No.  11,  114; 
at  Manila,  Batteries  D  and  K  of  the 
Third  and  the  Astor  Battery,  236;  in 
China,  310,  311,  312,  316;  at  Ladysmith, 
Thirteenth  Battery,  375,  402;  Twenty- 
first,  366,  373,  374,  378,  379,  381,  383, 
386,  391,  393,  397,  398,  402;  Thirty- 
fourth,  364,  394;  Forty-second,  366,  367, 
370,  371,  372,  378,  379,  381,  390,  396; 
Fifty-third  Battery,  Royal  Field  Artil 
lery,  363-381,  383,  384,  386, 387,  389, 391- 
400,  402;  Sixty-seventh  Battery,  383,  402; 
Sixty-ninth,  390,  402;  Sixtieth  Rifles, 
384,  337;  a  few  points,  376;  ammunition 
expended,  387;  Boer  artillery  fire,  382 
et  seq.;  Garrison  Artillery,  307;  losses,  376, 


462 


INDEX 


386,  397;  Mountain  Battery  No.  10,  372, 
402;  Veterinary  Department,  366;  at 
Petersburg,  92,  93,  97,  110,  112,  113, 
Battery  No.  5,  88,  92,  108,  Battery  No. 
11,  88,  114. 

Art  of  war,  tabulation  of,  350. 

Asia,  343. 

Asiatic  coast,  271. 

Asuncion  Island,  237. 

Atlanta,  213,  446. 

Atlanta,  348,  449. 

Atlanta-Chattanooga  area,  322. 

Atlantic  Coast,  235,  322. 

Auerstadt,  430. 

Austerlitz,  429,  447. 

Australians,  373. 

Australian  horses,  364;  entraining,  366. 

Austrians,  428,  429,  431,  432. 

Ayuntamiento,  250,  251. 

Bacoor,  Province  of  Cavite,  place  of  landing 
American  troops,  241;  Aguinaldo's  old 
home  and  headquarters,  282,  284. 

Balkan  War,  422,  448. 

Baltimore,  169,  195,  211. 

Baltimore  pike,  22,  23,  24,  26,  28,  30,  32,  34. 

Bafios,  an  old  health  resort  of  Spanish  days, 
256. 

Barker,  Archdeacon  of  the  English  Church, 
397. 

Barnett's  Ford,  45,  53. 

Barras,  Louis,  Comte  de,  353. 

Bartlett's  Mill,  47,  48,  60. 

Barton,  Gen.  William  B.,  100,  101. 

Baruch,  Simon,  surgeon,  C.S.A.,  161. 

Batangas,  Province  of,  291,  292. 

Battle  of  the  Kegs,  442. 

Bautzen  in  1813,  429,  430. 

Bavaria,  upper,  431. 

Baxter,  Brig.-Gen.  Henry,  63. 

Bayamban,  255. 

Baylor's  Farm,  88,  99,  106,  112. 

Bayly,  Capt.  Edward,  Royal  Navy,  307. 

Bazaine,  Francois  A.,  448. 

Beatty,  Major,  113. 

Beauregard,  Gen.  G.  T.,  86,  87,  103,  104, 
105,  107,  451. 

Beauvoir,  house  of  Jefferson  Davis,  161. 

Belford's  Magazine,  161. 

Belger,  Capt.  James,  104. 

Belgian  Consul.   See  AndrS. 

Belgium,  122,  433. 

Bellows,  H.  W.,  President  of  the  Sanitary 
Commission,  199. 

Bement,  Major,  253. 

Benjamin,  Confederate  official,  157. 

Benner's  Hill,  22. 

Benson,  Sergt.  Benjamin,  153,  170. 

Bergson's  system  of  philosophy,  433. 

Berlin  in  1806,  430. 

Bermuda,  454,  455. 

Bermuda  Front,  99,  122. 

Bermuda  Hundred,  86,  88,  89,  101, 102, 107. 

Berthier,  Marshal,  431. 

Bessy,  Capt.,  93. 


Biac-na-bato,  treaty  of,  274  et  seg.,  280. 

Bingham,  Capt.  Henry  H.,  50. 

Binondo,  249. 

Biographical  Register  of  the  Graduates  of  the 

U.S.  M.A.,  169. 
Blaaukrau's  River  Bridge,  368. 
Black  Monday,  as  called  by  the  British,  376. 
Blanchard,  Lieut.  William,  176. 
Blauubank  Road,  384,  397. 
Blewitt,  Major,  374. 
Blewitt's  Post,  381,  382,  393,  401. 
Blucher,  Marshal  Gebhard,  433. 
Boer  Artillery,  375,  382. 
Boer  gunners,  374,  378,  382. 
Boers,  368,  369,  371,  377,  378,  379,  383,  385, 

386-398,  400,  401,  402. 
Bombay,  363,  364,  365. 
Booldana,  S.S.,  365,  366. 
Border  States  in  the  Union,  445. 
Boseley,  Sergt.,  394. 
Boston,  57,  143,  355,  439. 
Boston,  242,  248,  348. 
Boston  Globe,  201. 
Boston  Herald,  201. 
Boxers,  297,  301,  302,  305,  312. 
Braddock,  Gen.,  Regulars  under,  438. 
Bragg,  Gen.  Braxton,  67,  68,  73. 
Brandy  Station,  45. 
Breckinridge,  Hon.  J.  C.,  Secretary  of  War, 

225. 

Brescia-Milan,  428. 
Bridgeport,  Tenn.,  67,  68,  69,  71,  73. 
Bright,  Capt.,  402. 
British  Army,  439. 
British  control  of  the  sea,  440. 
British  fleet,  353. 
British  forces,  309. 
British  Government,  413,  456. 
British  losses,  439. 
British  Marines,  308,  315. 
British  Minister  at  Washington,  414. 
British  Navy,  444. 

British  non-successes  in  South  Africa,  379. 
British  troops  in  this  country,  325;  in  China, 

311;  at  Ladysmith,  395. 
British  Vice-Consul.   See  Ramsden,  H.  A. 
Brocklehurst,  Maj.-Gen.,  379,  389. 
Brooks,  Major  J.  C.,  133. 
Brooks,  Brig.-Gen.  William  T.  H.,  105,  106, 

107,  108,  111,  114. 
Brown,  Capt.  George  T.,  185  et  seq. 
Brown's  Ferry,  69,  70. 
Brownson,  Capt.  Edward  P.,  50. 
Bruce,  Col.  George  A.,  119. 
Brumby,  Lieut.,  248,  249,  250. 
Buckner,  Gen.,  201  et  seq. 
Buencamino,  Sefior  Felipe,  257,  258,  288. 
Buffalo,  15. 

Buffalo-Albany  region,  322. 
Bullard  and  Exchange  Hotel,  Richmond, 

133. 

Buller,  Gen.,  368,  369,  371,  388,  390,  401. 
Bull  Run,  First,  157,  158,  164. 
Bulwana  Hill,  378,  380,  382,  389,  390,  394, 

397,  398,  401. 


INDEX 


463 


Bulwer  Road  Bridge,  368. 

Bunker  Hill,  61,  439,  443. 

Burgos,  Sefior  A.,  260. 

Burnham,  Gen.  Hiram,  90,  95,  100. 

Burnside,  Gen.  Ambrose,  2,  3,  8,  9,  11,  15, 

16,  17,  18,  71. 

Burrage,  Bvt.-Maj.  Henry  S.,  207. 
Bushnell,  David,  built  diving  boat  known  as 

The  American  Turtle,  441;  in   1778  set 

afloat  torpedoes  against  British  shipping, 

442  et  seq.,  444. 
Butler,  Gen.  B.  F.,  86,  87,  89,  98-102,  105, 

106,  121,  123;  as  Federal  Commissioner  of 

Exchange,  195. 

Cadiz  fleet,  245. 

Caesar's  Camp,  380,  381,  385,  387,  390,  393, 

395,  396,  397,  398,  400,  401 ;  Boers  attack, 

383  et  seq. 

Cagayan,  Province  of,  289. 
Cahaba,  Ala.,  158,  175. 
Calcasieu  Pass,  La.,  164. 
California,  247. 
Callao,  248. 

Calocan,  Province  of  Manila,  288. 
Camara,  Admiral,  235,  236,  238. 
Cameron,  2d  Lieut.,  O.S.,  393,  396,  397,  399. 
Campbell,  Hon.  J.  A.,  Assistant  Secretary 

of  War,  227. 
Campbell,  Capt.,  391. 
Camp  Alger,  154. 
Camp  Arcadia,  367. 
Camp  Lee,  140. 

Camp  Sorghum.   See  Military  Prisons. 
Candy,  Col.  Charles,  23,  32,  33. 
Canning,  British  Foreign  Secretary,  413. 
Cape  Engano,  Luzon,  236. 
Cape  of  Good  Hope,  265. 
Cape  Hatteras,  157. 
Carpenter,  Capt.  Edward  N.,  162. 
Carpenter,  Lieut.  John  Quincy,  162,  176. 
Casademunt,  Carlos,  248. 
Castiglione  in  1797,  428. 
Castle  Thunder,  141. 
Catharpin  Road,  49. 
Cavada,  Col.,  181. 
Cavalry,  at  Antietam,  8,  12;  in  the  Mine 

Run  Campaign,  47;  at  Petersburg  and 

Ft.  Harrison,  86,  105;  at  Richmond,  121; 

at  Ladysmith,  379,  383,  389. 
Cavalry  horses,  402. 
Cavite,  Province  of,  238,  239,  241,  250,  254, 

257,  275,  277,  281,  291,  297,  298. 
Cavite  arsenal,  281,  282. 
Cedar  Creek,  117,  213. 
Cemetery  Hill,  22,  25,  37. 
Cemetery  Ridge,  110. 
Central  West,  322. 
Centurion,  H.M.S.,  297. 
Century  Magazine,  121. 
Cerberus,  442. 

Chadwick,  Capt.  F.  E.,  341. 
Chaffin's  Farm,  98,  122. 
Chancellorsville,  27,  45,  168. 
Chandler,  Col.  Daniel  T.,  169,  172. 


Chandler,  W.  E.,  Secretary  of  Navy  in  1884; 
354. 

Charleroi,  433. 

Charleston,  242. 

Charleston,  S.C.,  124,  157,  162,  173,  176; 
450,  452. 

Charleston  Courier  of  September  7,  1864, 
215. 

Charlotte,  N.C.,  159. 

Chase,  Mr.  Salmon  P.,  209,  210. 

Chattanooga,  Tenn.,  65,  67-72,  81,  88. 

Chavairi,  Capt.  Don  Francisco,  248. 

Chef  u^  200. 

Chemung  River,  152. 

Cheng-liang-cheng,  301. 

Chesapeake,  frigate,  443. 

Chesapeake  Bay,  353. 

Chester  Junction,  101. 

Chesterfield  Court-House,  126. 

Chicago,  348. 

Chickamauga,  Tenn.,  57,  72,  154. 

Chickasaw  Bayou,  174. 

Childrey,  Mr.,  92. 

Chilton,  Col.  Robert  Hall,  169. 

China,  237,  344;  the  visit  of  the  Allies  in 
1900,  295,  297,  307,  309,  315,  316. 

China  Sea,  263,  278. 

Chinese  forts,  298;  troops,  303, 305-307,311. 

Chipman,  Gen.  N.  P.,  160,  172. 

Chisholm,  Col.  Scott,  368. 

Christian  and  Sanitary  Commission,  187. 

Christopher,  Mr.,  391. 

Cincinnati,  Society  of,  408. 

Circassian,  454. 

City  of  Para,  S.S.,  236. 

City  Point,  Va.,  96,  111,  140,  216. 

Civil  War,  21,  40,  41,  57,  61,  72,  85,  115,  122, 
149,  204;  conditions  under  which  it  was 
fought,  and  the  one  thing  which  it  gave 
us,  326;  number  of  men  enrolled,  328;  its 
inspiring  cause,  417  et  seq.;  settlement, 
419;  tactics  and  weapons  of  warfare,  437; 
intrenchments,  445  et  seq.;  tactics  on  the 
sea,  448;  development  of  torpedoes  and 
submarines,  450;  blockade,  454. 

Clerk's  work  on  tactics  in  1779,  353. 

Clery,  advance  of,  378. 

Coasters'  Harbor  Island,  355. 

"Cold  Cheer  at  Camp  Morton,"  article  in 
Century  Magazine  for  April,  1891,  149. 

Cold  Harbor,  446,  447. 

Colenso,  368,  369,  383,  390,  398,  400,  401. 

Colgrove,  Col.  Silas,  23,  24,  30-32,  34,  36. 

Collamer,  Jacob,  U.S.  Senator,  212. 

Cologne,  432,  433. 

Colonists,  412,  437,  438,  440. 

Columbia,  S.C.,  158,  177. 

Commando,  or  Free  State,  367. 

Commentaries  on  American  Law,  413. 

Concord,  Mass.,  438. 

Confederate  Army,  at  Antietam,  7,  14,  15; 
at  Gettysburg,  41 ;  in  the  Mine  Run  Cam 
paign,  58,  59,  61;  at  Richmond,  124,  132; 
the  effect  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  reelection, 
217;  desertions,  124,  218,  225,  231,  232. 


464 


INDEX 


Confederate  Burgevine,  200  et  seq. 

Confederate  Cabinet,  disagreement,  58. 

Confederate  Congress,  219,  228. 

Confederate  Congress,  May,  1861,  198. 

Confederate  Congress,  March  3,  1865,  198. 

Confederate  fleet,  burning  of,  127. 

Confederate  Government,  15,  89,  127,  168, 
180,  453. 

Confederate  House  of  Representatives,  196, 
197. 

Confederate  losses,  at  Antietam,  14;  at 
Gettysburg,  34;  in  Mine  Run  Campaign, 
63;  at  Ft.  Harrison,  97;  at  Petersburg, 
104;  at  Ft.  Stedman,  229-232. 

Confederate  Navy  in  the  Civil  War,  453. 

Confederate  War  Department,  170. 

Confederate  White  House,  140. 

Confederates  captured,  in  Northern  mili 
tary  prisons,  149;  died  and  paroled,  204. 

Congress,  frigate,  443. 

Congressional  Committee,  164. 

Connecticut  troops,  Seventh,  106;  Eighth, 
100,  101,  106. 

Conscription  Act  in  April,  1862,  124. 

Conscription  laws,  59. 

Constantinople,  343. 

Constellation,  frigate,  443. 

Constitution,  443,  444,  448,  450. 

Continental  Army,  437. 

Cook,  William,  183  et  seq. 

Cooke,  Bombardier,  394. 

Cooke,  Capt.  Henry  Parkhurst,  179. 

Cooke,  Brig.-Gen.  John  R.,  218. 

Cooper,  Adjt.-Gen.  Samuel,  C.S.A.,  165, 
224. 

Corcoran,  Col.  Michael,  158. 

Cornwallis,  Lord,  353,  438,  439;  at  York- 
town,  325. 

Corregidor  Island,  237. 

Cossacks,  301. 

Couch,  Maj.-Gen.  Darius  N.,  107. 

Council  of  Defence,  244. 

Council,  Col.  J.  Calvin,  113. 

Cowikee,  Ala.,  167. 

Coxhead,  Lieut.-Col.  J.  A.,  367,  372,  374, 
375,  398. 

"  Cracker  Line,"  70. 

Crampton's  Pass,  89. 

Crane,  W.  F.,  letter  from,  167,  168. 

Crawford's  statue  of  Washington,  140. 

Cremona-Milan,  428. 

Creusot  gun,  or  "  Long  Tom,"  373,  377,  382, 
388-391,  393,  394,  401. 

Croffut's  Fifty  Years  of  Camp  and  Field, 
155. 

Cromwell,  Oliver,  335. 

Cronan,  Lieut.-Commander  W.  P.,  449. 

Crook,  Gen.  George,  81,  117. 

Crowder,  Lieut.-Col.  E.  H.,  252. 

Crowninshield,  Col.  Benjamin  W.,  117. 

Crozier,  Brig.-Gen.  William,  405. 

Cuba,  Island  of,  235,  279;  Joint  Resolutions 
of  Congress  approved  April  20,  1898,  419. 

Cullen,  Col.  Edward  M.,  93. 

Cull  urn,  Gen.  George  W.,  169. 


Culpepper  Ford,  46. 
Gulp's  Hill,  22,  23,  25. 
Cunningham,  Col.  Dick,  396. 
Curtis,  Lieut.-Col.  Arthur  R.,  183. 
Cushing's  daring  night  attack,  450. 
Custom  House,  receipts  at,  257. 

Dagupan,  255. 

Daly,  Capt.,  192. 

Dan  River,  180. 

Daniel,  Brig.-Gen.  Junius,  32,  37. 

Danube,  valley  of,  432. 

Danville,  Va.,  158,  180,  194,  232. 

David,  type  of  submarine,  450,  453. 

Davidson,  Sergt.  Henry  M.,  171,  174. 

Davila,  Don  Basilic  Augustin,  Governor- 
General  of  Manila,  Proclamation  of  23d 
of  April,  1898,  245,  246. 

Davis,  Gen.  George  B.,  45,  47,  64. 

Davis,  Henry  Winter,  211. 

Davis,  Jefferson,  58,  96,  131,  136,  139,  140, 
142,  161,  163,  173,  195,  200;  action  con 
cerning  court-martial  cases,  218;  message 
to  the  Confederate  Congress,  219;  his  re 
ply  to  General  Lee's  proposed  proclama 
tion,  222  et  seq. 

Davout,  Marshal,  430,  431,  432. 

Dawkins,  Major  J.  W.  G.,  375. 

Dearing,  Gen.  James,  86. 

Deep  Bottom,  90,  122,  123. 

Deesa,  a  military  station  in  Northern 
Gwzevat,  363-365. 

De  Grasse,  Admiral  Francois  Joseph  Paul, 
353. 

Delaware  River,  442. 

Dennis,  death  of,  396. 

Department  of  the  Cumberland,  77. 

Department  of  Virginia,  123. 

Devens,  Gen.  Charles,  121,  123,  125,  126, 
128,  129,  132,  133,  134,  136,  138,  139. 

Devons,  396. 

Dewey,  Admiral  George,  236-238,  241-244, 
248,  253,  254,  275,  277,  279. 

Digby-Jones,  Lieut.,  389,  396. 

Dimick,  Col.  Justin,  202. 

Diugaau's  Day,  important  holiday  cele 
brated  by  the  Boers  December  16,  390. 

Dix,  Dorothea,  152. 

Dole,  President,  236. 

Dolphin,  348. 

Donohoe,  Col.  M.  T.,  90,  91,  95,  107. 

Dorr,  Major  Henry  G.,  158,  162. 

Dorward,  Gen.,  commander  of  British  forces, 
309,  311,  312. 

Douglas,  Stephen  A.,  199. 

Doyle,  A.  Conan,  377. 

Drake,  Jeremiah  C.,  100. 

Drakensberg  range,  367. 

Dresden-Glogan,  430. 

Drought,  John  W.,  murdered  at  Elk  River, 
78. 

Drury's  Bluff,  91,  105. 

Duncan,  Lieut.-Col.,  J.  H.,  219. 

Duncan,  private,  128. 

Dundee,  South  Africa,  366,  372,  373. 


INDEX 


465 


Dundonald,  Lord,  401. 
Dunkard  Church,  10,  13,  18. 
Durban,  South  Africa,  366,  378. 

Eagle,  442. 

Early,  Gen.  Jubal  A.,  at  Gettysburg,  32; 

movement    of,    into    Maryland,    88;    at 

Fisher's  Hill,  213;  desertions  in  his  corps, 

225. 

East  Arsenal,  302,  305,  307,  308. 
Eastern  Coast,  340. 
Eastman,  Lieut.-Col.  Seth,  152. 
East  Tennessee,  72. 
Eckmuhl,  Campaign  of  1809,  430,  432. 
Edwards'  Crossing,  8. 
Eighteenth  Army  Corps,  at  Petersburg,  88- 

90,  98,  99,  101-103;  at  Richmond,  123. 
Elandslaagte,  368,  369,  397. 
Elder,  Capt.  Samuel  S.,  109,  111,  162. 
Eleventh  Army  Corps,  at  Gettysburg,  22, 

25,  28;  at  Chickamauga,  67,  68,  71. 
Elizabethtown,  N.J.,  168. 
Elk  River,  75-77,  80. 
Elliot,  notorious  desperado,  80. 
Elmira,  N.Y.,  151. 
Ely,  Alfred,  164,  166. 
Ely's  Ford,  54. 
Emden,  454. 

Emory,  Gen.  W.  H.,  117. 
End  Hill,  379,  387. 
England,  344,  345,  353,  363,  367. 
England,  our  war  with,  325  et  seq. 
English  troops,  61,  316. 
Enterprise,  schooner,  444. 
Essex,  frigate,  443. 
Estcourt,  368,  369. 
Europe,  344,  414;  military  countries  of,  336, 

348. 

European  armies,  122. 
European  tactics,  438,  439,  447,  448. 
Ewell,  Gen.  Richard  S.,  at  Gettysburg,  28, 

34;  in  the  Mine  Run  Campaign,  46,  47, 

53,  178. 

Farallon  de  Pa j  arcs,  active  volcano,  237. 

Farquhar's  Farm,  376. 

Fayetteville,  Tenn.,  79,  80. 

Federals  captured  during  the  war,  died  and 

paroled,  204. 

Feliu,  Col.,  Jos6  Maria  Olaquen,  252. 
Field,  Maj.-Gen.  Charles  W.,  126. 
Field,  David  Dudley,  211. 
Fifth  Army  Corps,  at  Antietam,  2,  8,  9;  at 

Gettysburg,  22,  23,  25;  in  the  Mine  Run 

Campaign,  46-49,  62,  63. 
Filipino  characteristics,  263-294. 
Filipinos,  238,  239,  246,  258,  259,  273,  276, 

278,  282,  285. 

Finegan,  Brig.-Gen.  Joseph,  218-220. 
First  Army  Corps,  at  Antietam,  3,  8,  9,  17, 

18;  at  Gettysburg,  22,  23,  25,  39,  40;  in 

the  Mine  Run  Campaign,  46-49,  61. 
Fisher's  Hill,  213. 
Five  Forks,  125,  231. 
Flamborough  Head,  440. 


Fletcher,  Thomas  C.,  174. 

Florida,  453. 

Florida  troops,  Ninth  Regiment,  220. 

Foley,  James  W.,  78. 

Folsom,  Col.,  2. 

Foote,  Henry  S.,  196,  197. 

Forrest,  Gen.  Nathan  B.,  115. 

Fort  Darling,  103. 

Fort  Delaware,  151,  177. 

Fort  Donelson,  72,  199. 

Fort  Fisher,  111,  124. 

Fort  Gilmer,  92,  95,  129. 

Fort  Harrison,  83,  85,  90-92,  96,  97,  111, 

123,  132,  322. 
Fort  Henry,  72,  199. 
Fort  Leavenworth,  322. 
Fort  Monroe,  150,  200. 
Fort  Riley,  322. 

Fort  Stedman,  182,  228,  229,  230. 
Fort  Sumter,  124. 
Fort  Wagner,  111. 
Fort  Warren,  201,  202. 
Foster,  Hon.  John  W.,  412,  413,  415,  416. 
Four  Years  with  General  Lee,  227,  231. 
Fowke,  Capt.,  389. 
Fox,  Capt.  George  B.,  30,  31,  179. 
France,  336,  344,  348,  358,  408,  431. 
Franco-German  War,  346. 
Franco-Prussian  War,  349,  447. 
Franklin,  Gen.  William  B.,  1,  2,  8, 12, 13,  18. 
Frederick,  Md.,  8,  9. 
Frederick  the  Great,  426. 
Fredericksburg,  51,  53,  110,  168. 
Fredericksburg  and  Potomac  R.R.,  154. 
Freedley,  Capt.  Henry  W.,  152. 
Freeman,  Lieut.  H.  B.,  162. 
Free  State  Army,  372. 
Free  State  Column,  367,  368. 
Free  State  or  Commando,  367. 
French,  Brig.-Gen.  William  H.,  10,  11,  46, 

47,  49,  50. 

French  army  in  Germany,  430-432. 
French  fleet,  325,  353. 
French  troops  in  China,  311. 
French  and  Indian  Wars,  437,  438. 
Frey,  Capt.  Emil,  161. 
Friend  House,  104,  114. 
Froeschweiler,  defence  of,  447. 
Frothingham,  Thomas  G.,  435. 
Fulton,  Robert,  444. 
Fulton  ferry-boat,  454. 
Funkstown,  57. 

Games'  Mill,  446. 
Garcia,  Gen.  Pantaleon,  259. 
ardner,  Capt.  Silas  E.,  80. 
Gaston,  Representative,  414. 
Geary,  Brig.-Gen.  John  W.,  at  Gettysburg, 
23,  24,  26,  29,  32-34,  38-10;  at  Chatta 
nooga,  70,  71. 

eneral  Board,  348,  349,  351. 
eneral  Orders,  No.  2,  222,  225;  No.  6,  77; 
No.  159,  198. 

eneral  Staff  for  the  Navy,  349  et  seq. 
eorgetown,  150. 


466 


INDEX 


Georgia,  158,  169,  175,  227. 

Georgia,  453. 

German  armies,  122. 

German  concession,  309. 

German  cruisers,  453. 

German  General  Staff,  346  et  seq. 

German  troops,  316;  in  China,  311. 

Germanna  Ford,  46,  54,  63. 

Germantown,  Pa.,  151. 

Germany,  military  training  in,  336;  power  in, 
343,  344;  system  of,  348;  took  sixty  years 
to  prepare  the  overthrow  of  France,  358; 
French  armies  in,  431,  432. 

Gettysburg,  19,  21-23,  25,  38,  40,  41,  57,  58, 
110,  162,  168,  232. 

Gibbon,  Gen.  John,  123. 

Gillmore,  Gen.  Quincy  A.,  101, 102, 105,  106. 

Gingalls,  the  famous  two-men  guns,  306. 

Gloucester  Regiment,  372,  391. 

Godwin,  Parke,  211. 

Goldsboro,  N.C.,  159,  162. 

Goodrich,  Lieut.-Commander  C.  F.,  U.S.N., 
354. 

Gordon,  Charles  G.  ("Chinese"),  200,  313. 

Gordon,  General,  355. 

Gordon,  Brig.-Gen.  John  B.,  47,  225,  228- 
230 

Gordon  Hall,  303,  304. 

Gordon  Highlanders,  385,  388,  395. 

Gordonsville,  53. 

Goss,  Capt.  Enoch,  113. 

Goulburn,  Major,  381,  390. 

Gracie,  Gen.  Archibald,  Jr.,  103,  104. 

Grant,  Gen.  Ulysses  S.,  in  the  Mine  Run 
Campaign,  53,  54;  at  Chickamauga,  68, 
\69,  71,  72;  at  Petersburg  and  Ft.  Harri 
son,  86-89,  92,  95,  96,  99,  114;  at  Rich 
mond,  125,  126,  142;  last  campaigns 
against  Lee,  446;  tactics,  448;  mentioned, 

'  170,  196,  213,  216,  221,  223,  226,  229, 
231. 

Gravelotte,  447,  448. 

Graves,  Admiral  Sir  Thomas,  353. 

Gray,  Major  John  C.,  Jr.,  1,  2. 

Great  Britain,  272,  408,  412,  414,  415,  440, 
456. 

Greeley,  Horace,  211. 

Greene,  Gen.  Francis  V.,  at  Manila,  235, 
238,  239,  241,  249,  250,  252. 

Greene,  Brig.-Gen.  George  S.,  at  Antietam, 
10,  11,  13,  18;  at  Gettysburg,  23,  24,  26- 
30,  33,  34,  38,  40. 

Greensboro,  N.C.,  180. 

Greenville,  S.C.,  159. 

Grimes,  Brig.-Gen.  Bryan,  225. 

Grimes,  James  W.,  211. 

Grimwood's  battalions  at  Ladysmith,  376. 

Guibert,  French  general,  427. 

Gulf  Coast,  322. 

Gun  Hill,  387,  389. 

Gwzevat,  Northern,  363. 

Habeas  Corpus,  writ  of,  59. 
Hagerstown  road,  10;  pike,  12,  18. 
Hagood,  Gen.  Johnson,  100,  101,  104. 


Hague,  The,  First  International  Peace  Con 
ference  in  1899,  422. 

Hairston,  Maj.  J.  T.  W.,  165  et  seq. 

Halfway  House,  102,  104. 

Hall,  Gen.  Foster  quotes,  412-413. 

Halleck,  Maj. -Gen.  Henry  W.,  40,  58,  59. 

Hamburg,  431. 

Hamilton,  Col.  Ian,  373. 

Hampton,  Maj. -Gen.  Wade,  47,  48,  177, 
178. 

Hampton  Roads,  448. 

Hampton  Roads  Conference,  226. 

Hancock,  Gen.  Winheld  S.,  22,  61,  107,  110. 

Harper  and  Brothers,  161. 

Harper's  Ferry,  1,  7,  8;  Union  losses,  14. 

Harper's  Monthly  Magazine,  January,  1915, 
210. 

Hartranft,  Gen.  John  F.,  229. 

Haskins,  Lieut.  Alex.  D.,  80. 

Hatcher's  Run,  122. 

Hatteras  Inlet,  157. 

Havana,  454. 

Hawaii,  annexation  to  the  U.S.,  238. 

Hawley,  Col.  Joseph  R.,  106. 

Hawley,  Col.  William,  80. 

Hay,  Hon.  John,  121,  210,  212-215. 

Hayes,  Gen.,  192. 

Hayes,  Gen.  Joseph,  183. 

Hayes,  Gen.  Rutherford  B.,  8. 

Hays,  Brig.-Gen.  Harry  T.,  47,  48. 

Hazel  River,  45. 

Hazen,  Gen.  William  B.,  70. 

Headquarters  Staff,  391. 

Heckman,  Gen.  Charles  A.,  93,  95,  99,  103, 
104. 

Helpmakaar  Post,  381;  Boers  attack  on, 
383-385. 

Helpmakaar  Ridge,  382. 

Helpmakaar  Road,  373. 

Henrico  Jail  in  Richmond,  157. 

Heth,  Maj. -Gen.  Henry,  218,  223,  225. 

Higgins,  Lieut.  J.  F.,  375,  380,  383,  396. 

Higgins,  Mr.  H.  L.,  General  Manager  of 
R.R.  in  the  Philippines,  255,  257. 

Hill,  Gen.  A.  P.,  at  Antietam,  14;  in  the 
Mine  Run  Campaign,  47-49,  53;  at  Rich 
mond,  140;  at  Petersburg  and  Ft.  Harri 
son,  216;  report  to  Gen.  Lee  on  desertions, 
218  et  seq. 

Hill,  Hon.  Benjamin  H.,  Senator  from  Geor 
gia  in  Confederate  Congress,  153,  214. 

Hincks,  Gen.  Edward  W.,  at  Petersburg 
and  Ft.  Harrison,  99,  100,  107,  108,  109, 
111,  114. 

Hitchcock,  Gen.,  Diary  of,  155. 

Hlaugwaue,  South  Africa,  401. 

Hogg,  Gen.,  commanding  Deesa  District^ 
363. 

Hoke,  Gen.  Robert  F.,  103,  104. 

Holland,  inventor  of  submarine,  452. 

Holt,  Judge  Advocate,  171. 

Home  Guards,  86. 

Homes,  Clay  W.,  151. 

Hong  Kong,  241,  243,  245,  254,  273,  274, 
278,  280,  281. 


INDEX 


467 


Hong  Kong  Junta,  273,  274  et  seq.,  278,  280. 

Honolulu,  P. I.,  235,  236,  239. 

Hood,  Gen.  John  B.,  72,  124. 

Hooker,  Gen.  Joseph,  at  Antietam,  2,  3,  8- 

12,  15-17;  at  Chattanooga,  68-71. 
Hooper,  Lieut.-Col.  Charles  H.,  183. 
Hornet,  sloop,  443. 

Housatonic,  U.S.S.,  453. 

House  of  Representatives,  192;  Documents, 
No.  1109,  163,  173;  No.  4064,  174;  No. 
199,  176;  No.  845,  180;  40th  Congress,  3d 
Session,  Document  No.  455,  198. 

Hovey,  A.  P.,  149. 

Howard,  Gen.  O.  O.,  in  the  Mine  Run  Cam 
paign,  57;  at  Chattanooga,  68,  70,  71. 

Howe,  Gen.  Sir  William,  61. 

Huddleton,  private,  execution  of,  224. 

Hume's  Shop,  45,  46. 

Humphreys,  Gen.  A.  A.,  in  the  Mine  Run 
Campaign,  45,  47;  at  Petersburg  and  Ft. 
Harrison,  107. 

Hunt,  Gen.  Henry  J.,  37. 

Hunter,  Maj.-Gen.  Sir  A.,  375,  389. 

Hunter,  Senator,  of  Virginia,  142. 

Huntley,  Horace  L.,  inventor  of  submarine, 
451,  452.  453. 

Hussars,  Eighteenth,  379;  Nineteenth,  368. 

Huxford,  Capt.  W.  P.,  183. 

Ilo  Ilo,  Island  of  Panay,  285. 

Iltis,  German  gunboat,  299. 

Immortalite,  British,  239. 

Imperial  army,  200. 

Imperial  troops,  305,  312;  Imperial  Light 
Horse,  368,  369,  379;  camp  and  trenches, 
385,  388. 

India,  271,  363,  364,  366,  367,  403. 

Indiana,  214;  troops,  Twenty-seventh  Regi 
ment,  30,  31,  35,  36. 

Indiana,  236. 

Indianapolis,  149,  153. 

Indian  troops,  315,  368. 

Indian  war,  331,  437. 

Indo-European,  264. 

Insurgent  Junta,  227. 

Intelligence  Division,  392. 
.•     International  Disputes,  Society  for  the  Ju 
dicial  Settlement  of,  407,  408,  412. 

Intombi  Camp,  380,  390,  392,  399,  400,  401, 
403. 

Iron  Bridge,  369,  378,  380. 

Isamblwhaua,  commonly  called  Bulwana 
Hills,  378. 

Isthmus  of  Suez,  235. 

Italy,  from  1720  to  the  Napoleonic  Wars, 
335. 

Jackson,    "Stonewall,"    at    Antietam,    8, 

13,  14,  18;  mentioned,  29. 

Jacobs,  George  W.,  murdered  at  Elk  River, 

78. 

Jacob's  Ford,  46. 
James  River,  58,  86,  88,  89,  93,  98,  99,  102, 

103,  105,  107,  111,  122,  127,  128,  131,  132, 

138,  158,  192. 


Japanese  troops  in  China,  311,  316. 

Jaudenes,  Firmin,  Governor  and  Captain- 
General  of  the  Philippines,  243,  244,  245, 
247,  249,  251,  253,  275. 

Jena,  430. 

John  Adams,  corvette,  443. 

Johnson,  Andrew,  142. 

Johnson,  Gen.  Bradley  T.,  179. 

Johnson,  Gen.  Bushrod,  100,  101,  225. 

Johnson,  Gen.  Edward,  at  Gettysburg,  23, 
28,  29,  32,  33;  in  the  Mine  Run  Cam 
paign,  46-48. 

JohnsonrGen.  Richard  W.,  110. 

Johnson,  Dr.  Samuel,  62. 

Johnston,  Gen.  Joseph,  163,  227,  228. 

Johnston,  Prof.  R.  M.,  423. 

Jolo  Archipelago,  289. 

Jomini,  Antoine  Henri,  his  study  of  war, 
350,  351,  352,  425. 

Jones,  Mr.  J.  B.,  96. 

Jones,  Brig.-Gen.  John  M.,  28. 

Jones,  Paul,  440. 

Julian,  Capt.  George  N.,  113,  114. 

Junction  Hill,  398. 

Kane,  Brig.-Gen.  Thomas  L.,  23,  28,  29,  33, 

34. 

Kane,  Dr.,  29. 

Kautz,  Gen.  August  V.,  89,  125,  130. 
Kautz,  Lieut.  Albert,  U.S.N.,  156,  157. 
Kelly,  A.  M.,  153. 
Kelly,  Assistant  Surgeon,  Indian  Medical 

Service,  394. 
Kelly's  Ferry,  45. 
Kemper,  Gen.  James  L.,  103. 
Kempff,  Admiral,  299. 
Kent,  Chancellor,  413. 
Kentucky,  215. 
Ketcham,  Col.  John  H.,  79. 
King,  Preston,  142. 
King's  Post,  384. 

Klip  River,  378,  385,  388,  393,  400,  401. 
Klip  River  Camp  Bridge,  383. 
Knox,  Col.  W.,  C.B.,  402. 
Knoxville,  Tenn.,  71. 
Kronje,  Gen.,  401. 

Ladd,  Capt.  William  J.,  133,  134. 

Ladysmith,  South  Africa,  311;  siege  of,  361, 
362,  366-369,  372,  373,  375,  377-381,  388, 
394,  395,  397,  399,  401-403;  official  state 
ment  for  the  24th  of  November:  ammuni 
tion  expended,  387;  losses,  386. 

Laguna,  Province  of,  256,  292. 

Laguna  de  Bey,  291. 

Lake,  inventor  of  submarine,  453. 

Lake  George,  Provincials  at,  438. 

Lamberton,  Capt.  B.  P.,  U.S.N.,  252. 

Lancers'  Hill,  379,  380. 

Lands,  Capt.,  299. 

Lane,  Brig.-Gen.  James  H.,  218. 

Lang,  Col.  D.,  220. 

Latouche,  Lieut.,  181,  182,  190. 

Lech,  river,  430-432. 

Lee,  Gen.  Fitzhugh,  189. 


468 


INDEX 


Lee,  Gen.  Robert  E.,  at  Antietam,  7,  8,  9, 
11,  14,  15,  17,  18;  at  Gettysburg,  22,  41; 
in  the  Mine  Run  Campaign,  46,  48,  53, 
54,  57,  58,  60,  64;  at  Petersburg  and  Ft. 
Harrison,  88,  97;  at  Richmond,  122,  126, 

;  131,  132,  142;  condition  of  affairs  in  his 
army,  217-227;  letter  to  President  Davis 
regarding  negroes  for  services  as  soldiers, 
228;  report  to  the  Secretary  of  War  on 
desertions,  230,  231;  losses,  232;  men 
tioned,  426,  446,  448. 

Leigh,  Major  B.  W.,  33. 

Leonard,  Capt.  Henry,  U.S.  M.C.,  295,  307. 

Lexington,  Mass.,  438,  439,  446. 

Libby  &  Sons,  180. 

Liberty  Mills,  60. 

Life  and  Letters  of  Gen.  Meade,  232. 

Limit  Hill,  373,  389. 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  suspended  the  writ  of 
Habeas  Corpus,  59;  interview  with  Miss 
Miller,  81;  at  Richmond,  139,  140;  au 
thorized  exchange  of  prisoners,  157;  ef 
fect  of  his  reelection  upon  the  waning  for 
tunes  of  the  Confederate  States,  209-232. 

Lincoln,  Tad,  139. 

Ling  Chi,  200. 

Livermore,  Col.  Thomas  L.,  2,  43,  50,  85, 
98,  114,  155. 

Liverpool  Regiment,  at  Ladysmith,  368, 
369. 

Lloyd's  list  containing  notices  of  British  ves 
sels  captured  by  Americans,  443. 

Lockwood,  Brig.-Gen.  Henry  L.,  at  Gettys 
burg,  24,  26,  27,  32,  39,  40. 

Locust  Grove.   See  Robertson's  Tavern. 

Lodge,  Hon.  Henry  Cabot,  418. 

Lombard's  Kop,  374, 376,  377,  387,  390,  394, 
395. 

London  Times,  443,  444. 

Long  Hill,  378,  402. 

Longstreet,  Gen.  James,  at  Antietam,  14; 
at  Gettysburg,  25;  in  the  Mine  Run  Cam 
paign,  53;  at  Chickamauga,  67,  71;  at 
Richmond,  124,  142;  report  of  November 
14,  1864,  218;  desertions  from,  225,  231; 
interview  with  Gen.  Ord,  226;  writes  to 
Gen.  Lee,  230. 

Lookout  Mountain,  69-71. 

Los  Angeles,  322. 

Loud,  Lieut.  E.  DeC.,  162. 

Low,  Gen.  Sir  R.,  commanding  Bombay 
Army,  365. 

Loyal  League,  134. 

Luce,  Commodore  Stephen  B.,  U.S.N., 
354,  355. 

Luke,  Major,  313. 

Luna,  Gen.,  288. 

Luzon,  Island  of,  236,  254,  274,  279,  281- 
284,  289-292. 

Lynchburg,  191,  232. 

Lyons,  Judge,  97. 

Mabini,  Sefior,  281,  285,  287. 
Macdougall,  Lieut.,  378. 
Maclay,  441. 


Macon,  Ga.,  158,  161,  170,  175. 

Madison,  James,  325,  413,  414. 

Madrid,  270. 

Madrid  Government,  245. 

Mahan,  Capt.  and  Admiral  A.  T.f  351,  355; 

in  his  Sea  Power  in  its  Relation  to  the  War 

of  1812,  414. 

Mahone,  Maj.-Gen.  William,  218,  219. 
Maiden  Post,  397. 
Maine,  214. 

Maine,  disaster  to,  420. 
Mainz,  Germany,  431. 
Malacanang,    Palace    at,    Gen.    Merritt's 

Headquarters,  253. 
Mallory,  Confederate  officer,  157. 
Malolos,    Aguinaldo's    Headquarters,    254, 

256,  257,  259,  276,  279,  284,  285,  288,  289; 

insurgent  capital  moved  to,  277. 
Manassas,  7,  164,  166. 
Manassas  to  Appomatlox,  230. 
Manchester  Regiment,  367,  381. 
Manila,  P.I.,  occupation  of  in  1898,  235- 

260;  mentioned,  269,  271,  275-277,  279- 

287,  289-291. 

Manila  Bay,  238,  242, 254,  271,  275, 280,  297. 
Manila  Custom-House,  273;  University  of, 

270. 

Mannlicher  rifles,  306,  307. 
Mansfield,  Maj.-Gen.  Joseph  K  F.,  2,  8,  10. 
Mantua,  428. 

Marines,  First  Regiment  of,  in  China,  310. 
Maryborough's  wars,  intrenchments  in,  445. 
Martindale,  Gen.  John  H.,  107,  109,  111. 
Marye's  Heights,  51. 
Maryland,  7,  8,  9,  14,  15,  88,  215. 
Maryland  Heights,  1. 
Maryland  troops,  First  Battalion,  33. 
Mason,  Rev.  R.,  191. 
Mason  and  Dixon  line,  150. 
Mason  and  Slidell,  202. 
Massachusetts,  133,  142. 
Massachusetts    troops,    Cavalry,    Fourth, 

129,   133;   Infantry,   Second,  30,   35,  36; 

Sixth  at  Baltimore  in  1861,  169;  Thirty- 
third,  71;  Thirty-ninth,  63. 
Massena,  Marshal,  431,  432. 
Matamoras,  454. 
Mauritius,  367. 
Mayo,  Joseph,  Mayor  of  Richmond,  130, 

132. 

Mayo's  Bridge,  135. 
McAllister,  Col.  Robert,  24. 
McAllister's  Mill,  24. 
McArthur,  Gen.  Arthur,  235,  241,  248. 
McCabe,  Rev.  Dr.,  Government  Chaplain, 

191. 
McClellan,  Gen.  George  B.,  at  Antietam,  1, 

2,  3,  7,  8,  9,  13-18;  nomination  of,  213, 

215,  216. 

McDougal,  Surgeon  Charles  M.,  152,  153. 
McDougall,  Col.  Archibald  L.,  23,  24,  34. 
McGilvery,  Major  Freeman,  27. 
McGowan,  Brig.-Gen.  Samuel,  218. 
McKinley,    William,   281;   Administration, 

151. 


INDEX 


469 


McLain,  Lieut.,  248. 

McLaws,  Gen.  Lafayette,  1,  3. 

McRae,  Brig.-Gen.  William,  218. 

Meade,  Col.,  312. 

Meade,  Gen.  George  G.,  at  Antietam,  10; 
at  Gettysburg,  21,  22,  25,  26,  28,  38-41; 
in  the  Mine  Run  Campaign,  46,  47,  49, 
50,  52,  53,  57-61,  64;  at  Richmond,  122; 
how  he  regarded  President  Davis'  message 
to  the  Confederate  Congress,  219;  letter, 
dated  April  3,  232. 

Merrimac,  449. 

Merritt,  Maj.-Gen.  Wesley,  Military  Gov 
ernor  of  the  Philippines,  235-237;  meets 
the  Belgian  Consul,  238;  proposes  to  Ad 
miral  Dewey  a  joint  letter  to  the  Span 
iards,  241;  correspondence,  242-247;  on 
the  Zafiro,  248;  his  agreement  with  Don 
Firmin  Jaudenes,  251,  252;  gives  Agui- 
naldo  assurance  of  his  friendship,  253;  re 
lieved  from  command,  257. 

Metcalfe,  Col.  C.,  KB.,  389. 

Mexican  currency,  253. 

Mexican  troops,  416. 

Mexican  War,  415,  417. 

Mexico,  181,  326,  416,  417. 

Michigan,  U.S.S.,  450. 

Middle  Hill,  397. 

Midwood,  driver,  390. 

Miles,  Col.  Nelson  A.,  50. 

Militar-Gewehr  (German),  model  of  1876, 
299. 

Military  Commission,  171. 

Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi,  68. 

Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachu 
setts,  64,  85,  162,  407. 

Military  Memoirs  of  a  Confederate,  232. 

Military  Order  of  the  Loyal  Legion,  Massa 
chusetts  Commandery,  162,  182,  204. 

Military  prisons,  North  and  South,  149. 

NORTH,  Alton,  111.,  154;  Belle  Plain,  Va., 
154;  Camp  Alger,  154;  Camp  Butler, 
Springfield,  111.,  154;  Camp  Chase,  153; 
Camp  Douglas,  153;  Camp  Morton,  149- 
153;  Elmira,  N.Y.,  151-154;  Fort  Colum 
bus,  N.Y.  Harbor,  154;  Fort  Lafayette, 
N.Y.  Harbor,  154;  Fort  McHenry,  near 
Baltimore,  154;  Fort  Delaware,  near 
Philadelphia,  154;  Fort  Warren,  Boston 
Harbor,  154;  Gratiot  Street,  St.  Louis, 
154;  Johnson's  Island,  Sandusky  Bay, 
Ohio,  153,  155,  156;  Old  Capitol  Prison, 
Washington,  154;  Point  Lookout,  Md., 
151,  153,  155;  Rock  Island,  111.,  154. 

SOUTH,  Andersonville,  149,  154,  158, 
162,  164,]  173,  174,  176,  178;  description 
of,  169-172;  Atkinson  tobacco  factory, 
165;  Belle  Isle,  149,  158,  163,  194,  197; 
description  of,  192-194;  Camp  Asylum 
(see  Camp  Sorghum);  Camp  Douglas, 
199;  Camp  Ford,  Tex.,  158,  163;  Camp 
Groce,  158,  164;  Camp  Lawton,  158; 
Camp  Oglethorpe,  Ga.,  175;  Camp  Pa 
role,  204;  Camp  Sorghum,  149,  158,  171; 
Camp  Sumtcr  (see  Andersonville) ;  Crew's, 


157;  Castle  Morgan,  175;  Castle  Pinck- 
ney,  158;  Castle  Thunder,  141,  157,  158, 
165;  Florence,  149,  158,  178;  Laundry, 
the,  157;  Libby,  141,  149,  150,  153,  157, 
161,  164,  166,  168,  169,  180,  181,  185,  187, 
189,  192;  Liggon's,  157;  Parish,  159; 
Richland  County  Jail,  178;  Roper  Hos 
pital  and  City  Jail,  Charleston,  S.C., 
158,  176;  Salisbury,  N.C.,  149,  150,  158, 
178;  Scott's,  157;  Smith  and  Pemberton's 
buildings,  157;  deaths,  154,  158,  164,  170, 
174,  177,  178,  179,  195. 

Millen,  Ga.,  158,  173. 

Miller,  notorious  desperado,  80,  81. 

Mine  Run  Campaign,  43,  45,  48,  50,  51-55, 
57,  59-64. 

Minister  of  Finance,  242. 

Missionary  Ridge,  67,  71,  110. 

Mississippi  River,  445. 

Mississippi  Valley,  322. 

Missouri,  445. 

Mitchell,  assistant  correspondent  of  the 
Standard,  386. 

Mobile,  Ala.,  213. 

Modder  Spruit,  373,  376,  401;  blowing  up 
of  railroad  station,  402. 

Monitor,  449,  450. 

Monocacy,  U.S.S.,  300,  301,  306. 

Monroe  Doctrine,  334. 

Montcalm,  Gen.,  438.   •- 

Monterey,  239,  241,  242. 

Montgomery,  Ala.,  175,  198. 

Montojo,  Admiral,  242,  249. 

Mooi  River  Station,  366. 

Moore,  Dr.  John  Bassett,  358. 

Morgan  City,  236. 

Morgan,  Lieut.,  439. 

Morris,  Gouverneur,  414. 

Morris  Island,  176,  177. 

Morris,  Widow,  46. 

Morse,  Col.  Charles  F.,  19,  65. 

Morton,  Gov.  Oliver  P.,  149. 

Morton's  Ford,  53,  60. 

Mosby,  Gen.  John  S.,  72. 

Mott,  Dr.  Valentine,  Chairman  of  U.S. 
Sanitary  Commission,  196. 

Mountain  Run,  45,  48. 

Mudge,  Lieut.-Col.  Charles  R.,  30,  31,  35. 

Mulberry,  Tenn.,  77. 

Mulligan,  Col.  James  Albert,  200. 

Murray,  Lieut.  H.  H.,  141  et  seq. 

Namur,  Belgium,  433. 

Napoleon,  325,  346,  350;  geometrical  factor 
in  his  generalship,  425-433;  tactics,  447. 
Napoleon  guns,  53. 

Nashville,  Tenn.,  67,  68,  73,  80,  81,  124. 
Nashville,  U.S.S.,  297. 
Nassau,  454,  455. 

Natal,  South  Africa,  363,  368,  392. 
Natal  Carabiniers,  379,  388,  390. 
Natal  field  force,  383. 
Natal  Mounted  Volunteers,  367. 
Natal  State  Railway,  366. 
Natal  Volunteers,  395. 


470 


INDEX 


Nautilus,  schooner,  444. 

Naval  Academy,  351. 

Naval  Intelligence,  Office  of,  348,  349,  351, 
352. 

Naval  War  College,  341,  343,  345,  348,  350, 
352;  history  of,  354-359;  Board  of  Officers, 
354,  355. 

Navy  Department,  349;  Bureau  of  Person 
nel,  351,  354,  355. 

Negros,  Island  of,  285,  289. 

Nelson,  Rear  Admiral  Sir  Horatio,  425. 

Netherlands,  272. 

Newark,  U.S.  flagship,  298. 

Newcastle,  South  Africa,  369. 

Newcastle  road,  373,  389,  402. 

New  England,  143. 

New  Hampshire,  133. 

New  Hampshire  troops,  Fifth,  2,  11;  Tenth, 
90,  93;  Thirteenth,  94,  106-108,  113,  141. 

New  Hope  Church,  48. 

New  Ironsides,  U.S.S.,  453. 

New  Jersey,  168,  215. 

New  Jersey  troops,  Ninth,  103;  Thirteenth, 
30,  31. 

New  London,  442. 

New  Market  road,  90,  122,  129,  130,  132, 
133. 

New  Orleans,  325;  Battle  of,  443. 

Newport,  353,  355. 

Newport,  236,  237,  239,  243,  247. 

Newton,  Maj.-Gen.  John,  61. 

New  York,  355,  442. 

New  York  City,  Five  Points  District,  191, 
455. 

New  York  illustrated  paper,  139. 

New  York  riots,  57,  59. 

New  York  Times,  161. 

New  York  troops,  Sixtieth,  34;  Ninety- 
second,  106;  Ninety-sixth,  93;  One  Hun 
dred  and  Eighteenth,  90,  93,  106. 

Ney,  Marshal  Michel,  430. 

Niagara,  U.S.S.,  448,  450. 

Nicholls,  Brig. -Gen.  F.  T.,  28,  29. 

Nicholson's  Nek,  376,  378. 

Nicolay,  John  G.,  121,  212-215. 

Nicolay  and  Hay,  163,  212-215. 

Ninth  Army  Corps,  at  Antietam,  8,  9,  14, 
17,  18. 

North  America,  246. 

North  American  troops,  282. 

North  Anna,  447. 

North  Atlantic  Squadron,  355. 

North  Carolina,  37,  157,  180,  223,  224,  225, 
227,  228. 

Northcott,  Gen.  R.  S.,  161. 

Northrop,  Lucius  Ballinger,  197. 

North  Sea,  122,  456. 

Norton,  Prof.  Charles  Eliot,  216. 

Nozaleda,  P.,  Archbishop  of  Manila,  242, 247. 

Observation  Hill,  389,  390,  398;  Boera  at 
tack,  383. 
Ohio,  214. 
Ohio,  236. 
Ohio  troops,  Seventh,  34. 


Olaquer,  Col.  Don  Jos6  M.,  248. 

Old  Dominion,  144. 

Olympia,  238,  242,  248. 

Onderbrook,  368. 

Onderbrook  Pass,  369. 

O'Neal,  Col.  E.  A.,  32. 

Orange  Court  House,  60. 

Orange  Plank  Road,  46,  47,  48-52,  54. 

Orange  Turnpike,  46,  47,  49,  54. 

Orcutt,  Newell  E.,  murdered  at  Elk  River, 
78. 

Ord,  Gen.  Edward  O.  C.,  at  Petersburg  and 
Ft.  Harrison,  88,  90-92,  94,  95,  98;  at 
Richmond,  122, 123;  interview  with  Long- 
street,  226. 

Ordnance  Parks,  385. 

Oregon  Regiment,  250. 

Oregon  troops,  Second,  241. 

Osborne  pike,  130. 

Otis,  Lieut.-Col.  Elwell  Stephen,  151. 

Otis,  Maj.-Gen.  E.  S.,  261. 

Ould,  Col.  Robert,  Confederate  Commis 
sioner  of  Exchange,  161,  163,  195,  204. 

Pacific  Coast,  322. 

Pacific  Mail  Company,  agent  of,  236. 

Page,  James  Madison,  162. 

Palfrey,  Gen.  John  C.,  355. 

Palmer,  Gen.  John  M.,  69. 

Palmer,  Col.  W.  H.,  216,  217,  225. 

Panay,  Island  of,  285,  289. 

Paranaque,  Manila  Province,  238. 

Paris,  Declaration  of,  453;  Peace  Commit- 
sion  at,  257,  260. 

Parke,  Gen.  John  G.,  229. 

Parker,  Lieut.  David,  182. 

Parker's  Store,  46. 

Pasha  Osman,  tactics  used  by,  448. 

Pasig  River,  250,  256,  286,  291. 

Peabody,  Mr.  Frank,  85. 

Pearl  River,  174. 

Pe-chi-li,  Gulf  of,  297. 

Pegram,  Gen.  John,  in  the  Mine  Run  Cam 
paign,  48. 

Pei-ho  River,  298,  300,  304,  306. 

Peirson,  Col.  and  Bvt.  Brig.-Gen.  Charles  L., 
in  the  Mine  Run  Campaign,  45, 48, 50,  55. 

Pekin,  298,  301,  305,  308,  314. 

Pemberton,  Gen.  John  C.,  195. 

Pena,  Gen.  Nicholas  de  la,  252. 

Peninsular  Campaign,  16. 

Peninsular  War,  443. 

Pennsylvania,  8,  58,  214. 

Pennsylvania,  450. 

Pennypacker,  Capt.  E.  J.,  162. 

Pensacola,  Fla.,  157. 

Pepworth's  Farm,  373. 

Pepworth's  Hill,  373,  374,  377,  378,  402. 

Perreau,  Lieut.  A.  M.,  371. 

Petapsco,  monitor,  450. 

Peterkin,  Rev.  J.,  190,  191. 

Petersburg,  Va.,  83,  85-89,  92,  97,  101,  108, 
109,  111,  114,  122,  125,  126,  213,  216,  217, 
221,  224,  225,  228,  231,  446,  447. 

Philadelphia,  151,  190. 


INDEX 


471 


Philippines,  151,  235,  251,  255,  260,  269, 271, 
272,  275,  276,  278,  280,  281,  283,  293,  310, 
314;  High  Commissioner  of  the  Republic 
of,  280. 

Philippine  Government,  258;  Republic,  273, 
274,  276,  278. 

Pickett,  Gen.  George  E.,  at  Gettysburg,  37, 
41;  at  Petersburg  and  Ft.  Harrison,  101; 
men  in  guard-house,  218;  desertions  from 
bis  division,  231. 

Pickwood,  Lieut.-Col.,  402. 

Pietermaritzburg,  368. 

Pieter's  Hill,  401;  camp,  402. 

Plains  of  Abraham,  438. 

Plaisted,  Col.  Harris  M.,  100,  101. 

Plank  road,  46,  47. 

Plaza,  250. 

Pleasant  Valley,  1,  3,  12. 

Pleasonton,  Gen.  Alfred,  8. 

Point  Engano,  Luzon,  237. 

Point  Lookout,  Md.,  151,  153. 

Pollard,  gunner,  394. 

Pollard,  Edward  A.,  195. 

Pomeroy,  Samuel  C.,  U.S.  Senator,  209, 210. 

Poort  Road,  385,  390,  391. 

Pope,  Gen.  John,  7,  16. 

Porter,  Admiral  David,  139,  140. 

Porter,  Gen.  Fitz  John,  8. 

Porter,  Lieut.  Samuel  D.,  76,  77. 

Port  Walthall  Junction,  101,  102. 

Potgieter's  Drift,  398. 

Potomac  River,  7,  14,  15,  57,  144,  154. 

Potter,  Lieut.  Henry  C.,  162. 

Poundburg  Hill,  398. 

Powhatan,  estate  of  Mayor  of  Richmond, 
131. 

President,  frigate,  443. 

Preston,  Gen.,  head  of  Bureau  of  Conscrip 
tion,  227. 

Prince  of  Wales,  383. 

Prince's  Dock,  Bombay,  365. 

Prisons,  list  of  books  and  authors,  159-161. 

Provincials,  438,  439. 

Prussians,  432. 

Puget  Sound,  322. 

Putnam,  Major  George  Haven,  172,  181. 

Race  Course,  a  Chinese  stronghold,  308. 

Rajputana-Malwa  Railway,  India,  363. 

Raleigh,  N.C.,  159,  162,  179,  223. 

Raleigh,  242,  248. 

Ramsden,  H.  A.,  British  Vice-Consul  in 
charge  of  U.S.  consular  interests,  242,  244. 

Randolph,  George  W.,  Confederate  Secre 
tary  of  War,  196. 

Range  Post,  378,  379,  384,  392,  393,  399. 

Range  Post  Ridge,  380. 

Ransom,  Gen.  Robert,  Jr.,  103,  104. 

Rapidan  River,  45,  46,  48,  53,  58-60,  62,  63. 

Rappahannock  River,  45,  58,  62,  63. 

Ration  Post,  383,  384,  386,  387. 

Ratisbon,  Germany,  431. 

Rawlinson,  Lieut.-Col.  Sir  H.,  391. 

Raymond,  Henry  J.,  editor  of  New  York 
Times,  212. 


Read,  Hon.  John,  164. 

Redesdale,  Lord,  Memoirs,  200. 

Regular  Army,  438,  439. 

Reid,  Lieut.  James  R.,  152. 

Reminiscences  of  the  Civil  War,  230. 

Review  of  Reviews  Photographic  History  of 
the  Civil  War,  153,  199,  202,  205. 

Revolutionary  War,  325,  417;  on  land,  438; 
on  sea,  441 ;  submarine  and  torpedo,  442. 

Reyes,  Col.  Carlos,  252. 

Reynolds,  Col.  John  Fulton,  181. 

Rhine,  river,  431,  433. 

Rhodes'  History  of  the  United  States,  223. 

Rhodes,  "Col.  Frank,  398. 

Richardson,  Maj.-Gen.  Israel  B.,  10, 11,  12. 

Richmond,  Va.,  7,  45,  89,  96,  98,  101-103, 
167,  182,  189-191,  213,  216,  221,  446; 
capture  and  occupation  of,  121, 122,  126- 
134,  136,  138,  140,  141,  143;  prisons  in, 
157,  161,  163-165,  169,  178,  180,  192,  194, 
195,  197,  198;  concerning  desertions,  217, 
224,  225. 

Richmond  Examiner,  156,  169;  January  21, 
1864,  162,  173,  194  et  seq. 

Richmond,  ironclad,  128. 

Richmond  and  Petersburg  R.R.,  99  et  seq. 

Richmond  turnpike,  102. 

Rifle  Post,  400. 

Rifleman's  Ridge,  379,  380,  384,  388,  397. 

Rio  Grande,  Luzon,  255. 

Ripley,  Gen.  Edward  H.,  132,  133,  136. 

Rizzo,  Gen.,  Governor  of  Ayuntamiento, 
250. 

Roach,  Lieut.  A.  C.,  194. 

Roanoke,  449,  450. 

Roanoke  River,  225. 

Roberts,  Col.  Samuel  H.,  90,  94. 

Robertson's  Ford,  46. 

Robertson's  Tavern  (Locust  Grove),  46-18, 
50-52,  62. 

Rochambeau,  353. 

Rock  Creek,  22-24,  26,  31,  32,  34,  36. 

Rock  Creek  Valley,  23. 

Rocketts,  130,  132,  134,  164. 

Rock  Island,  111.,  154. 

Rodes,  Gen.  Robert  E.,  32,  48. 

Rodney,  Admiral  Sir  George  Brydges,  353. 

Root,  Mr.  Elihu,  408. 

Ropes,  John  C.,  2,  3,  14,  355. 

Rose,  Col.  T.  E.,  181. 

Rosecrans,  Maj.-Gen.  William  S.,  at  Chat 
tanooga,  67,  68,  71. 

Ross,  Erastus  W.,  182. 

Rossia,  Russian  man-of-war,  297. 

Round  Tops,  25. 

Royal  Army,  438,  440;  troops,  439. 

Royal  Artillery,  380,  381,  388,  397,  398,  402; 
camp,  385,  386,  397;  Officers'  camp,  393; 
Medical  Corps,  366. 

Royal  Engineers,  389,  391,  397. 

Royal  troops  in  Boston,  439. 

Royston,  Col.,  commandant  of  Natal  Vol 
unteers,  393,  395. 

Ruger,  Brig.-Gen.  Thomas  H.,  23,  24,  27, 
30,  31,  34. 


472 


INDEX 


Russell,  Earl,  456. 

Russia,  343. 

Russian  Army,  350;  troops,  316. 

Russo-Japanese  War,  422,  448. 

Russo-Turkish  War,  448. 

Ruyter's  telegrams  to  Hong  Kong,  241. 

Sacket,  Col.  Delos  B.,  16. 

Saigon,  China,  275. 

Saint  Helena,  425. 

Sampson,  Commander  Wm.  T.,  U.S.N.,  354. 

San  Antonio,  Texas,  322. 

Sanders,  Col.  C.  C.,  218. 

San  Francisco,  Cal.,  235,  237,  322. 

San  Isidro,  P.I.,  289. 

Santiago,  Cuba,  237. 

Saratoga,  438. 

Saunders,  Corporal,  376,  390. 

Savannah,  Ga.,  124,  158,  162,  173,  221. 

Scales,  Brig.-Gen.  Alfred  M.,  218. 

Scheldt,  river,  433. 

Schofield,  Gen.  John  M.,  223. 

Scott,  Dred,  417. 

Scott,  Gen.  Winfield,  131. 

Scoville,  Capt.,  156. 

Seagrove,  Capt.  George  Henry,  191. 

Second  Army  Corps,  at  Antietam,  1,  2,  8,  9, 

11,  12,  16,  17,  18;  at  Gettysburg,  25;  in 

the  Mine  Run  Campaign,  46-48,  61;  at 

Petersburg,  107. 
Seddon,  James  A.,  Confederate  Secretary  of 

War,  168,  197,  223,  230. 
Sedgwick,  Maj.-Gen.  John,  at  Antietam,  10, 

11,  12,  18;  in  the  Mine  Run  Campaign, 

49,  57,  61. 

Selden,  Lieut.  George  L.,  U.S.N.,  156. 
Seminary  Ridge,  110. 
Semple,  Dr.,  184,  191. 
Serrurier,  Gen.,  428,  429. 
Seward,  William  H.,  212,  213. 
Sewell,  U.S.  Minister,  236. 
Seymour,  Vice-Admiral,  Royal  Navy,  298, 

305,  307. 

Shaler,  Brig.-Gen.  Alexander,  33,  40. 
Shanghai,  298. 
Shanks,  W.  F.  G.,  159. 
Sharpsburg,  9,  14,  15. 
Shenandoah  Valley,  213. 
Shepley,  Gen.  George  F.,  136. 
Sheridan,  Gen.  Philip,  88,  110,  114;  at  Five 

Forks,  125;  first  victories  over  Early,  213. 
Sherman,  Gen.  William  T.,  71,  72,  81,  114, 

124,  177,  213,  221;  his  tactics,  446,  448. 
Sherman  Act,  411. 
Shiloh,  199. 

Short,  notorious  desperado,  80. 
Shreveport,  La.,  159,  163. 
Sickles,  Gen.  Daniel  E.,  25. 
Sign  Post  Ridge,  379. 
Sikh  regiment,  officer  of,  315  et  seq. 
Si-ku  Arsenal,  305. 
Simla,  telegram  from,  364. 
Singapore,  275,  280;   conference,  276;   Con- 

sul-General,  275. 
Singapore  Free  Press,  of  May  4,  278. 


Siren,  brig,  443. 

Sixth  Army  Corps,  at  Antietam,  8,  9,  12,  18; 
at  Gettysburg,  22,  25,  33,  38,  41;  in  the 
Mine  Run  Campaign,  46,  48,  49,  50,  61; 
at  Washington,  88. 

Skobeloff,  tactics  used  by,  448. 

Slayter,  Capt.,  Royal  Artillery,  Medical 
Corps,  392. 

Sloan,  Capt.  Benjamin  P.,  183. 

Sloan,  Surgeon  E.  F.,  153. 

Slocum,  Maj.-Gen.  Henry  W.,  at  Antietam, 
13;  at  Gettysburg,  22,  26,  38,  40;  at  Chat 
tanooga,  68,  73,  74  et  seq. ;  guerrilla  opera 
tions  in  Tennessee,  77-80. 

Smith,  Gen.  Kirby,  204. 

Smith,  Gen.  William,  32,  183. 

Smith,  Gen.  William  F.,  at  Chattanooga, 
69-71;  at  Petersburg  and  Ft.  Harrison, 
85-88,  98-102, 104, 105, 107-109,  111,  112, 
114  et  seq. 

Smith,  Governor,  of  Va.,  138,  139. 

Smith,  Bell  &  Co.,  owners  of  rice  mills,  255. 

Snow,  Lieut.,  34. 

Soley,  Prof.  J.  R.,  U.S.N.,  355,  454,  455. 

Sorrel,  Brig.-Gen.  G.  Moxley,  218. 

Soult,  Marshal,  430. 

South  Africa,  363,  364;  two  Republics  de 
clare  war  on  England,  367;  British  non- 
successes,  379. 

South  African  War,  422. 

South  America,  344. 

South  Arsenal,  310. 

South  Carolina,  99,  223,  227. 

South  Carolina  troops,  7th  Battalion,  104. 

South  Mountain,  1,  9. 

South  Mountain  Pass,  8. 

Southern  Historical  Society  Papers,  229,  451. 

Spain,  235,  238,  245,  249,  252,  253,  271-275; 
rebellious  subjects  of,  280;  termination 
of  the  sovereignty  of,  in  Cuba,  419,  420. 

Spangle's  Springs,  30. 

Spanish  Army  at  Santiago,237 ;  Government, 
255,  274  et  seq.;  Treasury,  252;  war-ships, 
236. 

Special  Order  No.  271,  Dec.  14,  1863,  452. 

Spion  Kop,  398. 

Spotswood  Hotel,  182. 

Spottsylvania,  54,  61,  110,  154,  447. 

Stafford  Hills,  110. 

Stafford,  Brig.-Gen.  Leroy  A.,  47. 

Stanhope,  Capt.  Philip  W.,  152.     ' 

Stanley,  Henry  M.,  199  et  seq.,  200. 

Stannard,  Brig.-Gen.  George  J.,  89-93,  95. 

Stanton,  Edward  M.,  95,  218,  220,  226. 

Star  Hill,  383. 

Steevens,  G.  W.,  386,  398. 

Steuart,  Brig.-Gen.  George  H.,  28. 

Stevens,  Col.  Aaron  F.,  90,  94,  106. 

Stevens,  Hon.  Alexander  H.,  141,  214. 

Stevens,  Maj.  Atherton  H.,  129,  133. 

Stevenson,  Tenn.,  68. 

Stobart,  Lieut.,  396. 

Stoessel,  Maj.-Gen.  (Russian  Commander- 
in-Chief),  account  of  the  engagement  in 
taking  the  East  Arsenal,  garrisoned  by 


INDEX 


473 


7000  Chinese  troops,  307,  308;  his  procla 
mation,  313. 

Stoneman,  Gen.  George,  172. 

Stone  River,  73. 

"Stonewall"  brigade,  at  Gettysburg,  33. 

Stoodley,  Capt.  Nathan  D.,  113,  114. 

Story,  Justice,  413. 

Strassburg,  430. 

Strassburg-Lech,  431. 

Streight,  Col.  A.  D.,  180. 

Stuart,  Gen.  J.  E.  B.,  8,  13. 

Sturtevant,  Capt.,  114. 

Suez  Canal,  237,  245. 

Sumner,  Charles,  142,  211,  212. 

Sumner,  Gen.  E.  V.,  at  Antietam,  2,  8,  10, 
11,  13,  15-18. 

Sumner,  Gen.  Samuel  S.,  5. 

Sumter,  453. 

Surprise  Hill,  383,  389. 

Swift  Creek,  86,  101,  102. 

Swinton,  William,  2. 

Swiss  system,  337  et  seq. 

Sykes,  Maj.-Gen.  George,  62. 

Symons,  Sir  Penn,  366. 

Taft,  Governor  William  H.,  260;  address 
before  the  Society  of  the  Cincinnati, 
November  7,  1911,  408,  409. 

Taipings,  200. 

Taku  Bar,  297, 298;  Fort,  300, 305;  gate,  310. 

Tappan,  Lieut.,  248. 

Tarleton,  Lieut.-Col.,  afterwards  Gen.  Sir 
Banastre,  439. 

Tatham,  Capt.  (Natal  Carabiniers) ,  393. 

Tavera,  Seiior  Trinidad  H.  Pardo  de,  259. 

Taylor,  Admiral,  quotation  from  his  Memo 
randum  on  a  General  Staff  for  the  Navy, 
349,  350. 

Taylor,  Col.  Walter  H.,  227,  229,  231. 

Taylor,  Commander  H.  C.,  355. 

Taylor,  Gen.  Richard,  172. 

Tayobas,  Province  of,  292. 

Tecumseh,  monitor,  450. 

Telegraph  Hill,  380,  384,  397. 

Tennessee,  53,  65,  67,  68,  72;  guerrilla  oper 
ations,  73-81 ;  Unionists  of,  445. 

Tennessee  River,  67,  69. 

Tenth  Army  Corps,  90,  98-103,  123. 

Terrible  (British),  310. 

Terry,  Gen.  Alfred  H.,  48,  106,  123. 

Teutonic  Allies,  456. 

Texas,  163,  164. 

Thann,  Germany,  432. 

Thiers,  Louis  A.,  425. 

Third  Army  Corps,  23,  25,  30,  46-48,  218. 

Thomas,  Gen.  George  H.,  68-72,  76,  77,  79- 
81,  114. 

Thompson,  Prof.  Holland,  182,  203. 

Thornhill's  Kopje,  383,  384,  386. 

Thwaites,  Capt.,  376,  390,  396,  400. 

Tien  Tsin,  China,  298,  301,  304-308,  312, 
314,  316. 

Tilson,  Mr.,  his  bill  introduced  in  Congress, 
324. 

Tin  Camp,  366,  383,  384. 


Todd,  Lieut.,  brother  of  Mrs.  Lincoln,  165. 

Tong-ku,  China,  300,  301. 

Torgau-Leipzig,  430. 

Tracy,  Col.  Benjamin  F.,  152. 

Trafalgar,  425. 

Transvaal  armies,  372. 

Tree  Forts,  310. 

Trias,  Lieut.-Gen.,  290,  291. 

Tripolitan  War,  444. 

Tullahoma,  Fla.,  73,  74,  78,  80. 

Turner,  Dick,  141,  168,  181,  182,  192. 

Turner,  Lieut.,  389. 

Turner,  Gen.  John  W.,  102. 

TurnerrMaj.  Thomas  P.,  181,  182,  185,  191. 

Tuscaloosa,  Ala.,  158.          J 

Twelfth  Army  Corps,  at  Antietam,  3,  8-10, 

13,  17,  18;  at  Gettysburg,  19,  21-28,  32, 

37-40;  at  the  relief  of  Chattanooga,  67- 

68,  70-71,  73,  78. 
Twenty-fourth  Army  Corps,  at  the  capture 

and  occupation  of  Richmond,  123,  125. 
Twenty-fifth  Army  Corps,  at  the  capture  and 

occupation  of  Richmond,  123-125,  128- 

129,  132. 

Twiggs,  treachery  of,  163. 
Two  Taverns,  22,  26,  29,  40. 

U-boat,  efficiency  of,  453. 

Underwood,  Col.,  71. 

Union  Army,  7,  8,  14,  15,  28,  41,  45,  46,  53, 
58,  72,  139,  174. 

Union  losses,  at  Antietam  and  Harper's 
Ferry,  14;  at  Gettysburg,  34,  36;  in  the 
Mine  Run  Campaign,  53;  at  Fort  Har 
rison,  94;  at  Petersburg,  100,  101. 

United    States,  military  policy  of,  321-340. 

United  States,  frigate,  443. 

United  States  Army,  at  Manila,  242,  243. 

United  States  Congress,  appropriation  ap 
proved  March  3,  1885,  355;  bill  intro 
duced  for  the  establishment  of  a  reserve, 
323,  324;  Fortieth,  159,  176;  Joint  Reso 
lution  of,  April  20,  1898,  419;  House  of 
Representatives,  175. 

United  States  forces  in  China,  309. 

United  States  Government,  174,  252,  283. 

United  States  Marine  Hospital,  173. 

United  States  Navy,  440,  441;  list  of  ships 
in  commission  at  the  outbreak  of  the  War 
of  1812,  443,  444;  blockade  by,  454,  455. 

United  States  Sanitary  Commission,  192, 
197-199,  204. 

United  States  Supreme  Court,  411,  418. 

United  States  troops,  Ninth  Infantry,  in 
China,  310-312;  Twelfth  Infantry,  at  El- 
mira,  N.Y.,  151. 

United  States  War  Department,  40,  68, 143, 
155,  163,  196,  323,  324. 

Valencia,  236. 

Valley  Campaign,  213. 

Valley  Forge,  439. 

Van  Lew,  Miss  Elizabeth  L.,  157,  182. 

Van  Reenen's  Pass,  367. 

Vanvalzah,  Lieut.  D.  D.,  162. 


474 


INDEX 


Varina  Landing,  90,  92. 

Varina  Road,  92. 

Vermont,  133,  214. 

Vevers,  Battery  Sergt.-Major,  376. 

Vicksburg,  162,  195. 

Vicksburg  Campaign,  68,  174. 

Vienna,  429,  431. 

Vigan,  Province  of  Ilocos  Sur,  P. I.,  256. 

Virginia,  67,  72,  73,  92,  122,  125,  138,  143, 

144, 154, 181,228,438,439;Departmentof, 

123 ;  Senate  and  House  of  Delegates  of,  228. 
Virginia,  ironclad,  449. 
Virginia  Campaign,  1864,  45. 
Virginia  troops,  Second  Regiment,  32;  Tenth 

Battalion,  126;  Twenty-third  Regiment, 

31;  Stonewall  brigade,  32-34. 
Viscayan  soldiers,  277. 
Vixen,  schooner,  444. 
Von  Clausewitz,  425. 
Von  Hannicken,  Major,  306. 
Von  Moltke,  Gen.,  347. 

Wade,  Benjamin  F.,  211. 

Wadsworth,  Brig.-Gen.  James  S.,  22,  23,  25, 

28,  33,  57. 

Wagner,  Col.  Arthur  L.,  445,  447. 
Wagon  Hill,  387,  395-398. 
Wai-hei-wai  regiment,  composed  of  Chinese 

enlisted   in   the   English    possessions   of 

China,  315. 

Wales,  Capt.  (Natal  Volunteers),  393. 
Walker,  Capt.  A.  L.,  367,  380;  road,  381. 
Walker,  Col.  Francis  A.,  183. 
Walker,  Gen.  James  A.,  29,  33,  89,  228. 
Walker,  Gen.,  202. 
Wallace,  Lewis,  149. 
Walled  City,  China,  304,  305,  308,  310,  314; 

South  Gate,  310,  312,  313,  316. 
Waller,  Maj.,  298,  301,  302. 
Walnut  Run,  45,  48. 
Walsh,  Capt.  John  A.,  C.S.A.,  156. 
War  of  1812,  412,  437,  442^44. 
War  Academy,  347. 
War  College,  345,  348,  349,  351,  353. 
War  Records,  121. 

Ward,  Col.  and  Asst.  Adjt.-Gen.,  392. 
Ward,  Gen.  Henry  Clay,  182. 
Warden,  Robert  B.,  210. 
Warren,  Maj. -Gen.  Gouverneur  K.,  46-53, 

60-64. 

Warsaw  Sound,  449. 
Washburn,  Hon.  E.  B.,  214. 
Washington,  D.C.,  7,  14,  41,  57,  58,  81,  88, 

89,  121,  154,  157,  213,  215,  235,  252,  259, 
.     277,  278,  325,  355,  408,  412. 
Washington,  Gen.  George,  61,  353,  437,  439. 
Wasp,  sloop,  443. 
Waterloo,  433. 
Wauhatchie  Station,  70,  71. 
Weed,  Thurlow,  212,  213. 
Weehawken,  monitor,  449. 
Weisiger,  Brig.-Gen.  David  A.,  218. 
Weitzel,  Gen.  Godfrey,  103,  105,  125,  126, 

129,  132,  136,  139,  140. 


Weld,  Gen.  Stephen  M.,  2,  3. 

Weldon  Railroad,  183. 

Welles,  Gideon,  Secretary  of  Navy,  209. 

Wellford's  Ford,  45. 

Wenrick,  Capt.  J.  C.,  162. 

Wessells,  Brig.-Gen.  H.  W.,  152. 

West  Arsenal,  308,  310,  313. 

Western  Army,  71. 

West  Point,  N.Y.,  181,  426. 

West  Virginia,  445. 

Wheaton,  Brig.-Gen.  Frank,  38-40. 

Wheeler,  Gen.  Joseph,  68,  73. 

Wheeler,  Maj.  D.  D.,  132. 

Whipple,  William  D.,  79. 

Whistle,  torpedo  boat,  297. 

White  House,  216. 

White,  Maj.  John  Chester,  147,  184,  191. 

White,  Sir  George,  372-374,  389,  391,  402. 

Whitefield,  Surgeon  R.  M.,  175. 

Whiteside,  Tenn.,  69. 

Whittier,  Brig.-Gen.  Charles  A.,  at  Manila, 
233,  252;  breakfast  at  Malolos,  256,  257; 
letter  from  Aguinaldo,  259. 

Widdis,  Lieut.  C.  E.,  162. 

Wilcox,  Maj  .-Gen.  Cadmus  M.,  218,  223. 

Wilde,  Gen.  Edward  A.,  130. 

Wilderness,  45,  46,  53,  54,  154,  447. 

Wilford,  Col.,  372. 

Willcox,  Gen.  O.  B.,  149. 

Williams,  Brig.-Gen.  A.  S.,  at  Gettysburg, 
22,  26,  27,  38-40. 

Williams,  Mr.,  late  Consul  at  Manila,  259. 

Wilmington,  124. 

Winchester,  Va.,  200,  213. 

Winder,  Gen.  John  B.,  163,  165-167,  169, 
170,  172,  182,  196. 

Wing,  Major,  390. 

Wirz,  Henry,  165,  169,  171,  172,  181. 

Wisconsin  troops,  Third  Infantry  at  Gettys 
burg,  31;  at  Fayetteville,  80. 

With  Sabre  and  Scalpel,  150. 

Woerth,  447. 

Wolfe,  Gen.,  438. 

Wolf  Hill,  24. 

Womack,  Joseph  M.,  153. 

Wood,  Maj  .-Gen.  Leonard,  319. 

Wood,  Mr.  Robert,  255. 

Wood,  Gen.  Thomas  J.,  110. 

Woodruff,  Maj.  Carle  A.,  201. 

Worden,  Lieut.  John  L.,  U.S.N.,  156. 

Wright,  Augustus  R.,  Chairman  of  a  Com 
mittee  of  the  Confederate  House  of  Rep 
resentatives,  196  et  seq. 

Wright,  Gen.  Horatio  G.,  117. 

Wyeth,  Dr.  John,  149,  150,  155. 

Yaku,  China,  301. 
Yokohama,  Japan,  300. 
York,  Pa.,  8. 

Yorktown,  Va.,  353,  438,  439. 
Yule,  Gen.,  372. 

Zafiro,  248,  250. 
Zoar  Church,  47,  48. 


CAMBRIDGE  .  MASSACHUSETTS 
U    .    S    .   A 


RETURN     CIRCULATION  DEPARTMENT 

202  Main  Library 


t\Jm      ^        *.v-  • 

LOAN  PERIOD  1 
HOME  USE 

2 

3 

4      p-'TV.'ALS  A\'^  RECI  :-'  ' 
L<-;AN  PERIODS  ARE  1-M< 

CTS  WAY  CZ  MADE  4  DAYS  P 
»NTH.  3-MONTHS,  AND  1-YEA 

i^R  TO  DUE  DATE. 

ALL  BOOKS  MAY  BE  RECALLED  AFTER  7  DAYS 

1 -month  loans  may  be  renewed  by  calling  64,- 

6-month  loans  may  be  recharged  by  brmg.ng  books  to  Circulation  Desk 

Renewals  and  recharges  may  be  made  4  days  pr.or  to  due  date 

Hi  IF  AS  STAMPED  BELOW 


//r-/ 


- — - 


B_B 


JUL21P86 


ORCUIAHON 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA,  BERKELEY 
FORM  NO.  DD6,  60m,  12/80        BERKELEY,  CA  94720  @$ 


GENERAL  LIBRARY  -  U.C.  BERKELEY 


402094 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


